


SECOND EDITION

PLANNING AND URBAN CHANGE

STEPHEN V. WARD



PLANNING AND URBAN CHANGE

Second Edition

Stephen V. Ward



SAGE Publications
London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi

© Stephen V. Ward 2004

First published 2004

Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, only with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction, in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers.



SAGE Publications Ltd
6 Bonhill Street
London EC2A 4PU

SAGE Publications Inc.
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320

SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
B-42, Panchsheel Enclave
Post Box 4109
New Delhi 100 017

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0 7619 4317 X
ISBN 0 7619 4318 8

Library of Congress Control Number available

Typeset by M Rules
Printed and bound in Great Britain by The Athenaeum Press, Gateshead

To the memory of my mother and father

The Author

Stephen V. Ward is Professor of Planning History at Oxford Brookes University and edits the international planning history journal *Planning Perspectives*. He has lectured and published widely on historical subjects related to planning. His other books include *The Geography of Interwar Britain: The State and Uneven Development* (1988), *The Garden City: Past, Present and Future* (edited, 1992), *Selling Places: The Marketing and Promotion of Towns and Cities 1850–2000* (1998) and *Planning the Twentieth-Century City: The Advanced Capitalist World* (2002). From 1996 to 2002 he was President of the International Planning History Society.

Contents

Preface	ix
Picture Credits	x
1. Planning and Urban Change	1
The central themes of the book	2
The structure of the book	7
2. Ideas and the Beginnings of Policy, 1890–1914	9
The nineteenth-century city	9
The origins of town planning ideas	17
The beginnings of statutory town planning	27
Overview	34
3. Widening Conceptions and Policy Shifts, 1914–39	36
Town extension planning and mass suburbanization	37
New models for managing urban growth	47
Origins of planned redevelopment	55
Origins of balanced regional development	64
Towards a comprehensive approach	70
4. A New Orthodoxy of Planning, 1939–52	74
War and the emergence of a mass consensus for planning	74
Formulating the post-war planning agenda, 1940–42	79
Partial implementation of the planning agenda, 1943–45	84
Creating the new orthodoxy, 1945–47	92
Completing the new orthodoxy and the first retreats, 1947–52	103
Overview	106
5. Adjustments and New Agendas: I. The Changing Planning System, 1952–74	107
Politics, the ‘affluent society’ and planning	107
The changing physical planning system	112
Overview	129

6. Adjustments and New Agendas: II. Strategic Policies, 1952–74	130
Planning and redevelopment	130
Planned containment	148
Regional balance	154
Planned decentralization	161
Overview	170
7. Remaking Planning: I. The Changing System, 1974–90	171
The making of a new political economy	171
The changing physical planning system	177
Overview	199
8. Remaking Planning: II. Specific Policies, 1974–90	201
Regenerating the urban cores	201
Accepting regional imbalance?	218
Decentralization after the New Towns	221
Planned containment	226
Overview	230
9. A New Consensus? Planning since 1990	231
The post-Thatcher era	232
Changing the planning system	235
Specific planning policies	242
Overview	268
10. Planning Impacts since 1945 and the Future	269
Spatial impacts of planning	269
Economic and social impacts	280
The future	285
Bibliography	288
Websites	307
Index	308

Preface

This book is a product of many years studying planning in Britain and its role in changing cities. It began as a student interest when I was fortunate enough to study under Tony Sutcliffe and the late Gordon Cherry. Gordon played a particularly important role by employing me as his research assistant on the Royal Town Planning Institute History Project in 1971–73. Thereafter it became my main teaching interest at South Bank Polytechnic (to 1979) and Oxford Brookes University. The International Planning History Society and, more recently, my editorship of *Planning Perspectives* have brought me into contact with many others interested in the development of planning. All this forms an essential underpinning for this book which brings together the labours of many scholars, commentators and practitioners. It was a genuine pleasure to write the first edition some ten years ago and I have been delighted that it has proved its worth with students, teachers and researchers. I hope that this second edition will be as useful.

Inevitably many debts are incurred in such a project. First I must record my thanks to my colleagues at Oxford, especially Sue Brownill, Tim Marshall and Martin Elson, who contributed by lending or giving me material, by advising on sources, by giving insights from their own research, practice or teaching and, not least, by their informative conversation. Dennis Hardy and John and Margaret Gold kindly lent me pictures used in their own publications. Rob Woodward has prepared most of the illustrations for this book. The staff at Paul Chapman (for the first edition) and Sage, particularly Marianne Lagrange, Robert Rojek and David Mainwaring, have been helpful, efficient and encouraging.

Yet, as always, the main debts are personal ones. My own much-loved family, Maggie, Tom, Rosamund and Alice, bore a disproportionate part of the burden of the original writing. I thank them again for their tolerance of all the distracted holidays, weekends and evenings. The updating for this second edition has been, I hope, a little better for them. In various combinations, they have shared in the new research through enjoyable short stays in several British cities (or, by their locational decisions in higher education, allowing me to combine fatherly transport duties with field research). My dear wife Maggie has been involved in almost all of these trips, including those to some of the least uplifting of Britain's late twentieth-century creations.

In the longer term I also owe a huge debt to my parents, who did so much to encourage my early interests. My father died while the first edition was being written, my still grieving mother the year after it was published. In a way that few readers can possibly appreciate, the brief words of dedication that authors write at the beginning of works such as this are more emotionally charged than all the many thousands that follow. I understand this from my mother's reaction to the original dedication of the first edition to her and the memory of my father. Now neither of them will see the words with which I dedicate this second edition but again, by this simple means, I remember their love.

Stephen V. Ward,
Oxford

Picture Credits

Bournville Village Trust: 2.2, 3.1.
Consortium Developments Ltd: 6.9.
Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office: 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3,
6.2, 6.3, 6.11, 7.1, 7.2, 7.7, 8.10.
Corby Borough Council: 7.6.
Crown Copyright: 9.1.
First Garden City Heritage Museum, Letchworth: 2.6.
Hulton Deutsch Limited: 6.9.
Laing Development Company: 6.4.
Liverpool City Housing Department: 2.3, 3.7, 3.8.
Merseyside Development Corporation: 8.2.
Newcastle Chronicle and Journal: 6.7.
Osborn Collection, Welwyn Garden City Library: 3.3, 3.4.
Punch Library: 3.5.
Sheffield City Housing Department: 6.5, 6.6, 6.8, 6.10.
Solo Syndications: 4.2, 4.3.
Thamesdown Borough Council: 6.14.
Town and Country Planning Association: 4.8.
Willan Group Limited: 8.3.
7.5, 7.8, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7 and 9.8 were
photographed by the author.

Despite all efforts, the copyright on several illustrations remains uncertain. The author and publishers are grateful to all who gave their permission for the use of copyright material. They apologize if they have inadvertently failed to acknowledge any copyright holder and will be glad to correct any omissions that are drawn to their attention in future reprints or editions.

1

Planning and Urban Change

Town planning, by its nature, is essentially concerned with shaping the future. This does not mean, however, that town planners are able to ignore the past. In an older urbanized country such as Britain they have, fairly obviously, to work with physical structures and urban arrangements inherited from the past. What is less obvious though is that the concerns and ideologies of the town planners themselves are also products of the past. Planners carry with them professional assumptions about the need to regulate and order urban space and about the ways in which they should do this. They also work within a planning system that embodies past political assumptions about the institutional location, purpose and instruments of planning policy. And, not least, they have to live with the consequences of past planning decisions, expressed within the fabric of towns and cities.

All this is by way of arguing that to understand town planning properly, it is essential to understand how it has developed. This is not to say that planners or indeed society should drive into the future with eyes fixed exclusively on the rear-view mirror. Quite obviously this would be a recipe for disaster, although the analogy aptly reminds us that failing to look behind can also produce disaster, however exhilarating it may be in the short term. Nor is it to say what many planners certainly thought in more pessimistic moments during Thatcherite assaults on their activities, that the past was the only thing they had to look forward to. Clearly, it is always important to appreciate that town planning as a tradition of thought, policy and action has a breadth, depth and diversity that may not be immediately apparent in the way it is practised today. But however much we might yearn for the Utopian socialism of the early days or the political backing for the strong and socially concerned planning system created in the 1940s, we must also understand the reasons why they were superseded.

The case for the explicitly historical approach of this book is, then, to enable a rounded understanding of town planning as a continuing tradition of thought, policy and action. Other books share this broad historical approach, among them Ashworth (1954), Cherry (1972, 1974b, 1988, 1996), Hague (1984), Hall (2002a, 2002b), Lawless and Brown (1986), Meller (1997), Ravetz (1980, 1986) and Taylor (1998). All inevitably interpret the story in their own way, stressing different aspects and offering different explanations. The reader should certainly refer to these and the other works referenced in the succeeding chapters of this book to gain a fuller understanding. But the present work itself provides a solid grounding for those training to be town planners or otherwise interested in planning in the early twenty-first century to understand the development of town planning ideas and policies since the late nineteenth century and assess their impacts on urban change. We examine where town planning ideas actually came from, who originated them and why. We also consider how and why governments saw fit to incorporate at least some of the ideas of the town planning movement into state policies, and assess something of their impacts on the processes of actual urban change. Ideas, policies and impacts are in fact the three continuing themes that run through this book. It is therefore important to establish from the outset what we understand these

terms to mean, and briefly rehearse some of the main arguments that we will develop in detail in the following chapters.

THE CENTRAL THEMES OF THE BOOK

Ideas

The genesis of town planning ideas

Before it was anything else, town planning was a series of radical reformist ideas about changing and improving the city which began to take shape from about 1890. The basis of these ideas lay in land reform and, increasingly, housing reform, although with other important dimensions in the enhancement of community and the protection of amenity. The actual term 'town planning' was coined, almost certainly, in 1905, to give these ideas a distinct identity and coherence. They were advanced further mainly by the relatively small number of reformers and professionals who rallied behind the new flag of the town planning movement. A few key organizations, most notably the Garden City and Town Planning Association, the National Housing and Town Planning Council and the Town Planning Institute, played central roles in this.

Early conceptual innovation in planning

As the reformist ideas of this new movement were given physical expression in pioneering ventures such as garden cities and suburbs, it acquired a more specifically physical and professional focus. A new professional, design-based repertoire of ideas was assembled, incorporating wider strategic concepts of city extension or comprehensively decentralized 'social cities' and detailed ideas of zoning, site layout, etc. Within a few decades many important new ideas were developed and incorporated within this intellectual tradition of town planning. A strategic model for planned metropolitan decentralization and containment was moulded out of the more radical notions of the social city. Ideas for urban redevelopment were reinvigorated as the functionalist theories of the modern movement in architecture were extended to entire cities. Before the late 1930s, however, there was usually little immediate prospect of most of these ideas being implemented on a sizeable scale. In fact what was most striking about the process of intellectual innovation over this period was the extent to which it was independent of the rather limited operations of planning policies in practice.

Later conceptual innovation in planning

All this began to change significantly as town planning ideas were comprehensively incorporated into official town planning policies from the 1940s. The essential focus of planning activity now became, as never before, the officially ordered planning system rather than the independent planning movement. Increasingly, and especially after 1960, innovations in planning thought arose more from within the policy process, rather than from the wider town planning movement. The tradition of autonomous intellectual thought and conceptual innovation that had characterized the earlier years now began to atrophy. The wider town planning movement became more concerned with refining and celebrating the contemporary successes of town planning policies (such as the New Towns), rather than with developing new radical models that looked beyond present concerns.

Thus as events and government actions moved very sharply against the established policy conventions of planning in the 1970s and especially the 1980s, the town planning movement found itself without the autonomous intellectual tradition that would have allowed it to develop alternatives in the manner of earlier generations. Certainly new environmentalist ideas emerged during these years, but not from the town planning movement. Despite welcome attempts to incorporate such ideas within town planning thought, there is no doubt that this new environmental radicalism has to some extent outflanked the older established town planning tradition. As we will show, one of the main reasons for this lies within our other central concerns with planning policies and impacts.

Policies

What are planning policies?

Put very simply, town planning ideas become policies at the point at which they are incorporated by government into officially endorsed courses of action. The manner of this incorporation varies, depending on the importance of the original idea. Some policies were so fundamental to town planning that they were written directly into the planning system by central government. For example, elements of land market reform were integral to the whole practice of town planning and became intrinsic policies, embodied in the various compensation and betterment provisions of the Acts. Others, however, represent conscious applications of the planning system to pursue particular ends, for example by encouraging town extension rather than containment, or rehabilitation rather than redevelopment, etc. Such conscious policies may also reflect the various scales of planning ideas, with strategic policies such as metropolitan decentralization or containment, and more detailed policies, for example zoning or pedestrianization. The adoption of these conscious policies is inevitably a rather more discretionary process, involving more local decisions.

Town planning policies and party politics

Ideas may have political implications but, while they remain just ideas, this dimension remains fairly passive. Policies, by contrast, are actively political and the course of policy-making in planning cannot therefore be understood without reference to a wider political frame. In this connection it is immediately important to recognize that town planning ideas have generally found a more sympathetic political home within the Liberal and Labour parties. By its nature, town planning as a political project has involved greater state control over private activity, particularly in the use and exploitation of land. Its general political trajectory has been based historically on the assertion of public interest concerns and reduction of the role of private interests in the urban development process. It is therefore readily understandable that first Liberal and later Labour administrations should have set the pace in town planning policy-making over this century.

Conservative governments have generally pursued a more cautious line, usually diminishing earlier Liberal or Labour planning policy initiatives in favour of private development interests. This has been particularly evident in the intrinsic policies on land values that are embodied in planning legislation, on which there was a long history of party political disagreement. Generally, Conservatives have wanted to see a bigger proportion of land value increases arising from development remaining with private landowners and developers, while the Liberals and Labour have favoured stronger taxation or public landownership. Recently though, the

approaches of the two main parties have converged, seeking betterment through locally negotiated planning agreements or obligations.

Moreover, in other aspects of planning, party political disagreements have always been less significant. Conservative sympathy for private developers has been tempered by their sensitivity to other important political interests, notably the protection of residential owner-occupiers and other established interests, such as farming. In practice this has encouraged a high degree of political consensus over many planning matters, especially in the 1940–74 period. Elements of this approach have even survived as the traditional post-war consensus on many aspects of state policy broke down in the late 1970s and 1980s. In practice the traditional Conservative desire for planning policies that restricted development ‘in their backyards’ has probably outweighed the 1979–90 Thatcherite Conservative portrayal of it as a drag on the ‘enterprise culture’, especially in urban fringe areas. Since 1990 there has been even greater continuity. The planning policies of both Conservative and ‘New’ Labour have given developers a much more central role than they ever had from the 1940s to the 1970s.

Officialdom and policies

Another important element in the continuity of planning policies has been the largely hidden politics of civil servants, defending their established departmental interests. In an activity like planning, which has only rarely been a national party political issue of the first order and which raises issues of great technical complexity, civil servants and professional experts have had key roles in forming policies. Ultimately they can be overridden by determined ministers, but we will find only a few clear-cut instances where this has definitely happened. By contrast, officials have certainly limited the impact of potentially far-reaching planning reforms on some occasions, most notably in 1964–65. Their local equivalents, the municipal town planners, also helped shape the course of policies in their own areas.

Ideas and policies

All of this serves to remind us that the policy dimension introduces many considerations that may have precious little to do with town planning ideas in the purest sense. One of the most important points to understand about the relationship between ideas and policies is that the state generally adopted town planning for rather different reasons from those which motivated the town planning movement to invent it. The recognition of this point can sometimes be difficult because the advocates of town planning were generally clever enough to present their case in a way that did more than merely preach to the converted. In the pre-1914 period, for example, they addressed their arguments to the concerns of the political elite to defend British imperial and economic dominance and domestic social stability, not themes which were central to the garden city or co-partnership housing ideas.

But there can be little doubt that it was these (and other) wider concerns which propelled the Liberal government towards the first town planning legislation in 1909 rather than the radical reformism and Utopian socialism of many of the inventors of town planning’s central ideas. Similarly, external events like the 1930s’ Depression and both world wars, especially the Second World War, had a dramatic effect on the sympathy of governments for planning ideas that were of rather older origin. Whereas ideas can and frequently do have a purity of purpose, policy-making has been inherently opportunistic.

The lack of congruence between conceptual innovation and policy-making was also reflected in the partial way in which town planning ideas were incorporated in policies. The

wider social reformism that animated early planning ideas was quickly narrowed down to environmental policies. The co-operative and voluntarist tradition was soon subordinated to a more government-oriented approach as, for example, co-operatively developed garden suburbs gave way to municipal satellite towns and garden cities to New Towns. Yet such policy-driven changes could also add a creative dynamic as older ideas were adapted to meet new circumstances. This was particularly noticeable in the post-war period as the distinction between ideas and policies became increasingly blurred. By the 1960s, for example, the metropolitan, decentralist garden city/New Town idea was being merged with French growth-pole theory to become a model for regional growth. But these various kinds of slippage between ideas and policies were minor compared to that which occurred when policies were actually implemented.

Impacts

Assessing impacts

Whether town planners like it or not, society essentially evaluates the success or failure of planning by its impacts rather than the intentions embodied in policies, still less in the underlying ideas. Social and political reactions to the perceived impacts of planning policies have helped trigger important changes of direction, for example against town extension policies in the late 1930s and 1940s or against comprehensive inner-city housing redevelopment in the 1970s. It is, however, arguable that much of what was being criticized did not actually result from planning policies, but represented particular modes of implementing planning policies over which planners had little control.

There is, in fact, a major problem in assessing what the impacts of planning have actually been. Planning policies supplement and attempt to order existing processes of urban change, but do not normally replace them. This means that we can never be exactly certain as to what would have happened without planning. Inevitably, therefore, planning impact studies, however well researched, ultimately rest on a degree of intelligent 'counterfactual' guesswork and can never be proven in a completely satisfactory way. As we have suggested though, the need to evaluate planning outcomes is too important to be ignored on grounds of methodological purity.

Impacts, policies and ideas

What we are arguing here is that what are termed the impacts of planning have actually been produced by a much wider and more diverse set of forces than those which have shaped our other two concerns. Both ideas and policies were certainly directed at wider issues, but their characteristics were actively shaped within rather narrower social and political milieux. Thus ideas essentially arose out of the particular social and intellectual setting of a few creative individuals and organizations. Policies were broadly the result of an interaction of these planning ideas with political and institutional processes, but in ways that still reflected the particular concerns and approaches of the policy-makers. Planning impacts, in contrast, arise from the interaction of these ideas and policies with an altogether wider range of economic and social forces, many of them entirely outside the planner's control. Despite commonly held assumptions about their power to shape cities, town planners have actually had rather limited powers over most of the twentieth century.

Planning and twentieth-century urban change

Developing this point further, we must immediately note a considerable variation over time in the conscious ability of planners to shape the pattern of urban change. Planning was a significant though somewhat marginal influence before 1939. Then, as wartime brought a state-dominated economy, marginalizing private landed and development interests, town planning briefly became a major force in the 1940s. But when this interventionism gave way, during the 1950s, to the mixed economy, where an active state was retained but within what was now an unequivocally capitalist, market-led economy, town planning also assumed a less directive role in urban change. Increasingly, until the 1970s, town planning sought to harness rather than dominate private interests in development. Decisive change occurred in the 1980s as town planning intentions were more firmly subordinated to a market-dominated process of urban change. The 1990s saw political aspirations to redress the balance in favour of the planner and these have gone a little further in the new century. So far, though, the effects have not been great.

Planning and the market

The net effect of all this fluctuation is that planning has only once, in the 1940s, been in a sufficiently strong position actively to shape urban change fairly independently of land market considerations. Yet this was a period when relatively little urban development took place, compared to what went before and what came after. Most urban development has occurred when town planning was able to exert at best an important minor, at worst a marginal, influence on the process of change. The implementation of plans has relied on actions that have been beyond the planner's control. They have been dependent on investment (and disinvestment) decisions by private developers and land users. Such decisions have been motivated, first, by considerations of profit and only, at best, secondly by the intentions of town planners.

This has been true even of such state-dominated exercises in planning as the early New Towns, where the Development Corporation set up by central government for each town was planner, landowner and developer. Despite such apparent omnipotence, success remained contingent on decisions by employers to locate there. Nor was inner- and central-city planned redevelopment able to transcend the considerations of the market, despite an almost equally powerful array of planning powers. Still less could planning actively shape urban change where it was merely providing blueprints or guidelines for change but remained entirely reliant on private development for their fulfilment. Nor was it just the economic considerations of the market that deflected the outcomes of planning from the original intentions.

Town planning and other state intervention

Another point of great significance is that town planning has never had complete control over other aspects of government intervention in relation to urban change. Town planners actually have very little direct formal influence over road-building decisions and have often had surprisingly little real control over public-sector housing, despite a historically close association between the two functions. More generally there is no automatic assurance that publicly owned land will be managed in ways that are any more consistent with town planning objectives than are those of private landowners. Especially in recent years, municipal estates departments have often needed to look to maximize financial returns on surplus lands and commercial properties, producing outcomes that differ little from those of the market. And

town planning influence over the decisions of major public utilities (even when these were under state ownership), health authorities or nationalized industries, etc., has been very limited. All of this introduces other dimensions into plan implementation that the planner has less influence over than might at first appear. At best town planners will be engaged in a continual process of negotiation with other arms of state intervention, attempting to mould their actions into something consistent with planning intentions.

Planning and social change

Finally we should note that planning impacts also bear the imprint of important social changes that have proved notoriously difficult to predict, let alone consciously incorporate into planning intentions. Since they began making use of population forecasts in the 1930s, town planners have, fairly consistently, had to work with faulty projections. Future population size was underestimated in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, then overestimated in the 1960s. And even as the accuracy of overall population size forecasts began to improve in the 1970s, serious mistakes were made in predictions of household size. Such flawed demographic data reverberated throughout town planning, most notably in a very marked failure to allocate sufficient housing land in the post-1945 period.

In turn, faulty population projections were paralleled in weak forecasting of other critical social and economic indicators. Thus predictions of car ownership were also seriously flawed. The net result of these not very well foreseen social changes was that planning outcomes could sometimes diverge markedly from the intentions embodied in major planning policies. For example, metropolitan containment and decentralization policies took on a somewhat different character as greater affluence and mobility allowed far more spontaneously dispersed patterns of living and working than those envisaged in the early post-1945 plans. In the 1940s, planners envisaged highly planned outer metropolitan areas dominated by publicly rented housing in relatively self-contained New and Expanded Towns. What happened was a much less planned 'outer city' peopled by car-commuting owner-occupiers. And, as we will see, it is not difficult to think of other examples where unforeseen social changes have deflected policy impacts from policy intentions.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This interplay of ideas, policies and impacts is then our central theme, present in every chapter. The book's detailed structure is largely chronological, however, tracing the development of town planning over approximately the last hundred years. In the next chapter we examine the origins of town planning ideas and policies in the formative pre-1914 years, when the term 'town planning' itself came into being. Chapter 3 looks at the widening of planning ideas during the period between the outbreak of the two world wars. It also assesses the impacts of the first wave of planning policies, encouraging town extension, and considers how planning policies shifted to reflect something of the widening agenda for planning action in the 1930s. Chapter 4 is largely focused on the policy changes of the 1940s, when the circumstances of war created the political momentum for decisive action on the town planning agenda that had been rehearsed between the wars.

The next two chapters look at the years of post-war affluence, from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. Chapter 5 traces the development of the planning system over this important

period of consensus mixed-economy planning, highlighting both intrinsic policies and new ideas. Chapter 6 complements this by examining conceptual and policy developments in relation to the four main strategic planning concerns with redevelopment, containment, regional balance and decentralization. This pattern is repeated in Chapters 7 and 8, covering the years between 1974 and 1990, when the previous political consensus over planning matters was substantially undermined. Thus Chapter 7 explores the broader pattern of change in planning thinking and policies, while Chapter 8 addresses the specifics of particular policy initiatives. Chapter 9, new to this second edition, examines the post-Thatcher years. It traces the emergence of a new consensus held together by wide political agreement over the need to make towns and cities more competitive and sustainable. Finally, Chapter 10 considers the overall impacts of post-1945 planning and draws together the main conclusions of the whole book. We begin, however, at the other end of this historical process of urban change, considering how and why the notion of town planning came to be invented and adopted as public policy.

2

Ideas and the Beginnings of Policy, 1890–1914

The last decade of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth centuries were the critical formative period for town planning thought and policy in Britain and other major urban industrial countries (Ward, 2002a). It was during this period that the specific reform movements which created the body of thought that informed modern town planning came to prominence. And it was during these years that the very term ‘town planning’ itself was coined, as an umbrella term to encompass the activities of separate, in some ways rather divergent, reform movements. A recognizable and self-conscious town planning movement appeared and began to foster town planning ideas in model schemes of various kinds. It also became a pressure group, lobbying politicians to incorporate these ideas into formal government policies.

In 1909 the first British town planning legislation was passed – the Housing, Town Planning Etc. Act. It was this modest measure which defined what soon became the dominant location of town planning activity, within the framework of local government. This was the first step in shifting planning away from the realm of philanthropic and co-operative social reform to the realm of state policy. In the same year too town planning education was begun, a key stage in the professionalization of the new activity of planning that accompanied the transition from idealism to policy. A few years later, in 1914, the body that ultimately grew into the professional body and qualifying association for planning, the Town Planning Institute, was itself formed.

In this chapter we examine and analyse how and why this new activity of town planning appeared. The distinction, introduced in the last chapter, between ideas and policies is developed in this explanation. In particular we will contrast the often radical origins of the ideas that made up town planning thought, based in many cases on Utopian socialist and co-operative traditions, with the more conservative conceptions of reform that led to their incorporation into policies. Both, however, were essentially reactions to the late nineteenth-century city.

THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CITY

The urban condition

The extent of urban growth

During the nineteenth century, Britain had become an overwhelmingly urban society (Dyos and Wolff, 1973; Carter and Lewis, 1990). Although the rate of urbanization was less rapid than that which has affected many other countries in the twentieth century, we should be under no illusions as to its significance. There has been nothing comparable anywhere in Britain in our lifetime. In 1801 the urban population of England and Wales had been

3 million, just over one-third of the whole population. By 1901 the figure was nearly 25.1 million or 77 per cent of the total. This growth was integral to the economic transformation of Britain from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Whereas towns and cities had formerly fulfilled essentially trading and mercantile functions, they now became central to the new, more concentrated, mode of capital accumulation. The growing urban populations supplied the labour that was essential to the functioning of this new, more intense mode of economic activity.

Before industrialization, only London, with a population of roughly 575,000 in 1700, would have been regarded as a large city by modern standards. The second largest city in England and Wales, Norwich, had only 29,000. A century later, in 1801, London had risen to 865,000 (almost 10 per cent of the total). A new pattern of regional cities was now emerging, headed by Liverpool and Manchester with 78,000 and 70,000 respectively. London remained the only really large city, however, outweighing all the other urban centres put together. Another century later this had changed. London had continued to grow in absolute and relative importance, now with a population of nearly 6.6 million. However, the five major provincial urban concentrations of south-east Lancashire, Merseyside, west midlands, west Yorkshire and Tyneside now together contained 6.8 million. Clydeside added another 1.5 million and there were smaller concentrations in south Wales, the east midlands, south Yorkshire and elsewhere. By 1891 over half the population lived in towns of over 20,000 population.

Urban spatial structure

The economic and demographic changes associated with urban growth had also remodelled the spatial structure of cities (Johnson and Pooley, 1982; Waller, 2000). By the late nineteenth century, and before the appearance of town planning, there were already recognizable zones within cities that were highly specialized in particular activities (Carter and Lewis, 1990). Central office and shopping districts had emerged. Beyond them, typically, were mixed areas of industry and tightly built working-class housing, usually built in the earlier part of the century. In the midlands and much of the north these were typically built in back-to-back form. In Scotland and a few English towns, multi-storey tenements were usual. Further from the centre these very high-density areas gave way to more recently built, less packed and more ordered housing, often close to, but less intermingled with, industry. There were also distinct middle-class residential areas. Finally, in the urban-fringe areas, there were large areas of more completely residential development, varying from upper-working-class terraces, to the rather grander detached villas of the better off. By the end of the century the rapid growth of these suburbs, catering for a widening lower middle class, was becoming one of the most striking aspects of urban change.

Urban spatial dynamics

Overall this new pattern had arisen relatively spontaneously, reflecting the demands of a changing economy and society (Dennis, 1984; Waller, 2000). These changing demands were mainly expressed through an increasingly dynamic urban land market, which began to allocate space for particular activities using the price mechanism. Another closely related and directly formative influence on the structure of the nineteenth-century city was the increasingly sophisticated urban transport system. By the early twentieth century this included railways, electric tramways and first horse and then motor buses. These, especially the first two, were



Figure 2.1 By the late nineteenth century all large urban areas had densely packed slum areas close to their centres. This photograph, of Gateshead, shows one basic type of slum, the tenement, where many families lived under one roof. Further south, tiny individual houses, often of back-to-back construction, were typical.

of critical importance in the growth of the new middle-class residential suburbs, allowing them the increasing separation from the typical places of employment on which their inhabitants depended, the offices and shops of the central area.

Urban problems

The immense scale of urban growth and change had not been problem free. Although there had been an abundance of private capital to fuel economic transformation, the vast increase of urban population associated with this created major social problems (Sutcliffe, 1982). There was a prevailing political faith in *laissez-faire* over much of the nineteenth century, allowing market processes to reign supreme over most aspects of economic and social life. Unregulated private enterprise proved quite unable, however, to create or maintain the social investment and services that were the essential cornerstone of the city as an efficient productive unit. The nineteenth-century city was accordingly dogged by serious and recurrent problems of disease and ill-health. Outside London, building took place for much of the century without effective controls over materials or minimum standards. Most cheaper houses were poorly designed and built. Drainage and sanitary provision were usually poor and often abysmal, relying on rural practices of cess pits or earth closets. Water supplies were often inadequate and drawn from tainted sources.

By the last decades of the century the severity of the public-health question was diminishing in significance as governmental action gradually tackled these problems. Other urban matters which private initiative had also failed to address satisfactorily now assumed greater prominence. Education and the creation or ownership of new urban infrastructures of gas, electricity and public transport became more pressing. These were all issues which had tremendous potential for the overall effectiveness of the city as a productive unit. The issue of the inadequacy of low-cost housing supply, which was to be closely tied to the emergence of town planning, also began to figure increasingly as an urban problem from the 1880s.

Municipal intervention

The Victorian local government system

The main response to urban problems came from the various agencies of local government (Finer, 1950). Urban local government was largely in the hands of the boroughs, established for the main urban centres under the Municipal Corporations Act 1835. Within their areas they increasingly controlled most aspects of local government, although the pattern outside was much more chaotic. It was greatly simplified by the creation of the county councils and county boroughs (in effect a new name for many of the municipal corporations) in 1888 and the urban and rural district councils six years later. Although separate, single-purpose local bodies survived for education (until 1902) and poor relief (until 1929), these reforms created an enduring framework of comprehensive local government that survived until the 1972 reforms. It was a system which contained unitary authorities, the county boroughs, which undertook the full range of local government functions in the larger urban centres (outside London). Outside the county boroughs a two-tier system was created, with an upper tier of county councils and a lower tier of municipal boroughs, urban and rural districts. A slightly different two-tier system also operated in London, with a very powerful London County Council (LCC) and a lower tier of metropolitan boroughs. The Scottish system exhibited some important differences but for the bigger cities at least it was broadly similar to that in England and Wales.

Local government and urban reform

Much of the initiative in addressing urban problems came from the local level (Briggs, 1968; Fraser, 1979, 1982). Local autonomy was not absolute, however. Although many cities aspired to become ‘city states’ with local sovereignty, central government provided an overall enabling framework and exerted supervisory control. But it was local authorities that made most of the running. Frequent use was made of local legislation, locally promoted parliamentary Acts which gave specific powers to the sponsoring authority. Liverpool, for example, had taken pioneering steps in public health in the 1840s, while Birmingham launched a major drive towards municipal ownership of public utilities in the 1870s under the radical mayoralty of Joseph Chamberlain (Hennock, 1973). By the early twentieth century the LCC and Glasgow were establishing a supremacy in municipal tramways.

The political bases of such municipal innovation varied, but it was usual to find progressive local big business and professional interests dominating the most innovative councils. Councils dominated by small business or property interests were usually more cautious in their policies. Reflecting the still narrow electoral franchise, Labour was not yet an important political force, although it was beginning to have some influence in London by the 1890s. It was this which fuelled contemporary discussion about ‘municipal socialism’, describing the increasing municipalization of the social capital of cities that had become well established by 1900. In fact though, this process would have been much better described as municipal capitalism.

Reformist motivations

How then can we explain the reformism of the urban elites? In the formal sense they increasingly sought to legitimate their policies by reference to the concept of the public interest. This was an important legal abstraction resting on a notion of the whole community and supposedly transcending the narrow interests of powerful individuals or social classes. Yet, as town planners found when they subsequently inherited the concept in the twentieth century, it is a very malleable and imprecise construct, capable of widely varying interpretation.

For the urban elites of the nineteenth century, it certainly rested on some degree of altruism, often inspired by religion. Many of the leading business figures, in the industrial cities at least, were active members of non-conformist churches such as Unitarians, Congregationalists or Quakers. This predisposed them to look for ways of doing God’s work on earth (rather than viewing urban social problems solely in terms of personal morality). But there can be no doubt that the progressive policy agenda, the ‘municipal socialism’, of Victorian cities reflected a good deal that was in the general interests of industrial capital during this period. Disease and ill-health damaged industrial productivity (and did not always respect social class: elite residential areas, such as Edgbaston in Birmingham or Victoria Park in Manchester, were not entirely insulated from the rest of the city). Nor did the manufacturers approve of the high cost or inefficiency of utilities that characterized the private supply of water, gas or electricity. It all added either directly to production costs or indirectly to wage costs. Similarly, cheap and efficient public transport reduced wage costs and gave employers access to a wider labour market.

The other side of this was that all these services were run to earn profits that could be used to keep local taxes down. There was no sense in which labour was being subsidized by the taxes of the better off, which true municipal socialism would have implied. It was noticeable that the business elites that ran urban government in the late nineteenth century were much harder-faced when it came to functions like poor relief, which involved transfer payments to

the poor, funded from local taxation. Such attitudes also coloured their whole approach to the mounting problem of housing.

The politics of the housing problem

The issue of housing had assumed political prominence during the 1880s, when popular and labour unrest had prompted the appointment of a Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, reporting in 1885 (Jones, 1971). Generally, real incomes were rising in the later decades of the century, allowing the lower middle classes and a widening section of the working classes, particularly skilled workers in regular waged employment, to secure better housing through market mechanisms. The problem was that the position of a large section of the working class remained insecure. This was because many jobs (particularly the less skilled) were subject to cyclical fluctuations (e.g. shipbuilding) or were inherently irregular or organized on a casual basis (e.g. dock work) or simply remained very low paid. Moreover, all the big cities contained huge numbers of underemployed people, many attempting to eke out an existence as street traders.

The main working-class response was to create trade unions and other increasingly political movements to protect their interests. The middle and upper classes were, however, very reluctant to countenance wholesale change in the distribution of income. Housing therefore became a more acceptable arena for political action. On the one hand it represented a key part of working-class quality of life, which gave it a real saliency in emergent Labour politics. On the other, it was an area where the urban business elites were prepared to make some concessions, particularly since the private landlords (who provided the bulk of working-class housing at this time) were increasingly being marginalized politically. Moreover, other municipal reformist initiatives had already begun to impinge directly on housing, giving it a tangible reality as an urban and municipal issue.

Housing and municipal action

By 1890 public health and street improvement (at this time meaning clearance) initiatives were actively reducing the supply of very cheap housing (Ashworth, 1954). Major schemes of central area rebuilding (such as the creation of Corporation Street in Birmingham) typically involved municipal acquisition and demolition of slum housing, usually replacing it with new streets, shops and offices. There were powers to close particularly unfit housing (e.g. cellar dwellings) in many cities, or even control overcrowding. The introduction of better water supplies, water-borne sewerage and other improvements into older housing also had the effect of pushing up rents. More importantly there were increasing controls on new building, in effect preventing additions to the stock of very cheap housing. London had had some controls since the Great Fire in 1666, but from the 1840s the new industrial towns and cities also began to regulate building, initially by local Acts. This regulation became general following the Public Health Act 1875. Most cities banned the very cheap and high-density back-to-back building. Virtually every late nineteenth-century English and Welsh city was now acquiring whole districts of grid-iron street layouts with long rows of narrow-fronted 'by-law' houses (Muthesius, 1982; Daunton, 1983). The tenement tradition of Scotland and Tyneside was also more tightly regulated.

In addition, their new powers to create and manage the urban infrastructure were giving municipalities a more positive role in housing development. Most important was the growth of tramways, especially as electricity was adopted from the mid-1890s. The cheapness of the

electric trams, in contrast to the higher costs of horse buses and, with some exceptions, railways, offered a tremendous prospect for the dispersal of the tightly packed inner districts, widening social access to suburban living. This was to be a key factor in Edwardian thinking about the housing problem during the first decade of the twentieth century.

The origins of municipal housing

By this stage municipalities themselves had begun to provide housing directly, although on a very modest scale (Wohl, 1974). It was legally possible to build council housing from 1851 but, although municipal lodging houses were built in a few towns, only Liverpool built family accommodation – St Martin's Cottages (actually a tenement block) in 1869. A few more authorities took action in the 1870s and 1880s using a growing volume of legislation. Usually such initiatives involved the erection of a limited amount of replacement dwellings for central clearance schemes. There was still, however, a strong tendency to prefer private philanthropic initiatives wherever possible (Tarn, 1973). In London especially, it was still usual in the 1880s for bodies like the Peabody Trust or the Improved Industrial Dwellings Company to erect tenement blocks on sites provided by the Metropolitan Board of Works (the precursor of the LCC). These bodies operated on the principle of '5 per cent philanthropy', offering only limited profits of 5 per cent or less and relying on the great and the good of Victorian society to put up the funding.



Figure 2.2 Housing built to conform to local by-laws brought marked improvements over the older slums by the last decades of the nineteenth century. The form of most such housing in England and Wales is shown in this 1930s' photograph of Birmingham. Notice the long continuous rows of narrow-fronted houses, built to make maximum use of the wide (and, for developers, expensive) by-law streets, a sharp contrast with the courts and alleys of earlier slums. The houses themselves were larger with better sanitation and small backyards or gardens, giving increased privacy to individual families.

The Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890

The extent of Victorian philanthropy fell well short of what was required, however, especially in provincial cities. The Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 marked the beginnings of a comprehensive framework for municipal housing provision and it was certainly more extensively used than previous legislation (Yelling, 1986). Before 1890, fewer than 3,000 council houses had been built in the whole country; between 1890 and 1914 the figure was over 20,000, still an extremely small number but a marked increase. The new LCC, for example, built tenement schemes at Boundary Street in Bethnal Green, Millbank and on several suburban sites, to be discussed more fully below (Beattie, 1980). The pace of building in the already active cities of Liverpool and Glasgow quickened. In fact most cities and many smaller towns built some housing under the Act.

Political limitations on municipal housing

Yet in doing this, they quickly moved beyond the limits of their own political agenda (Merrett, 1979; Smith et al., 1986). Municipal housing was an expensive function that, unlike gas, trams or water, could not be expected to earn profits. And although private landlords were often only marginal influences on the business elites who ran most cities, the fact was that municipal housing was competing with a well-established private rental market. Rents were not intended to be subsidized from local tax revenues, but concealed and sometimes overt subsidies were usual. It was easy therefore for councils and electors to become frightened of their growing



Figure 2.3 Higher standards meant higher rents that were beyond the means of most slum dwellers. The increasing need to remove the worst slums and the inadequate supply of cheap housing led many local authorities into direct housing provision in the 1890–1914 period, often using a more carefully designed form of flatted, tenement housing. This example was completed in 1914 by Liverpool, one of the main pioneers of municipal housing.

involvement in municipal housing. Despite a mounting national housing shortage in the early years of the twentieth century, there was paradoxically something of a political backlash against municipal housing during this same period, especially noticeable in London and Birmingham (Nettlefold, 1908; Gibbon and Bell, 1939). This backlash was, as we will see, a crucial element in the mounting belief in town planning as a new policy solution. First, however, we must examine the emergence of the ideas underpinning the town planning movement that appeared in the first decade of the twentieth century.

THE ORIGINS OF TOWN PLANNING IDEAS

Land reform

The land problem

One of the key reformist concerns which underpinned the early development of town planning ideas was land. To an extent that is difficult to appreciate today, many reform interests of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw land as the most critical dimension in achieving social and political change. As they saw it, there were two main aspects of the land problem (Aalen, 1992). The first arose from the parlous state of rural economy and society, consequent on the decline in agriculture, as imported wheat and refrigerated meat began to replace home produce in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Land reformers argued that the prevailing pattern of land ownership, dominated by large and increasingly absentee owners, was a major contributory factor in the failure to adapt.

Meanwhile the intensification of the operations of the urban land market provided a second focus for their concerns (LLEC, 1914). As well as a general attack on private landlords, there were specific attacks on the growth of land speculation and the related practice of 'sweating'. These were becoming more common as transport improvements were opening up the cheaper land on the urban fringe for building. Meanwhile, however, shrewd speculators, who had contributed nothing to the costs of the improvements, were able to force up land values by buying up land around the new railway stations or tram termini, restricting its availability for development. In turn this nullified the original cheapness of the land, forcing development to occur at a much higher density than otherwise. This would also increase housing costs and thereby contribute to overcrowding and other urban ills.

'Back to the Land'

The whole land reform movement was unified by a strong pastoral, anti-urban impulse (Gould, 1988). The idea of a countryside revived by owner-occupied smallholdings as an alternative to the concentrated cities and derelict tenant farms was a powerful one, expressed in famous slogans such as 'Back to the Land' or 'Three Acres and a Cow'. But although such visions retained great potency in the Celtic periphery, above all in Ireland, Britain's (and especially England's) overwhelmingly urbanized character by the late nineteenth century limited the specific appeal of such a peasant-based agrarian Utopia. In a less specific sense, however, the rural imagery of this vision survived and became a powerful bequest to early town planning.

Land taxation and land nationalization

The advance of specific land reform ideas within the more urbanized sections of British society came to depend on more specific remedies. During the 1880s two bodies were formed that propounded slightly different solutions, both of which were subsequently incorporated within town planning thinking. The English Land Restoration League (and similar Scottish body) pushed the notion of a land tax. In this they were following the ideas of the American economist and increasingly well-known lecturer and writer Henry George, advanced in his important book *Progress and Poverty*, published in 1880 (George, 1911). He argued that the unearned increases in land values that accrued from the efforts of society at large should be appropriated by the state in a single tax. The other organization was the Land Nationalisation Society (Hyder, 1913). Under the leadership of Alfred Russel Wallace, the land nationalizers looked to the gradual elimination of private land ownership. It would be replaced by state ownership, so that communally created increases in land value would automatically be in collective hands, secured as ground rent from tenants.

Both organizations disseminated their ideas with great fervour from the 1880s, sending out their respective fleets of red and yellow horse-drawn vans to spread the word. Both shared the characteristic belief that land reform alone would transform society, a notion which potentially offered a path to reform that avoided any clash between industrialist and worker. It seemed that both classes could find common cause against private landed interests. Reform was to be sought in rents, not wages. A century later it is easy to see the limitations of these ideas, but we should also recognize their huge significance for the development of town planning. They were crucial in the early years and, incorporated within a wider reformist programme, they have continued to resonate throughout twentieth-century debates on town planning policy.

Housing reform

The origins of housing reform

By about 1900, land reform ideas had also begun to have an important effect on housing reform, itself another important contributor to the emergence of town planning ideas and policy. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century there had been many important housing reform initiatives, including some we have already noted (Burnett, 1978). The 5 per cent philanthropy schemes were usually model tenement dwellings, managed in a paternalistic way that was intended to promote a new model existence on the part of tenants. Tenants were to be steered away from social evils such as drink or gambling and towards more physically hygienic and morally uplifting lifestyles. Less authoritarian methods of management to secure social improvement were developed by Octavia Hill (1883). By the 1880s her emphasis on close tenant supervision to encourage self-help in matters of household management was having an increased influence. Paternalistic management styles, often reflecting at least some of Hill's precepts, were typically incorporated into the new municipal schemes, most of which were also tenement dwellings.

Industrial philanthropy

Several enlightened employers had also been attracted into housing and community development. In common with other forms of company or tied housing, this was usually in less urbanized locations where it was otherwise difficult to retain workers. The quality of a few of these schemes made them wholly outstanding, usually reflecting something more than

simple economic self-interest. In common with many of the progressive leaders of late Victorian urban government, almost all such industrial philanthropists were active members of non-conformist churches. The new community of Saltaire, for example, was developed outside Bradford by the Congregationalist mill owner Sir Titus Salt from 1854 (Reynolds, 1983). Extremely important later schemes were those at Port Sunlight, near Birkenhead, developed from 1888 by Congregationalist soap maker W. H. Lever (Hubbard and Shippobottom, 1988) and Bournville, just outside Birmingham, developed from 1894 by the Quaker cocoa manufacturer George Cadbury (BVT, 1955).

Port Sunlight and Bournville

These later schemes and their initiators contributed very directly to the emergence of town planning ideas. Environmentally they were particularly important because they exemplified a new form of working-class housing that was of much lower density than contemporary by-law estates. Bournville, for example, was developed at eight houses per acre (20 per hectare) compared to 20 (50 per hectare) or more in immediately adjoining areas. Cottage-style housing in short terraced or semi-detached form was provided with large amounts of open space and good community facilities. In practice the rents were rather high and such schemes were certainly beyond the reach of slum dwellers. Yet rent levels at the lower end overlapped those of by-law housing so that skilled workers could begin to consider living in these kinds of environment (Cadbury, 1915). For housing and land reformers the schemes illustrated what was possible when development was organized on non-speculative lines. They showed that the need for municipal housing might be avoided if the land market in the urban fringe could be regulated (as it was voluntarily by Cadbury and Lever) and some viable mechanism of low-cost housing development could be found.

Co-partnership schemes

Housing reformers thought they had found this in the co-partnership approach (Skilleter, 1993). Essentially it involved a co-operative structure, whereby the tenants collectively owned the society that undertook the development. This avoided some of the evils of land speculation and sweating, and allowed land value increases after the site had been bought to be enjoyed collectively by the members of the co-partnership societies (LLEC, 1914). The approach had been pioneered in 1888, but was little used until 1901, when Ealing Tenants' Society was formed. By this time the law had been strengthened to allow all housing agencies paying less than 5 per cent dividends to borrow most of the capital needed from the Public Works Loan Commissioners. This did not overcome all their financial problems and the continuing need for additional finance tended to give such initiatives a strong lower-middle-class/upper-working-class character. To Edwardian housing reformers, however, it seemed to offer a viable middle way between traditional philanthropy and municipal housing, an ideal way to secure low-cost, good-quality housing in the areas being opened up by the new electric tramways.

The National Housing Reform Council

By this time the whole topic of housing reform was growing in political importance. In 1900, Henry Aldridge, a Land Nationalisation Society lecturer, and William Thompson, a schoolteacher and member of Richmond Town Council in Surrey, formed the National Housing Reform Council (NHRC) (Aldridge, 1915). Initially it was a predominantly working-class organization, but it increasingly assumed a more middle-class character with




Figure 2.4 Industrial philanthropists such as Cadbury and Lever developed something closer to the middle-class, rural-inspired ideal of the home as the model for working-class housing. Bournville, shown here in 1914, lay just beyond the 'middle ring' of Birmingham's by-law terraces, yet its cottage houses, large gardens and community facilities built around the Cadbury factory set new standards.

figures such as Cadbury and Lever in prominent positions. It functioned primarily as a pressure group and quickly established strong parliamentary links. Meanwhile its initial concerns to promote municipal housing and secure central assistance gave way to a more mixed approach that gave great encouragement to co-partnership development and, within a few years, town planning. Its interests in this new area were not, however, unrivalled.

The garden city

Ebenezer Howard

The garden city idea and the movement it spawned were crucial precursors to the town planning movement in Britain. They were the source of many important planning ideas and the means by which existing reformist notions were applied to the solution of urban (and rural) problems. The originator of the idea was a lower-middle-class Londoner, Ebenezer Howard (1850–1928), who had tried, and failed at, various things during his life, including homesteading in Nebraska and being an inventor (Fishman, 1977; Beevers, 1988; Ward, 2002b). By the 1890s he was making a modest living as a parliamentary stenographer, producing verbatim shorthand accounts of meetings. More important though was his increasing immersion in the various currents of free thought and social reformism in the last decades of the century. Politically Liberal, Howard became increasingly interested in emergent socialist ideas, though very much of the voluntary and co-operative kind. In effect, he was a non-Marxist Utopian socialist, looking to achieve socialism without the need for class conflict.

From the late 1880s, Howard developed and rehearsed his ideas at great length within reformist circles and his own family, often going well beyond the boredom threshold of his listeners. One of his reformist acquaintances, the emerging playwright George Bernard Shaw, dubbed him ‘Ebenezer the Garden City Geyser’ (Beevers, 1988, p. 70). To his own family, particularly its younger members, his obsessive commitment was seen as ‘an affliction’ (ibid., p. 44). Finally, however, in 1898, Howard published a book that introduced to a wider public the ideas which had taken over his life.

This book originally appeared under the title *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, although it was reissued in 1902, with some modifications, under its better-known title, *Garden Cities of To-morrow* (Howard, 1902). It outlined a Utopian socialist alternative to the evils of existing urban society, specifically the huge urban concentration of London. This vision was to take the form of a social city, a decentralized network of individual garden cities, each of 30,000 population, surrounding a larger central city of 58,000. The garden cities were to be slumless and smokeless, with good-quality housing, planned development, large amounts of open space and green belts separating one settlement from another. The key to the whole approach was to be the communal ownership of land purchased cheaply at agricultural values, so that the citizens of the garden cities would collectively benefit by the increment in land values consequent on urban development. Many other aspects of the garden city would also be owned and operated collectively, although Howard did not envisage a complete replacement of private capital.

The sources of Howard's ideas

The novelty of Howard's ideas lay in the fact that they were a ‘unique combination of proposals’ (Howard, 1898, p. 102). It is clear that Howard was heavily influenced by much of the Utopian thinking of the 1890s. Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888), describing




Figure 2.5 Ebenezer Howard's book *To-morrow* (1898) articulated a vision of the urban future that addressed all the major social ills of late nineteenth-century society. The big, continuously built-up industrial city was to be replaced by a network of smaller garden cities, collectively known as the social city.

a technological socialist future, was a profoundly important influence. Important too were the socialist artist William Morris's arcadian visions of a rebuilt London, *News From Nowhere* (1890) (Briggs, 1962) and the various writings of the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin (1974, orig. 1899), who also favoured a small-settlement alternative to the big industrial city. Howard also drew heavily on the thinking of the land reform movement, reflecting both their strong pastoral impulse and belief in the centrality of land and rent in achieving social change. Howard himself was closely involved with the Land Nationalisation Society and his earliest adherents in the garden city movement came from that source.

He was also influenced by various housing reform ideas, especially the environmental ideals being pioneered at Bournville and Port Sunlight (Creese, 1966) and the organizational innovations of co-partnership. Howard also explicitly acknowledged the importance of the ideas of the economist Alfred Marshall, who in the 1880s had proposed the creation of new industrial colonies, away from the big cities, where better working-class environments could be developed. Apart from Bournville and Port Sunlight, such hopes had remained unfulfilled at the time, but Howard saw his social city as a means of giving specific form to the industrial decentralization that was becoming apparent in the 1890s.

A garden city movement

What differentiated Howard's ideas from many other exercises in Utopian dreaming was that they quickly formed the basis for a wider movement (Hardy, 1991a; Hall and Ward, 1998). In 1899 the Garden City Association was formed to promote the garden city idea and in 1903 the first garden city at Letchworth in Hertfordshire was begun. Thanks to an effective propagandist campaign, many other countries also created their own garden city associations (Buder, 1990; Ward, 1992a). These successes coincided with the beginnings of a marked shift in the leadership and general tone of the movement by moving it from Utopian socialism to more respectable bourgeois reformism (Ward, 1992b). Howard had found it very difficult to secure support from the emergent labour movement, where there was scepticism from both the working-class and intellectual wings. By contrast liberal reform interests saw great potential in the movement, provided there was some toning down of its rather cranky image.

From about 1900 the initial dominance of the links with the Land Nationalisation Society interest was weakened and a new leadership began to appear. In 1901 Ralph Neville, a prominent London lawyer and ardent advocate of co-partnership, became the chairman of the Association. He strengthened the links already developing with prominent industrialists like Cadbury, Lever and Thomas Idris, a well-known ginger beer manufacturer. Another extremely important recruit was Alfred Harmsworth, the proprietor of the *Daily Mail*, one of the first mass-circulation newspapers, catering very much for the new lower-middle-class suburbanites. Such patrons gave money and respectability to the garden city idea, something the unworldly Howard would have found impossible. It soon became clear, however, that they saw the garden city primarily as a model to reform the urban environment. They were less interested in Howard's wider reformism.

Letchworth Garden City

This shift was encouraged by the early experience of developing Letchworth (Miller, 1989). Although Howard and his immediate associates were able to buy the estate at agricultural value, it proved extraordinarily difficult to attract capital for such a Utopian venture. Compromises of Howard's principles of communal ownership and living were necessary,



Figure 2.6 Letchworth Garden City, begun in 1903, embodied some of Howard's social ideals, but its major impact was as a model for environmental reform. Particularly important were the new standards for housing design and layout set by Letchworth's planners, Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker.

although this did not prevent Letchworth acquiring a reputation for social experiment. It was, though, the way that Letchworth was planned that gave it greatest claim to significance as the town planning movement took shape. Following a competition, a plan was prepared by two young architects, Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker, both heavily influenced by the Arts and Crafts movement founded by William Morris (Day, 1981). Their scheme moved beyond the rather diagrammatic proposals in Howard's book to outline a carefully zoned plan with industrial areas segregated from housing, parkland and central shopping areas. As with other aspects of Letchworth, there were serious compromises in the implementation of this plan, but it expressed a holistic approach that became central to the wider notion of town planning which crystallized in the decade after 1900 (Sutcliffe, 1981a). There was a brilliance too in individual plan elements. By 1905, Unwin and Parker were setting new standards at Letchworth in the design and planning of low-cost housing, building on the foundations of Bournville and Port Sunlight. In the years that followed, this element was increasingly detached from much of the rest of the garden city idea.

A town planning movement

The town planning umbrella

By 1905 the various initiatives of land and housing reform and the garden city were coalescing into a self-conscious town planning movement. The new term 'town planning' was apparently

coined in 1905 by John S. Nettlefold, the Chairman of Birmingham's Housing Committee, in discussion with the same city's Medical Officer of Health, John R. Robertson (Adams, 1929; King, 1982). Nettlefold, a nephew of the radical 1870s' Birmingham Mayor, Joseph Chamberlain, and member of the city's Unitarian business elite, was a Unionist politician (in effect a radical Conservative, with policies very similar to the Liberals on urban and social matters) (Cherry, 1975a). His new label was quickly taken up, providing a politically neutral umbrella under which controversial reformist ideas could shelter, allowing them to regroup into something more widely acceptable and causing more overtly extreme ideas to be marginalized. All this was of course continuing a trend towards middle-class respectability which we have identified amongst the housing reformers and garden city advocates. And, in contrast to Howard's belief in the need to replace the big city, the new movement increasingly focused on ameliorating its housing and other problems.

German town extension planning

From about this time, a new idea for planned urban development began to appear, one which was to dominate actual planning policies in Britain until the 1940s. One of its earliest advocates was a Manchester reformer, Thomas Coghlan Horsfall, an active member of the National Housing Reform Council, who in 1904 published a book called *The Improvement of the Dwellings and Surroundings of the People: The Example of Germany* (Reynolds, 1952; Harrison, 1991). He showed how the Germans already had a well-developed system of town extension planning, *stadterweiterungen* (Ward, 2002a). This provided a planning framework for urban expansion, reserving road lines and zoning land uses. It was also accompanied by cheap loans to builders of low-cost housing, municipal land purchase and cheap transport. The book had considerable impact, especially in Birmingham, and a municipal deputation, led by Nettlefold, duly went to Germany to see *stadterweiterungen* in action in 1905.

British town extension planning

While not denying the significance of garden city ideas, Nettlefold recognized that town extension was a solution which, with some changes in the law, could be readily applied to big cities like Birmingham. Some 2,200 miles of electric tramways were created throughout urban Britain over the years 1897–1906, amounting to nothing short of a revolution in cheap intra-urban transport (Finer, 1941). Because of this and the decline of agriculture, an unprecedented quantity of extremely cheap land was becoming available for development in the urban fringe. As Nettlefold argued in his important book *Practical Housing* (1908), controls should immediately be imposed on this urban fringe to prevent land speculation and sweating and the associated cramped development. For preference, the municipality should also own the land. There should also be positive measures to encourage the building of good-quality cheap housing, and here he looked to the co-partnership societies currently favoured by the National Housing Reform Council. Here, surely, was the solution to the problem of urban housing. If this could be implemented on a big enough scale, then it would allow densities in slum areas to be reduced by selective demolition, and remaining houses to be improved, avoiding any need for expensive municipal housing. 'It may be', he commented, 'that Town Planning will show municipal house building to be unnecessary' (Nettlefold, 1908, p. 109).

A new model: the garden suburb

In English eyes there was, however, one weakness in the German model of town planning: its reliance on the high-density apartment block as the usual form of suburban expansion. It was here that the new residential ideals of Bournville, Port Sunlight and latterly Letchworth came into their own. The Garden City Association began increasingly to encourage the application of the residential ideals of Unwin and Parker to existing cities in the form of the garden suburb. This was something which was already starting to happen even as Letchworth was beginning. In effect they were accepting that it would be impractical to implement Howard's full social city strategy in the foreseeable future.

The earliest garden suburbs

During the Edwardian period there was a veritable flowering of garden suburb schemes (sometimes known as garden villages if there was an association with industry) (Culpin, 1913). A few, such as the LCC's schemes at Norbury, Old Oak in Acton, White Hart Lane in Tottenham and Totterdown Fields in Tooting, developed from 1900, were municipal schemes (Beattie, 1980). These were built at higher densities, however, and were less impressive than the main private initiatives. One of the first private schemes, slightly predating Letchworth, was New Earswick in York, a Bournville-type development initiated in 1902 by Joseph Rowntree, another Quaker cocoa manufacturer (Miller, 1992). As well as the Cadbury example, Joseph had been prompted by his son, Seebohm, who had just produced a seminal piece of social investigation based in the city, entitled *Poverty: A Study of Town Life* (Rowntree, 1901). Seebohm had already developed links with the garden city movement and it was he who brought in Unwin and Parker as architect-planners.

Hampstead Garden Suburb

Most famous was Hampstead Garden Suburb, in London, conceived in 1904, but begun in earnest from 1906, coinciding with the tube extension to nearby Golders Green (Miller and Gray, 1992). Initiated by wealthy philanthropists Dame Henrietta Barnett and her husband, the scheme quickly secured powerful and wealthy backing, in sharp contrast to Letchworth's still rather uncertain development. The scheme was planned by Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker, incorporating and developing their innovative work at Letchworth and New Earswick. It further benefited by more detailed architectural work from the well-known 'society' architect Edwin Lutyens. Its impact was tremendous, and the private Act passed to allow the variations to the local building by-laws necessary to give more freedom in site planning was an important legal precedent.

Many other schemes quickly followed (e.g. Gaskell, 1981; Harrison, 1981). Nettlefold himself presided over a co-partnership scheme at Harborne in Birmingham and nearby Bournville continued to expand on similar lines. Several were developed in Manchester and there were smaller initiatives in Coventry, Leicester, Liverpool and elsewhere. Within a very short period the garden suburb had secured a central position in the rapidly developing field of town planning. There was meanwhile a growing pressure on government to adopt measures that would allow town extension planning to work effectively by adding it to the formal powers of local authorities.

Other early dimensions

In addition to this town extension mainstream, there were other dimensions to the movement (Cherry, 1974b). A number of amenity preservation groups, particularly the Commons, Open

Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society, began to associate themselves with the new label. An important, if not always readily digestible, intellectual contribution came from the pioneer sociologist and biologist Patrick Geddes (Meller, 1990). Based in Edinburgh, Geddes was interested in the organic associations between people, culture, economy and the places they inhabited. Following the French social scientist Le Play, he expressed this relationship as Place–Work–Folk. From the 1880s he had been particularly interested in Octavia Hill's work in London and had become closely involved in a slum rehabilitation scheme in Edinburgh, based on a similar approach of renewal relying partly on the people themselves. Similar principles underlay his interest in civics, which developed a new approach to active citizenship, and his increasing advocacy of the civic and later regional surveys. These ideas came to increasing prominence outside Edinburgh from 1904, particularly through the early conferences of the new Sociological Society. For the moment, however, such ideas were secondary elements within the evolving notion of town planning.

THE BEGINNINGS OF STATUTORY TOWN PLANNING

The wider arguments for government action

Ideas and policy

This narrative has so far concentrated on the development of ideas within the planning movement and its precursors. We have traced the logic of the arguments for town planning as its inventors understood it. We have noted how their social, economic, political and religious backgrounds shaped the nature of the solutions they advocated. This is only part of the explanation of the development of planning as an aspect of policy, however. We need also to ask why the relatively small group of people who originated these ideas were able to convince government of the need to pass legislation, moving town planning beyond the realm of ideas and voluntary action. To answer this question we need to understand something of the wider context of insecurity on the part of the British ruling class at this time (Masterman, 1909; Read, 1972).

International insecurity and British cities

One of the main sources of insecurity lay in the growing recognition that Britain was losing the position of world dominance it had enjoyed for much of the nineteenth century. The dramatic rise of Germany and the USA as world economic and military powers certainly frightened Britain's leaders. A particularly telling experience was the physical unfitness of many of the urban volunteers for military service during the Boer War, an imperial war with a strong undertone of Anglo-German rivalry. Recruiting stations in the bigger cities were obliged to reject between a quarter and half of the volunteers on medical grounds; many more could be accepted only provisionally (Wohl, 1983). There were even more pessimistic claims that urbanization was bringing progressive degeneration of the British people.

Such concerns were reflected in the growing upper- and middle-class interest in eugenics, a branch of social genetics concerned with protecting and enhancing the hereditary quality of the population that began also to embrace social hygiene and environmental improvement for the masses. As well as prominent aristocrats, churchmen and professionals, its adherents included the Cadburys, the Chamberlains, Seebohm Rowntree, Patrick Geddes and other

members of the nascent town planning movement (Garside, 1988; Hardy, 1991a; Aalen, 1992). The political significance of its concerns was manifest when an Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration was set up by the Conservative government in 1903. The Committee's report the following year was critical of the environmental quality of urban life and made specific calls for ameliorative action, including greater control of the development of newer districts.

It was into this highly charged context that Horsfall's writings on German cities were received. Many observers were becoming predisposed to find reasons for Germany's spectacular rise to economic and military prominence after 1870 in its more advanced system of social provision. Perhaps, the argument went, if Britain adopted the German practices of planned town extension, low-cost housing (and technical education and all the rest), it would soon recover its former dominance. Certainly many of the more conservative advocates of town planning, such as Horsfall and Nettlefold, were quick to point this out. As Horsfall wrote in 1908,

Unless we at once begin at least to protect the health of our people by making the towns in which most of them now live, more wholesome for body and mind, we may as well hand over our trade, our colonies, our whole influence in the world, to Germany without undergoing all the trouble of a struggle in which we condemn ourselves beforehand to certain failure. (cited in Ashworth, 1954, p. 169)

This militaristic and nationalistic tone was all a far cry from the gentle Utopianism of Morris or Howard. But it struck a raw nerve amongst Edwardian opinion-formers and decision-makers.

Industrial unrest and town planning ideas

At the same time there were also mounting fears about the stability of British society. A new labour movement was growing, using mass unionism as a force to change the *status quo*. There were a growing number of serious strikes from the 1880s, particularly after 1906 (Read, 1972). And it is clear that many of the moves towards social reform that characterized the first decade of the twentieth century were seen partly as ways of relieving this pressure. Such reforms, including the relief of unemployment, old age pensions and health insurance, began to address the main sources of economic insecurity in working-class life. The advocates of town planning did not shrink from pointing out the role that their new model for working-class life could play. George Cadbury Junior, in 1915, summed up sentiments that many middle-class reformers had shared for some years:

The great stirrings of social unrest, which are such a striking manifestation in these days, are not controlled by considerations of finance only. The demand is not for a higher wage merely. In essence the demand is for a better way of life, for fuller opportunities, for the chance of self-expression in ways hitherto denied. Men ask for houses fit to live in – with gardens they can cultivate and air they can enjoy. They ask for a share in the good things of this life, in the things which elevate and inspire, and sooner or later that demand will be irresistible. (Cadbury, 1915, p. 136)

Social stability and town planning

What the town planners were essentially arguing is that society could be stabilized by widespread application of their principles. At the heart of the model they were purveying was

the middle-class notion of home and family. Although there was some interest in women's co-operative forms of living within the movement, especially at Letchworth (Pearson, 1988), the town planning ideas that entered the mainstream of political discussion rested firmly on the notion of an increasingly nuclear family. Community and citizenship were encouraged but to supplement, not replace, the family. To insecure Edwardians, assailed by suffragettes and the gloomy reports of urban deprivation, the family itself seemed to be in danger of falling apart under the impact of pressures as varied as poverty, militant feminism and birth control.

The garden suburb offered a means of extending the upper-middle-class ideal of the family home down the social scale (Edwards, 1981). Nettlefold's garden suburb at Harborne was to be an 'Edgbaston . . . for the working men' (Harborne Tenants Ltd, 1907, p. 2). And Harmsworth saw clearly the appeal of the model for the widening lower-middle-class suburban readership of his newspapers. Central to all this was the garden. It served to delineate a specifically private family space separate from that of other families, in sharp contrast to the communal space of the courts and alleys of the older working-class areas. But it was also a source of physical, moral and economic reinforcement to family cohesion and therefore social stability. These sentiments, also from the Harborne prospectus, were entirely typical: 'in cleaner air, with open space near to their doors, with gardens where the family labour will produce vegetables, fruit and flowers, the people will develop a sense of home life and interest in nature which will form the best security against the temptations of drink and gambling' (ibid., p. 2). Here then was a vision of cosy domesticity and social order to counter all the sources of insecurity that troubled the British ruling class in the last years of peace.

A peaceful path to real reform?

Moreover, it seemed, at least as the town planners portrayed it, that this vision could be implemented without heavy cost to any important interests (Sutcliffe, 1981a). The rates could be kept down, compared to a municipal housing programme. There would be no need for central subsidies. And the working class would benefit by better housing, the industrialist by a better workforce and greater certainty about co-ordinating his own investment plans with those of others. Existing suburbanites could avoid the devaluing effects of new slums being built near them. Even landed interests were supposed to benefit. Town planning had grown out of an attack on the existing system of land ownership and development. But now it was being argued that even these interests would benefit by a rationalized land market, which would reduce the uncertainties of the speculative development process.

Statutory planning in practice

The Housing, Town Planning Etc. Act 1909

It was against this background that the first town planning legislation was passed by the Liberal government (Ashworth, 1954; Minett, 1974; Sutcliffe, 1988). The arguments were put with great effectiveness by the National Housing Reform Council, which renamed itself the National Housing and Town Planning Council in 1909, and the Garden City Association, which became the Garden City and Town Planning Association in 1908. Despite Nettlefold's probable role in its drafting, the resultant Act was, in practice, a great disappointment to the movement. Its main long-term significance was to make town planning into a local government function, a decisive switch from the private efforts of early years. It was also important because it marked the official endorsement of town extension planning. Town

planning schemes could (there was no compulsion) be prepared for land liable to be used for building development. These would essentially allow the use and density zoning of the new suburban areas, though there were no powers to plan already built-up areas.

The 1909 Act and landed interests

Yet it would still have been possible to do a great deal with the Act if these had been the only limitations. One of the other main weaknesses lay in the unwillingness to intervene decisively in the land market (McDougall, 1979). Even the great reforming government of the Liberals from 1906, in spite of its other attacks on landed privilege, such as the famous 'People's Budget' of 1909, was reluctant to take sufficiently radical action. Despite its leadership by John Burns, a former socialist member of the LCC, the Local Government Board created a legal framework that was heavily compromised by urban property interests. Specifically, there was no central impetus for the really extensive municipal land purchase that Nettlefold had urged. And the measures for taxing land value increases (betterment) produced by planning actions proved extremely weak. The rate was set at 50 per cent, but proved virtually impossible to collect. Conversely, property was protected from planning provisions by extremely complex consultation procedures and, more seriously, the compensation system. This allowed owners the full value of any reductions in land value they could prove were the result of planning actions. In practice, the statutory town planning agenda would be largely set by property.

The 1909 Act and working-class housing

Such compromises did not help the effectiveness of town planning in solving the housing problem. The housing sections of the Act gave some limited encouragement to co-partnership societies, by increasing their access to cheap loans. In practice, however, this did very little to tackle a housing shortage that worsened noticeably in 1909–14. Despite John Burns's former leading role in working-class politics, the Act had little credibility within the developing labour movement. From the outset the leaders of working-class politics were sceptical about the progressive industrialists and middle-class reformers who pushed the cause of a reformed urban land market as the solution to all the ills of urban society. The 1909 Act seemed to confirm that the much vaunted battle between progressive industrial capital and reactionary landed capital, a key element of the rhetoric of liberal reformism at this time, had little substance, certainly when measured as material welfare outcomes for the urban masses. Instead the labour movement redoubled the pressure for municipal housing and central subsidies.

The implementation of the Act

The permissive nature of the Act, its procedural complexity and the great doubts about its possible benefits limited its use. Only Birmingham, where so much of the early conceptual groundwork for planning had been done, used the Act as its initiators had hoped, although they shared the general disappointment (Nettlefold, 1914; Cadbury, 1915). The city engineer began surveys of the whole city, particularly the developing urban fringe, and a series of town planning schemes were instigated, each covering parts of this area. Thus two of the first three town planning schemes to be approved in the whole country, in 1913, were Birmingham schemes. The first, for Quinton, Harborne and Edgbaston, was intended to continue Nettlefold's strategy of opening up the urban fringe for garden suburb development, largely at 12 houses per acre. The other Birmingham scheme, for the east of the city, was a mixed industrial and residential area. Another influential early scheme was for Ruislip–Northwood,




Figure 2.7 Under the 1909 Act local authorities began to prepare statutory town planning schemes and Birmingham was one of the most active authorities. The primary concern here, as in other early schemes, was land use and density zoning and the reservation of road lines for suburban extension. Notice how the scheme proposed a gradual transition from already developed by-law housing areas (see Figure 2.2) to what was becoming the new standard of 12 dwellings per acre, a solution which protected existing development land values.

a largely residential area in north-west London (Aldridge, 1915). But there were precious few others. By 1914 only 56 schemes had been begun in England and Wales, covering just over 50,000 acres. Progress in Scotland was even worse.

Professional implications

Despite such modest action, the Act was already having two important professional implications. First, it was moving town planning more decisively into the purview of the professional expert (Cherry, 1974b; Hawtree, 1981). Figures like architects Raymond Unwin (Miller, 1992) and Barry Parker and surveyor Thomas Adams (Simpson, 1985) had already demonstrated something of the potential role of town planners as professionals, rather than reformers. As the notion of town planning became a statutory function, however uncertainly, it was inevitable that this role would grow. This in turn affected the second dimension, because the Act had moved town planning from the voluntary sector into the local government arena. Here a rather different set of professionals, the borough engineers and surveyors, took hold of the new activity, giving it a rather different twist. As Birmingham's city engineer, Henry Stilgoe, remarked revealingly in 1910:

I think the people who will administer it [the 1909 Act] will be the borough engineers and surveyors of this country. It is their right. They are the officials, the statutory officials, appointed under the Public Health Act, and without their cooperation, and, in fact, without their intimate knowledge of their districts, this Act cannot be put into proper and efficient working order . . . what we want is men who will come forward and with a bold scheme, leaving the little matters, good as they are, the small garden suburbs, to develop of themselves. We must drive forward the great engineering works. The others will follow. Those people who talk so much about town planning do not know what they want; would not know what to do with it if given the opportunity.' (Stilgoe, 1910, p. 44)

Meanwhile the architects particularly were also asserting their rights to dominate the new activity in a major Royal Institute of British Architects' conference in the same year. Surveyors and lawyers also declared their interests.

The Town Planning Institute

Gradually, out of this rivalry, the need for an inter-professional forum began to be recognized. The emergence of independent town planning education with the setting up of the Department of Civic Design at Liverpool University in 1909 was an important step (Wright, 1982). Its journal, the *Town Planning Review*, fostered a new sense of planning as a professional activity in its own right. The idea of a new professional body was pushed by Thomas Adams, who had been central to the evolving town planning movement. He had worked on the early development of Letchworth, then became one of the first town planning consultants and, latterly, first planning inspector at the Local Government Board. In 1913–14 the Town Planning Institute (TPI) was formed following the deliberations of an informal inter-professional group (Cherry, 1974b). Its structure represented a compromise between architects, engineers, surveyors and lawyers, but its main significance was that it was, above all, a body of professionals. Reformers and propagandists could be associated with it, but only professionals could be full members. As the TPI's historian, Gordon Cherry, has observed, 'From now on the course of town planning was to be very considerably affected by professionalism and the liberal, humanitarian and social reform element was partly squeezed

into a professional frame. This “inner drive” both gained through technical expertise and lost through institutionalization’ (Cherry, 1974b, p. 61).

Conceptual developments after 1909

Conceptual innovation and professionalization

This growing professionalization of town planning affected the development of ideas. There was less attention now to the grand strategies of urban reform and more to the development of a professional practice. Densities, zoning, site layouts and civic design now became the staples of planning theory and practice, transmitted through professional education to a small but growing number of practitioners. Patrick Geddes’s emphasis on the need for surveys began to attract greater interest, although the shallowness and narrowness of statutory town planning schemes fell well short of what Geddes was advocating (Geddes, 1968, orig. 1915; Meller, 1990). More of the town planning literature of this period focused on professional ideas and practice, and there was less purely propagandist writing. There was a consolidation and articulation of design principles that had been established in some of the pioneer schemes. Foreign influences were revealed and, in many cases, further extended, and there were some significant British extensions of earlier initiatives.

The German aesthetic

One of the most notable trends was the interest in the traditional Germanic approach to ‘organic’ town design. This was distinct from the British envy of institutional arrangements described by Horsfall and drew particularly on the example of smaller historic towns. The main theorist of this approach was the Viennese architect Camillo Sitte, whose seminal 1889 book, *City Planning According to Artistic Principles*, although not translated in English until much later, became known through a rather bad French translation of 1902 (Sitte, 1965). Sitte emphasized the informality, absence of rigid layouts and careful use of streets and public spaces in older European towns. It was an approach that had a huge influence on Raymond Unwin, who had absorbed much from the medievalism of William Morris’s Arts and Crafts movement in the 1890s (Miller, 1992). By 1909 the impact of medieval German towns such as Nuremburg and Rothenburg became clearly apparent at Hampstead Garden Suburb and, through emulation, other early garden suburbs. It was, however, his 1909 book, *Town Planning in Practice*, that articulated these ideas in a comprehensive way with a lasting impact on the aesthetic of British planning.

Other foreign influences

Meanwhile, however, important ideas pointing in a rather different aesthetic direction also entered the rapidly evolving mainstream of British town planning thought. Unwin’s ideas of informality became accepted within a primarily residential and suburban context. But the planning of central areas, where the opportunity arose, seemed to require grander statements. The revival of classicist ideas under the influence of the French Ecole des Beaux Arts, saw a growing Edwardian interest in Baroque architecture that occasionally had wider planning significance, for example in the creation of the Cathays Park civic centre at Cardiff from 1901. There was also a growing interest in the American ‘City Beautiful’ planning approach, largely introduced via the new Civic Design Department at Liverpool (Wright, 1982). This had important similarities to the Beaux Arts tradition. It embodied a highly monumental,

classically inspired formal approach, making extensive use of landscaping. Major plans such as that by Daniel Burnham for Chicago (1909) were reviewed in the professional press. In sharp contrast with the small-scale suburban emphasis of the 1909 Act, however, most such American plans were intended as major exercises in civic boosterism (Sutcliffe, 1981a). There were few opportunities to plan on such a scale in Britain before 1914. Despite a 'City Beautiful'-inspired replanning of Port Sunlight, suburban planning was dominated by the informal aesthetic pioneered by Unwin.

Nothing Gained by Overcrowding

Paradoxically though, it was Unwin who pointed the way to standardizing this informality into specific residential density standards. In his booklet *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding* (Unwin, 1912), he showed how the local by-laws, with their insistence on needlessly wide streets, encouraged the packing of narrow-fronted by-law housing on this expensive frontage. This threw away the opportunities offered by generally declining land costs. In contrast he showed how a more spacious approach, possible especially if by-laws were relaxed, would allow lower densities with private gardens and public open space.

It was an argument directed at builders, developers, surveyors, engineers – and tenants. By this stage the town planning movement needed little convincing. It used the language of land and development economics, showing that garden suburbs did not need to be just philanthropic gestures. They could be profitable and still cheap to rent. Perhaps partly for this reason, he suggested densities of about 15 dwellings per acre (38 per hectare) that were slightly higher than those he and Barry Parker had actually used at New Earswick, Letchworth and Hampstead. Within a few years, events and falling land costs proved him too cautious and his earlier efforts more directly shaped the standards of the inter-war years. But this was in the future. In 1912 *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding* was of major importance because it seemed to demonstrate the economic rationality of low density.

OVERVIEW

By 1914 therefore town planning had arrived. It had been one of the great hopes for early twentieth-century urban reform, a cure for all the insecurities that assailed the ruling classes. But the hopes were exaggerated. When rhetoric was converted into legislative reality in 1909, liberal, middle-class reformism proved itself unwilling to tackle the power of land where it really mattered, in the urban arena. Town planning therefore was turned into something that was less an attack on landed interests, more a process of conciliating urban land and development interests into accepting an overall approach. Unwin's 1912 booklet was centrally based on this premise, in effect accepting that profit-seeking within the urban land market would continue to be the primary engine of urban development.

This was already far removed from the Utopian socialism of land nationalizers like Howard, whose ideas had given birth to town planning. As the radical ideas of land reform and co-operation were unpacked and remodelled into a new practice of town planning, they lost their social reformism and became instead a model for less fundamental, if still important, reform of the physical environment of the city. Coincidentally, they were incorporated into the mainstream of bourgeois reformism, espoused by progressive industrialists and later, as the ideas were converted into policies, professional practice. This institutionalization was the beginning

of a process that ultimately was to deny the traditions of independent radical thought from which town planning ideas had sprung. For the moment, however, the achievements of this institutionalization were so puny that the town planning movement retained much of its autonomy. The events of the next few years also reinvigorated some of the original spirit of radicalism that had spawned it.

3

Widening Conceptions and Policy Shifts, 1914–39

The 25 years between the outbreaks of the First and Second World Wars were extremely important for the evolution of all three dimensions of planning. For the first time planning was having real, if not always recognized, impacts on the development of towns and cities. The town extension policies embodied in the 1909 Act were implemented on a vast scale, although by mechanisms that had little to do with any formal planning actions. Meanwhile the conceptual bases of planning were being widened to embrace new spatial problems and rehearse new policy solutions.

This second phase in the development of planning thought had various origins. In part it was simply a reaction against mass suburbanization. Thus Howard's social city was reconceptualized as a model for managing urban growth involving planned decentralization and containment. Another source was the heightened social and political awareness of the long-standing problem of urban obsolescence, which encouraged a growing emphasis on planned redevelopment, increasingly under modernist influences. Entirely new concerns like the growing numbers of motor vehicles also stimulated planning thinking in a variety of ways. The most important new direction was the emerging concern with a national planning approach and regional balance reflecting the acute regional unevenness of the inter-war Depression years.

In contrast to this important conceptual activity, extending the range of planning ideas, there were only modest shifts in actual policies. After a short phase of political idealism associated with the later war and early peacetime years, the inter-war period was dominated by a pragmatic but ultimately cautious Conservatism, with two short periods of minority Labour government (Mowat, 1955). Attitudes to public intervention were dominated by the 'Treasury view' which held that government spending, however justifiable on social criteria, could only harm the economy and should therefore be avoided in a time of economic distress (Ward, 1988). Accordingly, the new conceptual agendas of the planning movement were addressed only in partial or limited ways. There were some important local initiatives, but these too were necessarily limited in their wider impacts. Overall therefore the period saw the conceptual development and rehearsal of a new policy agenda, but a postponement of any committed government action to address the items on it in a comprehensive way. At the outset, however, it seemed as if things might be different, as grand visions of a post-war world began to develop.

TOWN EXTENSION PLANNING AND MASS SUBURBANIZATION

Housing policies and town planning

Political context

From 1916 post-war reconstruction became an important government priority (Marwick, 1967). War produced only very slight destruction of the physical fabric of Britain's towns and cities, in contrast to the experiences of parts of Belgium and France (and indeed Britain itself during the Second World War). Yet reconstruction concerns grew from the political need to maintain popular support for a war that was horrifically expensive in human lives and required a far higher level of mass loyalty and commitment within the industrial workforce than was ever necessary in peacetime. In effect, as was to happen during the Second World War, war heightened the bargaining power of working-class men and women. The 1917 Russian Revolution reminded the wartime coalition government what could happen if mass needs were not satisfactorily addressed.

Britain, however, was an altogether more robust political edifice than Russia. Moreover, the war also strengthened the bargaining power of the industrialists, whose commitment was equally necessary to running the war economy. What this meant was that the emergent reconstruction agenda had to improve the lot of the working classes, although not in ways that would prove too costly for these powerful business interests. It became increasingly clear that greater state intervention, particularly to improve social welfare, would be an important means of managing these potentially conflicting pressures.

The pressures for government housing policies

There were important signs of these new political realities during the war itself. In the Second World War town planning quickly assumed a major position in reconstruction debates. Now, though, it was the question of housing that became prominent as the primary issue, albeit with strong connections to town planning. Thus the initial moves on rent controls, although not immediately linked to planning, were to be of profound long-term importance (Bowley, 1945; Melling, 1980). There was already, as we have noted, a serious pre-war housing problem. The war worsened this by bringing a virtual cessation of new housing construction and, more seriously, an increased demand for accommodation in the main industrial centres as production moved into higher gear to meet war requirements. In a virtually free housing market, this combination of fixed supply and increased demand quickly brought higher rents. In turn this threatened to have a knock-on effect by disrupting war production as workers pressed for higher wages. Higher rents themselves also directly produced serious disruption in some areas, particularly Clydeside, where there were rent strikes.

In 1915, therefore, the government passed the Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, which held rents at the pre-war level. It was a measure that benefited both sides of industry, essentially at the expense of the private landlords who lacked any strong political voice in central government. In the long term the move was important because it accustomed people to paying rents that were increasingly out of touch with market rents in a period of serious inflation. In turn this exacerbated the wartime disruption of the private housebuilders by seriously weakening their profit-based incentive to build. These specific short-term responses to the pressures of war and the continuing political strength of working-class interests, coming on top of the already serious pre-war housing position, pushed government into becoming a major provider of housing.

The Tudor Walters Report, 1918

As the government moved down the path of granting Exchequer subsidies to local authorities to provide council housing on a greatly increased scale, the question of design standards assumed prominence (Swenarton, 1981). The emergent reconstruction ideal favoured standards somewhat higher than pre-war norms. It was here that the direct link with town planning became more obvious. In 1917 the Tudor Walters Committee was established to consider the methods and standards of building the new working-class houses. Its chair, Sir John Tudor Walters, was a Liberal MP who was also a director of the Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust. Several of its other members were associated with housing reform and planning. However, its most important member was Raymond Unwin, the co-planner of Letchworth, Hampstead and New Earswick and by this time a senior housing and planning adviser with the Local Government Board (Miller, 1992).

The Report (Tudor Walters Committee, 1918), published a few weeks before the Armistice in autumn 1918, embodied much that was undiluted Unwin. What was proposed was a rationalized version of the garden-city-type cottage housing built at a density of 12 per acre (30 per hectare), the standard Unwin had evolved in his pre-war work. Following the Arts and Crafts origins of the garden city movement, the building technology was to be traditional, but using increasingly standardized materials. All the Unwin devices of attention to site and aspect were present. Space standards within dwellings were to be very high, better in fact than those for equivalent pre-war housing in the garden suburbs. The overall pattern for urban change was to be firmly based on pre-war town extension – the garden suburb rather than the garden city – and housing schemes were to be developed in conjunction with statutory town planning schemes.

Housing, Town Planning Etc. Act 1919

The Tudor Walters recommendations were embodied in the 1919 housing manual (LGB, 1919) and underpinned the Housing, Town Planning Etc. Act of the same year (Swenarton, 1981). This measure is usually known as the Addison Act after Dr Christopher Addison, the radical Liberal who was a wartime Minister of Reconstruction and then became the first Minister of Health, responsible for implementing large parts of the reconstruction agenda, including housing and planning. The Act became the main vehicle of Prime Minister Lloyd George's 1918 election pledge to make Britain 'a land fit for heroes to live in'. Its most important innovation was to provide central government housing subsidies. These were extremely generous and limited local authority loss to the product of a one (old)-penny rate, regardless of the final housing costs. The Act also included proposals to make the preparation of town planning schemes compulsory for towns of over 20,000 population, showing a clear intent to develop housing within a statutory planning framework (Cherry, 1974a).

The 1923 and 1924 Housing Acts

In fact the high cost of the housing subsidies and very high standard municipal garden suburb estates that were built under the Addison 'homes for heroes' programme soon proved too much for the Conservative majority in Lloyd George's coalition government (Bowley, 1945; Daunton, 1984; Smith and Whysall, 1990). Addison himself was dismissed and the programme was dropped in 1921. More modest fixed housing subsidies were reintroduced in the Housing Etc. Act 1923 introduced by Conservative Minister of Health, Neville Chamberlain, who had been closely associated with early town planning initiatives in Birmingham. The following



Figure 3.1 During the 1920s the principles of planned town extension were implemented mainly through the state-assisted council housing programme. This picture shows the Allens Cross estate in Birmingham, built from 1929 under the Wheatley Act. Detailed design and layouts of such schemes were usually more austere and standardized than the pre-1914 garden suburbs and there was less emphasis on community development. However, such estates were generally popular with the better-off workers who lived on them.

year John Wheatley, the Clydeside socialist Minister of Health in Ramsay MacDonald's first minority Labour government, introduced more generous subsidies in a further Housing Act. Both these Acts represented retreats from the most generous of the Tudor Walters standards, although 12 houses to the acre, suburban cottage-type housing had by now become the benchmark standard for such schemes (LCC, 1937; Manzoni, 1939).

Later housing legislation

Until 1929 the two Acts operated in tandem, with the Wheatley subsidy largely used by local authorities, the Chamberlain subsidy by private builders. In 1929 the Chamberlain subsidy was abolished by MacDonald's second Labour government. Arthur Greenwood, Labour's Minister of Health, strengthened the Wheatley subsidy, which had been reduced from the 1924 level, and added a new concern with municipal slum clearance and redevelopment in the Housing Act 1930 (Yelling, 1992). This became a dominant element in housing policy from 1933, when the Wheatley subsidy was abolished by the Conservative-dominated National Government. The approach of targeting housing subsidies on the less well off was continued when the Housing Act 1935 gave subsidies for the abatement of overcrowding.

We will return to examine important aspects of housing policy in the 1930s in the section

on the origins of planned redevelopment. For the present we can note that the bulk of housing built under these 1930 and 1935 Acts was also garden suburb-type housing, again following the basic 12 per acre density standard. Yet the pressure to build at lower rents for poorer tenants but with lower subsidies meant that the resultant housing was a rather degraded version of Tudor Walters' standards. Although individual authorities continued to produce good results, there was less attention to site and aspect detailing than Unwin had wanted. The space standards of individual houses were also much reduced. Overall such schemes were significantly worse than those built under the Wheatley and especially the Addison legislation (NCDP, 1976).

Private housing and town planning policies

The private housebuilding boom

The main political rationale for the shift in housing policies in the 1930s was the tremendous buoyancy of private housebuilding (Richardson and Aldcroft, 1968). In 1930 for the first time over 100,000 private houses were built in one year without subsidy in Britain. Despite the Depression, the figure continued upwards, remaining above 250,000 per annum during the five years 1934–38 inclusive and peaking at over 275,000 in 1935 and 1936. Even in 1939, when war brought severe curtailment of housebuilding, just over 200,000 private dwellings were completed. The overwhelming majority were suburban houses, usually in semi-detached or short terraced form, built at densities of 12 to the acre or less, with great emphasis on private gardens (Oliver et al., 1981; Whitehand and Carr, 2001).

The main sources of this boom reflected a combination of demand and supply factors. On the demand side, the lower cost of living in the 1930s' Depression years increased the disposable income of those who remained in employment. Demographically the tendency for smaller families also had a similar effect. Meanwhile there was a powerful shift in social preferences towards owner-occupation, a vision which became strongly associated with the garden housing of the new suburbs, especially in the advertisements of the development industry (Gold and Gold, 1990, 1994; Ward, 1998). On the supply side there were historically very low interest rates, the rapid expansion of the building societies, cheap labour and relatively cheap building materials. Around all the major cities undeveloped land was readily available and very cheap, reflecting the generally depressed state of agriculture. In the early 1920s land prices of about £300 an acre, sometimes much less, were common in provincial urban-fringe locations, a little higher in London (Carr, 1982). And there was a general willingness of local authorities and public utilities to service developments with water, gas, electricity, sewerage and roads. Above all, public transport had a decisive impact in opening up the urban fringe for residential development.

The role of public transport

In London the public transport undertakings, such as the Southern Railway, the Underground Group and later the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) under the leadership of Frank Pick played a key role in facilitating the spread of suburbia (Jackson, 1991). Underground extensions such as that from Golders Green to Edgware in 1924 had quite consciously opened up a whole sector of the urban fringe for development, which in turn generated more passengers. The suburban message was then promoted in advertisements: 'Stake your claim in Edgware. Omar Khayyam's recipe for turning the wilderness into paradise hardly fits the

English climate, but provision has been made at Edgware of an alternative recipe which at least will turn pleasant undulating fields into happy homes' (Graves and Hodge, 1971, p. 168). The formula was used over and over again (Ward, 1998). And similar tendencies were apparent in other cities, especially those where electrified commuter rail systems were being created. Everywhere though, the role of public transport was a decisive element in the private suburban development process.

Developments in statutory planning

But what, given such powerful formative factors in promoting private suburban growth, was the role of statutory planning? Before considering this we must review the main developments in planning policies since 1919. The record was not impressive. The compulsory element of town planning provisions in the Housing, Town Planning Etc. Act 1919 had never proved practicable, largely because, as feared by some planners, there were simply too few of them to operate the new system. Moreover, the housing section of the Ministry of Health had, for quite understandable reasons, given subsidies to countless council housing schemes without insisting that these be embedded within statutory planning schemes, as was originally intended. Deadlines for planning schemes had regularly been extended and progress under the Act proved very slow (Cherry, 1974b). By 1928, 98 of the 262 urban authorities with populations of over 20,000, for whom planning was theoretically compulsory, had still submitted no proposals, and very few schemes were actually near completion.

In recognition of the growing complexity of housing policies, housing and town planning had been separated as objects of legislation. The Housing Etc. Act 1923 was the last (until 1986) to incorporate planning proposals. It was also notable in extending the remit of planning to include areas of special architectural, historic or artistic interest, thereby launching the concept of what was later called the conservation area (Delafons, 1997). (Yet, apart from some limited application in Oxford, Canterbury, Winchester and a few other historic cities, little use was made of this new instrument, which had to be reinvented in 1967.) The Housing Act 1924 marked the legislative divergence of housing and planning. In 1925 a Town Planning Act consolidated existing legislation. Important planning provisions were also included in the Local Government Act 1929, allowing county councils to assume responsibility for statutory planning activities. In practice though, the system remained very similar to that created in 1909. The second Labour government came to power with a commitment to strengthen statutory town planning and extend its role.

Town and Country Planning Bill 1931

In 1931 Arthur Greenwood introduced a Town and Country Planning Bill, the first to consider rural issues, but also intended to confer greatly enhanced powers to plan urban areas (Ward, 1974; Sheail, 1981). Thus entirely new powers were included to allow planning to deal with already fully developed areas, which we will examine in the section on the origins of planned redevelopment (see pp. 55–63). Of more general importance were the proposals to reduce the gap between compensation and betterment, which had remained unevenly balanced at 100 per cent compensation to 50 per cent betterment since 1909. More seriously, the short period allowed for betterment collection meant that it was rarely recovered. Now the new bill included betterment proposals of 75 per cent and there was some prospect of a more workable system. Moreover, frontbench spokesmen on all sides welcomed the bill and gave it general approval.




Figure 3.2 By the 1930s the private housing boom saw the garden suburban imagery of the early planning movement fully adopted by private developers, building societies and commuter transport operators. Notice here how the suburban residential ideal of space, light, nature and fresh air, in contrast to the gloomy by-law terraces, are directly linked with the promotion of owner-occupation.

Town and Country Planning Act 1932

At this point, though, the Labour government fell, a victim of the economic, financial and ultimately political crisis of 1931 (Skidelsky, 1967). The subsequent general election gave a huge endorsement to the Conservative-dominated National Government, which secured 60.5 per cent of the poll and 554 of the 615 seats on a mandate of cutting government commitments. The new Conservative Minister of Health, Sir Edward Hilton-Young, himself a moderate Conservative, reintroduced the bill into a very different House of Commons from that which had considered it the previous year. The comments of a new Conservative member were typical:

In spite of what the Parliamentary Secretary has said ‘this is the 1925 Act over again, why grumble at it; it was a Tory measure’, that is what is the matter with it. Our party was as bad as most others in passing Socialist measures. There are many new Members in this House, and a good deal that has been done in the past we may take the opportunity of undoing. (Ward, 1974, p. 686)

And that, broadly speaking, is what happened. Many extra complications were introduced into planning procedures and the new proposals in the bill were hedged about with restrictions. Planning ceased, even formally, to be a compulsory obligation and a new concept of ‘static areas’ was introduced that heavily compromised the extension of planning to all areas built and unbuilt that Greenwood had intended. The embryonic, but little used, instrument for preserving the integrity of areas of special architectural, historic or artistic interest, introduced in 1923, also now disappeared (Delafons, 1997). The rather weak provision for individual building preservation orders did, however, lay the basis for important additions to planning powers in the 1940s.

Statutory planning under the 1932 Act

Paradoxically, despite its unpromising beginnings, the Act was more successful than any previous legislation. Thus the area covered by planning schemes at various stages of completion grew from over 9 million acres in 1933 (when the 1932 Act became operative) to nearly 26.5 million in 1939 (Barlow Commission, 1940). The numbers of approved schemes grew much more modestly, however, from 94 to 143. This reflected a growing willingness to engage with local planning activity, particularly by county councils, but a parallel scepticism about the need to go through all the cumbersome procedures of actually finalizing schemes. Interim development control in conjunction with a draft scheme became a favoured mechanism by which local authorities sought to influence the process of development.

Planning schemes and the private housebuilder

Much of the increase in the planned area simply reflected the spread of planning in the countryside (Sheail, 1981), but the main thrust of the statutory process remained in town extension planning. The town planning scheme typically allowed local planning authorities to introduce outline land use and density zoning and reserve road lines into the developing suburban areas. Often the schemes simply reflected and co-ordinated the expressed desires of individual landowners and developers, while incorporating the borough or county engineer’s road schemes. A good deal of persuasive discussion went on to try to convince recalcitrant property interests, usually on density questions. Planners had little more than moral or

technical authority in such negotiations. Essentially they were handicapped in imposing planning proposals on any landowner or developer who disagreed by the compensation provisions of the planning legislation, which could saddle their authority with heavy claims. When authorities wished to vary the development process significantly, the more predictable course was to buy the necessary land themselves, rather than work through the planning system.

Accordingly, despite occasional bleating from property interests, there is little evidence that the pre-1939 planning system was a serious obstacle to their operations. Development control, even for an approved scheme, was usually a formality since the scheme itself effectively permitted development to the extent of its proposals. Even in the occasional instances when permission was refused, enforcement powers were very limited. Overall the system contrasted sharply with the much tighter planning system which was created after 1945, when there were frequent complaints about excessive planning constraints on the supply of development land. In fact there was a strong inter-war tendency to 'overzone' land for development. Thus Unwin estimated that the residential land zoned in draft planning schemes in 1937, when Britain had an actual population of just 46 million, would have accommodated a population of 291 million (Barlow Commission, 1940, p. 113). Moreover the more rational development of whole areas that planning promised offered real benefits to individual developers. Thus it was common for private housing schemes to be advertised as conforming to the requirements of a local planning scheme.

Restriction of Ribbon Development Act 1935

There was one aspect of suburban development which caused particular public and political concern in the 1930s' building boom. This was the tendency for arterial roads to be subject to ill-considered ribbon development of cheaper housing extending out well beyond the more continuously built-up areas (Cullingworth, 1975, pp. 167–77). The practice saved developers the cost of building proper residential roads, but it damaged scenic quality and undermined the efficiency and safety of main roads by mixing local and through traffic. It was disliked even by many of the right-wing opponents of town and country planning.

Theoretically, the 1932 Act offered all the powers necessary to stop ribbon development. The practice, however, was rather different and a new Act specifically focused on this proven abuse was passed. It gave highway authorities (counties and county boroughs) immediate control over main roads, regardless of whether a planning scheme (normally prepared by a county district or county borough) was in force. Moreover, it had the tremendous advantage of allowing immediate enforcement, which was not possible under interim planning development control. Basically, it allowed the whole question of planning in the vicinity of major roads to be tackled more effectively. Yet, despite what the widening planning lobby would have liked, it did not challenge the predominant emphasis on peripheral suburban development as the main strategy for urban growth.

Planning solution or problem? Impacts of suburbanization

Overall dimensions

In all some 4.3 million dwellings were built in Britain between the wars, a greater addition to the housing stock than in any previous comparable period (Richardson and Aldcroft, 1968). Of these, almost 31 per cent (nearly 1.33 million) were provided by local authorities. Eleven

per cent (a little over 0.47 million) were built by private enterprise with state assistance (including housing associations). Over 58 per cent (just over 2.5 million) were provided by unaided private enterprise. As we have shown, the great majority of these dwellings were built in the new suburban areas at lower densities than ever before (Whitehand and Carr, 2001). This suburbanization occurred everywhere, although it was most pronounced around the big conurbations, especially in the more prosperous south and midlands. In particular, the distribution of private building closely reflected the wider economic changes in these regions.

Spatial impacts

There was, accordingly, a huge conversion of rural land to urban, particularly residential, uses, although no precise record was kept of the extent of this (Johnson, 1974). It has been estimated that the annual average transfer of agricultural to urban uses in England and Wales rose from some 9,100 hectares per annum in 1922–26 to 21,100 hectares in 1926–31. From 1931 to 1939 it was running at an astonishing 25,100 hectares per annum. This represented a total of over 340,000 hectares converted between 1922 and 1939, amounting to an increase of roughly 40 per cent in the total urban area. Not surprisingly there was a growing concern at the speed and extent of the change.

Impacts for agriculture

By the later 1930s there were growing fears about the implications of the loss of agricultural land, given the growing threat of war. Certainly suburbanization, especially around London, had often been at the expense of highly productive land (Robson, 1939). Thus London County Council's giant estate at Becontree–Dagenham had taken some of the best market gardening land in Essex and there were similar losses in west London. The whole issue was highlighted during the 1930s by the influential Land Utilisation Survey of Britain, headed by the geographer, L. Dudley Stamp (1962). There were, however, some weaknesses in the agricultural protectionists' arguments, since they took no account of the potential food production of suburban gardens, which proved very important during the war years.

Transport and congestion costs

One consequence of suburbanization was simply that the big cities got even bigger. This, combined with a rise in the numbers of motor vehicles from just over 2 million in 1928 to just over 3 million in 1939, including an increase from nearly 0.9 million to just over 2 million motor cars, contributed to mounting congestion problems, especially in central areas. Moreover, longer journeys to work for the suburbanite absorbed appreciable amounts of time and money. The average London family was spending £15 per annum on fares by 1938, representing 8 per cent of working-class family income (Barlow Commission, 1940). Clearly many suburban families were spending rather more than this, and the advantages to the transport undertakings of promoting suburban development were also diminishing. Thus it was increasingly noticeable that new traffic in the outer suburbs was being partly offset by the reduced revenue from the inner areas. There was also the growing and costly necessity to retain passenger stock simply to meet peak loadings for long suburban journeys to work, identified as a serious problem in Birmingham as early as 1932 (Finer, 1941, pp. 357–8). And by the late 1930s Frank Pick of the London Passenger Transport Board was rethinking his strategy of promoting suburban growth around London (Hall, 2002b, p. 65–6).

The social costs

Suburban living undoubtedly proved immensely attractive and popular with the majority of people who were able to bear the extra costs of living there. As well as extra spending on transport, mortgage repayments or rents were usually higher than in the inner city (Young, 1934; Durant, 1939; Williams, 1939; BVT, 1941; Jevons and Madge, 1946). Moreover, suburban areas could not offer the bargain shopping and cheaper food that was available in the street markets of the older districts. The low-density suburban homes also cost more to heat than the higher-density terraces. These costs bore particularly heavily on the working-class suburbanites, those in the cheaper private housing and especially the council slum clearance estates of the 1930s (Turkington, 1999). For them, lower-density garden suburban living did not always produce the health improvements promised by the pre-1914 planners. A famous study in Stockton showed how health actually deteriorated because very poor families from the slums were obliged to spend less on food in order to make ends meet (M'Gonigle and Kirby, 1936).

Suburban life

Even those with sufficient money to enjoy suburban living found that social and community facilities were often inadequate, especially in the early years. There was also a growing critique of the social coldness and soullessness of suburban living. Petty social distinctions between the smarter and cheaper private estates were rife. Council estates were usually beyond the pale and were resisted in many areas of private suburbia. In a few cases, notably at Downham near Bromley and Cutteslowe in Oxford, unofficial walls were erected by residents or developers to close roads between the two kinds of area (Collison, 1963; Weightman and Humphries, 1984). Even within socially homogeneous areas, a more private and less communal life seemed to be emerging. As a housing survey of Birmingham in the late 1930s noted, 'The neighbours are not so handy, or not so obviously neighbours at all, since they are up trim paths and behind trim curtains' (BVT, 1941, p. 96).

To many, particularly in private suburbia, this was less of a problem, as a new mass family and home-based culture of domestic life developed (Gittins, 1982; Weightman and Humphries, 1984; Jackson, 1991; Harris and Larkham, 1999). It was based on the notion of a comfortable home away from the city, occupied by a smaller, nuclear family and a widening range of consumer durables. It relied much more on home-based leisure pursuits like gardening or the radio. Yet, even for adherents of this new suburban culture, the dynamic and seemingly unstoppable suburbanization process was unsettling, particularly when their homes ceased to be on the edge of the city. The rural landscape and sense of being in the country, a quality that developers frequently emphasized, rapidly became more remote (although not as remote as it had become for inner-city dwellers of course). These issues formed yet another strand in the emergent social critique of suburbia.

In addition, it was a way of life that was increasingly subject to intellectual and left-wing criticism for the way it encouraged a sense of escape from the social realities of both the cities and the wider world (Oliver et al., 1981). Thus the famous socialist writer George Orwell, returning from fighting the Fascists in the Spanish Civil War and conscious of the imminence of a wider struggle, remarked, not unkindly, that the 'huge peaceful wilderness of outer London' seemed, along with most of the rest of the country, to be 'sleeping the deep, deep sleep of England' (Orwell, 1962, orig. 1938, p. 221). Such ideological perspectives were important because, in conjunction with the other manifest problems of suburbanization, they

had an important influence on many of the younger planners and architects of the period. And they certainly contributed to the growing interest in the higher-density and supposedly more communal forms of housing being advocated by modernist architects and planners whose work will be discussed more fully below.

Planned extension or unplanned sprawl?

The mounting critique of suburbanization during the 1930s frequently represented it as unplanned sprawl. Yet in its essentials it did exactly what the dominant strand of pre-1914 planning opinion had wanted. The main agencies of this change, the municipal housing authorities and the speculative builders, were certainly not those that Cadbury, Nettlefold and the other pioneers had expected or wanted. But did that matter? Inter-war suburbanization had extended the towns, providing huge quantities of good-quality and relatively cheap garden housing for a much wider section of the population than hitherto. Moreover, the design inspiration for the basic form of the housing certainly came from the garden city tradition (Sharp, 1932). The line of influence was directly traceable for the municipal garden suburbs via the Tudor Walters Report of 1918. It was still apparent, although more indirectly, for private suburbia. Statutory planning also played a significant, if not major, role in allowing mass suburbanization and providing some rudimentary framework within which it could happen. All this is not to deny that there was a debit side that was increasingly apparent by the late 1930s. Yet it would be wrong to imply that this arose because the suburbs were not planned in any fundamental sense. We have only to compare inter-war London with the French capital, for example, to see what unplanned suburbia was really like (Evenson, 1979). In Paris large numbers of self-built and frequently ramshackle suburban dwellings were put on plots with no co-ordination whatsoever and lacking even the most basic infrastructure. Dirt roads and lack of mains drainage were typical of many areas. Although environments like this did exist in inter-war Britain, in some rural and coastal areas (Hardy and Ward, 1984), the inter-war suburbs of British cities were, by comparison, models of ordered development. We must then reject the charge that the suburbs were not planned. What was happening was that, for the first but not the last time, a planning solution was in its mass implementation turning into a planning problem. It was this recognition that drove the search for alternative models for accommodating urban growth.

NEW MODELS FOR MANAGING URBAN GROWTH

Planned decentralization

A conceptual refit

As we noted in the previous chapter, there was from the outset a strong decentralist tradition in British planning represented by the garden city movement. This had, however, become largely deflected into ‘garden suburb revisionism’, part of town extension, before 1914. Ebenezer Howard’s grand vision of a social city network and a withering away of the large concentrated cities was largely forgotten (Ward, 2002b). Towards the end of the First World War, however, there was a revival in the purer strand of garden city thinking, although with some important differences from Howard’s original ideals (Hardy, 1991a). In 1918 a small but important book, *New Towns after the War*, was published as a contribution to the reconstruction

debate. The authors were a group of garden city enthusiasts who called themselves the New Townsmen. They included Howard himself, but the book was essentially the work of two of his younger supporters, C. B. Purdom and F. J. Osborn (New Townsmen, 1918).

Conceptually, it was important because it marked the first attempt to transform the garden city idea into the New Town. The key innovation was a much greater reliance on the state in initiating and undertaking New Town development, compared to the voluntarist, co-operative framework originally proposed by Howard. In addition, it was also becoming increasingly clear from this and other contemporary work, particularly by Purdom, that there was also to be an important though subtle shift away from the social city regional model. Instead the wider strategic concept was of new or satellite towns (as they were increasingly called in the inter-war years) used as a conscious strategy for metropolitan decentralization (Purdom, 1925). The objective was no longer to replace the big city but to accommodate metropolitan growth in an alternative form to continuous suburbanization.

The idea received clear endorsement in the Ministry of Health's Unhealthy Areas Committee Reports of 1920 and 1921 (Chamberlain Committee, 1920, 1921). The Committee was chaired by Neville Chamberlain (Cherry, 1980) and had a number of prominent members of the planning and housing reform movements. But its proposals, although conceptually important, had no immediate impact on policies. Foreign examples, particularly the work of Ernst May (a former associate of Unwin's) at Breslau and Frankfurt in pre-Nazi Germany, were to be influential in advancing the idea among British planners later in the 1920s (Hall, 2002b; Ward, 1992b). It was eventually to become an idea of tremendous importance for the long-term development of British planning policy.

A second garden city

Meanwhile, contradicting some of the views he had endorsed as a New Townsman, Howard initiated a second experiment in more traditional garden city development (Filler, 1986; de Soissons, 1988). Fundamentally, Howard did not believe the movement could afford to wait for the state to shift its ground. While his fellow authors wanted to concentrate on a propagandist campaign, Howard's response was that they were wasting their time: 'If you wait for the authorities to build new towns you will be older than Methuselah before they start. The only way to get anything done is to do it yourself' (Beevers, 1988, p. 160).

Given the failure of the New Townsmen to persuade government, even in its most idealistic moment under Addison, to bend in their direction, he perhaps had a point. But without consulting his sympathizers he went off and bought a site. Although horrified, they could not afford to discredit the movement by not supporting him. Thus Welwyn Garden City was born in 1920. Even more than Letchworth, it provided a model of good planning on principles that were now very familiar. There were many examples of learning from the first experiment and generally there were fewer compromises in its development. Its planner, Louis de Soissons, was able to maintain a consistently high design standard, especially in the centre which had a rather formal, neo-Georgian feel. Overall it became itself an important exemplar of the planning idea during the inter-war and wartime periods.

Municipal satellite towns

Despite Howard's pessimism, some municipalities also adopted elements of the emerging model of metropolitan decentralization in some of their large estates. Most prominent were Wythenshawe in Manchester and Speke in Liverpool. The former was the more ambitious,

a scheme for some 25,000 dwellings, 20 per cent of them private sector (Deakin, 1989). It also had the more authentic links with the garden city tradition in that it was planned, from 1927, by Barry Parker, Raymond Unwin's former partner at Letchworth. Speke was smaller, planned during the 1930s for ultimately about 7,000 dwellings, all of them municipal (HDL, 1937). Its neo-Georgian styling, designed during the 1930s by Liverpool city architect, Lancelot H. Keay, was reminiscent of Welwyn, although it had a rather higher proportion of flats and much poorer open-space standards.

Both schemes were very innovative in that they aimed for a high degree of self-containment, offering full community facilities and local employment. This last was a particularly ambitious aim, not achieved (or attempted) even in Ernst May's much-admired Frankfurt satellites. Occasionally a degree of self-containment had arisen fairly spontaneously within suburban areas. At Slough, for example, a new community grew around a pioneering industrial estate (see also below) or at Becontree-Dagenham, where the Ford motor company moved in 1931, providing much-needed local employment adjoining the giant London County Council (LCC) estate. Wythenshawe and Speke were planned from the outset with this in mind. Yet both showed some of the major difficulties in achieving planned decentralization through municipal action. A particular problem was securing sufficient land to allow the satellite to grow with even a very modest degree of physical separation from the 'parent city'. Both authorities had to obtain major boundary extensions, which seriously delayed development and was fiercely contested in the case of Wythenshawe. In both cases they were far from complete by 1939 and had not yet fulfilled their distinctive self-containment objectives.

Other decentralist proposals

The decentralist idea was given further endorsement in a 1931 report of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC) (Miller, 1992). This body had been established in 1927 to develop planning proposals for the metropolitan area, and its reports, issued in the late 1920s and early 1930s, broke new ground in several important respects, as we will see. The GLRPC's technical adviser and author of these reports was Raymond Unwin, who had by now left the Ministry of Health. In the 1931 report he proposed a combination of fairly self-contained, planned suburban units, satellite towns and industrial garden cities as a means of accommodating London's growth. Along with other parts of the emergent planning agenda, these proposals fell victim to retrenchment in the early 1930s. They did, however, help shape the growing debate about planning large urban areas in the 1930s.

The beginning of the decade also saw Unwin becoming a member of a Ministry of Health Committee set up under Lord Marley to examine garden cities and satellite towns. The group basically endorsed planned decentralization as an approach to regional and national planning and wanted to see a greatly strengthened planning framework to allow implementation. This was a conclusion that might have been received with some sympathy by Arthur Greenwood, the Labour minister who had initiated the inquiry. However, it found no support in the changed political order after 1931 and was only grudgingly published four years later (Marley Committee, 1935).

The National Government remained profoundly opposed to extending its influence over urban change, an essential prerequisite of a decentralist programme. Meanwhile an altogether more sympathetic approach to planning and particularly garden city ideas was apparent in the USA. It represented the culmination of a remarkably creative period in American planning,

producing two concepts that became extremely important to British planning history. Throughout this period, Britain benefited by very strong professional and cultural links across the Atlantic. Figures such as Adams (Simpson, 1985) and Unwin (Miller, 1992) practised in both Britain and the USA and played an important role in spreading new ideas.

The neighbourhood unit

The garden city idea, as originally articulated by Howard, had included the notion of 'wards' within the town that would each have their own communal facilities. In the late 1920s Clarence Perry, a sociologist working on the New York Regional Plan, had taken the idea




Figure 3.3 In the late 1920s Clarence Perry, an American sociologist, developed the important concept of the neighbourhood as a physical model for grouping community facilities in residential areas thereby, it was hoped, promoting social coherence. With slight modifications it was widely (and rather uncritically) adopted in Britain in the 1940s and after.



Figure 3.4 The other important American planning innovation of this period was the Radburn layout, perfected by Henry Wright and Clarence Stein. Heavily influenced by Perry's ideas, Radburn principles involved the separation of pedestrian and motor traffic, effectively updating the garden city vision for the motor age.

further and given it the formal title of the neighbourhood unit (Perry, 1939; Miller, 2002). It was to be a conscious grouping of schools, community facilities and shops within easy walking distance of housing in a way that would create a sense of social identity and attachment to the locality. These higher aims of social engineering are of rather dubious provenance but, as British planners became more aware of it in the 1930s and especially the 1940s, it became extremely popular. One of its first uses in Britain was by Barry Parker in his 1931 plan for Wythenshawe, discussed above.

The Radburn principle

Closely related to the neighbourhood unit was the distinctive residential layout developed by Henry Wright and Clarence Stein during 1927–29 (Stein, 1958). Radburn was actually a planned garden city project in New Jersey. Only one neighbourhood was ever built but it was sufficient to demonstrate the principle. It involved the complete segregation of pedestrian and vehicle circulation systems, making extensive use of cul-de-sacs, ‘inner parks’ and pedestrian underpasses. Overall Radburn was an adaptation of the low-density garden city type of residential environment to bring it into the era of the motor vehicle.

Radburn and neighbourhood principles were used together in the green-belt town programme introduced by President Roosevelt’s Resettlement Administration set up under the ‘New Deal’. The towns were small residential satellites with full community facilities (although no industrial areas) in a generous green-belt setting that separated them from larger population centres. Although only three – Greenbelt (Maryland), Greenhills (Ohio) and Greendale (Wisconsin) – were ever built, they attracted considerable interest in Britain because of their novel planning features. The Radburn principle was, however, slow to be adopted, partly because motor vehicle ownership was far lower than in the USA. It only began to be used on any scale in Britain in the 1950s. By contrast, the green-belt ideal made more headway in 1930s’ Britain.

Planned containment

The pressures for restraint

The corollary of metropolitan decentralization was containment, stopping the big city expanding so that its growth could be channelled into garden cities or satellites. As we saw in the previous chapter, this was an idea that had begun to be discussed before 1914, although not quite in the form it later came to be understood. The idea now began to involve the spatial limitation of urban growth, giving a firm edge to the city to allow the preservation of rural landscapes for scenic and recreational enjoyment and retention of agricultural land. It was a notion that advanced significantly between the two world wars. As part of the decentralist model it was pushed by the Garden City and Town Planning Association and there were small agricultural belts around Letchworth and Welwyn. Moreover, during the 1920s there was a mounting preservationist lobby reacting against all kinds of development that impinged on the countryside (Williams-Ellis, 1975, orig. 1928). The Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE) was formed in 1926 and soon became an important umbrella group, co-ordinating the efforts of many different bodies.

It was, however, very difficult to implement green belts through the statutory planning system because of the risk of heavy compensation claims for the loss of development rights. But the very cheapness of land that encouraged large-scale suburbanization also opened up

possibilities for large-scale purchases by municipalities or voluntary bodies to sterilize areas from development. Also, it sometimes proved possible to secure agreement to schemes preventing building, in some areas where land was held in large private estates. Politically there was a widening lobby for the green-belt idea, especially (and paradoxically) from many of the new suburban areas. Many of the new suburbanites certainly felt they were being cheated out of their initial direct relationship with the countryside by continuing building activity.

Early preservation initiatives

Many early policy actions were partial rather than being consciously directed towards the achievement of planned containment (Sheail, 1981; Elson, 1986). By the 1920s, for example, Birmingham had acquired a large part of the Lickey Hills on its south-western boundaries and there were similar initiatives in many other large provincial cities, especially Sheffield, Glasgow and Leeds. By 1934 Brighton had bought some 4,000 hectares of the South Downs to prevent building development. Voluntary actions were also important. In Birmingham the Bournville Village Trust and the National Trust dedicated large rural areas south of the city to perpetual undeveloped status. From 1927 the newly formed Oxford Preservation Trust raised money to retain important green areas around that city.

Although all these schemes shared a common desire to stop building development, there was a good deal of variation in practice about the prime objectives of such reservations on the urban fringe. In Brighton, for example, the main motivation was securing the purity of water supplies for the town, and similar concerns were apparent in the Pennines around Greater Manchester and Sheffield. In Oxford, scenic quality and a particular concern with protecting the setting of the historic city were paramount. Attitudes to public enjoyment of these preserved areas varied a great deal. Birmingham had always seen public access as a key consideration in the Lickeys, so much so that it operated a tram route to serve them. Access was much more limited in the Pennines, however, even to publicly owned land, although Sheffield made some areas available (Rothman, 1982). By further contrast, Brighton Corporation was prepared to allow public enjoyment (notably motor racing) of a type that sharply contradicted the preservationist aims of the adjoining authorities. These kinds of confusion and conflict were to be inherited as the incremental acquisition of open land on the urban fringe gave way to the more formal concept of a containing green belt.

The concept of a containment strategy

The Unhealthy Areas Committee had broadly endorsed the idea of a continuous agricultural belt in 1920–21, although with no immediate impact on policies. Gradually the idea was being changed from a continuous narrow belt of parkland within the city to something that could actually redirect urban development as part of a broader strategy for growth management involving planned decentralization. It took some time before this was articulated fully, although there were important interim stages. Barry Parker's first proposals for Wythenshawe included a narrow green belt to separate satellite and parent city. He also adopted the American parkway concept for the main road developments which were set in a generous open space reservation, attractively landscaped to create high scenic quality.

These developments were important in demonstrating the ways green belts could be treated as objects of design. Yet again it was Raymond Unwin who outlined its full strategic role, in conjunction with planned decentralization, as a means of managing metropolitan growth and change (Miller, 1992). Thus his first report for the Greater London Regional Planning



Figure 3.5 The Labour victory in the London County Council elections in 1934 brought decisive moves towards implementing Unwin's proposed green girdle. Punch adopted a Shakespearean analogy with Labour's London leader, Herbert Morrison, portrayed as Oberon, enlisting Puck's aid to put a green belt around the capital. Reproduced by permission of *Punch*.

Committee in 1929 incorporated schematic proposals for a ‘green girdle’ around the built-up area with green wedges along river valleys. Beyond were to be the new satellite towns, referred to earlier. There was, however, more short-term action on the matter of the ‘green girdle’ than on the remainder of Unwin’s work.

The origins of green-belt policies

Although the operations of GLRPC were curtailed in 1931, the quest for a London green belt was taken up by the LCC following Labour’s victory in the 1934 elections (Gibbon and Bell, 1939). The following year Herbert Morrison, the new Council leader, unveiled proposals to implement a green belt around the capital (Sharp, 1980; Ward, 1991). The LCC would provide funds (initially up to £2 million) to allow the purchase or acquisition of development rights on undeveloped land. Adjoining authorities, including Middlesex, Surrey and the County Borough of Croydon, also reinforced the LCC’s programme with their own vigorous programmes, providing ample testimony of the popularity of the scheme in urban-fringe areas. It did not quite produce the continuous area which Unwin had wanted, but he greatly approved of what was being done. Moreover, the manner of its implementation was easier than that implied by his proposals, since fewer authorities were involved. There was a legal loophole in the 1935 scheme, however, requiring the Green Belt (London and Home Counties) Act to be passed in 1938.

Eventually some 27,600 acres were acquired under the scheme, rather less than the 70,000 acres originally intended. But changes far more dramatic than Morrison or Unwin ever dreamed possible occurred in the following decade, superseding this original scheme, so it would be wrong to imply it failed. More serious though was that the exact objectives of the scheme in practice remained rather confused, echoing in some respects the confusions apparent in earlier and more incremental preservationist initiatives. The LCC, as befitted what was by now an inner urban authority, was particularly concerned with recreation and access for its residents. Yet its concerns were not always reflected in its practice, particularly since adjoining authorities were not usually anxious to see widespread public access. There was, though, no widespread concern about these issues of social equity. The green belt was a widely approved initiative which, by 1939, was being tentatively adopted as a model for other cities. There had, however, been greater tangible activity in the field of planned redevelopment, to which we now turn.

ORIGINS OF PLANNED REDEVELOPMENT

The need for renewal

The slum problem

Although the early planners had used the slum extensively in their arguments in favour of planning before 1914, little had actually been done to deal with the problems of obsolescence. Despite the demolition of some 548,000 dwellings between the wars, there were still over 3 million pre-1855 dwellings surviving by 1938 (Richardson and Aldcroft, 1968). They were the products of a relatively poor, industrializing economy. There had been no effective form of building control for most such dwellings. Building standards were often such that their expected life would have been a few decades at the most, even with a standard of maintenance

that most had not received. Moreover, many were designed in a physical form that was already seen as very unsatisfactory by 1914.

Local examples

In 1913, Birmingham, for example, had over 43,000 back-to-back houses (BVT, 1941). It also had over 42,000 dwellings without separate water supplies, sinks or drains. Over 58,000 dwellings had no separate water closet. These facilities had to be shared in the common courts on to which this housing fronted. And Birmingham, it should be stressed, was far from being the worst. The smaller city of Leeds had 78,000 back-to-backs in 1914, representing 71 per cent of its housing stock (Finnegan, 1984). Unlike other cities, it continued to allow them to be built well into the twentieth century, although about half had already been built before building controls were introduced. London suffered from a variety of slum types, including multi-occupied and decrepit larger property with shared facilities (LCC, 1937). It also had areas of small, poorly constructed working-class terraced housing, especially in the East End. Urban Scotland and Tyneside were typified by large numbers of exceptionally small dwellings, often with poor, shared facilities and normally overcrowded. Thus in Newcastle in 1921 almost 37 per cent of families lived in dwellings of one or two rooms. In nearby South Shields the figure was over 43 per cent (Mess, 1928).

The wider problems

But although housing was the most obvious manifestation of obsolescence, much of the remaining environment of these inner slum areas was also in need of renewal. Old factories and cramped workshops were often interspersed with slum housing, contributing to industrial inefficiency and pollution. Street corner shops and beer houses were often in a similar physical state to the housing. Parks and allotments were usually lacking and schools were often inadequate, especially in open-space provision. Road and street layouts were typically rather chaotic, reflecting an unplanned development process that predated and was increasingly inappropriate for the motor vehicle.

Was clearance the only option?

All these problems meant that wholesale clearance became the only viable policy for dealing with such areas (Yelling, 1992). Some local consideration was given to reconditioning and improvement policies, on the lines of pre-1914 'slum patching' and 'closet conversion' schemes. The latter, for example, were important on Tyneside in converting the last urban areas that relied extensively on ash closets after 1924. The problem was that such initiatives usually depended on landlords being prepared to contribute some of the costs. This was rarely practicable, since most slum landlords were people of small means, although a few housing associations did improve older property. In addition, the actual business of restoration was more difficult than it is today in the absence of the sophisticated chemicals to eliminate damp and rot. And, quite simply, most of the slum areas were too far gone to be salvaged.

The central areas

Although the slums posed much the most serious redevelopment problem, there were also mounting demands to renew and expand the central areas of towns and cities. Central commercial, retailing and administrative areas had been created in the later nineteenth centuries, but they were much smaller than today and often still hemmed in by slum areas of

the type described above. The pressures for change in the city centres in this period have been rather dwarfed by even more dramatic changes since 1945. But here too important changes began before 1939.

Thus the growth of a much more consumer-oriented society between the wars strengthened the demands for greater central shopping provision. New multiple stores like Marks & Spencer, Littlewoods, Boots and Woolworths began to make their mark in central locations (Jefferys, 1954). Bigger and grander department stores were also being built, especially in the provincial cities. The continued development of commercial and financial office-based activities created a similar pressure for new and bigger central buildings, as the volume of business for the insurance companies, banks and building societies increased (Weightman and Humphries, 1984). There was also a great expansion of the public services, especially local government. This generated further demands for central office space and other facilities. Changes in transport, towards the motor vehicle, were also creating mounting congestion problems in the Victorian streets of the central areas and generating demands for new central facilities like bus stations.

Ideas for the redeveloped city

Traditional influences

During the inter-war period there were two main sets of ideas available in approaching the design of redeveloped higher-density urban spaces: traditionalism, usually derived from classical architectural principles or more recent variants, and modernism. In general the British approach to urban design was rather more conservative than in other European countries. Accordingly, more traditional ideas, usually interpreted broadly as a restrained version of the *beaux-arts* approach, with its strong sense of formality and symmetry, or even more in neo-Georgian styling, tended to dominate many of the redevelopment proposals in both central and inner areas.

Central area redevelopments

There were actually very few large central area redevelopments in this period, but the few there were underline the strength of traditional design concepts in planned redevelopment. The Headrow scheme in Leeds, developed from the early 1920s (Ravetz, 1974a), or the slightly later Ferensway scheme in Hull were relatively unusual as large central street-widening and redevelopment projects. Both used very formal façades fronting on to widened streets. The many smaller central schemes usually betrayed broadly similar traditional influences, sometimes mixed with the classically inspired monumentality of the American 'City Beautiful' movement. Such mixes of traditional ideas were apparent in many of the projects for new 'civic centres' that were pursued in several towns and cities, for example in Birmingham, to provide distinct administrative areas of civic buildings surrounded by gardens within the central area.

Modernism

(i) **Le Corbusier** An altogether more challenging set of ideas was developing outside Britain: in France, pre-Nazi Germany, Austria and elsewhere (Larsson, 1984). This was the emergent functionalist and consciously international approach of modernism. During the 1920s and early 1930s this took important steps forward as an urban planning project with

the publication of a series of hypothetical plans by a Swiss-born, self-trained architect. His name was Charles Edouard Jeanneret, although by this time he was known as Le Corbusier (1946, orig. 1927). His *Ville Contemporaine* (1922), *Plan Voisin* (1925) and *Ville Radieuse* (1933) together represented a vision of a rational, functional approach to urban design (Le Corbusier, 1922, 1925). Important developments in his ideas are apparent, notably from a capitalist, class-segregated 'Contemporary City' to a syndicalist and egalitarian 'Radiant City'. However, most of the essential elements of the city as a physical entity survived this transition.

The basic assumption of his work was that the big city itself could be perfected. The 'Contemporary City' had a population of 3 million, a hundred times larger than Howard's garden city. Utopianism in planning no longer had to look to an escape from the big city. It was, however, to be a drastically remodelled city, based on very strict zoning principles and abolishing many traditional facets of the urban scene such as the corridor street, lined with buildings. The central areas, dominated by huge office towers, were to be major interchanges for road, rail and air. Huge superhighways were to be built right into the central city. Beyond this were first luxury apartment blocks set in parkland for the elite and then the lower-density satellite towns for workers and factories. The *Plan Voisin* broadly interpreted this ideal within the specific context of central Paris, making few concessions to the existing city. His final articulation of the ideal, the 'Radiant City', had an entirely uniform housing area in the central area, composed of giant 'Unité' slab apartment blocks and devoid of any social distinctions, with the office and administrative areas to the north and industrial areas to the south.

(ii) German examples Le Corbusier did not develop his ideas in isolation. Other architects were working along similar lines and an international group called the *Congrès Internationaux de l'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM) was founded in 1928. Le Corbusier's main role at this time was the development of a theoretical programme for the city. Meanwhile architects in other European countries were creating more immediate models. In Weimar Germany socialist architects such as Walter Gropius, Bruno Taut, Martin Wagner and Hans Scharoun were developing the design of residential areas in social housing schemes such as Britz and Siemenstadt in the Berlin suburbs, designed between 1925 and 1931. Particularly important was their use of modern apartment blocks in ways that developed attractive higher-density alternatives to the 12 cottage-type houses per acre of Britain (Ward, 2002a). Their community facilities, the care taken to separate pedestrians and traffic, and their provision of gardens and open space were all particularly impressive.

(iii) Other influences The social housing schemes of pre-Nazi Vienna in the 1920s and early 1930s were also important (Denby, 1938). Large apartment complexes were developed by the socialist-controlled municipality, most famously at the *Karl Marx Hof*, with excellent community facilities. There were also several notable French schemes, especially in the late 1930s. Most important were *Drancy-la-Muette* in Paris and *Villeurbanne* near Lyons, which included tower blocks of social housing of 16 and 18 storeys respectively. And the practice of architects in other countries, particularly Holland, Czechoslovakia and Sweden, also contributed significantly to the further development of modernism as a project for urban planning, especially in the design of housing areas. In the Soviet Union the concept of the linear city emerged (Miliutin, 1974). This revived ideas of the Spanish engineer Soria y Mata,



Figure 3.6 Modernist architectural imagery began to influence British planning thinking in the 1930s and had a marked influence on ideas for the redeveloped city. These 1930s' tower blocks at the Cité de la Muette at Drancy in the north-east suburbs of Paris were featured in several important British planning and architectural publications of the period, although there were no actual British examples of this form of housing until after 1945.

who in the 1880s had proposed a linear urban form, and combined them with Ebenezer Howard's garden city. The result reflected the exciting mood of early post-revolutionary social and design experiment in Russia that attracted great interest from the modernists further west.

Modernism and British planning

It was only during the 1930s that the ideas of modernism began to influence British planning (Ravetz, 1974b; Gold, 1997). There was a mounting ideological opposition to traditionalism, reinforced by the wider critique of suburbanization. This received powerful reinforcement as the rise of the Nazis in Germany and the increasing cultural conservatism of Stalinism in Russia brought many of the seminal figures of the modern movement into Britain during the 1930s. The MARS (Modern Architectural Research) Group was established to provide a British chapter of CIAM (Johnson-Marshall, 1966). MARS was heavily influenced by Le Corbusier's schemes and Soviet ideas of the linear city, as later became apparent in the revolutionary MARS plan for London, unveiled in 1942. But it was the shifts in housing policy towards slum clearance and the increasing use of flats in redevelopment that did most to introduce the concepts of modernism into British planning practice.

The 'Great Crusade' 1930–39

Early attempts at planned redevelopment

Considering the seriousness of the problems, it is remarkable that so little was done about the slum areas for so long. In fact, as we have seen, the problems of absolute shortage took priority in 1920s' housing policy. Neville Chamberlain's Unhealthy Areas Committee had addressed the slum question in 1920–21, but was largely ignored. Only a very few authorities took any significant action on slum clearance in the 1920s, particularly the LCC and Liverpool (Sutcliffe, 1974a; Yelling, 1992). The former produced an important scheme at Ossulston Street (near St Pancras Station) in 1926 that echoed some features of the early Viennese estates. Its final form was, however, a good deal more conventional than originally intended, a testimony to the prevalent design conservatism of the period. The favoured solution in both London and Liverpool was the neo-Georgian, traditionally built block with balcony access. Estate layouts generally showed little of the design innovation that was apparent in German and other schemes of the same period.

The Five-Year Programmes

The Housing Act 1930 and the abandonment of the Wheatley general-needs subsidy in 1933 marked, as we noted earlier, a decisive switch in housing policy. Local authorities had to submit Five-Year Programmes for clearance and renewal in 1934 (Richardson and Aldcroft, 1968). Reflecting the still-dominant policy of restraint in public finance, many of these targets were very low. Despite all its slum problems, Birmingham proposed a target of only 4,500 demolitions, although Manchester proposed 15,000 and Leeds (roughly half the size of Birmingham) a heroic 30,000 (Ravetz, 1974a; Finnegan, 1984). Nationally the target was a little over 333,000. As public expenditure restrictions were eased from the mid-1930s, the drive to clear the slums acquired greater momentum, becoming the 'Great Crusade' (to borrow the title of a widely circulated 1936 promotional film). A much more ambitious revised target of over 600,000 was introduced, although it proved over-optimistic.

The political economy of redevelopment

Against the political background of economic and financial orthodoxy during the 1930s, the mounting impetus to clear the slums, involving a great deal of government intervention, appears as a paradox. It certainly puzzled George Orwell (1970, pp. 214–16) when he arrived in Liverpool in 1936, admired its new Viennese-style workers' flats, and then discovered that they were the work of a Conservative council. There were certainly energetic Labour councils who pushed the slum clearance programme, especially Leeds, Sheffield and London, but the loose alliance of forces that underlay the 'Great Crusade' was much more complex than either municipal politics or the strength of the reformism of the planning and housing movements.

There was a growing business lobby for slum clearance. Sometimes this was expressed locally in desires to renew the city's social capital or extend the central commercial areas. This reflected concerns with business prosperity that overrode the, by now, rather marginalized private landlords of the slums. Moreover, the recognition of the huge new opportunities for business represented by the production and use of the new dwellings was very important. We can detect this in the great national interest taken in slum clearance by the building, building materials and energy industries. Model flats projects were sponsored by the concrete, steel, gas and other industries and important films were made by them to promote the slum clearance message. Quite simply, a move from a small, ill-equipped slum dwelling to a fully equipped modern flat or house implied a massive increase on the under-consumption represented by the slums. This was not just cement or bricks or glass or paint but also stoves, bathroom fittings, lighting systems, etc. The scope for growing business for such industries represented by planned redevelopment was immense.

The redevelopment process in the 1930s

Of course, as we noted earlier, the bulk of the rehoused populations moved to suburban estates. The densities of the slum areas (and of course it was the very worst slum areas that were



Figure 3.7 The most typical flats built in the redevelopment areas of the big cities in the 1930s were medium-rise blocks, sometimes (as here) reflecting the influence of the pre-1934 schemes of socialist Vienna, although without ever matching all the latter's progressive community features. This photograph, taken c.1937, shows the recently completed Gerard Gardens scheme in Liverpool.

being tackled at this time) were usually so high that it was never possible to rehouse an equivalent population on the site. Clearance also left large areas of land that could be reused in a variety of ways. Non-housing use was common in smaller centres. Wakefield, for example, had embarked on a scheme to extend its central shopping area and create a new bus station on slum-cleared sites by the late 1930s. In the bigger cities most inner-city sites were necessarily reused, mainly for housing, however. Inevitably this soon raised the question of new roads and social facilities.

By the late 1930s, towns and cities were beginning to declare redevelopment areas under the Housing Acts. This enabled them to consider the replanning of wider areas, albeit mainly for housing, rather than simply working on the basis of individual clearance areas. Birmingham, for example, declared a 267-acre redevelopment area in Duddeston and Nechells in 1937 and was actively considering other large areas (Manzoni, 1939). The LCC similarly declared a large area in Stepney and Liverpool had five smaller redevelopment areas by 1937 (HDL, 1937; LCC, 1937). Yet the limitations of general planning and housing powers for land acquisition made the implementation of wholesale replanning very difficult. Some cities, like Birmingham in 1939, also began the process of statutory planning for their non-suburban areas at this time, but the weaknesses of the 1932 Act were even more exposed in dealing with the non-housing aspects of redevelopment areas. Even the acquisition and demolition of houses proved very slow, and by 1939 only a small part of the overall problem had been tackled. But the redevelopment areas were important in initiating a policy concern that was largely completed under post-war planning and housing legislation.

Modernism and redevelopment

Much the same conclusion about having a preview of the post-1945 period holds true for the impact of modernism (Ravetz, 1974b; Gold, 1997). The bulk of flats built in redeveloped areas in the 1930s were very traditional in style. The LCC and Liverpool, the two great inter-war municipal flatbuilders of England and Wales, continued to favour neo-Georgian designs, although there were some exceptions. Gerard Gardens (1937) in Liverpool was an early experiment in a modernist design showing strong continental influences (HDL, 1937). Birmingham, the most reluctant flatbuilder, finally produced a compromised modernist design for its 1939 scheme at Emily Street (St Martin's Flats) (Sutcliffe, 1974a). Manchester had already pointed the way with Kennett House (1935) and claimed another first at its Greenwood Estate (1938) with the invention of the mixed development of houses and flats that became officially endorsed in the 1940s.

More dramatically modern in conception was Kensal House (1937), designed by CIAM member Maxwell Fry and very innovative in communal facilities. It was a demonstration scheme produced by the Gas Light and Coke Company in north Kensington, housing tenants from slum clearance areas. Most profoundly impressive of all was Quarry Hill (1938–41) in Leeds, a huge 938-flat scheme built on the same French building system as Drancy-la-Muette and inspired by the Karl Marx Hof in Vienna (Ravetz, 1974a). Built on a sloping central site, and eight storeys at the highest point, it incorporated many important innovations including lifts, a sophisticated waste-disposal system and communal laundries. Here was the most profound and complete pre-1939 expression of what modernism could do in the solution of Britain's urban problems. And it was in schemes like this that planners, architects and housing reformers increasingly saw the future. Developments at the regional level of planning were similarly beginning to rehearse future policy options.




Figure 3.8 By the late 1930s, slum clearance was being integrated in wider projects of comprehensive redevelopment involving new housing, community facilities and road systems. Gerard Gardens (Figure 3.7), visible as the fan-shaped building in the south of the area, was conceived as part of a larger scheme of redevelopment.

ORIGINS OF BALANCED REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Regional planning**Regional surveys**

As we saw in the previous chapter the Geddesian concept of the region, wider than the individual town or city, had featured in the initial body of ideas that had made up town planning. Despite this, the statutory framework of planning created in 1909 had ignored this dimension and made districts and boroughs into the sole planning authorities. The town planning scheme was very localized and did not oblige planning authorities to think about wider questions. There were some signs of a revival of regionalism in the later years of the First World War, however. The most important was the South Wales Regional Survey, established by central government as a response to wartime labour unrest on this important coalfield (MH, 1921). It had been felt that part of the problem was the poor environment and the absence of any social or economic counterbalance to mining in the communities where the miners lived. The committee quite sensibly moved beyond the survey role and its report, issued in 1921, was in effect Britain's first regional plan, notable because of proposals for socially and economically diverse satellite towns as an alternative to pithead villages.

Regional planning initiatives

The 1920s saw a great deal of regional advisory planning activity (Cherry, 1974b; Massey, 1989). Central government officials recognized the limitations of a planning system that was based on very narrow spatial units and encouraged *ad hoc* groups of local authorities to come together to think collectively about the planning of their areas. By 1931, 11 years of this encouragement had produced 104 such regional planning bodies in England and Wales, largely in the main urban areas. Such regional planning only had an advisory status and relied on its proposals being adopted within the statutory planning schemes of its constituent members. Moreover, the actual areas covered by such initiatives varied tremendously. Some, like the Midlands Joint Town Planning Advisory Council, established in 1923, covered a vast area of 1,565 square miles with a population of 2.5 million. At the other extreme were urban regions covering the immediate sphere of influence of a particular centre. The model here was the Doncaster Regional Plan initiated in 1920 to make proposals for planned development associated with this new coalfield area. There were many intermediate types of area, however, sometimes with boundaries that overlapped or were entirely contained within other regional planning areas.

The process of regional planning

Despite the absence of any overall framework, there were many advantages in this approach to regional planning. For one thing it tended to produce much more attractive documents than the town planning schemes, which had to be written in a highly legalistic style. The general standard of the documents was set by the most prominent regional planner of this period, Patrick Abercrombie (Dix, 1981). His elegant prose made a sharp contrast with the rather dreary planning schemes. Conceptually the plans were a derivation and a development of the Geddesian tradition of Place–Work–Folk. This attention to the major themes of change and continuity brought the plans considerable publicity in the provincial press. The plans also

provided a focus for a rather wider public debate than the town planning schemes, which tended to attract attention only from local property interests.

The implementation of regional plans

In many cases the regional advisory proposals did encourage co-ordination in local scheme preparation. The problem was that the only powers behind these regional plans were those of persuasion. Even the modest powers of the statutory planning process were available to implement the regional plans only if the local authorities who exercised these statutory powers were agreeable. A classic case here was in Manchester in the late 1920s where two regional planning committees developed alternative proposals for the area which became the Wythenshawe satellite town. The North Cheshire Regional Planning Committee reflected the fierce opposition to the proposal in Cheshire (and their successful resistance of a proposed boundary extension in 1927). By contrast, the Manchester and District Regional Planning Committee embodied the emergent satellite town idea, but was only able to begin to implement it when Manchester, which already owned most of the land, finally secured a boundary extension in 1930 (Deakin, 1989).

Despite such problems, this was something on which action could be taken comparatively quickly. The most radical proposals to come out of the regional plans were virtually impossible to implement in the short term. Rather, they often served to implant planning proposals that acquired longer-term significance. The most striking example was in Raymond Unwin's radical proposals to the Greater London Regional Planning Committee, noted above, which were only partially implemented. The green-belt scheme grew from his recommendations, but his most radical proposals for decentralization served mainly to rehearse new planning solutions that were taken further in the 1940s.

Regional planning and public spending

Finance was often a key consideration in the implementation of regional plans (Ward, 1986). Many regional proposals involved public expenditure, often on the part of agencies other than the statutory planning authorities. With a generally cautious central attitude to public spending in the 1920s, it was inevitable that few such proposals would be implemented. However, the 1929 general election saw unemployment and a major public works programme feature as significant issues (Skidelsky, 1967). The pace was set by the Liberals and their important 1928 publication *We Can Conquer Unemployment*, based directly on the work of the famous economist John Maynard Keynes. What he and the Liberals were specifically arguing was that public works would put money in the pockets of the unemployed which they would spend, boosting aggregate demand in the economy.

In fact the Liberals came third in the 1929 election, but they held the balance of power and the Labour government depended on their support. Moreover, some prominent Labour politicians (most notably Sir Oswald Mosley) were very interested in a public works-led programme to deal with unemployment, while Labour itself had no real alternative strategy, so these Keynesian Liberal ideas continued to reverberate in the policy process. The link with the regional plans is that they represented, in the eyes of many Liberals at least, an unparalleled shopping list of public works proposals. It was against this background that an official committee was set up in 1931, chaired by Lord Chelmsford, to examine the possibilities of using the regional plans in this way, especially in the depressed areas (Chelmsford Committee, 1931).

The regional problem

By this time the major dimensions of the regional problem were clearly evident (Law, 1981). The older coalfield-based, export-oriented industries of coal, cotton, steel and shipbuilding had been experiencing serious decline since the collapse of the post-war boom in the early 1920s. By contrast, a whole set of newer consumer-based industries and services like motor vehicles, electrical engineering, food processing, building materials and retailing were showing rapid growth, largely in the south and midlands. This unevenness was manifest in patterns of inter-regional migration and, above all, unemployment. In 1931, for example, unemployment (recorded in the Census) varied from 7.8 per cent in the south east to 19.2 per cent in the northern region, with the north west, Scotland and Wales all over 16 per cent. And it was getting worse.

Regional plans and the Chelmsford Committee

This background of mounting economic crisis meant that greater than usual political courage was necessary to implement a radical and fiscally unorthodox Keynesian programme. The problem was that it would have needed to rely on heavy government borrowing, which ran counter to the 'Treasury View' of public finance and would have frightened the financial markets (Ward, 1986). Moreover, Ministry of Health officials were very worried about forming too direct a link between a highly controversial public works programme of planning and the more regulatory frameworks of statutory planning. In the event, the Chelmsford Committee took a cautious line, which was heavily reinforced by the political changes of 1931. We have already noted how the Town and Country Planning Bill 1932 was badly mauled by the Conservatives. Any incorporation of positive public works proposals would almost certainly have been fatal.

Regional plans and the depressed areas

The result of this separation was that mainstream planning had little to offer the depressed areas of the north and west of Britain. Under the orthodox view of public finance that continued to dominate over most of the 1930s, areas of private disinvestment represented the most serious risk for public investment. The Ministry of Health carefully controlled the approvals of capital spending and maintained a secret loan sanction blacklist (known as List Q) that discriminated heavily against such areas (Ward, 1984). Partly for this reason, capital spending tended to be rather lower in the depressed areas than elsewhere. Thus new road schemes that were proposed in regional plans in depressed areas such as that for South Tyneside (STJTPC, 1928) remained unbuilt, although they were of great long-term importance.

Given this apparent unwillingness to implement public spending proposals in such areas, many planners questioned the validity of pursuing the normal kind of planning. If no new private-sector investment in industry was likely to occur, with no hope of major public works, what was the point of planning town extensions (or indeed garden cities or satellite towns)? Some of the later regional plans, for example Abercrombie and Kelly's Cumbrian Regional Planning Scheme of 1932, virtually admitted this. Occasionally the sentiment was expressed in more forthright terms:

[The Planning Officer] . . . may be planning in a 'distressed area'. And as he puts the delicate bands of colour on his map that will allow Coketown to expand from its present 20,000 to 200,000 inhabitants, the thought suddenly strikes him that the place has been damned and dead for years, with no hope of resurrection. Actually what he should be

planning for it are cemeteries to hold the wretched people who have been left, workless and poverty stricken, because of the lack of industrial planning, which he is not allowed to undertake. (cited in Ward, 1986, p. 16)

By this time, though, there were the first signs of a policy response to the problems of such areas (Ward, 1988).

Regional policy

Responses to the depressed area problem

We have already noted the Ministry of Health's financially orthodox response to the problem of the depressed areas. This was reinforced because the Ministry also took responsibility for locally funded poor relief, which tended to be very high in such areas, sometimes accounting for half of local authority expenditure. The underlying approach was defined by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, advising his Minister, Neville Chamberlain, in 1925: 'we and the other Departments should not agree to additions to the capital liabilities in these areas. One wants in effect to discourage people from sticking to them and to drive them into shifting for themselves by going elsewhere' (cited in Ward, 1988, p. 175).

In 1927–28 this was taken further in the Industrial Transference Scheme developed by the Ministry of Labour (Pitfield, 1978). This subsidized the movement of unemployed workers (and their families in some cases) out of high unemployment areas. This policy was seen as one of lubricating a 'natural' response to spatial unevenness and indeed far more people moved from such areas than were covered by the scheme.

Within this unpromising policy framework set by central government, many areas tried to attract new investment (Ward, 1990). Some reluctant encouragement for this came in the Local Authorities (Publicity) Act of 1931. Development Boards of various kinds were set up in Lancashire, Scotland, south Wales, Cumberland and north-east England from 1930 and there were many other local initiatives. The Ministry of Health was worried about municipal competition for new investment subsidized out of local taxation. Meanwhile, however, the Board of Trade hoped that such local initiatives might provide an alibi for their own inaction on the depressed area question during the worst Depression years. Ultimately, though, it was very difficult to mount effective local promotion and development policies while capital spending in such areas was inhibited by central constraints.

Special Areas Act 1934

As the Depression of the early 1930s began to ease nationally it was clear that recovery was barely touching the export coalfield areas of outer Britain (Fogarty, 1945; Ward, 1988). These areas had of course also been very badly depressed during the 1920s, and the likelihood of spontaneous improvement now seemed remote. In particular, out-migration from these areas had fallen greatly during the worst Depression years, simply because there were fewer jobs elsewhere. And there was now increasing publicity for the plight of such areas, reflecting a mounting public and political sympathy. Ministry of Labour figures showed the shipbuilding town of Jarrow on Tyneside, for example, with average unemployment of 67.8 per cent in 1934. In the nearby town of Gateshead it was 44.2 per cent. In Cumberland, Maryport recorded a figure of 57 per cent. The south Wales coal and steel town of Merthyr Tydfil had 61.9 per cent unemployment. And there were many other examples, usually of smaller




Figure 3.9 The appalling unemployment and dereliction of the depressed areas began to touch the consciences of middle-class public opinion by the mid-1930s. King Edward VIII highlighted the problem during his short reign. Visiting the derelict steel works at Dowlais, which had employed 9,000 workers, he said that ‘something must be done to find them work’.

mining villages, above that figure, although many sizeable towns had unemployment above 30 per cent.

It was political expediency which pushed the National Government into passing the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 (Booth, 1978; Pitfield, 1978). The National Government, firm in its philosophical commitment to economic orthodoxy, had absolutely no belief that such actions could be anything other than a social gesture. The legislation designated four areas – south Wales, Durham and Tyneside, west Cumberland and a wide belt of central Scotland – as so-called Special Areas, overseen by two Commissioners (one for England and Wales, another for Scotland). Extra financial assistance was to be available to these areas, although on rather limited terms. Moreover, nothing was to be done to ease the spending straitjacket of local authorities in the depressed areas. Some useful projects to clear derelict land, improve housing and health facilities and provide infrastructure were initiated, but the expenditure was minuscule compared with the size of the problem.

Special Areas Acts 1936 and 1937

During 1935 the pressure for more action on the Special Areas intensified. The imminence of the 1935 general election was important because many depressed areas (including Jarrow) had returned Conservative MPs in 1931. Not surprisingly they were rather worried about keeping their seats. Accordingly, an industrial dimension was added to the policy and

implemented in the 1936 and 1937 legislation. The first provided a framework for charitable money to be used to finance new small business projects via a body called the Special Areas Reconstruction Association. The second took this further and provided direct central government aid and extended the scope of such assistance beyond the Special Areas proper (to include, for example, areas like Lancashire). All this was done with as little real commitment as the original legislation. The amount of spending, although increasing, remained paltry in comparison with the scale of the problems. Qualitatively, though, the principle of giving special assistance to industry in such areas was an important policy innovation of profound long-term importance.

Industrial planning

This shifting of the Special Areas initiative into the beginnings of an industrial location policy in 1936 and 1937 began to bring more obvious linkages with mainstream planning policies. In 1936 the important policy of developing new planned industrial estates in the Special Areas began providing low-cost modern premises for new industries. Although there were references back to Trafford Park and the industrial estates developed at Letchworth and later Welwyn, the conceptual inspiration was the Slough Trading Estate (Cassell, 1991). This had been developed as a fully serviced industrial estate by a private company from the early 1920s. It had attracted an impressive range of the new lighter growth industries of the inter-war years and was regarded as one of the symbols of economic success in the period.

Now a slight variant of the model was used at new Special Area estates at Team Valley (Gateshead), Treforest (near Pontypridd) and Hillington (near Glasgow). Like Slough, they were large schemes; Team Valley, the biggest, was over 700 acres (Loebl, 1988). Their size and location, near main routes, was with maximum publicity value in mind, as at Slough. Development was carefully planned, with full road and rail transport infrastructure, although without the total package of electricity and process steam provided by the Slough estate company. Communal facilities, including canteens, were provided by the government-owned estate companies which developed them. Most importantly, a range of standard factories were available 'off the peg', although sites for self-build were also provided.

Other smaller industrial sites were also developed in other parts of the Special Areas, usually closer to the worst local unemployment blackspots, but these were less sophisticated than the big estates which themselves became important models of planned industrial development, widely emulated in the post-war period. Several local authorities were also actively planning industrial estate developments at this time. Although these were generally less impressive than the Special Area estates, those at Liverpool and Manchester were important because of their integration in the satellite towns of Speke and Wythenshawe, noted earlier. Ideas for developing similar relationships within a more comprehensive approach to regional development planning in the Special Areas, particularly in Durham, were also being explored by the later 1930s. Like much else in this period, however, this only bore fruit after 1939.

Special Areas and the wider planning debate

One of the key reasons why so much qualitative innovation in policy was crammed into such a heavily constrained programme was due to the personality of the first Special Area Commissioner for England and Wales, Sir Malcolm Stewart. A successful businessman in the brick and cement industries, one of the major growth sectors of the inter-war years, he did not behave exactly as his orthodox political masters hoped. As early as January 1935 the

Chancellor, Neville Chamberlain, noted: 'I am afraid we have made a mistake with our commissioner and I anticipate more trouble' (Booth, 1978, p. 149). Stewart constantly pushed his powers to the limit and used his three annual reports to press all sections of political and influential opinion for enlarged powers. Most important of all was his final report where he argued that the problem of the Special Areas could not hope to be solved without an embargo on new industrial development in Greater London (Barlow Commission, 1940). In doing this he authoritatively established a basis for a comprehensive reconsideration of planning policy.

TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The pressures for change

The end of laissez-faire

The late 1930s saw an important shift in business attitudes towards the role of government intervention beginning to take place (Marwick, 1964). The fact that a prominent industrialist like Stewart could so enthusiastically embrace increasing state involvement with private industry hints at this shift. Similarly, the manifest commitment of wide sections of industry for the 'Great Crusade' of planned redevelopment provides further evidence. Nor were these isolated instances. We could list many individual businessmen, including captains of both growing and depressed industries, who wanted to see a stronger government role in many aspects of economic life. Thus Israel Sieff of Marks & Spencer, Lionel Hitchens of Cammell Laird and Sir Basil Blackett of the Bank of England were all prominent advocates of planning. Similar shifts were taking place within the wider establishment. Thus we can find civil servants (although not yet the most senior), progressive Conservative politicians (for example, the young Harold Macmillan) and leading professionals looking to a more active government role.

These shifts were rather more important than those within the Labour movement because they represented changes in the thinking of the dominant political interests of the period. But the Labour movement's virtually complete abandonment of any project for the wholesale socialist replacement of capitalism was not without significance. Spearheaded by Hugh Dalton, Ernest Bevin and others, the Labour Party and trade unions became increasingly interested in the successful management of capitalism as a precondition for a welfare state (Saville, 1988). This involved a much greater reliance on economic planning, including all levels of spatial planning.

Intellectual advocates of change

A wider planning movement was beginning to take shape in the 1930s that was providing an intellectual basis for this shift. Most important was John Maynard Keynes who, with the publication of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* in 1936, demonstrated convincing arguments for an overall approach to macro-economic management based on demand orchestration (Keynes, 1973). Building on his earlier advocacy of public works, his arguments finally challenged the orthodox approach to public expenditure on which the whole philosophy of minimal state intervention during the 1930s' economic crisis was based. He gave scant attention to spatial matters (although he recognized a need for some regional economic policies) (Lonie and Begg, 1979), but his work provided the 'political space' within which more specific planning proposals could develop.

These were advocated by both old and new planning groups. Among the older groups, the Garden Cities and Town Planning Association conducted a campaign for a comprehensive planning approach, under the vigorous leadership of Frederic Osborn. Newer groups, especially Political and Economic Planning (PEP), founded in 1931, provided a valuable and convincing series of reports and commentaries on many policy areas, including authoritative studies on housing (PEP, 1934) and industrial location (PEP, 1939). And many local surveys highlighted the arguments for a more considered approach to planning matters.

Sources of change

The sources of this shift towards more comprehensive planning were not simply a product of intellectual changes and research, however (Parsons, 1986). They embraced the much wider concerns about the social and economic price of suburbanization in congestion costs and the loss of amenity and agricultural land noted above. They embraced too the mounting enthusiasms for planned redevelopment. To these were added a series of worries about unemployment and the depressed areas. Genuine humanitarian concerns, especially for the depressed areas, were certainly present. The famous Jarrow Crusade of 1936 brought forth a tremendous surge of sympathy for such areas (Wilkinson, 1939). But this was underpinned by real fears about the destabilizing effects of unemployment on the social and political fabric. The prospect of 'Love on the Dole', of people raising families in depressed areas without ever having worked, was particularly shocking to many in the comfortable classes. More threatening perhaps was the spectre of an alienated and embittered underclass, permanently unemployed and prey to political extremism. The rise of the Nazis in Germany and the apparent advances in the mid-1930s of the British Union of Fascists, led by the former Labour advocate of Keynesian public works, Sir Oswald Mosley, seemed to underline this threat. The Communists were also very active in the Unemployed Workers movement (Hannington, 1937, 1977, orig. 1936).

By the late 1930s there were other concerns that appealed directly to business self-interest (Ward, 1988). The continued growth of the consumer boom industries depended on ending the under-consumption represented by unemployment and poverty. In addition, labour costs were rising significantly in the prosperous regions in the late 1930s' boom, especially when rearmament began. The mounting threat of war also highlighted the great strategic importance of the badly run-down traditional industries and industrial communities of the depressed areas. Overall business interests were increasingly looking to government to reintegrate the depressed areas into the national economic and social mainstream. Meanwhile the increasingly imminent threat of aerial warfare underlined the folly of continued metropolitan expansion. Bigger cities made easier bombing targets and the failure to encourage new and militarily important industries like motor and aircraft manufacturing to grow outside the vulnerable south and midlands began to look very foolish (Hornby, 1958). Overall there was a growing demand for a more national approach.

A new beginning?

Overall policy shifts

Slowly and tentatively the government was shifting its ground, particularly where the arguments for a more interventionist approach were undeniable, especially to business interests. Apart from the quickening interest in slum clearance, noted above, the most striking instance

was in roads planning. Throughout the 1930s unfavourable comparisons were being made between highway development in this country and the imaginative approaches apparent in Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the USA (Charlesworth, 1984). A key problem in Britain was the localized control even of the main national routes. This meant that, despite all the Ministry of Transport's policy guidance, advice and grants, the creation of a truly modern national road system depended on the financial capacity and willingness of the local highway authorities (essentially the counties). Many of these, especially in the rural and depressed areas, were unable to sustain major programmes. The nationalization of control of these routes was therefore a precondition of any major improvement programme. The Trunk Roads Act 1936 put over 4,500 miles of major roads under direct Ministry of Transport control. This allowed a truly national programme to be devised, paralleling the major exercise in roads planning for London produced in 1937 by Sir Charles Bressey and the architect Sir Edwin Lutyens. But of course these initiatives came too late to have any real impact before the outbreak of war.

The Barlow Commission

All the mounting concerns for a more comprehensive and national approach to planning came together in 1937 when Neville Chamberlain, by now Prime Minister, set up the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population. It was headed by a former Minister of Labour, Sir Montague Barlow, although from the planning viewpoint much the most important member was the most experienced and respected regional planner of the inter-war period, Patrick Abercrombie. Other members were drawn from business, the professions, the civil service and the trade unions. Their terms of reference were wide ranging but fully reflected the moves towards comprehensivity we have identified:

to inquire into the causes which have influenced the present geographical distribution of the industrial population of Great Britain and the probable direction of any change in that distribution in the future; to consider what social, economic or strategical disadvantages arise from the concentration of industries or of the industrial population in large towns or in particular areas of the country; and to report what remedial measures if any should be taken in the national interest. (Barlow Commission, 1940, p. 1)

This was in many ways a direct response to Sir Malcolm Stewart's parting shot as Special Areas Commissioner. It was also a breakthrough in the sense that it showed that government was at least looking at the urban and regional problems of Britain as a whole. Chamberlain was widely praised for his statesman-like action (although as PEP pointed out, it would have been truly statesman-like if he had done it ten years earlier). But it did not necessarily signal a commitment to significant change. Parsons (1986) particularly has stressed how sceptical Chamberlain and many Conservatives remained about any real policy shifts. Although the pressures for more powerful planning policies were impressive and growing, the forces that were limiting change also remained strong. The evidence presented to the Barlow Commission during 1938 highlighted these limits.

The limits to change

There was still a good deal of caution about drastic change (Ward, 1988). Despite the commitment of particular businessmen, the Federation of British Industries was reluctant to see anything beyond a government information and advisory role on industrial location. Similarly, although there was acceptance of a social case for more planning by government

departments, the important economic case, implying locational controls, was not accepted, especially by the Board of Trade (and, although it did not give evidence, the Treasury). Even some prosperous provincial cities, like Birmingham, which had pioneered local planning, were deeply sceptical of national planning controls, especially on industrial location. Its civic leaders were acutely aware that their avoidance of the inter-war recession had rested on the freedom of the new industries. To this list we could add urban property. Remarkably, no evidence was presented to the Commission by any body representative of such interests. This was despite the fact that the Commission was actively considering a significant shift in the balance of public and private power in the urban land market. But we can be certain that they opposed much of what this shift implied, as we will see in the next chapter, when the tentative shifts of the late 1930s received the powerful reinforcement of war.

4

A New Orthodoxy of Planning, 1939–52

The outbreak of war in September 1939 appeared to dash hopes of any immediate action on the planning front. The quickening governmental interest in planning matters that had been apparent in the last years of peace, particularly in the work of the Barlow Commission, seemed to have been put into suspended animation. At home the new and urgent wartime priorities of evacuation, air raid protection, rationing, and a whole panoply of government emergency controls took precedence. Yet it soon became clear that physical and land use planning was not as irrelevant to the war effort as was immediately supposed. In fact the war turned out to be the catalyst that finally overcame political objections to the creation of a comprehensive physical and land use planning system.

The 1940s thus became the most critical decade in the development of British planning policy. They saw the dramatic emergence of an active and mass consensus for a rather radical form of planning during the war years. This was paralleled by the development of a new and comprehensive policy agenda and, after some delay, its translation into a new policy framework. Conceptually too there were important innovations apparent in the plans prepared during this period. By 1952, therefore, an entirely new planning system and practice of planning had been created that was to survive, with some important modifications, to the 1970s. Yet the mass consensus of wartime had narrowed and shifted its character to a more enduring and moderate form by the early 1950s. This chapter shows how and why these important changes took place and begins to consider some of their more important consequences.

WAR AND THE EMERGENCE OF A MASS CONSENSUS FOR PLANNING

The war economy

State controls

During the Second World War Britain became a centrally directed state economy to an even greater extent than had occurred in the 1914–18 war (Calder, 1971). By 1943 state spending, under a Conservative-dominated wartime coalition government, accounted for almost three-quarters of the gross national product, higher than at any time before or since. Behind this lay an extraordinary range of state controls that would have been totally unacceptable in peacetime, but were accepted with equanimity and a surprising degree of popular enthusiasm in the equally extraordinary circumstances of war.

As never before, the state operated its own factories and directed the work of private businesses. The normal operations of the stock and money markets were curtailed. Private property, including land, could be and was appropriated at short notice for government purposes. The use of labour was heavily controlled on an almost military basis to facilitate war

production. Rationing and the queue became the official allocation mechanisms for many ordinary commodities, reducing (despite black marketeers) the active role of money and the price mechanism. Even in their own homes, householders could at short notice find themselves having to accommodate complete strangers. And to those in the armed forces the hand of the state was even more dominant.

Full employment

The effects of this wartime collectivism were much more beneficial for ordinary working people than they might sound today. After the mass unemployment of the 1930s, the most positive effect of the state-directed war machine was that it brought full employment. This was of profound long-term importance because it showed beyond doubt that government could ensure that everyone had a job, if the political will was there. This was something governments between the wars had conspicuously failed to do, and the contrast did not go unnoticed. Full employment also strengthened the position of working people both in their workplace and in society generally. The war economy, and indeed the whole war effort,



Figure 4.1 Bombing destroyed lives, homes and communities. The poorest districts, near docks and factories, were usually the worst affected, leaving bewilderment and confusion among survivors. In such circumstances firm plans for rebuilding and a commitment to create something better were seen as imperative to maintain civilian morale. The aftermath of the Blitz also fostered a society and a state that were more caring than before 1939, with lasting effects on the political agenda of post-war Britain.

depended on the active support of the ordinary workers to a far greater extent than was common in peacetime (Marwick, 1970). Government and employers necessarily became aware that they had to address the needs and demands of working people.

Industrial location policies

Another related issue that was to be of long-term importance in planning history was the way wartime production was steered to the traditionally depressed areas (Booth, 1982; Parsons, 1986). Such moves, which had begun under rearmament but were now intensified, reflected the need to make best use of labour surpluses and avoid areas at greatest risk of bombing. The control mechanism was a Board of Trade licence, introduced by the Location of Industry (Restriction) Order of 1941, under the wartime Defence Regulations. Initially the licence was to apply to businesses using premises of over 3,000 square feet, but this limitation was dropped the following year. The importance of these controls was, of course, that they again demonstrated what was possible when the political will was present. Moreover, they showed businessmen that government industrial location policies could work in their interests by helping them to make maximum use of cheaper labour.

Land and the built environment

Bombing

War also brought major changes to the urban and rural fabric of Britain (Calder, 1971). Much the most dramatic was the destruction produced by bombing. In the autumn, winter and spring of 1940–41 the *Luftwaffe* launched a strategic bombing offensive, ‘the Blitz’, against London and major provincial cities. Although this was the most concentrated period of attack, intermittent bombing occurred throughout the rest of the war. The ‘Baedeker raids’ (named after the then famous tourist guides) concentrated on historic towns. Flying bomb and rocket attacks continued until the final months of hostilities.

In total 475,000 dwellings were destroyed or made permanently uninhabitable in England and Wales alone. Destruction was particularly severe in some towns and cities (Hasegawa, 1992). The most badly affected were London, especially east London, Liverpool, Bristol, Southampton, Plymouth, Hull, Belfast, Coventry, Clydebank, Sheffield, Exeter and Canterbury. Virtually every city of any size (and many smaller towns) experienced at least some damage. Nor was there any certainty of immunity in those few centres that emerged unscathed.

The urban land market

The overall impact of war on the urban land market was nothing short of catastrophic. Although a few London property agents profited from the demands of bombed-out businesses (Marriott, 1969), bombing obviously did not encourage property values to recover (Ambrose, 1986). A few astute individuals were shrewd enough to acquire valuable redevelopment sites at knock-down prices, but generally urban property interests looked for government to come to their rescue. The immediate problems were addressed in war damage legislation from 1941. There was, though, no immediate rush to redevelop. Property and development interests looked for major injections of confidence and certainty into the urban land market before being prepared to initiate any redevelopment on bombed sites (Ward, 1975; Backwell and Dickens, 1978). The only agency capable of providing this confidence during wartime was the state.

Building licences

The government's major preoccupation in the immediate aftermath of bombing was patching up repairable buildings and ensuring that only new development essential for the war effort (such as factories or emergency housing) was undertaken. Again a special licensing system, administered by the Ministry of Works and Buildings, was introduced in 1941, surviving until 1954 (Kohan, 1952). The building licence enabled government to make a decision about whether any development project was justified on the grounds of its economic or social value to society. This was a quite separate question from whether it accorded with any town planning criteria. It was not in fact administered by planning authorities but by the district valuers who worked directly for central government. Yet the existence of this far-reaching building control system parallel to planning was to prove extremely important as the new more permanent post-war planning system was created.

Rural land

The countryside generally benefited by the wartime state support of agriculture in order to boost home food production. The risks of government expropriation of rural land for wartime purposes or eviction of unco-operative farmers diminished some of these benefits, but generally not for the majority. In sharp contrast to peacetime, when agriculture had been every bit as depressed as coal or cotton, lavish assistance was available for improvement and drainage. It was in fact yet another instance of state involvement in the economy protecting the position of important interest groups, in this case the farmers and rural landowners.

The demand for planning

Business interests and planning

As the preceding discussion has shown, the war and many of the short-term government measures that were introduced to facilitate the war effort helped prepare the way for a more permanent planning system. Important interest groups such as the industrialists and farmers were brought into much closer collaboration with government than was usual in peacetime. Moreover they found the relationship profitable, even when it involved unprecedented restrictions. All this predisposed them to add their general, if not always unqualified, support to the emerging wartime government commitments to a post-war system of comprehensive physical and land use planning that began to emerge after the Blitz.

Even before 1939 the rural landowners, represented by the Central (later the Country) Landowners' Association, had shown a considerable measure of support for planning. They were now joined by the industrialists. Thus we find the Federation of British Industries commenting in the editorial of its journal in July 1941:

Bombs have made builders of us all. We have hoped, and continue to hope that, in terms of bricks and streets, the tragedy of today may become tomorrow's opportunity. . . .

Industry, while seeking as much freedom for its choice of sites as is compatible with national (and local) interests, will agree that there ought to be some sense of orderliness and proportion in the planning of industrial towns . . . (cited in Ward, 1975, p. 13)

Urban property and development interests had been the traditional opponents of a more interventionist planning system. Thus the opposition of the National Federation of Property

Owners to state acquisition of development rights under active consideration in May 1941 was quite predictable. As we have seen, however, such interests had been greatly weakened by war. Their admission that bombing had created a 'new and unprecedented situation' (*Estates Gazette*, CXXXVII, 1941, p. 473) that required new national planning powers was effectively an admission that they needed planning in these areas (Ward, 1975; Ambrose, 1986).

Wider social pressures

The extent of popular and media interest in planning issues during the war years was also quite extraordinary. To some extent this flowed directly from the changes that war brought to society by breaking the narrowness and fragmented nature of peacetime social existence (Calder, 1971). It brought people from all classes of society into close contact with each other as part of a common endeavour, often while coping with shared hardship and loss. An early example was the evacuation scheme (intended to decrease the concentration of population in cities) which took mothers and children from poor inner-city working-class districts and billeted them with wealthy residents of the urban fringe and countryside. The armed forces and other forms of national service (for example in the mines or on the land) also 'mixed up' society in ways that were quite unknown in peacetime.

These and similar experiences gave ordinary people throughout society insights into the tremendous divisions and inequalities which then existed in Britain. Among the middle and upper classes, who learned most from such revelations, they encouraged a growing sense of the unfairness of many of these traditional distinctions and a commitment that things would have to be better when the war was over. Bombing did a great deal to strengthen this developing mood, since it mainly affected the poorer, working-class districts that adjoined the factories and docks. Those who had gained least out of British democracy were now losing their homes, communities and lives in its struggles. A genuine commitment on the part of wide sections of middle- and upper-class opinion grew out of this to create something better, as a kind of repayment for wartime suffering.

The class dimension and morale

There was, however, more to the emergent social commitment to planning than the middle and upper classes simply doing 'the decent thing' for the poorer members of society. A critical variable was the greatly strengthened power of the working classes because of full employment. Indeed, in wartime their bargaining power was heightened further, because the whole war effort depended on the active commitment and co-operation of working people to ensure the smooth and efficient operation of the fighting services and the war economy (Marwick, 1970). This assumed still greater importance during the period of the Blitz because of the widespread belief among military strategists that a strategic bombing offensive against cities might well produce a catastrophic decline in civilian morale. Thus the wartime diarist Harold Nicolson, who had a junior ministerial post at the Ministry of Information, wrote after the first raids: 'Everyone is worried about the feeling in the East End, where there is much bitterness. It is even said the King and Queen were booed the other day when they visited the destroyed areas' (Nicolson, 1967, p. 114).

The worst fears were not borne out, and civilian morale held remarkably well, as it did later under the much heavier bombardment meted out to German cities. But government received a sharp reminder that it needed to act decisively to sustain morale at this time when Britain's

cities were, in effect, the ‘front line’ of the battle. Planning and physical reconstruction were, as planning bodies such as the Town Planning Institute were quick to point out, obvious ways of doing this. Yet the working classes were not themselves actively demanding town planning itself to any great extent. In fact they had the much more tangible wants of decent housing and neighbourhoods and secure employment. Planning was portrayed as a means to those ends but, importantly, it also offered a way of reconciling them with the requirements of the other interest groups, notably industry and land, who had now lent at least some backing to the planning idea.

Propaganda

It was, then, against this background that Churchill’s wartime government actively began to sponsor the notion of a comprehensive planning system. In the months and years that followed, a huge amount of effort was put into the promotion of the planning idea. Maps, models, exhibitions, radio broadcasts and films were all used to put over the message (Gold and Ward, 1994). Newspapers and magazines gave large-scale coverage to planning matters on an unprecedented scale. Despite wartime shortages, a large number of books appeared to feed the public and political appetite for knowledge about planning. Thomas Sharp’s brilliantly argued Penguin paperback, *Town Planning* (1940), was a bestseller (Stansfield, 1981). Official agencies like the (hugely important) Army Bureau of Current Affairs and private bodies like the Town and Country Planning Association (the former Garden City and Town Planning Association) organized lunchtime talks and discussion groups (Hardy, 1991a). Almost invariably it was a message which was sold by professionals, middle-class reformers or junior officers, usually of centre-left political sympathies. These were becoming the guardians and the evangelists of the new consensus for planning. Meanwhile, within government, a group of people with broadly similar social backgrounds were actually formulating the details of the new system. That they were able to do this owed much to the dramatic high-level political shifts of 1940–42.

FORMULATING THE POST-WAR PLANNING AGENDA, 1940–42

The Barlow Report

Context

It is conceivable that even without the war some strengthening of planning powers might well have occurred. The most tangible sign of the mounting pressures to act was the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population (the Barlow Commission) appointed two years before war broke out. As we noted in the previous chapter, however, Neville Chamberlain’s government was reluctant to move decisively. The act of setting up a Royal Commission with a timescale of several years was itself a symptom of this indecision (Parsons, 1986). The outbreak of war initially allowed this indecision to continue, although the Civil Defence Act 1939 had actually reflected part of the spirit of the Barlow message, by charging town and country planning with the duty of avoiding dangerous concentrations of population. More seriously, however, the publication of the Commission’s report, completed by September 1939, was deferred. Following parliamentary pressure, it was finally published in January 1940 (Barlow Commission, 1940).

Findings

Although the Barlow Report has good claim to be considered the single most important policy document in British planning history, this was not immediately apparent when it was issued. Analytically it was impressive. There was a detailed study of the patterns and processes of change in the distribution of population and employment in recent times and the problems it posed. It considered the increased regional unevenness between the depressed and buoyant regions of Britain, the huge scale of inter-war suburbanization of both people and jobs, the increasing tendency to redevelop inner slum areas and the problems of the countryside. It also authoritatively spelled out why these spatial phenomena, separately or together, were national problems and why existing planning powers were inadequate.

The analysis was thorough so far as it went but, with hindsight, it is clear that it gave too little attention to service employment as a determinant of the geographical distribution of population. The emphasis was almost completely on the impacts of mining and manufacturing industries, with the geography of services seen as deriving largely from the patterns of these primary and secondary industries. In addition, although perhaps more understandably, the Commission failed to recognize the growing significance of large multi-locational firms as a factor in regional development.

Recommendations

More immediately, however, it was the slightly indecisive and cautious nature of the recommendations that struck those in the planning movement. Majority and minority reports were issued, reflecting a failure to agree not so much about the nature of the problem as on the solution and, more especially, the means to achieve it. Both called for a central planning authority and accepted the planning and other arguments that the present patterns of development were largely unsatisfactory in their cumulative effects. Regional balance in the distribution of employment, planned metropolitan decentralization and the continuance of planned redevelopment, all to be major elements of post-war strategic planning policy, were endorsed as planning objectives.

There was disagreement about the extent to which new industrial development should be restricted. The majority wanted it to be restricted only around London, whereas the minority, including Patrick Abercrombie, wanted restrictions to apply to a wider area. They also wanted inducements to be available to assist industrial development in the depressed areas. More generally they wanted a more powerful central ministry than that proposed by the majority. It was these minority proposals which began to seem more appropriate in the changed circumstances of war, but it took the Blitz to convince the government of this.

Lord Reith and the Ministry of Works

Reith's appointment

We have already noted the new pressures that the Blitz imposed on government. One of its first responses was to create a new Ministry of Works and Buildings to oversee the immediate building activity that would be required in October 1940. It was headed by an austere and autocratic Scot, the newly ennobled Lord Reith who, as Sir John Reith, had set up the BBC during the 1920s and 1930s (Addison, 1975). He was not a professional politician and had no real party allegiance. Like several other outstanding and dynamic managers, he had been brought in to help run the war machine. Partly because of his background he lacked many

basic political skills, such as knowing when to compromise and how to acquire allies. His independent and intransigent personality was to be a crucial factor in the fluid political situation created by bombing. More than any other single figure it was he who translated the emergent demands for interventionist reconstruction measures and the weakness of those interests traditionally opposed to planning into the beginnings of real policies.

Reith's planning responsibilities

In the discussions about his remit, Reith secured a vaguely defined responsibility for the long-term reconstruction of town and country (Cullingworth, 1975). This inevitably involved planning, although at this stage statutory planning remained the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. Matters were further confused when another more senior minister was appointed in January 1941 with overall responsibility for post-war planning and reconstruction. Reith, however, was untroubled by the niceties of these ministerial precedents and overlapping responsibilities (or the misgivings of his own civil servants about linking works and planning too closely) and began to push the planning agenda at a quite extraordinary speed.

'Plan boldly'

One not untypical incident gives a particular flavour of Reith's impact at this time. Early in 1941 he met a municipal deputation from the blitzed city of Coventry, who were beginning to wonder how to tackle the immense task of rebuilding, given the absence of any powers other than the rather weak 1932 Act. Without any assurance yet that the rest of the government would agree to his rapidly evolving proposals for a comprehensive planning system, Reith seized the moment: 'I told them that if I were in their position I would plan boldly and comprehensively, and that I would not at that stage worry about finance or local boundaries. They had not expected such advice. . . . But it was what they wanted and it put new heart into them' (Reith, 1949, p. 424).

He gave the same advice to other blitzed cities, seeing them as test cases which would be used to determine what kind of planning powers would be needed. It was a decisive moment in the history of British planning policies. Suddenly all the traditional limitations on planning action were, on ministerial advice, to be ignored (Mason and Tiratsoo, 1990).

Another more politically visible symptom of how much things had changed was his establishment of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, headed by the Honourable Mr Justice Uthwatt. Its brief was to advise what powers the government should acquire in this traditionally most sensitive dimension of town planning: the relationship between the state and the land market.

Government commitment

Meanwhile the Cabinet (of which Reith was not a member) decided to back Reith's proposals for a more comprehensive approach to planning. Given the mounting popular and political pressure for such moves, an 'action-man' figure like Reith was politically useful. In February 1941 he was able to make an important statement, expressing the basis of government thinking:

- (1) that the principle of planning will be accepted as national policy and that some central planning authority will be required;
- (2) that this authority will proceed on a positive policy for such matters as agriculture, industrial development and transport;

- (3) that some services will require treatment on a national basis, some regionally and some locally. (cited in Cullingworth, 1975, p. 61)

This marked a clear policy break with the past. Government was here committing itself to the basic principles of a planning policy radically different from what had gone before, even if it was still far from clear what the exact form of the policy would be.

'Moving too fast'?

The immediate political pressures on the government to be seen to be taking action on the planning front diminished as the Blitz ended and the nature of the war shifted to involve Russia, the USA and Japan during the remainder of 1941 (Ward, 1975). Yet Reith was not easily stoppable and was busily engaged in developing proposals for a central planning agency and the necessary legal framework for the new comprehensive planning policies. Not surprisingly, he was finding himself in continual conflict with other ministers who were jealous of their own post-war responsibilities, which Reith now appeared to be usurping.

Nor was the opposition purely internal. The land market also began to show the first signs of recovery as the likelihood of an invasion receded. Thus the interim proposals of the Uthwatt Committee for state acquisition of development rights on undeveloped land provoked a sharp response from the National Federation of Property Owners: 'it would mean, in effect, the nationalisation of a part of an owner's interest in land, and thus strike at the principle of private enterprise in property' (*Estates Gazette*, CXXXVII, 1941, p. 582).

For the moment, though, Reith was in a strong enough position to ignore these kind of pressures (Ambrose, 1986). In August 1941 he established the Scott Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas to advise him on other aspects of planning policies. Throughout 1941 he was initiating important plan-making activity, especially for London. After intense ministerial discussions he also secured the overall authority for physical planning that he had been seeking. The Ministry of Health's statutory planning powers were transferred and he became Minister of Works and Planning in February 1942. The central planning authority had appeared, but Reith himself was sacked within a few days of the decision. He was a victim of mounting Conservative fears about the radical nature of the planning agenda he was formulating and his personal lack of political friends (Reith, 1949).

The Uthwatt and Scott Reports

After Reith

Although one man had played a key role at a critical moment, and was now being sacrificed for political expediency, there was by early 1942 a huge momentum for planning and reconstruction issues. Property interests were certainly re-emerging as a significant lobby, seemingly somewhat horrified at what they had conceded over the preceding months. The wider social backing for planning was still strengthening, however, particularly as more specific proposals began to emerge and entered popular discussion through propagandist efforts. Industry also remained generally sympathetic, broadly welcoming the appearance of practical schemes and proposals. In the longer term the most important of these were the Scott Report and the Uthwatt Final Report, which appeared in summer 1942.

The Scott Report

The Report of the Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas (Scott Committee, 1942) contained what the official historian has called ‘a remarkable hotch-potch’ of specific proposals and recommendations related to rural land and life (Cullingworth, 1975, p. 41). At the heart of the report was the assumption that the countryside was a precious asset that should be protected, particularly its major industry, agriculture. It was a view that exactly embodied what its vice-chairman, the geographer L. Dudley Stamp, had been arguing in the 1930s when he had been horrified at the loss of farm land to urban uses (Stamp, 1962). And of course it made a great deal more sense in wartime, when productive farming was critical for national survival and the countryside itself had become a powerful symbol of the homeland for which people were fighting. (We can detect such sentiments, for example, even in Vera Lynn’s immensely popular wartime song ‘The White Cliffs of Dover’, which contains lines that are replete with rural imagery such as ‘The shepherd will tend his sheep/the valley will bloom again’.)

Virtually all the Scott Report’s majority recommendations (and there were over a hundred of them) derive from the presumption of preferential treatment for farming and the countryside. Among the most significant were proposals for national parks, nature reserves, green belts, strict controls on any industrial or other developments in the countryside (with particular concerns to ensure compactness and avoidance of good-quality agricultural land) and a whole series of measures to revive the quality of village life. Only S. R. Dennison, a distinguished economist, who issued a lengthy minority report, challenged the majority assumptions as a basis for long-term planning. Little notice was taken of these views, however, which now appear a good deal more far-sighted than perhaps they did in 1942. By contrast, the majority recommendations received much public attention and attracted widespread approval.

The Uthwatt Report

In contrast to the diversity of Scott’s concerns, the Final Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Uthwatt Committee, 1942), although written in the dry professional language of the lawyer, focused exclusively on one topic of the highest political significance (Ambrose, 1986). Its concern was to ensure that the state system of planning had the powers in relation to private landed interests to be able to implement the kinds of policy which Scott (and Barlow) had recommended. At the heart of the report were its proposals for compensation and betterment. It was, of course, the obligation of the planning authority to compensate private landowners who suffered through planning action. The discussion of betterment, in essence increases in land value, referred to the obligation by private landowners to pay at least some of that increase to the state, on the grounds that planning decisions or actions would be responsible for creating at least part of it.

The Final Report confirmed the approach signalled in its Interim Report (Uthwatt Committee, 1941) that had so alarmed the property lobby. It was clear the Committee favoured a highly interventionist solution that avoided many of the problems of the pre-war planning system by relying heavily on direct state ownership of land or development rights. Thus it proposed that development rights in all undeveloped land should be immediately acquired by the state with compensation based on March 1939 development values. Furthermore, the land itself would be purchased outright by the state (at undeveloped value) when development was set to occur. If private development was envisaged, the land would then be leased out at its development value, so that betterment (and freehold of the land) was retained by the state.

The proposals for built-up areas, still largely outside any statutory planning controls, avoided the outright nationalization that was to be applied elsewhere. The same principles of state intervention were apparent, however. As a first stage, planning controls were to be imposed in such areas, so that the right to change land use or redevelop were effectively nationalized. Paralleling the recommendations for newly developing areas, redevelopment was also to be brought directly under state (that is, local authority) control. Thus the local authorities would be granted stronger compulsory purchase powers for bombed or obsolescent areas that needed wholesale reconstruction. Again private developers might become involved in such redevelopments, but land in redevelopment areas would only be disposed of on a leasehold basis that ensured betterment stayed with the local authority. Finally, a betterment levy of perhaps 75 per cent would be collected on already developed sites on a regular basis.

Popular and political reactions

The reactions to Uthwatt tell us a good deal about the continuing strength of the new consensus for planning that had been forged since 1940. In property circles there were cries of rage, for example from the Housebuilders' Association, which complained about 'sweeping and Dictator-like proposals' (*Estates Gazette*, CXL, 1942, p. 536). More widely there was widespread press support even from many Conservative newspapers (*ibid.*, p. 273). Labour's *Daily Herald*, although generally supportive, even criticized the report for being too modest and wanted full land nationalization. Partly as a result of this high level of popular interest, the fate of Uthwatt, with Scott and Barlow, was coming to be seen as a test case of the government's commitment to building a better world after the war.

PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLANNING AGENDA, 1943-45

Wartime planning legislation

Government commitment

By the later years of the war there were many doubts about the extent of the commitment of Churchill's government to action on the high reconstruction ideals that had been encouraged in the early war years. Increasingly, popular opinion was looking forward to the implementation of Uthwatt, Scott, Barlow and other proposals, particularly the hugely important Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (which set out proposals for the welfare state and was also published in 1942). There was a growing anxiety, fostered by the left, to ensure that the country was not 'cheated', as had happened between the two world wars, when Lloyd George's promise of a 'land fit for heroes to live in' had given way to unemployment, poverty and another war (Calder, 1971; Addison, 1975; Hennessy, 1993).

There is little doubt that Churchill himself also wanted to avoid this sense of disillusionment, although his preferred solution was to try to retreat from what this clutch of reports seemed to represent. As final victory began to look inevitable following the late 1942 Allied successes in the Coral Sea, at Stalingrad and El Alamein, the morale-boosting arguments for post-war visions disappeared. Traditional Conservative concerns for ensuring the health of the normal processes of wealth creation began to take precedence. In January and February 1943 Churchill gave explicit warnings to his Cabinet about the 'dangerous optimism' that was

developing about post-war reconstruction: ‘While not disheartening our people by dwelling on the dark side of things, Ministers should, in my view, be careful not to raise false hopes, as was done last time by speeches about “homes for heroes” etc.’ (Churchill, 1951, pp. 861–2). Set against this background it is easy to understand why most of the major legislative planks of the new planning orthodoxy were still not in place by 1945. But some significant partial steps were taken.

Ministry of Town and Country Planning

One of the most important steps was the creation of a second (and more enduring) central planning authority. Reith’s successor as Minister of Works and Planning had not been interested in the planning remit and after a great deal of inter-departmental wrangling it was decided to hive off planning to a new small Ministry of Town and Country Planning, created in early 1943. In many respects a ministry with a specific remit to deal with issues that had



WALLFLOWERS

16 July 1943: *Three reconstruction reports strongly neglected by the Government.*

Figure 4.2 High public expectations about post-war planning had been engendered during 1940–42. By 1943 there was a widening view, expressed here by the famous radical cartoonist Vicky, that vested interests were blocking any decisive action on the trilogy of wartime reports. Meanwhile the new Minister of Town and Country Planning, W. S. Morrison, was able to do little to fulfil the promise of his new Ministry. Copyright © Vicky/Solo.

a highly technical dimension was a sensible solution. Reith had brought in a very talented group of planners, including William Holford (Cherry and Penny, 1986), Gordon Stephenson (Stephenson, 1992), Thomas Sharp and John Dower, who now joined the new Ministry. The problem was that its Minister, W. S. ('Shakes') Morrison, had no Cabinet position and had relatively little 'clout' in dealing with other established ministries. Specifically, there were no powers over finance (essential for action on Uthwatt), housing, industrial location, transport or agriculture. It was, as the prominent planning propagandist Frederic Osborn put it privately, 'grudgingly equipped with charming but weak men unable to fight for the necessary powers' (Hughes, 1971, p. 51). Had there been a firm overall government commitment to act, this need not necessarily have been a problem, as was demonstrated after 1945. W. S. Morrison did not have this, however, for the reasons we have already outlined.

The Interim Development Act 1943

The first legislative fruit of the new Ministry, The Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act, seemed to confirm these fears (Ward, 1975). Superficially it was a great step forward because it implemented a key requirement of the new planning agenda by putting all the country under planning control. In June 1942 only 3 per cent of the area of Britain had been covered by operative planning schemes, with a further 48 per cent subject to resolutions to prepare schemes and interim control. At a stroke, therefore, this Act put the remaining area on to a similar basis. What weakened it was that it merely applied a streamlined and very slightly strengthened version of the 1932 Act, which everyone was now agreed was a very unsatisfactory basis for planning. One prominent (Labour) member of the Cabinet referred to the interim development proposals as a 'farce' in ministerial discussions and its parliamentary reception was scarcely more complimentary (Cullingworth, 1975, p. 82).

The 'Blitz and Blight' Act 1944

By 1944 the Ministry, and the new Ministry of Reconstruction, which handled post-war planning issues in the Cabinet, were still struggling with the Uthwatt proposals (Woolton, 1959). These were of course the key to a comprehensive planning system that could implement the specific policies that Barlow, Scott and by now the blitzed cities were proposing. Decisive action was prevented essentially by a combination of departmental and property interests, the latter strongly represented within the Conservative Party which still dominated both the coalition government and Parliament. A 'strategic retreat', abandoning any pretence of seeking to implement Uthwatt or Uthwatt-style proposals, was being contemplated by March 1944 (Cullingworth, 1975, p. 112).

Despite these problems it did prove possible to legislate on the aspect of Uthwatt that dealt with redevelopment areas. This was the planning question that was most pressing as specific planning proposals began to be formulated for the blitzed cities (where Reith's advice to 'plan boldly' had been taken seriously) (Hasegawa, 1992). And it was the area where all interested parties accepted that new powers were needed. In practice, though, it proved extraordinarily difficult to secure parliamentary approval. Extensive amendments and redrafting were necessary while it was being considered. Despite this, the result satisfied no one. Conservative and landed interests saw it as going too far; for many others it still left too many important matters unsettled.

The Town and Country Planning Act 1944 was the result, soon dubbed the 'Blitz and Blight Act' since its purpose was to give compulsory purchase powers to permit the wholesale

replanning of war-damaged and obsolescent areas. It marked the formal beginnings of positive planning as opposed to the purely regulatory statutory planning of the 1932 and 1943 Acts. More specifically it introduced the redevelopment area, an important statutory planning device that, in a strengthened form after 1947, became known as the comprehensive development area. Its other notable innovation was that it introduced the listing of buildings of architectural or historic interest (Delafons, 1997). Yet this was not backed by effective powers to ensure that listing was either done or had any subsequent impact. For the present, however, these quite tentative moves towards a more interventionist form of planning marked the limits of political possibility as far as the wartime coalition was concerned.


The Control of Land Use White Paper 1944

On the same day the 1944 bill was published, the government issued a White Paper that set out the rest of its thinking on the issues raised by Uthwatt, so far as it could agree on them (MTCP and SO, 1944). Basically the White Paper diluted the most controversial of Uthwatt's proposals, particularly for the outright state purchase of land about to be developed, and made other more technical modifications. The key point, however, was that there was never any intention that legislation would immediately follow (Cullingworth, 1975). It was rather put forward as a focus for public discussion (and, in effect to take the pressure off government for a while). In the circumstances it was inevitably regarded with some suspicion.

Plans and reports, 1943–45

The wartime plans

Much more significant was the plan-making activity which had largely begun during the Reith era. The plans themselves were beginning to appear by the later war years, although



CONQUEST ABROAD — SURRENDER AT HOME

Figure 4.3 By 1944 there was still greater cynicism about the reassertion of private property interests compromising the post-war planning agenda. Once again Vicky satirized Morrison's impotence, reflecting widespread disbelief that the White Paper would lead to any real legislative action. Copyright © Vicky/Solo.

many more appeared after 1945 (Hasegawa, 1992). Particularly important among the wartime publications were the *County of London Plan* (1943), prepared by Patrick Abercrombie and the LCC chief architect, J. H. Forshaw, and Abercrombie's *Greater London Plan 1944*, to be examined in more detail below (Forshaw and Abercrombie, 1943; Abercrombie, 1945). Other important plans that Abercrombie (Dix, 1981) was involved in were those for Plymouth (with J. Paton Watson) (1943), and for Hull (with Sir Edwin Lutyens) (1945) (Watson and Abercrombie, 1943; Lutyens and Abercrombie, 1945). Much the most controversial was City Architect Donald Gibson's 1945 plan for central Coventry, which had appeared in outline as early as 1941 (Gregory, 1973). Although their character varied, they all captured something of the idealism that Reith particularly had encouraged. In some cases, notably the idealistic Coventry plan, Ministry of Town and Country Planning officials felt that 'Lord Reith's "plan boldly" . . . has been worked to death', and actively tried to undermine many of its proposals (Mason and Tiratsoo, 1990, p. 106). More generally these plans were important in the framing of the 1944 Act. Many also incorporated important, even dramatic, conceptual innovations.

Conceptual innovations

The key concern was planned redevelopment of central and inner areas. A marked break with pre-war precedents was apparent. Thus the models of redevelopment these plans offered invariably involved far more drastic simplifications of land use zones than had been contemplated before Uthwatt. Backyard and workshop industries interspersed with other uses were now to be replaced by new industrial estates. Shopping and other community facilities were also to be grouped. The principles of the modern movement in architecture became much more pronounced, especially in the new residential zones. Site layouts and housing designs began increasingly to reflect the innovations of pre-Nazi Germany, 1930s' France and Scandinavia. 'Mixed development' of houses and flats, with public open space and some private gardens, was particularly popular (Bullock, 1987). More traditional civic design approaches, based on classicism, were also apparent in many of the plans (e.g. Plymouth and Hull), particularly those for central areas. Indeed, Coventry's uncompromisingly modernist central area plan was an exception.

Much physical restructuring of residential areas and community facilities reflected the community ideal of the neighbourhood unit, developed in the USA during the 1920s and discussed in the last chapter. It became a major and remarkably enduring planning principle in Britain from the 1940s. By contrast, the other major American contribution to residential planning, the Radburn layout, allowing complete segregation of pedestrian and motor traffic, was conspicuous by its absence. Instead, systems of partial segregation were increasingly favoured, removing through traffic and encouraging the creation of precincts to which only local traffic was admitted. There was an important conceptual advance on this front in wartime Britain. In 1942 Scotland Yard's chief traffic policeman, H. Alker Tripp, developed an extended case for replanning on the precinct principle. Tripp's ideas also depended on a clearer road hierarchy for metropolitan areas, allowing through traffic to move more freely because it was separated from local traffic. These principles of hierarchy and precinct duly appeared in the 1943 County of London Plan and elements of these ideas influenced other plans of the time.

The Dudley Report, 1944

Some of the important innovations within the wartime plans were also incorporated in the Dudley Report, *The Design of Dwellings* (1944), and the *Housing Manual* (MH & MW, 1944)



Figure 4.4 Mixed development of flats and housing in redevelopment areas became a new wartime model for site development, shown here in Greater London Plan proposals for West Ham. The flats were higher than any municipal blocks then existing. Both they and the (almost) flat-roofed long terraces built at right angles to the road show a strong continental modernist design influence.

of the same year. They promised new higher housing standards than those of the pre-war period (although, as was by now familiar, the later manual diluted the earlier proposals). More importantly from the planning viewpoint, they gave official endorsement to the principles of mixed development and the neighbourhood unit. These too had been incorporated in the County of London Plan of the previous year.

The Greater London Plan, 1944

Most famous and influential of all the wartime plans was the Greater London Plan of 1944 (Abercrombie, 1945), prepared at the initial request of Lord Reith. Unlike other plans published in wartime, it focused on a metropolitan region, considering the full range of urban planning problems and solutions. In one document it elegantly and forcefully articulated three of what were to become the four main strategic concepts of post-war planning orthodoxy, namely decentralization, containment and redevelopment. It also rested explicitly on the fourth – regional balance. Not all of this was entirely new of course and its planning ideas had been well rehearsed before 1939. But the authoritative linking together of these proposals made it into one of the most significant plans ever produced anywhere.

In it, London was represented as four rings: the inner, tightly developed, ring; the lower-density suburban ring; the green belt; and outer country ring. Following the Barlow recommendations, the plan proposed a ban on new industrial development within the plan area, although extensive relocation of existing factories was envisaged. Planned redevelopment would occur within the inner ring, as already spelled out in the County of London Plan. The green belt was to be greatly enlarged from pre-war efforts and enforced by planning controls, rather than public ownership. The most radical proposal, however, was the planned

GREATER LONDON PLAN

MILES 0 5 10 15 20 25 30




Figure 4.5 One of the most important aspects of the Greater London Plan was the proposal for a large and continuous containing green belt to halt continuous suburban spread. Further development was to be concentrated largely at planned expansion points in the outer country ring.

decentralization of over a million people from the inner ring, mainly to the outer ring. In addition to the expansion of existing towns, eight completely new towns were to house a population of over 400,000, with full local employment and community facilities. Taken together, these historic proposals were a foretaste of British post-war planning. All that was missing was the legal power to implement them, although the wartime building and factory licensing controls temporarily prevented development that would prejudice the plan's proposals.

Regional policy

Employment Policy White Paper, 1944

Even before the war ended, however, there was action on one of the most fundamental aspects of post-war planning: industrial location. The agenda derived from the Barlow Report. Wartime experiences had now made possible all-party commitment to policies to ensure full employment, essentially through Keynesian macro-economic policies of demand management (Parsons, 1986). This was doubly important for spatial planning. First, it was clear that extra measures would be needed to assist the traditional depressed areas (Fogarty, 1945). Less obviously however, the agreement of more buoyant areas to restrictions on further industrial development would be easier to secure if they were made less vulnerable to trade-cycle-related unemployment in their existing industries. Such considerations had, for example, influenced Birmingham's opposition to locational controls in the 1930s (Ward, 1988). Accordingly, the inclusion of a section on industrial location in the White Paper was entirely




Figure 4.6 The most impressive proposals for planned expansion were eight entirely new satellite towns. The plan developed detailed proposals for one of the satellites (never built) at Ongar in Essex. This view shows the proposed town centre, anticipating the post-war move towards pedestrianized shopping precincts. Notice how shopping is firmly stereotyped as a female role, with Carmen Miranda starring at the Ritz cinema to relieve the boredom.

logical. What was more surprising, in view of government failure on any other part of the wartime planning agenda, was that on this topic alone enduring legislation was passed before the 1945 election.

Distribution of Industry Act 1945

There were essentially two reasons for this apparent inconsistency. One was that the economic interest group most affected was industry rather than property. As we have already noted, manufacturers were not unsympathetic to planned industrial location which had worked well for them during the war years. Moreover by 1945, a large measure of trust existed between industry and government, based on close wartime co-operation (Booth, 1982). The other reason was that the President of the Board of Trade, Hugh Dalton, was a Labour politician who represented a pre-war depressed area (Dalton, 1957). He was sufficiently anxious to secure effective legislation before the election (which Labour was by no means certain of winning) to threaten resignation over the issue.

The resulting Distribution of Industry Act was passed immediately before the dissolution of Parliament for the election. Basically, it extended the powers of the pre-war Special Areas legislation. It allowed financial assistance to firms in the scheduled development areas, provided for the development of factories and key worker housing and the improvement of derelict land. Spatially, too, the new Development Areas were extensions of the old Special Areas, soon joined by Merseyside (McCrone, 1969). Other features marked a clearer break with the past. Most important was the provision for negative controls on industrial developments over 3,000 square feet. The building licence was initially used as the control mechanism, although a more enduring instrument, the industrial development certificate (IDC), was introduced in 1947. Finally, and very importantly, the Act confirmed the grip of the Board of Trade on this aspect of spatial policy, even though it was obviously a cornerstone for physical and land use planning. But the significance of this dichotomy was initially overshadowed by the tremendous burst of activity in the Ministry of Town and Country Planning after the 1945 election.

CREATING THE NEW ORTHODOXY, 1945–47

The Labour government and planning

Attlee's government

The rejection of Churchill, the wartime leader, and the scale of Labour's landslide victory in the 1945 general election was remarkable (Sissons and French, 1964; Morgan, 1984; Hennessy, 1993). The first election for ten very important years, it returned a House of Commons in which the power of business and property interests was dramatically reduced. Conservative representation was halved to 213 seats, compared to Labour's 393. At the first meeting of the new Parliament Labour MPs shocked the hitherto established order by singing 'The Red Flag' in the House of Commons. Yet this was to be no socialist revolution. The new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had been Churchill's trusted deputy in the wartime coalition government. His middle-class, public school background and unassuming manner engendered widespread trust, especially among the suburban middle classes whose votes had assured Labour's handsome victory.

The new government was committed to an impressive programme, although not so much

outright socialism as limited state ownership, a welfare state, and planning in the widest sense. These were objectives for which public support was overwhelming and their implementation marked a decisive break in Britain's political trajectory, setting the tone for all that followed, at least until the 1980s. There were specific commitments to resolve the issues outstanding from Uthwatt. The advocates of town planning therefore had justifiable confidence that the battle for physical and land use planning, largely postponed during the later war years, would now be won.

Lewis Silkin

Although Labour had promised to merge the ministries responsible for town and country planning, housing and local government, the desire to act swiftly meant the move was postponed. Lewis Silkin was appointed Minister for Town and Country Planning, which remained a non-Cabinet post. Silkin was a distinctly uncharismatic figure and rather a boring speaker. Yet he possessed a profound and detailed understanding of the technicalities of physical and land use planning, which was rare among politicians (Hardy, 1991b; Hennessy, 1993). This understanding had grown from his background as a solicitor and local London politician. He had chaired the LCC Housing and Town Planning Committees and had presided over an important Labour Party wartime policy committee on both these topics. Given high-level government commitment to producing a new planning system, Silkin was probably the ideal political instrument to achieve this objective.

Sources of continuity

Despite the obvious political break in 1945, it is important to understand that, even so, strong continuities remained. The radical wartime consensus for planning still existed. Although the property market had strengthened, landed and development interests remained relatively weak. Immediate post-war shortages of all kinds of materials ensured the continuance of the wartime building licence system, which held private development in check. Within the Ministry of Town and Country Planning (and other ministries) the officials involved in the (as yet unresolved) policy issues remained the same. In a subject as highly technical as town and country planning, their role was extremely important. More specifically, the official and professional work on technical reports and plans initiated in the war period continued. The wartime propaganda effort for planning also continued apace with a spate of important new official films appearing in 1945–48. The emphasis of these was, however, shifting from selling an idea of the future to selling actual proposals (Gold and Ward, 1994).

The New Towns

The background

Although there had been nothing specific in Labour's election manifesto, the Labour Party was particularly attracted to the New Town idea, which would serve as an uncompromised model of the better post-war world that planning could create (Osborn and Whittick, 1977). Frederic Osborn, the tireless secretary of the Town and Country Planning Association, the main New Town pressure group, was a party member, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison, was very enthusiastic. Paradoxically, though, Silkin was thought to be rather sceptical about planned decentralization and had given little emphasis to the idea during Labour's wartime discussions. The growing number of plans recommending planned

decentralist solutions was important, however, reinforcing party enthusiasm. The Greater London Plan was joined by the Clyde Valley Plan of 1946 (Abercrombie and Matthew, 1949) and regional proposals for south Wales were making a similar point. Accordingly, Silkin took his first action on New Towns.

The Reith Committee

In 1945 he recruited Lord Reith to head a committee, including Osborn, to decide on a suitable planning and development framework for New Towns (Cullingworth, 1979). Its three reports (Reith Committee, 1946a, 1946b, 1946c) recommended a model for such settlements of 30,000–50,000 population. Each town was to be developed by a development corporation which could be appointed by central government or sponsored by local authorities and which would have wide-ranging powers. Occasional exceptions of New Towns developed by ‘authorized associations’ were contemplated, but essentially this was a state-dominated model. The offers of private builders to develop these towns were rejected. All land in the designated areas would be vested in the development corporations, with compulsory purchase powers if needed.

In planning terms, the towns would be self-contained in the sense that a balance of jobs to workers was being encouraged and that full social amenities would be provided. The principles of neighbourhood planning, familiar from the wartime plans, were endorsed and social class balance was to be sought even within individual neighbourhoods. This notion that the neighbourhood idea should now incorporate a social class-mix objective was pushing it conceptually beyond what its American originator, Clarence Perry, had intended. Such idealism was a reflection perhaps of the strong perceptions of social cohesion which had grown up in wartime Britain.

The New Towns Act 1946

In sharp contrast to the hesitations of the wartime government, Silkin accepted virtually everything that the Reith Committee said and immediately legislated on it. The Act provided an enabling structure for the creation of New Towns, so that it did not directly focus on detailed planning matters, which were reinforced in policy guidance. With the Reith Committee’s blessing, Silkin had in fact already begun the designation of the first New Town at Stevenage (Balchin, 1980). He was acting in advance of the Act, employing a previously unused part of the 1932 Town and Country Planning Act. This unorthodox move was running into legal difficulties, so speed was essential. Moreover, the bill attracted virtually no opposition in Parliament, although Lord Hinchingsbrooke, objecting to its heavily statist character, predicted it would, like all state experiments, wreak ‘havoc, bitterness and grave social damage’ (Cullingworth, 1979, p. 25).

Early New Town designations

Events at Stevenage during 1946–47 appeared to confirm his views (Orlans, 1952). New Towns policy opened with a public relations disaster. The local residents of the small pre-existing town of Stevenage objected strongly to the government acting in, as they saw it, a high-handed and dictatorial way. The famous novelist, E. M. Forster, became involved and presented the issue as a symptom of a deeper malaise in a radio broadcast (Forster, 1946). Rather more graphically, Silkin found Stevenage’s railway station name board had been replaced with the word SILKINGRAD when he arrived for a public meeting in the town.

Eventually, however, his right to proceed with the New Town was established by judgment of the House of Lords.

The 1946 Act provided a surer basis for action and the Ministry soon learned the need to prepare the way with local discussions. Around London a spate of designations followed Stevenage, at Crawley, Hemel Hempstead, Harlow (Gibberd et al., 1980) (all 1947), Hatfield and Welwyn Garden City (where the Garden City Company was nationalized) (Filler, 1986; de Soissons, 1988) in 1948, and Basildon and Bracknell (Ogilvy, 1975) in 1949. All these were primarily intended to implement Abercrombie's planned metropolitan decentralization strategy proposed in the Greater London Plan. Yet only Stevenage and Harlow were on sites he suggested. (He had proposed the expansion of Hatfield and Welwyn, although not specifically as New Towns.) Outside the Greater London area other New Towns were designated at Newton Aycliffe (1947) (Bowden, 1978) and Peterlee (1948) (Patton, 1978) in County Durham, at East Kilbride (1947) (Mitchell, 1967; Smith, 1979) and Glenrothes (1948) in Scotland, Cwmbran (1949) (Riden, 1988) in south Wales and Corby, Northamptonshire (1950). Most of these designations had important regional development objectives, although planned decentralization was the main purpose of East Kilbride, a site recommended in the 1946 Clyde Valley Plan.

Early New Town plans

These early New Towns (often referred to as Mark I) followed the Reith Committee recommendations in most respects (Schaffer, 1970; Aldridge, 1979). Their target populations (that is pre-existing population plus newcomers plus subsequent natural increase) at designation varied from 10,000 at Newton Aycliffe to 80,000 at Basildon, although all were subsequently increased at least once over the following two decades. The average target size of the London New Towns at designation was almost 50,000, in line with Reith, although only Crawley actually had this as its original target. Bracknell at 25,000 was the smallest. The provincial New Towns had a target average of 32,000, with East Kilbride topping the list at 45,000.

The plans were typically prepared by architect-planner consultants, although sometimes incorporating earlier local or Ministry of Town and Country Planning work. All were classic statements of the new planning orthodoxy, designed to provide a physical setting for the new model citizens of post-war Britain. Neighbourhood principles, with grouped communal facilities, were usual, although planners followed wartime plans and placed these centrally in neighbourhoods rather than at main road junctions as Perry had (perhaps more sensibly) proposed. As Reith had recommended, the plans tried to avoid the spatial segregation of social classes that typified existing cities. This concern was widely reflected in the speeches of politicians and decision-makers at this time. These 1947 comments, by the Chairman of the new Stevenage Development Corporation, were quite typical:

We want to revive that social structure which existed in the old English village, where the rich lived next door to the not so rich and everyone knew everybody . . . the man who wants a bigger house will be able to have it, but he will not be able to have it apart from the smaller houses. (Orlans, 1952, p. 82)

Much tighter land use zoning by activity was also typical, with strict separation of housing and industrial areas. Physical design standards and open-space provision were exemplary. Above all was the presumption of employment self-containment, reflected in careful planning




Figure 4.7 Stevenage was the first New Town and its plan, prepared initially by planners in the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, broke new ground. Notice the strong (and quite typical) emphasis on neighbourhood principles and the large single industrial area between railway and main arterial road. Not visible on this general plan was the pioneering pedestrianized central shopping area.

for industrial development. Internationally, this was the most distinctive feature of Britain's New Towns.

New Towns and the garden city tradition

The conception of the New Town that was appearing was in most respects a state-led version of pre-war garden city thinking, which had itself moved some way from Howard's original prescription (Ward, 1992b). Newer detailed planning concepts had obviously been incorporated. But the most important contrast was that the notion of the co-operatively run social city superseding the big city, as Howard had expressed it, was gone. In its place official policy endorsement was now given to the metropolitan decentralist or regional growth centre model that left the existing settlement pattern relatively unchanged. It was this shift, especially the metropolitan decentralist strategy, which underpinned the new significance given to the concept of self-containment, to allow the new towns to detach themselves from the magnetism of the giant city.

Early New Town progress

Overall the New Town programme was intended at this time to house over half a million people (Cullingworth, 1979). In fact by the end of 1950 only 592 houses had been built in all of them combined. In Stevenage, the first to be started, the figure was a pitiful 28 (MHLG, 1951). There were more, but not that many more, in the pipeline. To some extent these problems were perhaps inevitable. Entirely new towns required major planning and infrastructural work before housing production could begin in earnest. Continuing shortages of construction materials in the early post-war period did not help. The 1947 'dollar crisis' also had the effect of restricting capital investment in all the New Towns from 1948. As if this were not enough, there were other more specific difficulties that delayed particular New Towns, notably Peterlee's problems with the National Coal Board. Local opposition to designations, especially near Manchester, was also important in restricting the programme. Thus the initial scheme never reached the 20 New Towns that had been originally intended.

Criticisms of the New Towns

All this meant that they were open to criticism for not addressing the tremendous post-war housing shortage and for being expensive and irrelevant luxuries. In March 1948, for example, Ministry of Town and Country Planning officials were perturbed to receive a letter responding to their new promotional cartoon film, *New Town*, which had just gone on general cinema release. The film (of which Silkin and his officials were very proud) ended with the words 'just you try it':

I could be a good citizen in one of your New Towns. Send me more details – if you can – and I will endeavour to try it sometime! If you cannot, please omit these words from your next similar production, and save the people who are leg weary and mind weary (from looking for a house); from groaning aloud in the cinemas. (Gold and Ward, 1994)

This kind of criticism touched a raw nerve. Powerful and popularly based political arguments were already taking shape against excessively bureaucratic Labour planning which was failing to provide people with what they wanted. Primarily deployed against the continued shortages and rationing of early post-war Britain, the perceived failings of the New Towns also made



***"It's not fair. I want to throw for some sites for Satellite Towns in 1949.
You picked them all last year."***

Figure 4.8 The New Town, along with other aspects of planning, became the subject of increasing public criticism by the late 1940s. Allegations of bureaucratic muddle and delay postponed tangible achievements and tarnished the wartime vision.

them into targets for such arguments. Other aspects of the new physical and land use planning system soon followed.

The Town and Country Planning Act 1947

Why was it necessary?

By 1947 planning powers were available to make serious progress in implementing the strategic planning policies of regional balance and planned decentralization. There were, however, no planning powers to implement metropolitan containment policies such as those central to the 1944 Greater London Plan (Cullingworth, 1975). It was only the government's continued control of building licences (which it used to squeeze the amount of private development) that conferred any real powers to stop development without compensation. No permanent controls existed that would allow this on the scale now being envisaged, without saddling individual planning authorities with heavy claims. Moreover, there were still only rather limited powers to undertake planned redevelopment and none to undertake the planned 'remodelling' (or partial changes) of many built-up areas as proposed in, for example, the 1943 County of London Plan. The prospect of effective planning controls had been flagged by the Uthwatt Committee. Yet, as we have seen, the wartime coalition government had been unable to agree on suitable measures. The massive contribution of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 was essentially to fill this yawning gap (MTCP, 1947, 1948).

Nationalizing development rights

Much the most politically contentious part of the Act predictably related to compensation and betterment (Schaffer, 1974; McKay and Cox, 1979). Silkin and the government sought a different solution to Uthwatt, but with very similar objectives. The Act involved the state acquisition of development rights on all land (not just undeveloped land) with once and for all payments in compensation drawn from a fund of £300 million. A great deal of Cabinet political consideration had gone into the manner and amount of these payments. The final figure was apparently derived from the Barlow estimate of 1937 development values at £400 million plus £100 million for redevelopment values, scaled down to reflect the sharp fall in property values during the 1940s (Cullingworth, 1975, p. 237).

Very importantly, these payments for loss of development rights were to be handled by a new body, the Central Land Board, entirely divorced from local planning authorities. However, where planning authorities were acquiring land compulsorily, they remained directly liable for compensating the former owners. Grant aid for this was available from central government, as under the 1944 Act, although on more generous terms. The 1947 Act also greatly simplified the procedures for compulsory purchase. Among other changes, existing use value was now to be the basis for compensation. This avoided having to determine the value of land before the war, as the 1944 Act had required. This new parity meant that if a local authority was buying slum housing to create a new commercial area, it simply paid the current value as slum housing, even though the proposed use would command a higher price in a free land market. Bomb-damaged property had, of course, to be treated slightly differently.

The development charge

The central logic of the Act was that if the state had acquired all development rights, then all future increases in land value should be the property of the state, again in the guise of the

Central Land Board. Accordingly, the legislation as enacted incorporated a 100 per cent betterment tax called the development charge. This has been widely seen as one of the great weaknesses of the 1947 Act. Essentially it meant that there was a contradiction at the heart of the Act. It did not abolish private ownership of development land, as Uthwatt had wanted, but by taking all the increase in value that accrued from development, it removed the profit incentive in the development process (McKay and Cox, 1979; Ambrose, 1986). This contradiction in the betterment scheme contained the seeds of its own destruction, as we will see in the next chapter.

These sections of the Act were not simply a product of a dogmatic (if partial) state socialism on Silkin's part, as sometimes portrayed. The bill had started with a proposal for a charge of only 80 per cent, and the principle of a variable charge was favoured by the Ministry of Town and Country Planning, allowing sensitivity to particular circumstances at different times and in different places (Cullingworth, 1975, pp. 202–6). But these proposals failed to find favour with the Treasury, which disliked any agency other than itself having fiscal discretion. Other proposals for a more active land buying and selling role for the new Central Land Board, closer to that envisaged by Uthwatt, were also victims of Treasury pressures. Generally, official and departmental pressures seem to have been as important as Labour ideology in shaping the actual compensation and betterment scheme that was adopted (e.g. Cullingworth, 1975, p. 254). Yet it seems unlikely that a Conservative government would ever have adopted exactly similar measures.

Development planning

By contrast, the actual planning provisions of the 1947 Act were much less contentious. The number of local planning authorities in England and Wales was drastically reduced from 1,441 to 145 by making the counties the planning authorities rather than county districts (Cullingworth, 1988). The position of the county boroughs was unchanged. Each planning authority had to prepare a development plan for its whole area. The plan's proposals were to be based on a thorough survey and analysis, finally adopting something from the ideas of Patrick Geddes into statutory planning practice (Breheny and Batey, 1982). Yet the rationality of analysis that supposedly led from survey to very precise physical and land use proposals was never clear. In practice many of the wider assumptions and objectives which underlay the proposals were not made explicit in the plans. The development plan itself was intended to be (and was) more flexible than the 1932 Act schemes. Paradoxically, though, later planners also came to see the 1947 Act plans themselves as inflexible.

They were essentially precise, physical blueprint plans that specified an end state for land use at the end of the plan period (intended to be 20 years). They were more sophisticated than the 1932 Act schemes partly because they incorporated phasing of programme proposals. In addition, they included more detailed small area proposals (e.g. comprehensive development areas (CDAs) or town maps). The CDA, based on the strengthened compulsory purchase powers referred to above, became a major instrument of planned redevelopment, enabling planning authorities to act decisively to implement their planning intentions within the development plan framework. In other ways too, these development plans differed from the crude zoning approach apparent in earlier planning schemes. The 1932 Act schemes had, in effect, given permission to develop land uses or buildings in accordance with their provisions. Now a discretionary element remained with the planning authority, exercised through its development control function.

Development control

This had existed before 1947, but was only significant when a development proposal contravened a planning scheme's zoning (or occasionally other) provisions. All other development went through 'on the nod'. This changed dramatically after the 1947 Act gave planning authorities the discretion to refuse or impose conditions on detailed aspects of all development proposals and gave them effective enforcement powers. They were now wholly free from any fears of compensation claims, although they were subject to appeal and the minister 'calling in' particular cases. As initially introduced, the development order was very tight indeed, but was relaxed in 1950 to allow more permitted development (e.g. of farm buildings), not needing development control approval (MHLG, 1951). The distinction between the 'outline' and 'detailed' applications was also introduced at the same time, adding further refinement and discretion to the system.

Apart from this early revision, the 1947 Act development control system has endured with remarkably little change (even in the 1980s). It is, however, very important to appreciate that the circumstances in which this system was introduced were very different from later years. Until 1954 the development control system was, to a large extent, shielded by the building licence system which discouraged large-scale private development. Over 80 per cent of housing built between 1947 and 1954 was public-sector housing. Despite some post-war loosening of the building licence system, there was also very little commercial development at this time (McKay and Cox, 1979). In general, development control disputes affecting public-sector developers were likely to be determined by means other than development control procedures. New Towns, for example, were approved by a ministerial Special Development Order. Planning decisions about local authority housing estates would typically be resolved by inter- or intra-authority discussions. This meant that at the outset the new development controllers were largely dealing with small applications (albeit many of them) from a highly residualized private development sector. This was to change.

Other provisions

Among many other provisions in this mammoth Act, those for historic buildings and industrial development were probably most important. The former greatly strengthened existing powers for dealing with historic buildings, including the introduction of a building listing system that was now backed by mandatory powers. The latter introduced the industrial development certificate (IDC), referred to earlier, as a permanent control mechanism under the Distribution of Industry Act 1945, replacing the building licence. Issued by the Board of Trade, it was required before any new industrial developments of over 5,000 square feet could be permitted under local planning proposals. It became the formal point of contact between regional policy and town and country planning.

The 1947 Act and the public interest

This Act is justifiably seen as a major landmark in planning history (e.g. Cherry, 1974b, 1988; Donnison and Soto, 1980; Reade, 1987; Hall, 2002a). Its operations mark the beginnings of effective and comprehensive physical and land use planning. For the first time it allowed local planning authorities to produce outcomes significantly different from what would have happened without planning. As had already happened in the New Towns, planners everywhere were now able to think of land more as a neutral platform for activities and buildings than as a source of private gain and object of speculation. Accordingly, planning

conducted in the public interest was henceforth intended to determine the uses to which land was put, rather than private interests expressed through the land market (McAuslan, 1980).

It was an approach which placed great responsibilities on the planners themselves. Just as the formulation of the Act had been heavily dependent on expert civil servants, so the system in operation depended to a substantial extent on unelected professional experts. It was they who produced the development plans and CDA proposals, and who operated the development control system. This raised two important questions. The first was concerned with the appropriate technical qualifications for planners and ensuring that sufficient trained people were available to run the new system. The second, and more fundamental, issue involved establishing a proper and accountable relationship between the professional planner and the public. Both were extremely important, given the much greater role that planning was now to have under the 1947 Act.

Numbers and qualifications of planners

There had been mounting concerns during the war period that there would be insufficient trained planners to operate a new system effectively. In 1946, for example, the Town Planning Institute had only 1,700 members, roughly one-fifth of whom were not-yet-qualified student members, compared to over 1,400 planning authorities. This shortage had been a key consideration in reducing the number of planning authorities. Significant steps were taken in the later war years to introduce accelerated courses for ex-service personnel and to strengthen the more established training routes. Unprecedented numbers joined the profession in the early post-war years. The new planning authorities seem not to have been as seriously hampered by the lack of trained staff as their precursors.

Increasingly, though, the question became the nature of the planning qualification. The traditional emphasis had been on the parent professions of architecture, engineering, surveying and law (Cherry, 1974b). But the newly adopted survey and analytical techniques of the more influential wartime and early post-war plans, such as those for London and, above all, Max Lock's brilliant Middlesbrough Survey and Plan (Lock, 1946), drew much more heavily on geography, economics and sociology (Hebbert, 1983). The same approach was increasingly encouraged in the 1947 Act development plans. Silkin and his officials became more worried about this mismatch and he appointed a Departmental Committee on the Qualifications of Planners, chaired by Sir George Schuster. The Schuster Report (Schuster Committee, 1950) endorsed the need to widen planning education to reflect the realities of the new system, proposals which were gradually introduced. There were also more controversial proposals to undermine the autonomy of the professional body to make it a 'national institution', which were not adopted.

Public involvement and the 1947 Act system

As enacted, the 1947 Act rested on the presumption that the relationship of professional planners to the public, in whose 'interest' they supposedly planned, would be mediated through the established frameworks of electoral democracy. Councillors, members of parliament and ministers would ultimately be responsible for planning actions undertaken by local and central government. They would ultimately act as a check on the fallibility of the professional planners in determining what was in the public interest. This assumption was rather more conservative than that contemplated in wartime civil service discussions about formulating a comprehensive planning system. At that time (when there had been, of course,

an intense public interest in all matters related to planning, assiduously fostered by a whole range of propaganda activity) attention was given to the question of the direct involvement of the public in planning proposals at a formative stage.

Yet little of this spirit of public involvement was apparent in the Act and the regulations that accompanied it (McAuslan, 1980). The reduction in the number of planning authorities appreciably increased the remoteness of planners. There were fears that excessive public consultation would result in delays and indecision, and that the public could not be trusted to reach the correct judgements. In 1949, for example, Silkin himself advised planners:

I think it is necessary to lead the citizen – guide him. The citizen does not always know exactly what is best; nevertheless we have got to take into account his wishes and his ideas and give him an opportunity of expressing them and give him an opportunity of understanding what is proposed. (TCPSS, 1949, p. 49)

Conspicuously there was no suggestion here that planning proposals should be derived directly from what the public wanted. Plans were presented to the public largely as a *fait accompli*. The problem was seen as getting public approval after the plan had been prepared by the experts. It was partly because the new planning orthodoxy interpreted the notion of public interest in such a technocentric way, defined by professionals rather than directly by the public, that popular enthusiasm for planning had waned by the late 1940s. But there were other reasons.

COMPLETING THE NEW ORTHODOXY AND THE FIRST RETREATS, 1947–52

The Expanded Towns

General context

By 1948 planners had the powers that would allow them to make enforceable proposals to fulfil all the major planning objectives for urban regions that had emerged from the plans and reports of the years 1940–46. Yet two further important pieces of planning legislation were passed in 1949 and 1952 that completed the initial phase of post-war legislative action. The first of these, the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, did not affect urban areas, although we need to be aware of its existence (Cherry, 1975b). It followed inter-war pressures and the recommendations of three official studies (Scott Committee in 1942, the Dower Report of 1945 (MTCP, 1945) and the Hobhouse Report of 1947 (Hobhouse Committee, 1947)). The Act now provided a legislative basis for the designation of National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. The second piece of legislation was the Town Development Act 1952.

The Town Development Act 1952

The last of the five key pieces of post-war legislation, this was passed by the Conservative government which replaced Labour in 1951. As with so much else, its origins can be traced to the Greater London Plan of 1944. As well as establishing entirely new towns, this proposed achieving planned decentralization by the planned expansion of existing towns in the outer metropolitan area. The Town Development Act provided a mechanism for achieving planned decentralization that relied on local government initiative (although with central financial aid)

instead of the more centralist instrument of the New Town Development Corporation (Seeley, 1974). Several alternate models of the relationships between the exporting city, the importing district and the county council were provided, allowing for variations in the source of initiative and financing of the town development schemes (often referred to as Expanded Towns or overspill schemes).

The Town Development Act clearly avoided some of the perceived centralist excesses of the New Town mechanism noted above. In that respect it was certainly closer to Ebenezer Howard's localist ideal of the garden city (Ward, 1992b). But it would be wrong to see its sponsorship by the Conservatives primarily in this light. Silkin had always intended a parallel measure (Cullingworth, 1979). The bill had been drafted before the 1951 election and was fully supported by the Labour opposition. Its passage had been delayed for more subtle political reasons. It was obviously going to be very difficult to persuade any local authorities to house people from another area (even with generous financial assistance), while the housing shortage everywhere was as severe as immediately after the war. As these problems eased, town expansions were more realistic, although progress under the legislation was always disappointing, especially in the 1950s. Fewer than 10,000 houses had been provided in all the schemes by 1958. This partly reflected particular and arguably inherent difficulties with the Act itself, but it also reflected a growing disenchantment with town and country planning that was becoming more evident by the early 1950s.

A faltering consensus

Waning popular interest

The war years had seen the coincidence of unprecedented public support for planning and a severely weakened property market. Both had been crucial elements in securing the political acceptability of a much more far-reaching and ambitious planning system. Yet both these underlying preconditions were themselves changing by the early 1950s. The New Towns were, as we have seen, often irritating to pre-existing populations of the areas while failing to address metropolitan housing needs on any scale. The new 1947 Act system was remote and bureaucratic in its operations. It was also slow: only 22 of the 145 planning authorities managed to submit their development plans within the three years stipulated in the Act. More seriously, it too had done practically nothing to accelerate the meeting of housing needs.

These were important weaknesses. In 1945 the voters, working- and middle-class alike, had voted Labour essentially because they wanted housing, full employment and social security. Planning was to be one of the means of achieving these objectives, but there was little interest, especially working-class interest, in planning for its own sake. In fact the Distribution of Industry Act 1945 had done a good deal, especially in the 1945–47 period, to push new factories to the former depressed areas (Parsons, 1986). This, in conjunction with macro-economic management, ensured that jobs remained plentiful everywhere. But the housing shortage was not easily solved and planning now appeared to be part of the problem, rather than the solution. More generally there was disappointingly little evidence of the new post-war Britain that had been promised. The bomb sites remained largely unrebuilt. One of the key reasons for all this lay in the controversial 1947 Act development charge, which had become a major point of conflict between planning and a much strengthened property lobby.

Planning and property interests

Towards the end of the war land values had begun to rise again and property and development interests, although still weak by historical standards, began to become more significant in the early post-war years. Despite all the problems of shortages and building licences, and the limited housebuilding role available to the private sector, there was increased private developer and land market activity in 1945–48. This was before the 1947 Act came into operation, but the Act's new betterment provisions threatened to choke off this activity. The most frequent complaint was that, although land was supposed to change hands at existing use value, there was a marked reluctance to conform to this requirement (Cullingworth, 1980). The supply of building land dwindled to virtually nothing. Where it was available, buyers of development land typically found they had to pay the full market value (that is, the existing use value plus the value accruing from development) to the seller. Then, on top of this, they were liable for the full development charge to the Central Land Board. In effect, this was a 200 per cent betterment tax!

A remarkable array of property and business interest groups and professional bodies rose in opposition to these sections of the Act. During 1950 complaints and proposed amendments were received from the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the Chartered Auctioneers' and Estate Agents' Institute, the Council of the Law Society, the Federation of British Industries, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce and the Country Landowners' Association (MHLG, 1951). The Conservative opposition also committed themselves to drastic reform of the development charge. This was particularly important since they made huge gains at the 1950 general election, leaving Labour struggling with a majority of only five seats. Given the demoralized state of the government, another election seemed imminent, with the Conservatives strongly placed to win. Clearly this encouraged those pressing for radical change. But it also made it less likely that the existing system could be made to work, since owners of potential development land were now even more inclined to hold it back, in the growing expectation that the system would soon be changed. Events soon proved these assumptions correct.

The new Conservative government, 1951

We will deal with the actual dismantling of the compensation and betterment provisions of the 1947 Act in the next chapter. The change of government that preceded it was important, however. It reflected a tangible shift away from the 1940s' belief in planning as an overall principle for ordering human affairs. One telling instance of this change came when the Ministry of Local Government and Planning, finally created in 1950 to implement Labour's long-promised merger of housing, local government and town and country planning (Dalton, 1962), was immediately renamed by the Conservatives. Planning was dropped from the title and it became the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, an important symbol of a new emphasis (Sharp, 1969).

Reformulating the consensus for planning

It was at this time that the consensus for planning assumed its more enduring character, which saw it through the next two decades (Donnison and Soto, 1980; Reade, 1987). No longer did it have the mass support of the war and early post-war years. Socially, it was actively sustained by the narrower and decidedly middle-class bases of organized pressure groups and professional bodies that had always been central to the advance of planning ideas. Economically, it retained

the rather passive support of industry. Particularly important, though, was the new relationship between planning and an increasingly buoyant property sector that was emerging in the early 1950s. After the highly statist and more radical 1940s' notion of planning replacing the land market, planners and property interests were now moving into an ambiguously symbiotic relationship. Party political agreement was to be critical in the definition and articulation of this new version of the post-war consensus. What was increasingly evident during the 1950s was that, despite changes in emphasis, planning was the subject of a very wide measure of party political agreement. There were differences, certainly, but the forces of continuity were stronger.

OVERVIEW

The 1939–52 period was, then, a pivotal one in the history of British planning policies. A comprehensive conception of physical and land use planning, rehearsed in the 1930s, was now firmly embedded in a new orthodoxy of government policies that would endure in its essential elements until the late 1970s. Yet already some retreats were imminent. In planning, as in other aspects of government policy, the high tide of state intervention was set to recede, reflecting the emergent mixed economy of the 1950s. Even during the 1940s, the highly interventionist model of the planning system promised at the beginning of the decade was compromised. Reith's desire for an all-powerful planning super-ministry was sacrificed to existing departmental interests. And Uthwatt's scheme for the permanent subordination of private property interests was weakened as the urban land market recovered from its wartime low point. Bold and definitive as it was in most other respects, Labour's 1947 Act, by placing such heavy reliance on the development charge to assert the dominance of planners in the shaping of urban change, was condemning itself to be an early victim of the revival of private development.

5

Adjustments and New Agendas: The Changing Planning System, 1952–74

The Town Development Act, passed in 1952 by Churchill's Conservative government, with full Labour support, formed the last major element of the immediate post-war planning legislation. At the core of these measures lay the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 so that all of them together are called 'the 1947 Act system'. Everything else that followed in British planning, at least until the second half of the 1970s, rested on these impressive legislative foundations. This did not mean that the system was immutable. The most contentious parts of the 1947 Act were soon dropped, allowing the re-emergence of a rather freer market in development land. From about 1960 there was a very marked revival of government interest in planning. A welter of new legislation and planning initiatives gave planners a more positive role, in contrast to their rather more limited position in the 1950s. This new role built on the interaction of state and private sector that had emerged, almost accidentally, in the 1950s. Planning was now firmly located within a mixed economy and a society increasingly intent on the pursuit of private affluence. There was certainly no return to the high tide of 1940s' statism.

This and the following chapter consider the development of planning policies and ideas during these years. This chapter sketches out the broad pattern of social, economic and political change, the overall importance of government intervention and the more specific evolution of the physical and land use planning system. Chapter 6 will then focus on the evolution of specific strategic and detailed planning ideas and policies. We begin by reviewing the rapidly changing social and economic agenda of the 1950s and 1960s.

POLITICS, THE 'AFFLUENT SOCIETY' AND PLANNING

The economic and social context

The long boom

The quarter-century from 1947 was a period of virtually uninterrupted prosperity (Wright, 1979). It was this central economic fact with all its wider impacts on society that shaped the basic demands placed on the new planning system (Hobbs, 1992). The experience was virtually unprecedented. Thus, apart from the odd hiccup, the economy (gross domestic product (GDP) grew steadily from 1951 to 1973 at an average rate of 2.8 per cent per annum. Compared to other advanced industrial countries this was low, and more sophisticated measures underline this differential. But to those experiencing it, it was real enough. The newer manufacturing industries of the inter-war years now began to form the basis of the post-war export economy. The decline of older industries continued, especially from the late 1950s, but such structural changes no longer occurred in the precipitate manner of the pre-

1939 years. Unemployment, the absence of which had by now become a key measure of economic well-being, remained extremely low by inter-war standards (Law, 1981). Thus the 1951 Census recorded 1.8 per cent of workers unemployed (compared to 12 per cent in 1931). There was a steady, though modest, upward trend to 2.8 per cent in 1961 and 5.2 per cent in 1971, but this was very low compared to what came after.

The sources of prosperity

There were two basic sources of this virtually unprecedented prosperity. The first was the successful creation of a stable world framework in the late 1940s, allowing the growth of international trade and the global economy. The second (and not unrelated) factor was the commitment of all British governments (and indeed all the major advanced countries) to Keynesian-style economic management (Peden, 1991). This willingness to use public spending and intervention did much to iron out cyclical fluctuations in the economy and eased the effects of the decline of older industries. Other factors were also favourable to growth, such as the very high proportion of economically active people relative to dependants (largely the result of married women permanently entering the workforce). The greater application of new technologies was also important. It was new technology, more than anything else, that provided a symbol of economic and social progress.

Social impacts

GDP growth over the two decades from 1951 was almost eight times greater than population growth. With full employment and higher wages than ever before, the social consequences of the long boom were huge (Bogdanor and Skidelsky, 1970; Marwick, 1970; Morgan, 1992). The end of rationing in 1954 allowed the fortunate majority to become part of a mass consumer society, completing a shift which had begun in the more prosperous areas during the 1930s. Thus a new and technologically sophisticated consumer good like television had become virtually universal by the early 1970s, itself forming a powerful reinforcement of rising consumer expectations. Numbers of the other main, though more expensive, symbol of the age, the motor car, increased from 2.5 million in 1952 to nearly 12.6 million in 1971 (Plowden, 1973).

J. K. Galbraith's book, *The Affluent Society* (1958), was a telling critique of an American society motivated by the pursuit of private affluence. Already, though, he was describing well-recognized if less firmly established trends in Britain. The war had fostered a collective sense of society and common interest in the 1940s that disrupted the inter-war tendencies towards home-based suburban consumerism, privacy and the nuclear family noted in Chapter 3. Moreover, it had reinforced the more communal way of living that was still well established in most older working-class areas. But the changes of the 1950s and beyond were far more powerful. They dispelled not just the temporary sense of wartime social collectivism, but also undermined a good deal of the traditional cohesion of the working class. The young and ambitious particularly began to opt into the consumer society, if only as aspirants. It took a long time for the full effects of these trends to become apparent. But even by 1959 the Conservatives were able to win a handsome electoral victory on the message that 'You've Never Had It So Good' (Morgan, 1992, p. 176).

Demographic changes

This sense of increasingly self-centred well-being and affluence had marked, although rather unpredictable, effects on the birth rate (Marsh, 1965). Wider knowledge of reliable contraception methods, reinforced by the widespread availability of the Pill in the 1960s, made it much easier to prevent conception. Moreover, as more women undertook paid work which continued after marriage, the already declining desire for larger families diminished further. The pursuit of private affluence was associated with a growing tendency to view having children in almost the same light as acquiring consumer durables, to be fitted in after the home furnishings, the car, the foreign holiday. Yet against all this the very fact of social well-being itself also seems to have encouraged more couples to have children.

The upshot was a fluctuating birth rate that defied the forecasters (Cullingworth, 1976, p. 32). There was a surge in the early post-war years, a lull in the 1950s, another surge in the late 1950s and early 1960s, before a more sustained downturn from the late 1960s. Combined with continued decline in the death rate, as life expectancy steadily increased, this brought an overall 10.5 per cent population increase between 1951 and 1971, more than might have been expected given pre-war trends. Such overall changes were paralleled by changes in the family. Thus the trend towards the nuclear family, fewer children and the decline of multi-generational families was apparent in a marked rise in the number of one- and two-person households.

Outside the affluent society

But the reality of affluence was not universal, despite a widespread belief that poverty had disappeared (Coates and Silburn, 1970). This belief reflected the absence of serious unemployment and an overestimation of the effects of the post-war welfare state reforms. The truth was that poverty had certainly diminished in absolute terms, but that many people were still being left behind by the new culture of affluence. The welfare state was simply not sufficient to prevent the poverty of families with unskilled or unemployed heads or those dependent on state benefits such as the old, the chronically sick or disabled.

Entirely new social groups were also trying to get into the affluent society. These were immigrant populations from the Caribbean, south Asia and other parts of the so-called 'New Commonwealth'. Between 1950 and 1967 their numbers (including those born in Britain) increased from about 100,000 to just over a million, about 2 per cent of the total population (Daniel, 1968). Those of working age filled the lower-paid jobs that indigenous white workers were no longer prepared to fill in the long boom. Until the Race Relations Act 1965 overt and crude racism was widespread, producing an initial residential concentration of these immigrants in many of the worst slums of the big cities and barring their access to better-paid jobs. Signs of a considerable white resentment of the newcomers became apparent, especially in the Notting Hill riots of 1958 and the anti-immigrant marches ten years later.

Yet discrimination, although still considerable, was generally becoming less open by the late 1960s. This was partly because of legislation and the simple passage of time. The needs of a growing economy were also slowly allowing immigrant communities to move from the least attractive jobs and housing. Thus, even those presently unable to enjoy the fruits of affluence had grounds for believing that the prevailing prosperity would bring them within reach. This sense of optimism, even among the least favoured sections of society, was an important element reinforcing the general mood of well-being.

Politics and government attitudes to planning: an overview

Political changes

Economic and social changes were therefore structuring a formidable series of pressures for urban change which in turn exerted significant demands on the planning system. The exact nature of the planning response to these basic demands was primarily conditioned by the political process (Morgan, 1992). Britain had elected a Conservative government under Churchill in 1951. The elections of 1955 and 1959 brought progressively increased Tory majorities under Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1970). The pattern changed in 1964 when Labour, led by Harold Wilson, won a smaller than anticipated majority which was consolidated in the 1966 election. Unexpectedly, the 1970 election returned the Conservatives under Edward Heath, who remained in power until 1974. But despite this highly developed pattern of two-party politics, there were strong elements of policy continuity. Changes of government produced shifts in emphasis but, despite what contemporary commentators often thought they saw, no fundamental changes in direction. To understand this, we need to appreciate how physical and land use planning policies were located within the larger post-war political consensus on economic and social policies.

Politics and state intervention in the 1950s

By the 1950s the Conservatives, with a pragmatism that used to be typical, had absorbed the lessons of their crushing defeat in 1945. The British people, particularly the working class, wanted a government that would ensure full employment, decent housing provision and social services (Hennessy, 1993). On the other hand, the widening middle classes did not want an overly interventionist state or the continued austerity of the Attlee years. After many years of shortages and rationing, all classes looked forward to greater material prosperity and the variety of goods that only a market system could provide. These kinds of consideration had a marked impact on economic and social policies.

Thus the Conservatives quickly jettisoned the last of the austerity controls and Labour's grander aspirations to economic planning. There were few regrets when rationing ended in 1954. The Tory Chancellor, R. A. B. Butler, retained the overall notion of Keynesian-style demand management, however, providing real continuity with his Labour predecessor, Hugh Gaitskell (Brittan, 1971). Contemporary commentators coined the term 'Butskellism' to describe this political agreement in economic management and its ethos permeated many areas of policy. Most importantly, the Conservatives committed themselves to sustaining the goal and the reality of virtually full employment. Neither did they embark on any orgy of denationalization remotely comparable with Conservative policies in the 1980s. There was no significant undermining of the welfare state, and there was surprising enthusiasm too for housing, so that they soon reached their election pledge of 300,000 completions per annum (Macmillan, 1969; McKay and Cox, 1979). Under Harold Macmillan, the first Minister of Housing and Local Government, they even managed to reach an all-time high for public-sector completions in 1953 and 1954, each at just under 262,000 dwellings (UK figures). But, as we noted in the last chapter, this special emphasis on housing was accompanied by an apparent downgrading of physical planning.

Pressures for a new approach

This rather limited role for planning conceived by the Conservatives began to change during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The rising birth rate brought confident, though false,

expectations of massive population increases that challenged the rather limited planning approach of the 1950s. There were growing worries too about the scale and nature of economic growth. Would it be sufficient to maintain this growing population in the circumstances of ever-increasing affluence to which it was rapidly becoming accustomed? Would the growth occur in the right places and in the right sectors? And, above all, the nagging doubt – why was Britain's economic growth rate so clearly inferior to that of other comparable countries? Finally there were a growing series of worries about the public problems that the pursuit of private affluence was already creating, most notably the growth of car ownership. Given the growth projections, these problems were set to get much worse.

Macmillan's planning experiment, 1960–64

The upshot was a renewed political faith in planning in the widest sense during the early 1960s (Brittan, 1971; Blackaby, 1978). This shift occurred under the premiership of Harold Macmillan, one of the progressive Tory economic planners of the 1930s. The new economic planning was not on the highly statist pattern of the 1940s, but rather an attempt at indicative planning within a mixed economy. The state would indicate goals and use its own resources and activities to give a lead and point directions, but other agencies, particularly private business, would play key roles. One of the key elements of the approach was a close co-operation of government (including local government for sub-national initiatives), private sector and trade unions.

This kind of indicative approach, based largely on French experience, pervaded many of the new planning initiatives of this period (Shanks, 1977). The key agency was the new National Economic Development Council (NEDC) and Office (NEDO), established in 1961 as a forum for discussing problems related to growth and modernization and an agency to give advice (e.g. NEDC, 1963). In the same year a series of important regional planning initiatives were launched, broadly consistent with the same approach. We can detect elements of the approach in the important proposals for urban planning which also appeared in the early 1960s. We will consider these more fully in later sections.

Labour and the 'technological revolution'

Yet it was Labour, under Harold Wilson, who seemed to exhibit the clearest idea of how planning, in the widest sense, ought to be used. In an important speech at the 1963 Labour Party conference, he spoke of the need for 'conscious, planned, purposive use of scientific progress to provide undreamed of living standards and the possibility of leisure ultimately on an unbelievable scale'. And in the most memorable passage, he called for a New Britain, 'forged in the white heat of a technological revolution' (cited in Hardy, 1991b, p. 63).

The vision was a powerful one. It allowed different factions of the party, who had spent most of their opposition years fighting each other, to agree on a common programme (Bogdanor, 1970), and it seized on one of the most potent themes within the affluent society. There would be an active state, more active than Macmillan's indicative planning experiments had envisaged. But its main role would not rest on the traditional socialist preoccupations of nationalization and redistribution. Rather, it would accept the existence of the mixed economy and take the lead role in planning it, promoting and harnessing technology to secure the planned achievement of a higher level of growth. This would then pay for improved social welfare and public services, while still allowing the private pursuit of all the consumerist rewards of the affluent society.

Planning in the Wilson years, 1964–70

On election in 1964 the Labour government initially pursued its new vision with great energy and imagination (Wilson, 1974). Wilson established a new superministry, the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), charged with concentrating on longer-term economic policy (including spatial policy), offsetting the traditional ‘short-termism’ of the Treasury. The DEA was initially headed by Wilson’s deputy, George Brown, a mercurial and rumbustious political figure whose forthright style and fondness for alcohol quickly brought him press notoriety (Brown, 1972). Despite this, his political seniority helped force the pace to make the early Wilson years exciting ones for planning.

Brown’s most immediate tangible achievement was the preparation of a national plan (DEA, 1965a), laying out a programme for accelerated economic growth for the period 1965–70. In fact the plan, if it ever had been attainable, was soon blown off course by short-term financial pressures in 1966–67 (Brittan, 1971). Growth rates, although they improved, remained too low to fulfil the promises of the planned technological revolution. But the extent of these failures was not fully appreciated until later. The more immediate significance of the early Wilson years was an enthusiastic endorsement of the principle that planning was essential in a mixed economy to promote growth, deal with its problems and ensure that it brought wide social benefits (Saville, 1988). Overall, therefore, the Wilson years, while they may not have delivered the promised ‘technological revolution’, did bring a ‘second planning revolution’ (Hardy, 1991b, p. 63) that stimulated physical and spatial planning activity, as we will consider below.

The last phase of consensus, 1970–74

By the early 1970s many of the clever hopes of the previous decade were beginning to expire. There was a growing recognition on all sides that planning alone was insufficient to ensure the achievement of a modernized Britain (Morgan, 1992). Nevertheless, much of the planning momentum of the Wilson years continued under Heath’s Conservative administration. Despite an initial adherence to the so-called Selsdon programme, involving a vigorous reassertion of free market ideals, the Conservatives ultimately accepted all the main precepts of the prevailing consensus about the mixed economy and the role of government. Planning in the widest sense no longer had the high priority that Labour had given it. There were also some significant changes in physical and land use planning. But, compared to what came later, the Heath government brought no truly radical departures from the previous agenda. It marked the end of a long period of government, coinciding with the long post-war boom, where the elements of consensus were more important than the differences.

THE CHANGING PHYSICAL PLANNING SYSTEM

Conservative adjustments, 1952–64

The shifting consensus for physical and land use planning

Within these larger policy continuities, there was also a sizeable degree of political agreement on town and country planning. As we noted in the last chapter, the wartime mood that had generated the political momentum in favour of the new planning orthodoxy soon evaporated. By the early 1950s physical planning was being actively sustained by the support of the narrow

band of interests represented by the planning movement. The pressure groups, the professionals and the local and national politicians and civil servants directly involved in managing urban change were now its main protectors. It is the recognition of the narrowness and often weak or partial nature of this support that has led Hardy (1991b, p. 22), following Donnison and Soto (1980, p. 6), to see the post-war story of physical planning as that of a 'fragile consensus'.

Yet such views tend to ignore the growing, if rather ambivalent, accommodation of property and development interests within the planning system from the 1950s (Ravetz, 1980; Reade, 1987). The planning framework of the 1940s, conceived when property interests were extremely weak, had sought to peripheralize them. But as the statist economy of war and austerity was dismantled and a more enduring mixed economy was created, it was inevitable that such interests would become a more important consideration in planning policies. The rapid receding of the high tide of popular wartime pressure for a conception of planning that was potentially competitive with such an involvement of property and development interests obviously smoothed the transition. The new social engagement with the pursuit of private affluence also made it easier to accept a stronger role for developers of, for example, private housing, within the planning system.

Overall, then, we can see many of the changes of the 1950s and beyond in terms of this underlying shift, set within the wider context of the emergent affluent society. It marked, of course, a serious retreat from the radicalism of the 1940s. However, within the larger framework of policy continuity, it also added a political robustness to the planning consensus that has certainly helped ensure its remarkable resilience. Although the nature of the accommodation of private property was, to say the least, ambiguous and much less explicit than that of the planning movement, it began to take increasingly positive forms during the 1950s and 1960s. Without this growing together, the planning consensus might well have been too fragile to survive in any effective form. We must now consider the specific changes to the planning system.

Housing, planning and Conservative ideology

The Conservative shift in emphasis to housing, initially public-sector housing, was a remarkably successful act of short-term pragmatism (McKay and Cox, 1979). It also had a longer-term and more ideological dimension. At its heart was the concept of the 'property-owning democracy', first introduced into Conservative policy debates by Eden in 1946 in an attempt to find an idea to counteract Labour's supremacy in social policy matters (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1970). Ideologically, it rested on the argument that social democracy was to be achieved by widening social access to private property. It was an argument that the emergent affluent society of the 1950s was eager to hear. It contrasted sharply with the socialist idea of abolishing or heavily controlling private property and relying on state ownership and control.

There was no suggestion that a property-owning democracy would not require physical planning, as has consistently proved to be the case (see, for example, the section on containment in the next chapter pp. 148–54.) Yet it would clearly be rather different in emphasis from the unreformed 1947 Act system. In fact the greatly enhanced powers with which town planning entered the 1950s, especially with the continuance of the building licensing system, were easy to represent as the very antithesis of this property-owning democracy. This allowed the Conservatives to adopt a medium-term strategy which gave greater encouragement (and of course greater profits) to the private developers. As the new

Minister of Housing and Local Government, Harold Macmillan, remarked in 1952, 'the people whom the Government must help are those who do things: the developers, the people who create wealth, whether they are humble or exalted' (Marriott, 1969, p. 15).

Thus housing policies, although in the short term boosting public-sector building, brought a longer-term move towards the private sector and the encouragement of owner occupation. Accordingly, the private sector grew from just 15 per cent of all housing completions in 1952 to 60 per cent in 1961, an absolute increase from under 37,000 to over 180,000 (UK figures).

Mr Pilgrim's suicide

A more specific episode also brought the land provisions of the planning system into great disrepute in 1954 (Cullingworth, 1980). This was the unfortunate case of Mr Pilgrim who, having purchased land in 1950 at market value, failed to make a claim against the compensation fund set up under the 1947 Act. When the local council then compulsorily purchased the land at existing use value, he lost a great deal of money and killed himself. The case was widely reported and Churchill, normally indifferent to most planning matters, took a great personal interest. Macmillan later recalled being summoned to see the great man one morning:

When I got there, I was ushered upstairs and found Churchill in bed, finishing a substantial breakfast, soon to be followed by the inevitable cigar. He was wearing the famous Chinese dressing gown, and his favourite budgerigar was perched on his head. The bed was strewn with newspapers. But there was no benevolence in his manner. Instead he was in a fierce and angry mood, and poured out a flood of accusation and reproach. 'Why have you done this man to death – you and your minions?' (Macmillan, 1969, p. 428)

Despite this air of tragic comedy, the Prime Minister's political instincts were entirely sound. The issue was raising real fears among many ordinary Conservatives (and others) about the vaguely totalitarian character of the planning system, hounding the 'little man'.

Town and Country Planning Acts 1953 and 1954

By this time, though, the amendment of the 1947 legislation had already begun (MHLG, 1952a; Cullingworth, 1980). Indeed, the marked upturn in private housebuilding essentially reflected the impacts of the planning legislation of 1953 and 1954, together with the ending of the building licensing system in 1954. The two planning Acts were exclusively concerned with the financial sections of the 1947 Act and involved no other changes. The 1953 Act abolished the development charge although neither Act contained any alternative proposals to collect betterment. Between them the two Acts also changed the provisions on compensation for loss of development rights. This was now to be paid on a rather more limited basis than under the 1947 Act, spreading the public expenditure implications over a longer period. Under the original scheme this would not theoretically have been a problem because compensation could have been funded from the development charge income.

Finally, the 1954 Act redefined the valuation basis for land transfers. In contrast to the 1947 Act's reliance on existing use values, by now regarded as quite unworkable, the 1954 Act used existing use plus development value as the basis for land sales to private purchasers. Specific provisions safeguarded people in exactly the same position as the unfortunate Mr Pilgrim. Yet in a more general sense the new system increased the risk of individual losses of this kind. This

was because a different system operated when land was purchased by public agencies. Here the 1947 principle of transfer at existing use value was retained. The 'dual market' thereby created was much criticized by property and professional interests.

Town and Country Planning Act 1959

There was nothing to rival the Pilgrim scandal, but the operation of this dual land market undoubtedly created cases of individual hardship for small property owners. The system was roundly condemned by the official Report of the Franks Committee (1957) on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries. Accordingly, the 1959 Act corrected this anomaly, restoring full market value as the normal basis for all land transfers. It also contained other provisions, most notably to improve the quality of information given to the public and especially to property owners about planning applications. The need for this arose because there had been cases of developers who evaded paying market prices for property by concealing their planning intentions from the original owners of the sites they were assembling.

Policy hesitations in the early 1960s

This amendment was itself a confirmation of the general direction in which planning was moving in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Cullingworth, 1980). With the end of building licensing, the planning legislation of the 1950s had created a much more favourable climate for private property development of all kinds. Meanwhile the generally buoyant economy and mood of business confidence accelerated development pressures. More specific government initiatives of modernization gave further encouragement. The most notable was the long-delayed motorway programme, first promised in 1946, begun tentatively in 1953 and finally started in earnest in 1957 (Starkie, 1982; Charlesworth, 1984). The first short section (of what ultimately became the M6) was opened in 1958 as a bypass for Preston. The first long stretch, 72 miles of the M1, opened the following year and the creation of a national system was by then well under way.

Reflecting these and other more general growth pressures, the intensity of demand for development land caused land values to rise sharply, especially in the south east. This effect was intensified by the rather tight approach to the allocation of development land that had emerged in the 1950s. We will examine the sources of this tendency in more detail later (see pp. 148–50), but for the moment we can note that it was creating pressures for amendments to planning law, especially in relation to betterment. The Conservatives were rather resistant to this, arguing that greater land allocations would address the problem (in ways to be considered more fully in Chapter 6). The Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, did, however, introduce a modest 'speculative gains tax' on property development in the 1962 Budget.

Town and Country Planning Act 1963

The final legislative effort before the 1964 election (apart from a consolidating 1962 Act) closed one of the most serious loopholes used by commercial property developers in London (Marriott, 1969; Cullingworth, 1980). The Town and Country Planning Act 1963 modified the permitted development rules under the 1947 Act, which allowed a 10 per cent increase in the volume of a building in existing use. In other words, an old office could be demolished and redeveloped as a 10 per cent larger office without being subject to planning consent, other than on detailed design matters. Yet, given the lower ceiling heights that were possible in modern buildings, 10 per cent cubic increase could easily mean 40 per cent extra floorspace.

If all the older office space in central London were redeveloped with such gains, the extra floorspace alone would have been roughly equivalent to the total increase in office floorspace in the same area over the years 1951–60!

Moreover, developers were increasingly pressing, with some success, to exercise these rights in brand new buildings, immediately building them 10 per cent bigger than the intended planning permission. There was no way that the planning authority, the LCC, could stop any of this without facing extremely heavy compensation claims for revoking permitted development rights. Accordingly, the 1963 Act substituted only 10 per cent increase of floorspace in development rights, to apply only to buildings erected before the 1947 Act came into operation. The new legislation was effective so far as it went, although open-plan layouts meant that a good commercial architect could still do a lot with a 10 per cent floorspace increase. On its own, however, it represented no solution to the wider problem of the growth of office employment in London. In keeping with Macmillan's economic planning experiment of the early 1960s, this question had become part of the wider review being undertaken of regional growth problems in the south east (MHLG, 1963). We will examine this more fully in Chapter 6 (see p. 156).

The development plan system

During the early 1950s there had been widespread talk within the planning movement of a '1932 mentality' (Beaufoy, 1952, p. 3). The fear was of planning being sacrificed to mindless Conservatism and going back to the ineffectual system of the pre-war years. Yet the changes of the 1950s did not, with hindsight, justify this pessimism. The decade saw the completion and approval of virtually all the statutory development plans. As a group of documents they exhibited little of the panache and innovation of the non-statutory plans of the previous decade. Thomas Sharp, who had himself prepared several of these earlier plans, pulled no punches in 1957 when he commented: 'Far too few [development] plans contain any positive proposals that can excite interest . . . they are presented in documents of such insupportable dreariness . . . specially designed to produce the maximum amount of bewilderment and boredom' (Sharp, 1957, p. 135).

Their main problem, however, and it was becoming all too apparent by the early 1960s, was that they had simply not allocated enough land for residential development (Hall et al., 1973, vol. II). Although the Conservatives had encouraged a particularly 'tight' approach in the 1950s (see Chapter 6, pp. 148–51), the root problem was the faulty population forecasting referred to earlier. But however dreary and overly restrictive the plans might be, at least they were there. For the first time Britain had a comprehensive development planning framework, providing a basis for controlling development proposals.

Development control and the private developer

Despite the shock of a private development boom, the other staple of local planning activity, development control, also remained intact following its reform in 1950 under Labour. By mid-1964 the system was handling some 400,000 applications a year, 84 per cent of which were approved (Cullingworth, 1980). On the whole, the system was felt to work well, although the number of appeals on refusals was growing from under 4,500 in 1953 to over 12,000 in 1963, bringing more delays. There was, however, ministerial and official reluctance to go further in enlarging permitted development rights, especially since pressures were growing for greater involvement in planning decisions by an increasingly critical public.

Inevitably the development controller's relationship with the developer was to some extent that of gamekeeper and poacher, as the amendments in the 1959 and 1963 Acts rather suggest. But there were clear signs, too, of the emergent accommodation of the private developer within the planning process through development control. Each party became accustomed to the ways in which their actions could potentially assist the other, in return for concessions of various kinds. Already by the early 1960s crude forms of 'planning gain' (not yet called this) were in use and other partnership arrangements were becoming more common in the promotion of planned commercial redevelopments. As with other strategic policy details, we will examine these more fully in the next chapter. Yet they are important to note here as an indicator of how much town and country planning now reflected the norms of the mixed economy.

Labour's new agenda, 1964–70


The 'technological revolution' and physical planning

Labour's overall strategy for planned economic growth based on harnessing technology was important for physical and land use planning in three main ways. First, it set a general tone for government actions that brought all forms of planning activity into greater prominence. Secondly, it fixed the general political parameters for planning policies and actions. Above all there was to be greater reliance on private–public co-operation within the mixed economy than on the heavily state-dominated planning approaches of the 1940s. Finally, it thoroughly imbued the practice of physical planning with the prevailing optimistic ethos about technology and its capacity to address society's needs in a democratic and accountable way. None of these things was entirely new of course. All had emerged during the Conservative 'planning experiment' of the previous few years. But Wilson, especially during his first administration, managed to give the whole approach a coherence and positive sense of direction that had not been apparent under the Conservatives.

A Minister of Land and Planning?


Yet even in the first days of his administration he was forced to compromise. Wilson had intended to create a Ministry of Land and Planning (MLP) to expedite the supply of land needed to implement Labour's regional and housing proposals (Wilson, 1974; Crossman, 1975). His first Minister of Housing and Local Government, Richard Crossman, had readily accepted this scheme. But Crossman's long-established and formidable Permanent Secretary, Dame Evelyn Sharp, fought an intense and successful four-day Whitehall battle to stop the Ministry of Housing and Local Government's (MHLG's) planning powers being lost. The proposal was quickly reduced to a rather small Ministry of Land and Natural Resources (MLNR). Most planning responsibilities remained with MHLG, although MLNR carried through the Land Commission legislation before it was abolished.

It is difficult to assess the significance of this early disruption. Looking back, Wilson himself blamed the subsequent problems of the Land Commission at least partly on his failure to insist on this change. MHLG was, he felt, too committed to the local planning system to push it to release enough land for development. This civil service conspiracy theory may well be a convenient rationalization, however. Wilson never intended MLP to be a super-ministry that would have had the 'clout' to force through the planning and land changes that were needed to do what was intended. Yet the episode showed how much institutional inertia locked



TOWN MAP—Scale: 6 inches to one mile

This illustration exemplifies the Town Map, which is the basic map for a County Borough and will be prepared for selected parts of a County such as the principal towns. The red-brown and black markings show the proposals and a key to the notations used on this specimen appears below:



It is optional whether additional colours are used to bring out with greater clarity, for example, open spaces in green or shopping areas in blue.

Figure 5.1 Development plans prepared under the 1947 Act were essentially detailed physical blueprints for change. This map, part of the Leicester City Development Plan, shows how the intended use and density of every piece of land was specified, together with areas for comprehensive development.

planning into a particular governmental setting that was perhaps less appropriate for the new approach that was being canvassed in the 1960s. (The subsequent battle between MHLG and DEA over regional planning, reported in Chapter 6, rather reinforces this point.)

Control of Office and Industrial Development Act 1965

Labour's first legislative effort, although rather specific in intention, demonstrated a desire to take a stronger line than its predecessors. In November 1964 George Brown had introduced his so-called 'Brown Ban' on further office development in London. The 1965 Act introduced a permanent mechanism, the office development permit (ODP), directly comparable to the industrial development certificate (IDC) which applied to factory building. But despite Brown's initiative, ODP control was exercised by MHLG (unlike IDC control which was handled by the Board of Trade). The Act added some teeth to the advisory approach of the Conservatives, evident in the Location of Offices Bureau set up by them in 1963. Yet there was no serious opposition to it, even among the developers themselves. Marriott (1969, p. 22) has even described it as the 'crowning gift' to the office developers by calling a halt to what was by then becoming a speculative overprovision of offices, thereby enhancing the profitability of the final schemes.

Land Commission Act 1967

Such an effect had not, of course, been Brown's major intention, although it doubtless contributed to the widespread political support the proposals received. Labour's second attempt, 20 years after its first, to address the question of land values and betterment was, however, a conscious expression of their moderate intentions towards private landed and development interests (Hall et al., 1973, vol. II; Cullingworth, 1980). The Land Commission had two major aims: to tax betterment and to accelerate the supply of land for building development, especially for housing. In their pre-election proposals it sounded very much like an implementation of the wartime Uthwatt recommendations, but the Act and even more the practice were more modest (MLNR, 1965). Thus the betterment levy on development values was introduced at a level of 40 per cent, well below Uthwatt's suggested 75 per cent, the 1944 White Paper's 80 per cent or the 1947 Act's 100 per cent. The intention now was to leave a considerable incentive in private hands, a sharp contrast to the 1947 development charge. An increase to 50 per cent was promised but never occurred. The second aim was the most controversial since it included extensive compulsory purchase powers. It also included powers for subsequent disposal to developers, with discretion to offer concessionary terms where residential development was involved. There was a particular proviso that the Commission could ensure that owner-occupiers rather than developers secured these concessions.

Labour was therefore clearly following the parameters of its larger strategy in these proposals. It leaned very heavily in the direction of private landed interests and the mixed economy. It also clearly embodied the notion of promoting owner-occupation and the property-owning democracy. In a real sense, therefore, Labour showed that it too was pragmatic enough to learn from its political opponents. Unfortunately this did not make the Land Commission work any better. The main cause of the shortage of development land was not that landowners in general were wilfully holding it back (although this happened in some cases), but that development plans had not allocated enough land. This was not helped by local authority mistrust of this new central agency. Until this problem was resolved (as Labour believed it could be by reforming local government and introducing a new planning system)

it was difficult for the Land Commission to do very much. Moreover, the immediate Conservative commitment to abolish it at the first possible opportunity did not make its work any easier. Events gave it even less time than the 1947 Act's Central Land Board to prove itself.

The Planning Advisory Group (PAG) Report, 1965

The problems of the development plan system had in fact already been addressed by a group of officials, local authority and private practice representatives. This group had been established by the last Conservative Minister of Housing and Local Government, Keith Joseph. His Labour successor, Richard Crossman, an ebullient and intellectually heavyweight enthusiast for Wilson's modernizing vision, quickly recognized its members as potential heroes of the planned technological revolution and judged them 'stunningly able and successful' (Crossman, 1975, p. 184). The key item on the PAG agenda was the inflexibility of the system in meeting the needs for greatly increased development land allocations consequent on population and economic growth, especially for housing. It had also become increasingly clear that it was going to be impossible to adapt the 1947 Act development plans to accommodate all the emergent ideas and proposals of the 1960s.

The PAG Report *The Future of Development Plans*, (PAG, 1965), made an important distinction between policy or strategic questions, which would require ministerial approval,





Figure 5.2 The PAG Report of 1965 proposed radical changes to the planning process. In place of the blueprint plans of the 1947 Act (see Figure 5.1) there were to be rather generalized structure plans, intended to show only broad land use and transportation patterns and proposals for growth/restraint, etc. Where detailed plans were necessary, these would be elaborated in various kinds of local plan.



b

and tactical issues, which could be left for local decision. PAG envisaged several new kinds of plan. 'Urban plans' (for towns of over 50,000 population) and 'county plans' would deal with broad patterns of development and redevelopment and handle land use and transport in an integrated way. Each would identify 'action areas' requiring comprehensive planning action over ten or more years. In addition, detailed 'local plans' could be prepared, most significantly for the action areas. Finally, the Group entered fully into all the exciting proposals for national and regional economic planning that were just emerging from the DEA, and looked for strong linkages between local physical plans and these higher-level economic proposals.

Overall the Group was reinventing the planning process to fashion something that was more explicitly rational and responsive to change. It stressed the policy basis of plans and sought to avoid the excessive elaboration of physical and land use detail that dominated the blueprint approach of 1947 Act development plans. Some planners clearly regretted the retreat from precision, finding a voice in one of the more irritable (although eloquent) champions of the 1940s' planning revolution, Thomas Sharp (1966). Yet Sharp was by now well known as a quirky oppositionist and carried few with him (Stansfield, 1981). Most of the profession, who were rather younger than Sharp, were excited by the new approach. The PAG proposals were among the most important conceptual developments of the 1960s. And, in sharp contrast to comparable earlier conceptual innovations, which had their origins in the ideas of key individuals of the planning movement, the PAG Report showed how new ideas were now generated entirely within official agencies and fed directly into policies. The distinction between ideas and policies was becoming more blurred.

Town and Country Planning Act 1968

The PAG proposals formed the basis of the 1968 Act, the first major reform of the planning elements of the 1947 Act system (Bor, 1974; Bruton and Nicholson, 1987). It was introduced by Anthony Greenwood, the second of Labour's Ministers of Housing and Local Government (and, incidentally, son of Arthur Greenwood, who had reformed the planning system under the 1929–31 government). Greenwood was a rather quieter figure than Crossman, less given to independent thinking or impetuous action. Accordingly, the new Act contained few surprises. It was an attempt to overcome the inflexibility and cumbersome procedures of the 1947 Act system, largely on lines spelled out by PAG. It also sought to provide more opportunities for participation by individual citizens in the planning process, an aim which did not sit easily with attempts to speed up decisions. Finally, it was supposed to strengthen the ability of the planning system to stimulate good development, rather than merely to stop what was bad.

There was little to object to in what were, in the dominant thinking of the time, such worthy intentions. Now that planning legislation had been divested of its controversial land values elements, little political heat was generated in the passage of the 1968 Act. The Conservatives would almost certainly have passed a very similar measure at that time. There were, however, some justifiable worries about adopting a new planning system without first completing the local government reforms that were then starting to be considered (and which we will discuss later, see pp. 128–9) (MHLG and WO, 1967). Already in 1966, Greenwood was proposing delaying full implementation of the Act, instead inviting groups of existing local authorities within sub-regional areas to begin working together voluntarily in ways that anticipated, without of course knowing, the post-reform boundaries. It was a messy solution, fiercely opposed by Crossman (1976, p. 199) at least, but it was, in effect, what happened and

the sub-regional studies, especially the earlier ones begun in 1966, came to be seen as methodological dress rehearsals for the new planning process, (considered more fully below).

Structure plans and local plans

True to the spirit of PAG, two new types of plan were introduced in the 1968 legislation – structure plans, which embodied strategic policies, and three varieties of more detailed local plans – for districts, action areas (replacing the CDAs of the 1947 Act) and subjects (such as recreation or landscaping). These plans would be imbued with the whole ethos of the planned mixed economy, offering positive guidance to private developers with the clear intention of marrying profitable development with good planning. The new Act also expedited planning procedures, chiefly by strengthening the position of planning inspectors. There was also provision for greater public participation, although the exact forms this might take were still unclear.

The Skeffington Report, 1969

The 1947 Act system had not been encouraging to public involvement, even to the extent of denying information about planning proposals in their formative stages. By the late 1960s, however, there was a growing agreement of the need to change this, reinforced by much wider pressures calling for a dispersal of power within society (Morgan, 1992). The principle of participation was being endorsed both in planning and more widely (Hill, 1970). Student protests throughout the West in 1968 gave particular prominence to the idea. In the same year Tony Benn, Labour's Minister of Technology, put forward the idea of the participatory democracy as part of the new technologically based future, where citizens considered public affairs on television and expressed opinions by pressing buttons in their own homes. It was against this general background that the Committee on Public Participation in Planning, chaired by Arthur Skeffington, a junior minister at the MHLG, was established. A more specific concern grew directly out of the 1968 Act system. Since the new local plans, uniquely, did not need central approval, there was understandable Ministry concern that the planning process be properly conducted. In this light, involvement of the public at large could be a potential check on an approach that was too narrowly based.

Yet the Skeffington Report, *People and Planning* (Skeffington Committee, 1969), was a disappointing and cautious document. This was partly because the Committee's terms of reference had limited it only to planning procedures, rather than local affairs in general. The Report outlined the rudiments of a participation system for planning, offering more information and involvement at plan preparation stage. It also recognized the need to ensure that participation extended beyond the organized pressure groups. Yet it did not consider the fundamental question of how much this should involve a real shift of power to shape local planning proposals from its established guardians, the local politicians and planners. The failure to address this ensured that official public participation in planning has never fulfilled the promise of real involvement in local affairs. But it has certainly increased the scope for more organized interest groups to influence the planning process. A growing concern of such groups in the late 1960s was limiting the process of change. Here too there was important legislation.

The Civic Amenities Act 1967

This is an Act that superficially appears to fall outside the main story of the development of the planning system over these years. Very unusually, it was passed as a private member's bill,



Figure 5.3 In contrast to the 1947 system, which put the public into a passive role, citizen participation was to be integral to the new planning system proposed by PAG and implemented by the 1968 Act. The 1969 Skeffington Report spelled out the ways in which this was to be achieved.

introduced by a former Conservative Minister of Housing and Local Government, Duncan Sandys (Punter, 1985; Delafons, 1997). As we will see in the next chapter, his major ministerial achievement had been to encourage green belts. He had also played a key role in the establishment of the Civic Trust, whose influence was strongly apparent in this legislation. The Act's main concern, with the protection of the historic environment, also appears out of step with the dominant 1960s' planning themes of growth and technologically based modernization.

Yet such distinctions were more apparent than real. Had Sandys not brought forward his bill, the Labour government would certainly have introduced its own proposals. In the event, the 1967 Act quickly assumed major significance within the 1968 Act system (and was consolidated with it in 1971) because it addressed a question that was of real importance as urban change quickened: what was to be done about pressures for change in areas which were valued in their unchanged state? Essentially the Act extended planning's concern with the historic environment from individual buildings and monuments to wider areas. Specifically, it introduced the conservation area, where a stricter regime of planning regulation could operate and measures for enhancement could be implemented. Authorities speedily took up this new instrument of policy and by mid-1974 there were over 3,000 conservation areas throughout Britain.

Planners in the 1960s

By the end of the 1960s, therefore, there had been a tremendous change in the powers and duties of town planners. Even more significant was the change in the actual practice and methodology of planning, particularly urban planning. As Hall remarked in an instructive piece of hyperbole, 'a planner trained in 1930 would still have felt reasonably at home in the planning office of 1960. The same cannot be said for the planner trained in 1960 who finds himself in the planning office in 1970' (Hall, 1973, p. 49).

Already by 1965 there were sufficient signs of change to generate a major crisis of professional identity for the town planner, manifest in serious tensions within the Town Planning Institute (Cherry, 1974b). Increasingly, as the extent of planning expertise widened, the professional ideal of the generalist town planner, synthesizing a range of specialist skills, was becoming untenable. The new directions of the 1960s relied more on the collaboration of specialists within a team approach.

Yet the reformers of the Town Planning Institute, in common with Hall, overestimated the spread of these new approaches during the 1960s. In fact their full impact did not affect all planners until after 1972, when local government reform created a new institutional framework for planning. But the shift certainly originated in the 1960s as a direct consequence of two major changes that gave planners higher status within urban local authorities and brought a spread of more sophisticated planning methodologies.

New city planning departments

In the 1950s the planning profession had been dominated by county planning officers, a consequence of the enhanced role of the counties under the 1947 Act. City planners had been the poor relations. Apart from the LCC and occasional exceptions like Coventry, planners had done little more than dent the traditional dominance of the city engineers and other departments in the big provincial cities before 1960. In the first years of the 1960s this began to change decisively (Cullingworth, 1970, pp. 123–42). New full-status municipal planning

departments were created. In Newcastle, an extraordinarily charismatic and visionary Labour council leader, T. Dan Smith, who himself played an important, if ultimately corrupt, role in the 1960s' planning revolution (Smith, 1970), brought in Wilfred Burns from Coventry to plan the city's renewal (Burns, 1967). Liverpool and Leicester soon followed, appointing Walter Bor and Konrad Smigielski. A new pattern had emerged which gave planners a pivotal role in co-ordinating municipal intervention in rapidly changing cities.

New planning methodologies

These new planning departments took many important methodological initiatives. Planning research and intelligence were improved, increasingly using the computers which the big local authorities were acquiring to handle their payrolls. Yet it was a slightly different group of planners who made the most important methodological advances during this period. From 1966 the promise of the PAG Report was elaborated in the series of centrally encouraged sub-regional planning studies that we referred to earlier (Glasson, 1978). Leicester and Leicestershire; Coventry, Solihull and Warwickshire; Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire; and South Hampshire formed the first group. More followed after the 1968 Act became law, although by this stage their remit was more specific: to prepare actual structure plans. The studies pioneered the structure planning process, using sophisticated modelling techniques to generate clear policy choices (Cross and Bristow, 1983). Their concerns were with the general spatial patterns of land use, transport and development, a clear break with the detail of the blueprint 1947 Act development plans.

Systems planning

As interest in the new approaches spread in the early 1970s, the Geddes-inspired model of 'survey-analysis-plan' that had underpinned the 1947 Act development plans was supplanted by a goals- and objectives-led approach (Marshall and Masser, 1982). Instead of beginning with a survey, the new process began with broad policy goals and more specific objectives. Survey and analytical work, often involving computer modelling, was then used to generate choices that could be evaluated against the original intentions. It all mirrored the vogue for indicative planning in national economic management, which established strategic targets to be achieved by a combinations of public and private actions.

PAG had marked the beginning of this retreat from the Geddes formula. The increasingly sophisticated elaborations of it now derived their growing impetus from advanced US space and defence systems planning. The systems approach, which in some respects revived the notion of planning as a synthesizing discipline, was then translated into a physical planning context by McLoughlin (1969), Chadwick (1971) and others. Here truly was a rational and scientific approach to planning that was entirely appropriate to the new and exciting technological age. Or so it seemed. What was perhaps more significant in the longer term was that, as we have noted for the PAG Report, most conceptual innovation in planning was now fully incorporated within and driven by the policy process. Where new ideas derived from outside, they had precious few connections with the planning movement in the traditional sense and they were soon locked into policy concerns. New, more radical ideas about the city and society were beginning to emerge, as we will see in Chapter 7. However, they grew mainly outside the planning movement and their advocates often perceived planners as part of the problem, rather being any longer a path to real reform.

More Conservative adjustments, 1970–74

The Department of the Environment

Meanwhile the inter-party agreement on most physical planning issues remained very strong. The change of government in 1970 produced some immediate shifts, including, as in 1951, a change in the central department (McKay and Cox, 1979). The new Prime Minister, Edward Heath, created a new super-ministry, the Department of the Environment (DoE), with overlordship for housing, construction, local government, planning, water supply and transport. In many respects it was a continuation of the process begun by Wilson in 1969 when a new super-ministry called the Department of Local Government and Regional Planning had been created with federal powers over MHLG and the Ministry of Transport. The new DoE brought a tighter structure, abolishing the older ministries and establishing a single concentration of most of the key ministries related to land use planning (while still excluding industrial development control). In the circumstances there were no worries of the kind voiced in 1951. It was, after all, a strengthening of the central apparatus.

The end of the Land Commission

By contrast, the Land Commission Dissolution Act 1971, whose objects were self-explanatory, was a clear break with Labour's land value policies. Even in this, though, there was a strong element of agreement. Labour had by this time tacitly accepted the Commission's failure, for the reasons discussed earlier, and only went through the motions of opposition. Moreover, the Conservatives were not going back to 1951; they were picking up where they left off in 1964. Accordingly, they replaced the 40 per cent betterment levy with a 32 per cent capital gains tax on land value increases. There was an important difference of principle in Labour's desire to tax betterment in a different way from other forms of capital. But taken overall the new proposals revealed a really rather modest distinction in party attitudes to the balance of private and public interests within planning.

The Town and Country Planning Acts 1971 and 1972

Nor was there anything very dramatically different in the two planning Acts of these years. The 1971 Act was a consolidatory measure, introducing no new powers, although significant amendments were made the following year. In many ways these reflected the experience of the Greater London Development Plan (GLDP) Inquiry in 1970–72. The GLDP was not actually a structure plan (although it was later deemed as such), but it was an important rehearsal of the process. Yet the length of inquiry and the 28,000 objections to the published plan stunned the DoE into seeking some short cuts (Ardill, 1974, pp. 69–73). The most important introduced the 'examination in public' procedure, expediting the consideration of structure plans. It allowed the DoE to shape the agenda more closely than was possible in a traditional public inquiry. There have been many fears that this attempt to expedite the structure planning process has brought a denial of legitimate objections and a weakening of public participation.

The Land Compensation Act 1973

Although the general issue of compensation for loss of development rights, so prominent in the 1940s, had now been settled once and for all, the question of compensation for environmental deterioration produced by planning or related actions was of growing importance. The massive scale of urban redevelopment, which we will examine in greater

detail in the next chapter, often created serious environmental problems for neighbouring areas. Despite important moves during the 1960s to break down the traditional separation of transport and town planning, roads were much the most serious problem (Starkie, 1982). From about 1965 national trunk motorway routes were increasingly being constructed within major built-up city areas, for example in London, Leeds, Glasgow and Birmingham. In turn, they were complemented by new, locally initiated (but largely centrally funded) urban motorways. These new road systems within built-up areas involved major demolition of buildings and disturbance to adjoining areas when they were being built and serious problems of noise and fumes when they were in use. Not surprisingly therefore the 1970s saw a growth of anti-urban roads protest campaigns. A notable and widely publicized early instance came in 1970 when the new elevated section of Westway in London was opened. Houses whose upper storeys were only a few metres from the viaduct carried a huge and direct message: 'GET US OUT OF THIS HELL' (Aldous, 1972). In addition, the 1968 Act planning system, by creating the possibility of rather non-specific identifications of action areas of major change in structure plans, was felt to run the risk of intensifying planning 'blight' (that is uncertainty). The 1973 Act broke new ground in admitting rights to compensation in the case of environmental deterioration produced by roads, airports, etc., and extended the compensation provisions on blight.

Local government reform, 1972–74

Much the most fundamental change under Heath's premiership was the reform of local government. Virtually every government since 1945 had toyed with the idea of reform. From the planner's perspective the separation of urban county boroughs, usually tightly developed within their boundaries by the 1960s, and the surrounding counties was a general problem. In the main conurbations, particularly London, the absence of any overall local government body for metropolitan planning was a serious problem. Yet reform was a huge and politically rather thankless task. The Conservatives had finally reordered London's government in 1963, creating a two-tier system with a new Greater London Council and 32 London boroughs (Herbert Commission, 1960), but it was not until 1966 that the Royal Commission on Local Government (in England) was announced under the chairmanship of Lord Redcliffe-Maud. A parallel body (the Wheatley Commission) fulfilled a similar function in Scotland. Proposals for Wales were already being considered.

The Redcliffe-Maud Report (Redcliffe-Maud Commission, 1969a, 1969b) recommended a two-tier London-type metropolitan system for the three main provincial conurbations around Birmingham, Manchester and Liverpool, but otherwise a unitary, one-tier system. Labour had broadly accepted this and was preparing legislation when it lost office. But the Conservatives, while broadly implementing the Redcliffe-Maud two-tier concept for an extended list of metropolitan areas, also preferred a solution based on a rather different two-tier split elsewhere. This was also the basis for Wales with a more varied, but overwhelmingly two-tier, pattern for Scotland (Wheatley Commission, 1969). Moreover, in England particularly, the boundary definitions of the lower-tier authorities frequently perpetuated many earlier problems. Overall there were many doubts from the outset about how well the new system would meet the requirements of planning.

Physical planning under the new authorities

The impact of the reforms was particularly marked in planning because the strategic/tactical divide of the PAG Report was now split between the new counties and districts. This severely

compromised the integrity of the whole 1968 Act system which had rested on the assumption of unitary authorities. It made it impractical to assume that local plans, produced by the districts, could simply be the tactical elaboration of the counties' strategic structure plans. There would obviously be greater likelihood of real conflicts between plans produced by two different authorities. Development control was to be largely a district matter unless wider county issues were involved, although it contained similar potential for inter-authority conflict.

Planners in the new authorities

Despite these serious problems, local government reform served to extend the 1960s' mood of optimism among planners. From their point of view it had one wonderful consequence. As a result of the reforms there were now 504 local planning authorities throughout Britain, 455 in England and Wales compared to just 145 after the 1947 Act (Cullingworth, 1976). Quite simply it created many more planning jobs. Demand greatly outstripped the immediate supply, but major expansions in planning education accelerated this during the 1970s. There was, it is true, some uncertainty as to the exact policy roles that planners were fulfilling in the new authorities. The old certainties of a heavily land-use-based approach, although remaining reasonably intact in staple activities like development control, were now becoming blurred in other aspects of planners' work, especially in the main urban areas. The new 1960s' style of strategic policy planning, although it had first appeared as an underpinning to PAG, now seemed to pervade all aspects of the policy process in the new local authorities (Maud Report, 1967; Bains Report, 1972). It was no longer the special prerogative of the planner. And in the initial inter-departmental jockeying for position that accompanied local government reorganization, the relative importance of the planners varied. But everywhere there were more of them than there had been in the early 1950s.

OVERVIEW

The key point to emphasize is how much the changes in the physical and land use planning system reflected the larger shift away from the highly state-directed society of the 1940s. It had become something that, although still centralized by international standards, exactly mirrored the mixed economy, based on an interaction of the state and private sector. There was an associated shift from promoting collective welfare goals in the 1940s to facilitating the pursuit of private affluence. In this chapter we have noted its impact, particularly in the field of housing, with associated effects for planning. It will feature strongly in the more specific discussions of the next chapter.

By changing with the prevailing mood of post-war Britain, physical planning became part of the 'post-war consensus'. It was never totally immune to changes in government, but the elements of bipartisan continuity were always stronger. Thus 1960 appears as a more significant turning point than 1964 or 1970, reflecting a general recognition of social and economic changes rather than electoral shifts. As we have seen, physical planning acquired a high political profile in the 1960s. Yet it never regained the mass commitment that had been glimpsed in the war years. This had laid the essential political basis for the translation of planning ideas into effective policies. By the 1960s, however, the whole conceptual dimension, including the generation of planning ideas, was firmly incorporated within the planning policy process. We can trace more of the implications of this in the next chapter.

6

Adjustments and New Agendas: II. Strategic Policies, 1952–74

By the early 1950s four major strategic physical planning policies of decentralization, redevelopment, containment and regional balance had been adopted to deal with the problems of urban Britain. The thinking on which they were based reflected the experiences of the inter-war years, as we saw in Chapter 3. And they became government policies largely because of the changed political priorities of the later 1930s and especially the 1940s, as we saw in Chapter 4. They remained centrally important throughout the following quarter century, implemented through the evolving planning system outlined in the previous two chapters. Yet, as we will see, their importance relative to each other varied significantly over time, reflecting many of the wider shifts we identified in the previous chapter.

Thus the strong 1940s' commitment to decentralization and regional balance shifted in the 1950s to a stronger emphasis on containment and redevelopment. The new priorities of the 1960s brought strengthening commitment to redevelopment, re-emphasis on regional balance and decentralization and a reduction in the role of containment. Within these larger policies, there was also a great deal of more detailed policy innovation. Thus new ideas were applied to the planning of commercial and public-sector redevelopment areas, New Towns and other large green-field planned development, green belts and the urban fringe, traffic management, etc. Again the pace of policy innovation reflects the larger picture, with the 1960s being particularly important. Overall, then, we present a picture that complements that of the previous chapter, of shifting emphases against a background of strong continuity. We begin with the policy area that wrought the most dramatic changes on urban Britain over these years, planned redevelopment (Ravetz, 1980; Esher, 1983).

PLANNING AND REDEVELOPMENT

The central areas

Redevelopments pre-1954

In the previous chapter we saw how the reforms to the 1947 Act and the end of building licences in 1953–54 brought increasing development activity in central areas, especially London. Before that time there had been some rebuilding, especially in the blitzed cities, many of which sustained major damage to their central areas. The demand for shops was very high in large cities like Plymouth or Southampton so that it was easy to pre-let and thereby get the necessary building licence (Marriott, 1969). Moreover, few individual retailers or local small-scale developers were willing to tackle the scale of development that was needed. It was therefore in these kinds of location that the new specialist commercial developers, who

were to dominate central redevelopment over the following decades, cut their teeth. The first of these was Ravenseft Properties.

Early public–private partnership for shopping redevelopment

Although few people realized it at the time, such schemes constituted an important organizational innovation in planned redevelopment (Ward, 1999). In contrast to pre-1939 development practice, where public–private partnerships were virtually unknown, developers were now working closely with local authorities. This was because local authorities in larger towns and cities were usually landowners of redevelopment areas already (or able soon to become so), as well as being planning authorities. The compulsory purchase powers of the 1944 and 1947 Acts had eased land assembly problems in designated redevelopment or comprehensive development areas (Hasegawa, 1992). (By the 1950s the latter had largely superseded the 1944 Act's redevelopment areas.) Typically, the local authority would remain ground landlord, with developers becoming lessees and middlemen, undertaking the development and negotiating rentals with the retailers.

In some cases local authorities themselves might undertake initial development to prime the pump. This happened in Coventry, for example, where there was some private developer reluctance to conform with the rather radical planned proposals (Gregory, 1973; Mason and Tiratsoo, 1990). It was here that the first British traffic-free central shopping precinct development appeared in the mid-1950s. The scheme gave modified effect to Gibson's famous wartime plan, providing a British example to rival the earlier Lijnbaan pedestrianized area in Rotterdam. After initial developer and retailer caution, this notion of open pedestrianized precincts was gradually accepted so that private developers increasingly took on such schemes. This growing developer willingness to produce more innovative planned designs mirrored the narrowing opportunities for purely municipal developments, where planning priorities could be paramount. The Conservative government became increasingly reluctant to allow completely municipal central area developments during the 1950s.

Speculative development and partnership

The rather developer-friendly system created in 1954 encouraged the emergence of a more speculative approach, especially for office buildings (Marriott, 1969; Scott, 1996). After 15 years with very few new shops, offices or other central commercial buildings, there was a strong unfulfilled demand, particularly as consumption of goods and services soared following the end of rationing in 1954. The multiple retailing chains whose inter-war advance had been checked by austerity resumed their growth. Similarly, there was an expansion of financial services and demand for new headquarters buildings from major companies which stimulated office development in London. Meanwhile the range of potential investment funds was also widened as pension funds, which were beginning to become much more significant, were allowed to invest in property from 1955 (Whitehouse, 1964). Overall, therefore, the financial risks for speculative developers in these early years were rather low. Although there were a growing number of purely speculative schemes, usually individual office blocks, the larger schemes retained a high degree of partnership (and risk-sharing) with local authorities.



Figure 6.1 The Euston Centre (background, right) was one of the first major examples of 'planning gain'. The developers, Robert Clark (left) and Joe Levy, surreptitiously acquired a large rundown area for commercial development. Without disclosing what was happening, LCC planners connived in the proposals and the developers gave them the land needed for the widening of Euston Road, which otherwise would have been prohibitively expensive.

Examples of office developer/local authority partnerships

(i) Planning-led The nature of the partnership could vary considerably. Two notable London office schemes in the late 1950s/early 1960s indicate something of the range (Marriott, 1969). A more planning-led approach was apparent in the development of the six office towers lining London Wall, in the southern part of the Barbican comprehensive development area (CDA) in the City of London, based on municipal ownership of a huge blitzed area. There had been much preliminary planning and design work, part of a hugely ambitious mixed-use redevelopment scheme of over 60 acres on the fringe of the existing commercial area. In particular, the traffic planning was innovative, with a pedestrian deck above the road level, reminiscent of some of Le Corbusier's inter-war visions. From 1957 the rights to develop individual blocks were then sold by tender to developers. Because the location was then seen as rather risky, the bids were not high but in the event the schemes were hugely profitable.

(ii) Developer-led Further west the creation of the Euston Centre over the late 1950s and 1960s indicates how the partnership could work when local authorities were not landowners. Having already secured outline permission for office development on part of the site for a client, the West End estate agent Joe Levy and his partner, Robert Clark, conceived a plan to redevelop a 13-acre area adjoining a major new road scheme. The London County Council (LCC) planners and valuers had realized that to build the road would require revoking the permission Levy already held, a hugely expensive operation. Instead, they co-operated with him in his surreptitious assembly of the whole site, involving some 315 individual purchases, mainly in 1956–60. He meanwhile co-operated to the extent of giving them parts of the site needed for the road (worth perhaps £2 million) and also land to rehouse displaced people with established tenancy rights. This was done on the basis that the planners would allow more intensive development on the remaining site to compensate for the area lost. This was the first really big example of another important dimension of public–private interaction – planning gain – although the term was not yet used. Smaller examples were present in many other office schemes of the time (Elkin, 1974).

New planning concerns in the 1960s

As noted in the previous chapter, the quickening pace of redevelopment had rather overtaken the planning system by 1960. We have seen how important, though often incremental, organizational innovations in the 1950s drew planners and developers into closer union. The last chapter also showed how modifications to the planning system in 1959 and 1963 were largely directed against specific unacceptable practices of commercial developers. But neither of these trends constituted effective policy-making for planned central area redevelopment. The sheer pace of commercial development pressure, especially in areas where there was little bomb damage (and normally, therefore, rather less municipally owned land) threatened to swamp aspirations for a planned approach. The danger was that, without a more comprehensive approach and the funds to implement it, planners would become too dependent on developers to be able properly to control or shape their operations.

By 1962 the planners were trying to regain the initiative (Ward, 1999). The Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG) with the Ministry of Transport was officially encouraging local authorities large and small to renew their centres in partnership with private developers (MHLG and MT, 1962). It recognized the limitations of the 1947 Act system in




Figure 6.2 By the early 1960s central government was giving strong encouragement to central area renewal, using CDA powers in partnership with private developers. The approach highlighted the technical limitations of the statutory CDA plans, however, and a more sophisticated non-statutory planning process was being encouraged, as shown in this 1962 publication by the MHLG and the Ministry of Transport.

facilitating a coherent planning approach. The statutory town maps and CDA maps were too crude to allow an approach that was sufficiently sensitive, particularly within districts and non-county boroughs which were not actually planning authorities. Accordingly local authorities were advised to develop non-statutory central area plans that would allow a more detailed approach to evolve. The main elements were familiar enough, based on the experiences of innovative blitzed cities like Coventry (and the new town centres).

The problem of the motor car

A key factor that underlined the dangers of a less-planned approach was the increasing problem of the motor vehicle. Following the end of rationing, the number of cars particularly began to increase rapidly, from 3.5 million in 1955 to 5.5 million in 1960 (Plowden, 1973). This trend, allied with all the other forecasts for population and economic growth, pointed to huge future increases, and the problem was acquiring great public and political salience. More than anything else, it brought home Galbraith's message about the pursuit of private affluence creating public problems, in this case traffic congestion and deterioration of the urban environment. This submission to the House of Commons All-Party Roads Study Group in May 1960 by one of the rising stars of 1960s' planning, Konrad Smigielski, typified contemporary fears:

London is faced with a disaster on a far bigger scale than the bombing during the last war. The threatening heavy black cloud hanging over the metropolis has nothing to do with the danger of nuclear war. It is the result of our own faults, of our inability to think ahead and to plan ahead.

There is already sufficient evidence that the economic and physical disintegration of London has set in under the onslaught of motorisation. Of course the results will not be noticeable overnight, but they will be pretty soon, certainly in our lifetime, and possibly within the next ten or fifteen years. (Smigielski, 1960, p. 208)

Traffic in Towns Report, 1963

In 1961 the Ministry of Transport appointed a study group to examine the long-term problems of traffic in towns. The group was led by Colin Buchanan (Bruton, 1981), a particularly able transport planner and ex-civil servant who had shown great interest in the problems of planning for the car, notably in his book *Mixed Blessing* (1957). This book and his general background meant that Buchanan was widely respected as an independent figure, bringing a healthy scepticism to bear on the Ministry's enthusiasms for roads. His report (MT, 1963) vies with the PAG Report as the most important official planning document issued in the 1960s. Despite Buchanan's earlier scepticism, it was essentially a pro-car report, in the sense that it did not seriously consider options that did not use the car. It also left the reader in no doubt that cars would not go away (although in common with many forecasts of the period, it significantly overestimated their medium-term growth). But it pointed out that the capacity of towns to absorb traffic was not infinite, however much redevelopment was undertaken.

At a more practical level, the report also indicated a range of options. These could accommodate different traffic capacities in ways that would, in the study group's view, be reasonably tolerable in avoiding the twin evils of congestion and environmental deterioration. In effect, Buchanan was returning to a modified version of the precinct principle which Alker Tripp (1942) had elaborated in the 1940s, providing for the designation of 'environmental areas' from which extraneous traffic would be excluded. Yet, whereas Tripp had envisaged




Figure 6.3 The Buchanan Report of 1963 gave further encouragement to the integration of planning and transport concerns. Although the report posed a series of options, it was largely understood and promoted as being pro-car. The illustration shows how the needs of drivers and pedestrians are supposedly reconciled by recourse to multi-level segregation in a redeveloped modernist cityscape. Yet the environmental impacts of traffic noise and fumes seem to have been ignored.

specialized, single land use precincts, Buchanan's environmental areas were mixed use. Pedestrian circulation systems were to be developed that were segregated from the major traffic routes. The exact form of these environmental areas would vary according to the degree of restructuring and the required traffic capacity. The most drastic involved the creation of a new living deck above the main central routeways. More modest variants merely involved modifications of the existing fabric.

The impact of the Buchanan Report

Overall it was a report that had a profound influence on planning thinking (Starkie, 1982) (and we note, yet again, how important conceptual innovations were occurring within the policy framework). At the most basic level, the impetus it gave to thinking about land use and transport planning together was crucially important, especially in view of the administrative separation of the ministries responsible for the two policy areas before 1970. In a more practical sense, it authoritatively endorsed and gave more coherence to the approaches of vehicle–pedestrian segregation that were already apparent. It was, however, open to criticism in that it tended to ignore accessibility when it was not car-based and because it exhibited a naive understanding of environment (Plowden, 1972; Ravetz, 1980). In particular, it underestimated the intrusive effects of noise and fumes of traffic on the proposed environmental areas.

Planned shopping redevelopments in the 1960s and 1970s

Yet by adding planning arguments to the existing commercial pressures for change, Buchanan further encouraged the central redevelopment boom. As more local authorities initiated inner roads schemes, they typically found they were automatically creating important redevelopment opportunities. The pace of activity quickened markedly in the early 1960s (Marriott, 1969). Thus the numbers of CDAs under MHLG consideration rose from 15 in 1959 to 70 in 1963 (although not all were central schemes). The pace of shopping redevelopment quickened and traffic-free precinct developments, now endorsed by both Buchanan and major retailers, became the norm. In 1964 Britain's first fully enclosed shopping precinct opened at the Bull Ring in Birmingham, developed by Laing on municipally-owned land in conjunction with the city's major inner ring-road project begun a few years earlier (Sutcliffe and Smith, 1974). Yet this and another early enclosed centre at the Elephant and Castle in London (opened in 1965) were not very successful, largely because of overambitious designs and poor locations.

The loss of confidence was only temporary, however, with growing awareness of successful examples in North America (Darlow, 1972). An important factor was the attitude of the major retailers, whose market position was strengthened further following the abolition of resale price maintenance in 1964, allowing them to undercut smaller independent shops (Wright, 1979, p. 80). Such retailing giants were becoming more interested in the new centres and their position as 'anchor' tenants was a key factor in schemes that were successful in retailing terms. Thus by 1966–67, Arndale, one of the most successful of the 1960s' shopping developers, was engaged on a large number of enclosed schemes, most notably the St Sepulchre Gate scheme




Figure 6.4 The Birmingham Bull Ring, developed by the Laing Development Company in conjunction with the City Council, was Britain's first fully enclosed shopping centre, opened in 1964. Notice its close integration with the new inner ring-road. The whole redevelopment was recently demolished and a new Bull Ring Centre opened in 2003 (see Chapter 9).

at Doncaster (390,000 square feet) (APT, *c.* 1965). Within a few years it was actively developing much bigger schemes in concert with local authorities, especially in Luton (755,000 square feet, opened in 1972) and Manchester (1,200,000 square feet, opened in 1976). Cities like Leeds, Nottingham and Newcastle also had similar large schemes in hand by the late 1960s and 1970s, with a variety of developers.

Planned office redevelopments in the 1960s and 1970s

By contrast the amount of office redevelopment underwent rather more fluctuation (Cowan et al., 1969; Moor, 1979; Scott, 1996). After the boom of the late 1950s and early 1960s, a short-term oversupply, the 1964 'Brown Ban' and subsequent 1965 Act (discussed in the previous chapter) saw a comparative lull in building (if not profits) in London and, as the ban was extended in 1965–66, the midlands. Activity picked up again in the early 1970s as Office Development Permits (ODPs) (and interest rates) were relaxed. Thus the five years between 1967 and 1972 saw a 21 per cent increase in office space in Britain, with very high demand in London especially encouraging yet more schemes (Jenkins, 1975). There had also been significant growth of office building in provincial cities during the middle and later 1960s. In part this reflected regional policies intended to encourage dispersal from London, especially of government offices. Local desires to encourage a new service employment base in the older industrial cities were also important. City councils like Newcastle typically had themselves to act as developers in the early 1960s, to replace obsolete buildings and create new space for dispersed government offices (NPD, 1973). Private developer interest grew during the decade, however, and partnership schemes were typical by the early 1970s.

Changing nature of the public–private partnership

By the late 1960s and 1970s the actual form of partnerships had evolved still further, blurring even more the distinction between public and private actions. On the one hand, the requirement on developers to disclose their planning intentions for sites to property owners, introduced in 1959, together with the increasingly public nature of the whole planning process in the 1960s, had limited the possibilities for large-scale private land assembly on the Euston Centre pattern. Indeed, Joe Levy found this when he tried to repeat the formula on a neighbouring site at Tolmers Square in the early 1970s (Wates, 1976). As one developer commented in 1973, 'Too many schemes have been fouled up in the past when the public hears about them' (Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975, p. 65).

On the other hand, the sheer pace of redevelopment had triggered tremendous activity in central area land markets, which meant that a private developer might hold quite a large individual parcel of land. While such parcels would not often in themselves be a completely viable redevelopment area, they would allow developers to approach local authorities from a position of strength and with a definite proposal in mind. The local authority could then use its powers to assemble the rest of the site to allow a jointly planned scheme to proceed. The Doncaster Arndale, one of the earliest really successful covered shopping precincts, was a very early example of this kind of approach (APT, *c.* 1965; Marriott, 1969). The logic of this, then, increasingly drew local authorities and developers together into joint commercial development ventures, whereby they shared the equity of the final scheme. Coventry and Newcastle had increasingly struck such deals for both shopping and office developments by the early 1970s (Galley, 1973; Gregory, 1973).

Overall assessment

These years were very important for the renewal of British central areas, when planning and commercial pressures came together as never before. Although there were obvious planning and design innovations, most notably precinct developments and the universal reliance on modernist designs, it was the organizational innovation of public–private partnership that was of more fundamental significance. This was one of the most important symptoms of how the planning system was changing to reflect the mixed economy. And it was something that was fully endorsed by Labour as well as Conservative politicians at local and central levels. Thus developers like Sam Chippendale of Arndale were adept at gaining the confidence of Labour councils, especially in northern towns and cities (APT, *c.* 1965; Marriott, 1969). Another property developer, Murrayfield, employed Frank Price, a Birmingham Labour leader with much experience of negotiating partnership deals, for similar reasons.

In turn Labour ministers were happy to be seen encouraging this rebuilding of the old industrial areas. Such ventures were an important symbolic and material expression of their wider programme, creating ultra-modern city centres that extended the technologically advanced affluent society to the heartlands of Labour support. Indeed, both parties wanted to extend the idea of close co-operation and partnership into other spheres of planning activity, especially the implementation of the housing programme. Richard Crossman was particularly keen on this idea, even considering recruiting his ‘friend’, Harry Hyams, later seen as the most notorious of the 1960s developers, during the autumn of 1964 (Crossman, 1975, p. 48). The idea was pursued more formally by the Heath government in its 1971–72 Working Group on Local Authority/Private Enterprise Partnership Schemes (DoE, 1972). In fact, though, a somewhat different form of private–public relationships had evolved in the other arena of planned redevelopment, the slum areas of the inner city.

The inner city

Resuming clearance

In Chapter 3 we noted the origins of mass slum clearance and redevelopment as political, social, economic and design interests coalesced behind the notion of a ‘clean sweep’ approach during the 1930s. As we saw then, much work had been undertaken in many cities to define the extent and location of the slums. War had worsened the situation, yet it was not until the 1956 Housing Act that slum clearance and redevelopment resumed. Despite the hiatus, inter-war experience remained important, bequeathing a perception of inner-city problems that was overwhelmingly dominated by the need to replace slum housing and modernize the city (Ravetz, 1980). The war years had emphasized the case for comprehensive planning, involving the redevelopment not just of housing but all other land uses, including industry. In contrast to the extensive use of CDAs in city centres, however, only a few authorities applied them in the inner city (Burns, 1963). It was more common simply to use Housing Act powers. The LCC and Birmingham had used the 1944 and 1947 planning Acts to initiate comprehensive redevelopment proposals for inner-city areas but such initiatives were very unusual. Even in these areas housing priorities dominated the redevelopment agenda.

The scale of the slum problem

Given the extent of housing obsolescence, such dominance is easy to understand. The problem identified in the inter-war years had barely been touched by the truncated ‘Great

Crusade' of the 1930s. Moreover, housing obsolescence had grown during the 1940s and 1950s because of bomb damage and an absence of investment to maintain or improve older housing. In addition, the rising expectations engendered by the 1930s' housing boom, the war years and the new emergent affluent society of the 1950s had a very marked effect. Yet it took some time for governments to recognize all this. The initial assessment of unfitness in 1955 relied on local surveys, as had happened in the inter-war period. As then, many (though fewer) authorities found it convenient simply to find unfitness only to an extent that they could deal with in agreed clearance programmes (Gibson and Langstaff, 1982). Accordingly, the 1955 figure – 853,000 unfit dwellings (in England and Wales) – was a gross underestimate. By the 1960s, when there was a greater willingness to face reality, the same figure actually rose to 1.8 million, based on a nationally organized survey in 1967. This was despite the demolition of 644,000 dwellings between 1955 and 1966. Thus the rate of clearance remained high, although it began to tail off from the late 1960s.

Physical and social modernization

In all, approximately 1,165,000 dwellings were demolished between 1955 and 1974. This involved moving some 3.1 million people and profound disruption and dispersal of established working-class communities (Young and Willmott, 1957). Yet throughout much of this period these devastating changes, which destroyed much of the social and cultural fabric of life for the poorer working class, were accepted without any serious question (MHLG, 1970a, 1970b). The slum dwellers themselves offered little organized opposition and initially often welcomed the changes. For those shaping policies, including planners, the social effects were seen as inevitable, even desirable. They were part of a wider process of social and physical modernization that echoed the imperatives of the affluent society and its characteristic optimism about material progress. Thus Wilfred Burns, Newcastle's first City Planning Officer and one of the most influential planners of the period, enthused about the beneficial effects of destroying established communities:

this is a good thing when we are dealing with people who have no initiative or civic pride. The task, surely, is to break up such groupings even though the people seem to be satisfied with their miserable environment and seem to enjoy an extrovert social life in their own locality. (Burns, 1963, pp. 94–5)

The clearance process

Clearance typically began with the declaration of unfitness and compulsory purchase either of an individual house or, more often, a wider clearance area (English et al., 1976). This part of the process was controlled by the public health inspectors, although town planners and other officials were heavily involved in determining the scale of the intended redevelopment. This was important because it was rare for large areas suitable for redevelopment to be entirely unfit. To compensate for this, housing legislation allowed the removal of sound or well-maintained buildings that would otherwise prevent a more comprehensive approach to rebuilding.

The redevelopment process

Unlike the city centres, the cleared inner-city sites were invariably developed by the local authority (Burns, 1963; Esher, 1983). This put great pressure on their administrative structures and expertise. In fact, the exact departmental division of responsibilities varied by authority



Figures 6.5 and 6.6 Netherthorpe, Sheffield, in 1956 and 1961, showing the breathtaking physical impact of planned redevelopment. The potency of the modernist vision is abundantly clear as the smoky unplanned disorder of the industrial era is supplanted by the clean, bold rationality of the planned, modern city. The consequences of these changes for the communities concerned can only be imagined.

and over time. Housing architects, engineers and town planners were always involved, however, overseeing the detailed housing designs, road and infrastructural considerations and overall land use. Consistent with the strengthening of planning's position within the big city authorities in the 1960s, town planners (such as Burns) became more significant in shaping later redevelopment schemes.

A fundamental characteristic of redevelopment was that it invariably brought a reduction from pre-existing densities (even, as we will see, if multi-storey flats were built). This was partly because the new dwellings were larger than the old slums, reflecting the elimination of overcrowding, the provision of bathrooms, better kitchens, etc. It also reflected an improvement in external space standards, especially the increased provision of open space, car-parking spaces, wider roads and more spacious arrangement of community facilities such as schools. Such improvements were further encouraged by the Parker–Morris Report, *Homes for Today and Tomorrow* (Parker Morris Committee, 1961), which defined new, higher standards, although their adoption did not become mandatory until 1969. It followed, therefore, that rehousing required rather more land than the redevelopment site alone and it was here that planned redevelopment impinged on other strategic policies, especially containment and planned decentralization (Cullingworth, 1960). By 1960 most major cities had nearly exhausted the supply of building land within their boundaries. This had wider implications, as we will see below. It also underpinned pressures to redevelop at as high a density as possible during the 1950s and 1960s, to minimize the impact on green belts.

The push for high rise

In turn this was linked to the increasing use of progressively higher flats, either on their own, or in the mixed-development schemes which had been recommended in the 1940s (Bullock, 1987, 2002; Horsey, 1988) and endorsed in the MHLG booklet *Flats and Houses* (MHLG, 1958). In fact, density increases on the higher schemes were often more apparent than real because of the need for wider spacing of blocks. Yet as demographic pressures increased in the late 1950s and 1960s, image became more important than reality. There was a coincidence of a strong central government push, reinforced by architectural opinion, and the near impossibility of securing enough housing land because of tight green-belt policies. In addition, the ease with which high rise could be incorporated into the parallel drive for more industrialized building methods (and the associated involvement of major building groups) were also of crucial importance (Dunleavy, 1981). As Keith Joseph, the responsible minister in 1962–64, later regretted: 'I suppose that I was genuinely convinced that I had a new answer. It was prefabrication and, Heaven help me, high blocks' (1973, cited in Dunleavy, 1981, p. 170). Not that Joseph was the only advocate of these solutions. They reflected the essential 1960s' vision of modernization based on technological progress. At the local level they expressed a sense of forward-looking renewal that was extremely important for older cities, paralleling the redevelopment of their centres.

The rise of high rise

Between 1956 and 1967 central government housing subsidies gave progressively higher grants for higher blocks, offsetting their greater real costs (Glendinning and Muthesius, 1994). Accordingly, flats of all kinds rose from 23 per cent of all tenders approved for public-sector dwellings in 1953 to 55 per cent in 1964 and remained near that level through to the 1970s (England and Wales figures) (Cooney, 1974). Most were under five storeys, but within that



Figure 6.7 Two leaders of the 1960s' planning 'revolution': T. Dan Smith, the charismatic Labour leader of Newcastle City Council, and Dame Evelyn Sharp, the forceful Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, admire a model of the tower blocks proposed for the Scotswood Road area of Newcastle in 1961. Unlike most promoters of such schemes, Dan Smith actually lived in a similar block, after his fall from grace.

total there was a marked increase in the number of flats in higher blocks. Thus flats over five storeys increased from under 7 per cent in 1953–59 to nearly 26 per cent in 1964, before falling below 10 per cent in 1970. Very high blocks of over 15 storeys similarly rose from under 1 per cent in 1953–59 to over 10 per cent in both 1965 and 1966, before falling to less than 2 per cent in 1970. Apart from some limited use in suburban and New Town locations, most such high blocks were concentrated in the inner redevelopment areas.

Generically there were three basic types: the point (or tower) block, the slab block and 'streets in the sky'. In their design conception, all came from the modern movement in architecture (Johnson-Marshall, 1966; Esher, 1983). The point blocks were derived from various continental precedents, including French inter-war schemes like Drancy-la-Muette, although post-war Swedish schemes were also very influential. The slab blocks came from Le Corbusier's ideas, especially the famous Marseilles block, *Unité d'Habitation*, built in 1946–52 (Marmot, 1982). Both types appeared during the 1950s, especially at the LCC's Alton East and West estates (1952–59) at Roehampton, south-west London (actually a suburban rather than a redevelopment site). Finally, the linear multi-storey 'streets in the sky' deck-access blocks were another Corbusian variant, pioneered in Sheffield's Park Hill/Hyde Park estates from 1957 (HDCCS, 1962).



Figure 6.8 ‘Streets in the sky’. One of the main flatted alternatives to the tower block was the deck access medium-rise block. The form was pioneered by the Park Hill estate in Sheffield, visible in the middle foreground, developed from 1957. It was joined within a few years by the neighbouring Hyde Park estate (immediate foreground).

The role of the planner

Throughout there was conspicuous opposition to this flat-building boom from important (though, in the 1950s, rather weakened) sections of the town planning movement. The Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA), guardian of the garden city tradition, was resolute in its opposition (Hardy, 1991b). Osborn, its ageing leader, kept his own blacklist of modernist architects who designed high rise, but themselves lived in low-rise houses with gardens. Occasionally individual chief planners also publicly distanced themselves from their authority’s housing policies, for example Walter Bor in Liverpool (Muchnick, 1970). Yet it should also be recognized that, even if they had doubts, few planning officers had the status within their local authorities to challenge more powerful departments until the later 1960s (Dunleavy, 1981). The simple truth was that many planners were happy to acquiesce in high rise. It suited the concerns of the employers of many of them, the county councils. Moreover, a significant proportion of the more urban-oriented planners were as much seduced by the modernist imagery as their architectural colleagues.

The fall of high rise

By the late 1960s, however, the changes in planning methodology and greater awareness of research discussed in the last chapter were reinforcing a widening scepticism about high flats (Cooney, 1974; Dunleavy, 1981). There was a mounting critique of their social impacts, especially for families with children. This was mirrored by a growing concern about the high



Figure 6.9 The effects of the Ronan Point explosion, May 1968. The 22-storey Ronan Point and several similar council blocks were built in Canning Town, London, by the Taylor Woodrow Anglian Company, using a Scandinavian industrialized building system. The system had no structural frame or even fixings, and one floor simply rested on the wall panels of the one below, rendering it particularly vulnerable to 'progressive collapse'. The disaster brought the whole drive to build high into great disrepute.

cost of housing subsidies needed to offset the extra costs of higher towers. The switch began with the critical subsidy change in 1967. An event the following year completed it. In May 1968 a gas explosion on the eighteenth floor of Ronan Point, a 22-storey block in the London Borough of Newham, blew out the side walls and caused the progressive collapse of one corner of the block (MHLG, 1968). Remarkably only five people were killed, but the impact on wider awareness of the problems of high-rise redevelopment was tremendous. In particular it underlined the low structural quality of many of the blocks and was effectively the beginning of the end of high-rise housing.

Medium-rise deck-access ('streets in the sky') schemes, usually built by industrialized systems, continued to be built for a few more years. Yet they soon began to experience social, design and constructional problems at least as severe as those affecting many high-rise blocks. This was certainly the experience of Hulme in Manchester, where the notorious 'Crescents', designed by the architect of Sheffield's Park Hill scheme, did for 'streets in the sky' what Ronan Point did for tower blocks. By the late 1960s and 1970s there was a very marked reversion to lower-rise high-density schemes, such as St Ann's in Nottingham (Coates and Silburn, 1980), or predominantly low-rise mixed developments such as Byker in Newcastle (NPD, 1973). And by this stage the traditional emphasis on the redevelopment of the inner-city slums was itself changing.

System building and package deals

Before considering the shift towards improvement policies, we should note the particular variant of the mixed economy that evolved in inner-city planned redevelopment. Instead of the partnerships typical of central area redevelopments, it was the package deal that became the usual model. This meant that local authorities would often purchase a complete scheme 'off the peg' from the contractor. This was important because only a handful of extremely large firms had the capacity to offer industrialized systems, which required extensive off-site prefabrication facilities and expensive on-site handling equipment (Dunleavy, 1981; Russell, 1981; Finnemore, 1989). Normal competitive tendering procedures, whereby contractors submitted secret bids to build schemes that were entirely designed by the local authority, were simply not possible. Central government also discouraged local authorities from switching between systems. Rather, they should each establish a close relationship with one firm.

All this had the effect of diminishing the significance and control of the local authority as developer relative to the builder as contractor. The process actually had more in common with central area partnership deals than with the traditional model of competitive tendering. There was great emphasis on persuading a few key decision-makers, usually officials or committee chairs, to adopt particular systems. The professional sensibilities of the municipal architects were usually assuaged by leaving a few detailed design aspects to their discretion. A whole public relations machine appeared, to 'oil the wheels' and, on occasions, grease palms. Some commentators at least have portrayed this as one of the decisive forces shaping the boom in high-rise redevelopment:

There was no human need for the tower blocks or most of the industrialized building systems of recent years. But a commercial demand was organized by political manoeuvring and high pressure salesmanship, helped along by corruption, regardless of human needs and consequences. (McEwan, 1974, cited Dunleavy, 1981, p. 121)

Notable figures in this extremely grubby corner of the mixed economy were John Poulson, a Yorkshire architect, and T. Dan Smith, who had started the 1960s as the dynamic Labour leader of Newcastle City Council (Smith, 1970). As a public relations consultant, Smith later became an important intermediary between Poulson, the big construction companies and local authorities, especially Labour ones. Poulson, Smith and others were later jailed for corruption (Ravetz, 1980, p. 177). Another notable fall was that of Alan Maudsley, the Birmingham city architect. Both cases revealed wide networks of dubious practice. It was clear that several figures much closer to the centre of power, most prominently the Conservative Cabinet Minister Reginald Maudling, had been fortunate to escape prosecution (Morgan, 1992, p. 343).

The emergence of improvement

Such revelations during the early 1970s seemed to confirm a growing sense of public and political revulsion against comprehensive redevelopment. By this time clearance was running well ahead of replacement building, and there were growing allegations of many basically sound dwellings being unnecessarily removed. Moreover, there was growing resentment at the draconian character of the clearance process and its disruptive effect on local communities. Young and Willmott had warned about this in 1957, but there was little organized opposition until the later 1960s, when some areas, such as Millfield in Sunderland (Dennis, 1970), began successful challenges to redevelopment proposals. We should add, though, that some of the last major redevelopment schemes, notably Byker, were handled with great sensitivity, and only took place after residents had rejected the option of improvement (NPD, 1973; Ravetz, 1980). In fact there had been mechanisms and grants to facilitate the improvement of older housing since the Housing Act 1949. The Housing Act 1964 further introduced the policy instrument of the improvement area. Yet such policies had little real impact; only 5,600 dwellings were improved under the 1964 Act by 1969.

Housing Act 1969

The 1969 Housing Act marked a watershed, coming as it did after several influential studies and pilot schemes (notably at Deeplish, Rochdale) (MHLG, 1966). It also reflected something of the mounting reaction to redevelopment, although it was actually presented as a parallel, rather than a replacement approach (MHLG and WO, 1968). Its primary significance was that it created a strong area instrument for comprehensive improvement, the general improvement area (GIA), allowing increased direct local authority action. The Act was a great success in that grants for improvements grew from 222,000 in 1965–69 to 1,009,000 in 1969–74 (Gibson and Langstaff, 1982). This success was qualified, however, because the major policy innovation, the GIAs, accounted for less than 10 per cent of this total. The social benefits of the policy were also doubtful in that the grants were used least by the poorest and rather reinforced a process of gentrification of some older areas (Ferris, 1972). But little was made of this at the time so that improvement began to look like a serious alternative to clearance, particularly as central funding for housing began to be more constrained. Thus only 42,000 dwellings were demolished in 1974 compared to 71,000 in 1968.

The position in 1974

The 1969 Housing Act was a Labour measure, but the marked advance of improvement and retreat from clearance actually occurred under the Conservatives. Like much else, though, this

was a shift based on consensus rather than party politics (McKay and Cox, 1979). By 1973 the Conservatives proposed a strengthening of improvement, implemented by Labour's 1974 Housing Act. This created a more effective instrument for area improvement, the Housing Action Area. The early 1970s were therefore the beginning of the end for large-scale planned inner-city redevelopment on the model developed in the 1930s and applied so consistently and energetically from the 1950s. This was not without consequences for the second major strand of strategic planning policy, another product of the 1930s: planned containment.

PLANNED CONTAINMENT

'Land-saving' and green belts in the 1950s

Conservative 'land-saving' and housing policies

One of the most striking features of Conservative planning policy in the early 1950s was a marked concern to restrict the conversion of land to urban uses (e.g. Block, 1954). This was, of course, something which local planning authorities could only do following the 1947 Act's compensation provisions, which relieved them of the heavy burden of paying landowners not to develop. Very significantly the Conservative reforms in 1953–54 did not alter this and, indeed, actually reduced the burden of such compensation on central government (Cullingworth, 1980). Yet 'land-saving' was not an automatic consequence of these planning powers; it was a policy they were used to implement.

Contemporary critics such as Osborn of the TCPA attributed it to the strong agricultural lobby in the Conservative Party (Hughes, 1971, p. 213; Hebbert, 1981). It was certainly encouraged by contemporary projections of population decline and had the weighty backing of Stamp's Land Utilisation Survey of the 1930s and the Scott Report of 1942. Osborn (1959, p. 34) had actually satirized such thinking in his poem 'Jerusalem Replanned':

And did freestanding family homes
Invade A2 and A5 fields
And was Jerusalem builded here
Reducing agricultural yields?

But its influence was palpable in the early 1950s. In 1952 the MHLG publication *The Density of Residential Areas* (MHLG, 1952b) made many detailed proposals for tighter layouts to save land. The Ministry pushed this general message more directly in public-sector housebuilding. We have already noted how in 1956 the new housing subsidies gave strong encouragement to flat-building, with progressively bigger subsidies to higher flats.

'Land-saving' and planning issues

'Land-saving' was apparent too in the residential land allocations within development plans of counties adjacent to big cities. Although some smaller cities (such as Oxford) secured boundary extensions at this time, the big cities were refused either extensions or permissions to build housing on their peripheries (Hall et al., 1973, vol. I; Elson, 1986). Sheffield, for example, had a proposed major extension disallowed in 1952. The most famous instance was the MHLG's repeated refusal to allow Birmingham to build on land it owned in neighbouring Wythall, Worcestershire, following a series of important planning inquiries culminating in



Figure 6.10 In the first decade after 1945 many towns and cities continued to meet their housing needs in low-density peripheral estates, intensifying the pressures for a stronger approach to urban containment. Greenhill, Sheffield, developed in the early 1950s, was one such scheme and an early British example of the Radburn layout (see Figure 3.4).

1959 (Long, 1962). Nor, as we will see, were there new designations under the New Towns Act 1946, except in the rather specific circumstances of central Scotland. Even the Conservatives' own mechanism of planned decentralization, the Town Development Act, was little used. Manchester, for example, found its ambitions to build in Cheshire thwarted, following another famous 'test case' inquiry, concerning a proposed overspill scheme at Lymm, in 1958.

Wider support for 'land-saving'

Although the government's stance was making it unpopular in big cities and some planning circles, such views were by no means general. The farmers and rural/outer suburban populations of the county areas, almost invariably Conservative-supporting, did not want large council housing estates for the big cities (and with largely Labour-voting populations) in their areas.

There were also aesthetic objections to sprawl, which received support with the publication of 'Outrage', a famous special number of *Architectural Review*, in June 1955 (Punter, 1985). The tone throughout was apocalyptic and doom-laden, especially as its author, Ian Nairn, fulminated on the evils of 'Subtopia':

'This thing of terror, which will get you up sweating at night when you begin to realize its true proportions . . . the universal suburbanization not merely of the country or the town, but of town-and-country – the whole land surface. Suburbia becomes Utopia. Utopia becomes suburbia. (Nairn, 1955, pp. 365–6)

And planning, because of its traditional emphasis on development based on the house and garden, was roundly condemned for speeding rather than stopping Subtopia's advance. Overall, 'Outrage' was a forceful attack that reinforced existing public and political concerns about the spread of towns. In fact, the central issues it raised were already being addressed in a new and more positive policy initiative that was to put mere 'land-saving' on to an altogether higher plane.

The Green Belts circular

In April 1955 Duncan Sandys, Macmillan's successor as Minister of Housing and Local Government, issued the famous Green Belts circular, 42/55 (MHLG, 1955). Senior civil servants were rather worried about giving such positive endorsement to a planning concept that was potentially so negative and inflexible (Mandelker, 1962). But despite their opposition, Sandys knew he was on to a good thing politically and did not allow them to deflect him. In effect, the circular extended the green-belt principle which had been accepted for Greater London in 1946, following the 1944 Abercrombie Plan, and provided for green belts to be incorporated in development plans (Thomas, 1970; Munton, 1983). Now the floodgates were opened for country areas around provincial towns and cities to bring forward proposals (Elson, 1986). Some basic ground rules were laid down, stating that green belts were to check the growth of large built-up areas, prevent coalescence of neighbouring urban areas and/or preserve the special character of particular towns. And, in deference to his officials' fears, Sandys warned that he would be strict in applying these criteria. This did not stop several areas which did not fit these criteria trying their luck, however.

Green-belt proposals

Between 1955 and 1960 no fewer than 69 sketch plans of preliminary proposals had been submitted, many of them covering different parts of what ultimately became the same green belt. By 1963, 5,585 square miles of England were subject to green-belt policies. Over one-third of this area was the original London green belt (which was the only fully approved scheme) and its interim (that is not finally approved) extensions (Thomas, 1970). All the main English conurbations had interim schemes: Birmingham–Coventry, West Yorkshire, Tyneside–Wearside, Manchester–Merseyside and South Hampshire. The remainder comprised fairly large non-conurbation cities like Bristol–Bath, Stoke and Nottingham–Derby and historic centres like Oxford, York and Cambridge. Several other English bids were completely unsuccessful. Salisbury, Swindon, Scarborough, Teesside, Flintshire, East Sussex and most of the County Durham proposals were all rejected. Meanwhile green belts for Edinburgh and Aberdeen were designated from the mid-1950s (and for Falkirk–Grangemouth, Dundee and Prestwick Airport in the 1960s) (Skinner, 1976). Yet the 1946 Clyde Valley Plan's proposals for a green belt around Scotland's largest city, Glasgow, were only partially incorporated in development plans. This hinted at the perceptibly more sceptical Scottish attitude to the green-belt concept that was so uncritically adopted in England.

Refining green-belt policies

The consideration of the first round of English green-belt proposals (and further MHLG policy pronouncements, especially a 1957 circular) refined the notion of what a green belt was actually supposed to be. It became clear that formal green belts were not intended to apply to smaller towns (unless they had special character) and were unnecessary where growth pressures were not felt to be strong. This did not mean such areas could not operate policies

of restraint and containment through normal planning policies, merely that they did not need the extra reinforcement of a formal green belt. There was also a clear reluctance to sanction green belts in areas where there was uncertainty about future development, to avoid the need for frequent reviews. With the same consideration in mind, the MHLG was also anxious that green belts should allow for some increases in population in the urban areas they surrounded. In addition to land already allocated for building in development plans or town maps, the 1957 circular introduced the notion of 'white land', within the green-belt inner boundary, but not actually part of it. This could be made available for development at some future date, although until the need arose it would remain undeveloped (MHLG, 1957).

Overall assessment of the early green belts

Such refinements were pushed by MHLG officials who were worried about the long-term implications of such a potentially negative planning instrument (Elson, 1986). Yet they failed to dent the rather simple conception of the green belt held by their ministers and many others, especially in England. Thus Henry Brooke, Sandys' successor as Minister of Housing and Local Government, commented in 1960:

The very essence of a Green Belt is that it is a stopper. It may not all be very beautiful and it may not all be very green, but without it the town would never stop, and that is the case for preserving the circles of land around the town. (Heap, 1961, p. 18)

This view of the green belt as a simple, permanent and readily understandable restriction on the spread of towns was (and remains) its great strength (Mandelker, 1962; MHLG, 1962). But it was increasingly questionable whether such a highly specific expression of containment was appropriate in the 1960s, against the background of accelerating growth forecasts.

Declining emphasis on green belts in the 1960s

Doubts in the early 1960s

It was therefore ironic that no sooner had Sandys and Brooke established green belts as a key part of planning policies, than their successors began to experience serious doubts. The population forecasts of the early 1960s caused the whole process of green-belt approval to be placed in abeyance in 1962. In Greater London particularly a serious crisis of housing land supply was being recognized, manifest in shortages and high costs of development land (Cullingworth, 1980). Yet, as noted in the last chapter, the government was reluctant to intervene in the land market in any decisive way to expedite supply or stabilize values. The then Minister, Keith Joseph, saw the answer in simply urging local planning authorities to allocate more land. But this expedient sat very uneasily with a strong commitment to the green belt.

In 1963 he tried to open up further the issue for his fellow ministers. Yet, even in the secret confines of ministerial discussion, the issue had to be raised gingerly. His desire to 'clear the air' had to be prefaced by words that confirmed just how quickly the green belt had become a sacred cow of planning policy: 'Nobody intends to destroy the Green Belt. On the other hand, the pressure for housing land within easy reach of London is tremendous' (Cullingworth, 1980, p. 235). The results of these tentative deliberations were rather limited. A White Paper, *London: Employment, Housing, Land*, invited local authorities in the home counties voluntarily to come up with the necessary land (MHLG, 1963). It came as no great surprise when they conspicuously failed to do so.

Green belts out of favour, 1964–70

Labour was more inclined to agree with MHLG official advice that more development land needed to be allocated in the green belts. In quick succession, Richard Crossman, their first ministerial incumbent, granted requests to build in green-belt areas in Kent (New Ash Green), Birmingham (Chelmsley Wood) and Sheffield (Stannington). As he confided to his diary in December 1964:

I'm making these three decisions quite deliberately because I've decided, if rigidly interpreted, a green belt can be the strangulation of a city. With so many people to house we can't put them all in New Towns thirty miles away on the other side of the green belt. We have to find places nearer the cities to house them in, even if this means that in some cases we shall trespass into the green belts or turn a green belt into four or five green fingers. I know this will cause me my first major row but I'm pleased about it. I've decided to do it and I think it's good ground on which to fight. (Crossman, 1975, p. 87)

Yet, as he subsequently realized, great caution was still necessary in addressing such issues, which were capable of generating heat even on his own side. Accordingly, his 1965 policy statement began with a ritual reaffirmation of commitment to the purposes of green belts (which were now extended to embrace recreation for urban populations). However, he suspended judgement on the provisional green-belt proposals until the major questions about the need for and supply of development land had been resolved. Behind this decision lay a widening professional and official opinion that the policy, as then defined, was out of date and too static for the growth pressures facing Britain at that time (Elson, 1986). Certainly the trend of central decisions throughout the late 1960s saw a continuation of the pattern Crossman had set. Around Birmingham, for example, further peripheral development was permitted on appeal at Moundesley, Hawkesley and Pirton in 1968–69.

Green belts and other strategic policies

In fact the green-belt issue had become tied up with several other dimensions of strategic planning policies. We will consider these more fully in later sections, but for present purposes we need to be aware of how they impinged on the issue of green belts. It is, for example, important to realize that a series of regional and later sub-regional studies were being considered during the middle and later 1960s. The justification for Crossman's decision to suspend consideration of green-belt proposals was because he was awaiting their reports, largely concerned with the location of new development. The kind of growth-corridor and green-wedge solutions that Crossman was referring to in his diary might well have been favoured, radically altering the form of green reservations. And both green belts and regional planning were linked to the increased emphasis on both planned redevelopment of the inner city and planned decentralization throughout the 1960s. Clearly the amount of rehousing needed outside the inner city and the form, character and locations of any New Towns would have a major bearing on the green belts that had been proposed in the 1950s.

Green belts and local government reform

Another key imponderable was local government reform. In many respects the proposals for green belts were an expression of the political separation of town and country within the local government system. It is significant perhaps that it was in West Yorkshire, where much of the

‘countryside’ had a particularly urban character, that the most workable green belt was produced from the point of view of development land availability. The more typical pattern was of amenity-conscious, Conservative-voting, urban-fringe counties seeking to block incursions from the Labour cities. A radical reformulation of local government to create unitary authorities embracing both town and country would certainly reduce political polarization, generating a new form of fringe management. As noted in the previous chapter, the publication of the Redcliffe-Maud proposals in 1969 endorsed such a solution, which was also assumed in the Town and Country Planning Act 1968.

A recreational dimension

Meanwhile in his 1965 policy statement, Crossman (following Labour thinking since the inter-war period) had asserted an urban recreational role for green belts that had been neglected in the 1950s’ circulars. In the long term this was perhaps the main significance of this period for containment policy. The Countryside Act 1968 reflected the new emphasis by introducing country parks (Cullingworth, 1976; Elson, 1986). These were areas of countryside reserved specifically for urban recreational needs, within easy travelling distance of city populations. Many were in either formal green belts or urban-fringe areas where ordinary planning or land ownership controls were preventing building. Many of the early parks had already been used for recreation, but grant aid and more formal status improved what was being provided. Smaller picnic sites could also be created, and again many were in formal or informal green belts. By 1974 there were 111 country parks in England and Wales, covering 15,000 hectares, and 141 picnic sites.

Green-belt revival, 1970–74

Conservative enthusiasm

Peter Walker, the youthful first ever Secretary of State for the Environment, indicated a wish to accelerate green-belt approvals, signalling a real revival of enthusiasm for containment under the Conservatives (Elson, 1986). Moreover, he implemented a pattern of local government reform that perpetuated much of the pre-existing urban–rural separation, retaining the essential institutional basis of green belts. There was more to this than mere party politics. Growth pressures were slackening as population and economic growth forecasts were revised downwards, making the more static notion of green belts seem more appropriate. Uncertainties about regional growth strategies that had dominated the 1960s also ended as radical options were discarded, allowing traditional conceptions of the encircling green belt (as opposed to green wedges, for example) to remain dominant.

The position in 1974

Not for the first or last time, Conservative ministers soon found that firm commitments to green belts, however comforting to their supporters in urban-fringe areas, could prove embarrassing. By 1972–73 it was evident that more housing land was needed than simple population forecasts suggested. This was largely because a series of reflationary budgets, aimed at bolstering an increasingly ailing economy, had triggered a massive private housing and property boom (Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975). Moreover, it was becoming abundantly clear that as household size declined, housing needs could still remain high even if population increase was slowing. All this meant searching for more land in or near the green belts and

wholesale release of 'white land' for building was being contemplated by 1973–74. In the event, therefore, Walker and his successor, Geoffrey Rippon, were unable to grant the speedy approvals of green belts. By 1974 the position had barely changed from 1962 and less than half the total area of green belt was actually approved. For something that had become such an important component of strategic planning policies, this was indeed a paradox. The indecision over containment over these years had been closely linked to the heightened concern for wider regional issues. It is to these we now turn.

REGIONAL BALANCE

Regional policy in the 1950s

The relaxation of regional policy

The Distribution of Industry Act 1945 had been used very strictly in the years to 1947 but was then increasingly relaxed (McCrone, 1969; Parsons, 1986). The 'Butskellite' macro-economic policies of both Labour and Conservatives after 1950, relying on Keynesian-type demand management, allowed the reliance on physical controls (like industrial development certificates ((IDCs)) to be reduced. The fact was that unemployment had not re-emerged as a problem in post-war Britain and, although there were some regions which suffered more, unemployment everywhere was very low by historical standards. In 1951 the worst British regions, Scotland, Wales and the north, had unemployment rates of only 3.5 per cent, 3.5 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. Northern Ireland, at 6.6 per cent, was appreciably worse, although still relatively modest by the standards of the 1930s or 1980s (Law, 1981). These generally low levels did not, however, reflect the emergence of new regional economies. Although the war economy and post-war regional policies had brought new factories to many of the pre-war depressed areas, there had been a marked revival in employment in the older industries on which these regions remained heavily dependent.

But regional policy had not really been intended to remodel regional economies. It was primarily a response to regional unemployment and, in the circumstances of the 1950s, the Conservatives felt able to relax regional policy. Expenditure fell from an average £8.13 million per annum in the last three years of Labour to a mean annual figure of only £4.76 million in the first eight years of Conservative rule. The object of policy was no longer the application of serious obstacles to new industrial development in the buoyant regions so much as the diversion of a few industries to the worst-off regions. The wider objective of regional balance was very much in the background.

Regional policy revival from 1958

From 1958, however, older industries began to experience serious problems and responded by shedding labour. In response, the Conservatives were forced to abandon their hands-off approach. There was new legislation in the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act 1958 and the Local Employment Act 1960 (McCrone, 1969; McKay and Cox, 1979). The first signalled a marked increase in spending on regional policies, from £3.6 million in 1958–59 to £11.8 million in 1960–61 and allowed assistance to smaller blackspot areas outside the development areas. The second extended this principle and actually abolished the development areas, replacing them with development districts, smaller areas to be defined

solely according to unemployment criteria, essentially those where unemployment was roughly twice the national average or 4.5 per cent. This move was heavily criticized by planning commentators, who saw it as the culmination of a decade of retreat from regional policy. Certainly its focus was less on the balanced distribution of industry and more on the avoidance of local unemployment. It seemed to be, in Cullingworth's phrase, 'first-aid', falling well short of being a comprehensive approach to regional planning (cited in Parsons, 1986, p. 177).

From regional policy to regional planning, 1960–64

Regional policy, 1960–64

Despite such criticisms, the 1960 Act coincided with a much more vigorous approach to regional policy under Reginald Maudling and later Edward Heath as successive interventionist Conservative Presidents of the Board of Trade. Thus Maudling embarked on a major initiative to push new expansion in the motor industry into the depressed areas, especially Scotland and Merseyside. In February 1960 the *Guardian* described it, with only slight exaggeration, as 'the largest piece of planned industrial dispersal that has ever been attempted in Britain' (cited in Parsons, 1986, p. 146). (Wartime dispersal had, of course, been more significant.) Regional policy spending was further extended under the Local Employment Act 1963. Important too was the increasing concern to lure more office development away from London, manifest in the creation of the advisory Location of Offices Bureau in 1963, noted in the last chapter.

Sources of the shift

This broad policy shift in traditional regional policy was essentially a reflection of continuing high regional unemployment (by the standards then applied). In turn, of course, this highlighted the importance of the all-party, consensual commitment to the maintenance of full employment by government policy. The ghost of the 1930s still haunted the decision-making of the 1960s, especially for the Conservatives, who had been so successfully labelled as the party of unemployment in the inter-war years. But despite increasing regional policy expenditure, regional unemployment was appreciably higher in 1961 than it had been a decade earlier. The north, Wales and Scotland stood at 3.8, 4.2 and 4.5 per cent, respectively, with Northern Ireland at 9.4 per cent, despite major legislation extending assistance there as early as 1954 (Law, 1981).

There were, however, other important underlying factors. We have already noted the growing early 1960s' concern with accelerating population growth and the need to ensure it was matched by economic growth (e.g. NEDC, 1963). In such circumstances it was imperative that the older regions were properly integrated in the national economy, to avoid excessive congestion and growth pressures in more buoyant regions. As we have seen, the MHLG was simultaneously struggling with the management of growth pressures around London, particularly the specific problems of office development and the green belt (MHLG, 1963). It was beginning to dawn on government (and wide sections of business) that a more active regional policy could play a key role in avoiding the mounting wage, land and general congestion costs of the south east and the midlands. This involved moving beyond administering regional first-aid to the worst areas, but looking seriously at the capacity of the regions to attract and accommodate growth, all of which was pointing beyond regional policy to regional planning.

Regional planning frameworks, 1960–64

One of the main difficulties in moving to the more comprehensive notion of regional planning was the deeply entrenched departmentalism at central government level. This kept physical planning, controlled by the MHLG and largely applied through local government, separate from spatial economic policy, applied through the Board of Trade. The further separation of the Ministry of Transport, busily engaged on the national motorway programme by the early 1960s (Charlesworth, 1984), did not help either. As in other aspects of their planning policies, the Conservatives began to address this question but failed to act decisively.

The opening of regional offices by the key central departments was a gesture towards fostering a regional approach (and dispersing offices from London) (Cross, 1970). Yet it did practically nothing to transcend the departmentalism of Whitehall, where all the real power remained. In Scotland, the creation of the Scottish Development Department (SDD) in 1962 went furthest down the road to integration. And in early 1963 the government took the extraordinary step of appointing a special Minister for the North East, in the person of Lord Hailsham (also Minister for Science) (Hailsham, 1975). A Cabinet Minister and political heavyweight, Hailsham greatly advanced the case for regional planning in England's main problem region (Bulmer, 1978a). Moreover, he knew how to get the local politicians of this overwhelmingly Labour region, particularly the key figure, T. Dan Smith of Newcastle, on his side (Smith, 1970). His accidental substitution of a flat cap for his usual bowler hat during an early visit attracted some ridicule as a clumsy attempt to identify with working-class north-easterners. However, it won national publicity and helped give regional problems a popular prominence they had not had since the 1930s. Hailsham had only a temporary remit, however, inherited by the last of the Conservative Presidents of the Board of Trade, Edward Heath. Rather grandly titled the Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development, Heath let himself be known as 'Minister for the Regions' and seemed to symbolize the beginnings of a full regional commitment during the last months of Conservative rule.

Regional planning initiatives

Meanwhile the several agencies with regional planning responsibilities had been taking important initiatives during the early 1960s. In 1961 the MHLG initiated the South East Study 1961–1981, an analysis of growth pressures in the largest and most prosperous region. The report (MHLG, 1964) highlighted the huge need for housing that was building up, largely as a result of a forecast natural increase of some 2.5 million within the region itself and a further 1 million by migration. It advocated massive increases in development plan land allocations and major new town and city designations, together with additions to existing New and Expanded Towns.

Furthermore, in 1963 new centrally sponsored regional plans had also been prepared for central Scotland (SDD, 1963) and the north east (at Hailsham's instigation) (DITRD, 1963). The plans identified major growth areas within the regions and looked for a concentration of public and private investment in such areas. Such proposals broke with the 'blackspot' approach of the development districts because they focused on the most likely areas for growth within the regions. The approach, which included proposals for new towns and major road investments, was partly based on the then fashionable concept of the growth pole, a rather dubious though influential spatial adaptation of the ideas of the French economist François Perroux (Parsons, 1986). Yet it shared an important characteristic with the blackspot approach, the principle of selective, concentrated assistance. It was therefore an approach which depended on more careful planning.

From regional planning to regional policy, 1964–74

The Department of Economic Affairs and regional planning

As in other aspects of planning, these regional aspirations were given great initial encouragement by Labour in 1964–65. The creation of the DEA, noted in the previous chapter, and the National Plan were intended to link closely with regional proposals (DEA, 1965a). Under George Brown, the DEA instigated the ODP, the new national mechanism for office control, under the 1965 Act discussed in the last chapter. More importantly for regional planning, Brown (1972) created a new framework of Regional Economic Planning Councils (REPC) and Boards (REPB) (Smith, 1970; Martins, 1986; Pearce, 1989). The Councils comprised collections of regional worthies, including local politicians, businessmen, trade unionists, academics, etc. The Boards were the civil servants seconded from various departments to work on particular regions. Together this regional apparatus was charged with producing regional economic plans that would relate national economic planning objectives and local physical planning objectives. Brown himself saw them as something that was the embryo of a new form of regional government that he hoped would emerge as a by-product of local government and wider constitutional reform.

Weaknesses of the new regional machinery

The new machinery was seriously compromised from the outset. Despite some sympathy with Brown's planning objectives, the MHLG, with the tacit support of the Treasury, managed to emasculate the DEA proposals by the time they were announced in December 1964. Richard Crossman savoured his Ministry's victory in his diary:

I had been continually negotiating on the draft. It had come across to us with the word 'economic' added in longhand before the word 'planning' as a concession to me, so that it read not just 'regional planning' but 'regional economic planning', ha, ha, ha! I also wrote into the Statement the explicit assurance that nothing in this scheme would affect the existing powers of the local authorities with regard to planning. It seemed to go down fairly well in the House, mainly because it will take some time for people to discover how inadequate and meaningless it has now been made. (Crossman, 1975, p. 93)

Brown himself took a more hopeful view:

I reckoned that by agreeing to have the word 'Economic' in their title we could leave enough ambiguity in the situation for our scheme to go ahead without too much fuss. My hope was that, as time went on, the connection between planning for economic development of an area and planning for its physical development would become so obvious that the two would naturally fuse. (Brown, 1972, pp. 102–3)

In the event, Crossman's assessment was the more apt. This MHLG–DEA demarcation dispute was only part of it, because the regional bodies also found themselves with no decisive say in the exercise of regional economic policy (McKay and Cox, 1979). IDC controls remained with the Board of Trade (briefly shifting, in 1969–70, to the Ministry of Technology), while the new ODP was exercised by the MHLG. Even the DEA's National Plan, which included much regional trumpeting, was drawn up without any truly regional input. The Regional Councils and Boards thus came to occupy the no-man's land between national and local



Figure 6.11 T. Dan Smith as Chairman of the Northern Economic Planning Council, launching their regional study, *Challenge of the Changing North*, in 1966. The (unfulfilled) hope was that the Councils would be able to link regional and national economic concerns with physical and land use planning.

power and authority. By 1967 prominent planning figures like T. Dan Smith, then Chairman of the Northern REPC, and David Eversley, former member of the West Midlands Council, were going public on their frustration and disillusion (Parsons, 1986). And after George Brown ceased to be Secretary of State, what central commitment to the regional planning machinery that existed soon evaporated. In 1969 the DEA was abolished and the short-lived overlord Department of Local Government and Regional Planning assumed control of the regional planning apparatus. In 1970 it passed to the new Department of the Environment.

Regional economic studies

The most tangible achievement of this period was the production of regional economic studies (in effect, plans) (listed in Cullingworth, 1976, pp. 277–8). The DEA itself produced two studies, for the west midlands (DEA, 1965b) and the north west (DEA, 1965c). Thereafter the pace, such as it was, was set (in England) by the REPCs, all of which produced documents for their regions between 1966 and 1968 (e.g. NEPC, 1966). Three of the REPCs also produced sub-regional studies, most notably for the Halifax, Huddersfield and Doncaster areas by the Yorkshire and Humberside REPC. Several other notable sub-regional studies were also initiated in the late 1960s by central agencies for estuarine zones that were felt to have major growth potential at Humberside, Severnside and Tayside. Meanwhile Scotland continued the

pattern established pre-1964 of its own more direct form of economic planning. It was joined in this respect by Wales, a change which reflected the establishment in 1964 of the Welsh Office as a permanent 'regional' department of central government, on the model of the Scottish Office. The Scottish and Welsh proposals accordingly formed a more authoritative basis for action than those in the REPC reports, which, although producing a few suggestions that were taken up, were largely ignored.

Regional economic policy, 1966–70

Instead, as regional unemployment began to grow from 1966, the emphasis swung back to a strengthened regional policy, firmly controlled from Whitehall (McCrone, 1969; McKay and Cox, 1979; Jay, 1980). The Industrial Development Act 1966 reintroduced the Development Areas and strengthened available grants. The new areas covered 40 per cent of Britain's area and accounted for 20 per cent of the population, most of them Labour voting. This was much less spatially discriminating than either the blackspot or the growth-pole approach to regional assistance. There was also less discrimination about what kinds of firm were aided. Rather than




Figure 6.12 By the late 1960s the moves for regional economic planning were being subordinated to a more indiscriminate pattern of regional assistance, reflecting a gradually worsening economic climate.

particularly encouraging the more profitable firms by assistance paid as tax allowances, the emphasis shifted to more labour-intensive manufacturers, encouraged through bigger grants and the regional employment premium of the new selective employment tax, introduced in 1967. Also in 1967 the Special Development Areas (SDAs) were introduced, giving extra assistance to areas of coal-mining closures. Finally, the Local Employment Act 1970 offered a lower level of assistance to newly created Intermediate Areas (the so-called 'grey' areas) which did not justify Development Area status but were significantly less prosperous than the most favoured regions. This followed the recommendations of the important Hunt Committee (1969) on the Intermediate Areas.

Factors in the resurgence of regional policy

This shift was largely driven by rises in unemployment. This traditional concern began to assume priority over the growth-oriented concerns as the optimism of the early 1960s began to fade. It was intensified by the political priorities of the Wilson government. For Labour, the broad approach was more politically acceptable than the more selective strategy of blackspots and growth points that it had inherited from the Conservatives. Quite simply, it avoided the political damage of refusing or reducing aid to areas which were predominantly Labour voting. Thus by 1970 (an election year) the government was unwilling to tackle the issue of descheduling some of the development areas, as the Hunt Committee had recommended. Industry meanwhile was quite content to accept ever-increasing grants to move into areas with generally lower labour costs, objecting only (in evidence to the Hunt Committee) to the accompanying restrictions on the freedom to expand elsewhere.

Regional policies 1970–74

Nor did the incoming Conservative government resume the type of selective regional planning approach that Heath himself had espoused in 1963–64. Unemployment was much higher than it had been a decade earlier and from 1970 it began to move inexorably upwards. By 1971 the most favoured region, the south east, had unemployment of 4.1 per cent, worse than the least favoured British region in 1951. The three worst British regions – Scotland, Wales and the north – recorded figures of 7.4 per cent, 6.9 per cent, and 6.9 per cent respectively (Law, 1981). Accordingly, despite an ostensible electoral commitment to less interventionist industrial policies and a distinctly hard-faced approach to regional policy in 1970–71, the Heath government made its famous 'U-turn' (McKay and Cox, 1979). The Industry Act 1972 further extended regional policy aid, particularly by widening the Intermediate Areas. More assistance was also given for the clearance of derelict land. There were some elements of the earlier Conservative approach of selectivity in the type and availability of grants, but there was no resurgence of regional planning. The REPCs continued their work, some to the extent of issuing further reports, but by now they were completely sidelined. Despite the initial rhetoric of the Conservative programme, it was all essentially an extension of the approach of the late 1960s. Overall, it was a story with parallels in the final policy area, planned decentralization.

PLANNED DECENTRALIZATION

A limited approach in the 1950s**Conservative doubts**

In the early 1950s the position of the New Towns was by no means secure. Only 3,126 dwellings had been built in the 12 designated areas in England and Wales by the end of 1951 (Aldridge, 1979; Cullingworth, 1979). The Board of Trade was reluctant to grant IDCs for the London New Towns, arguing that they undermined regional policy. Nor were the New Towns being given favoured treatment by supply ministries, an important factor when major building materials were still rationed. Not least, the Treasury was worried by the large deficits on the programme. Given their very dubious progress, it was hardly surprising that the Conservative government seriously considered scrapping the programme. Macmillan himself admitted privately in September 1952 that ‘I do not think it was a very good idea in the immediate post-war conditions’ (Cullingworth, 1979, p. 555).

This was with the gift of hindsight; the Conservatives had not opposed the New Town programme under Labour. And the fact was that, despite early disappointment over poor progress, the New Towns remained a basically popular idea. Clearly it would be politically unwise to jettison the programme, given the Conservatives’ very slender majority at the 1951 election. Macmillan decided that it was better than the alternatives, especially around London. Without the New Towns, he argued that ‘the LCC will be striving to fill the gap – which will save neither public money, nor investment: it will just make a nasty mess’ (Cullingworth, 1979, p. 118).

The New Town programme in the 1950s

These arguments carried the day. The programme continued to be questioned in 1953–54, especially by the Treasury, until it began to dawn on them just how much profit would soon begin to flow in their direction (Heim, 1990). During 1952 Macmillan was able to get agreement for a policy whereby existing New Towns were continued, but there would be no new designations and any further planned decentralization would be handled through the Town Development Act 1952 (Block, 1954). Accordingly, the proposals for a New Town at Congleton to accept Manchester overspill was dropped, much to the relief of Cheshire County Council, which trenchantly opposed both it and an earlier proposal at Mobberley (Lee, 1963). (It was this that sowed the seeds of the move to develop at Lymm, referred to earlier.) There was, however, one apparent contradiction of this general policy line (Cullingworth, 1979). A further New Town was actually designated, in 1955, at Cumbernauld in Dunbartonshire. The anomaly reflected the extreme seriousness of Glasgow’s rehousing problems, particularly the higher than average additional land requirements when the city’s extremely high-density slums were redeveloped (Osborn and Whittick, 1977). Moreover, there was no Scottish legislation equivalent to the Town Development Act 1952 until the Housing and Town Development (Scotland) Act 1957, so that local authority overspill schemes were not an option.

Generally the development of the existing New Towns was accelerated, and they benefited from the relaxation of IDC availability to establish sound industrial bases during the 1950s. By the end of the decade progress had been sufficiently good to raise the question of what would happen to development corporation assets when the towns were completed. The

Commission for the New Towns was the favoured device, created under the New Towns Act 1959. Its essential purpose was to prevent the local authorities getting their hands on New Town assets. Initially the Commission was fiercely opposed by Labour (although they did nothing when in office after 1964). Hemel Hempstead and Crawley became the first to be handed over to the new Commission in 1962.

Social and economic development

The New Towns of the 1950s exactly caught the aspirations of younger, inner-city, skilled and semi-skilled working-class families for a better life (Aldridge, 1979). Formal (and, even more importantly, informal) industrial selection schemes ensured that migrants from the older city core areas had the kinds of skills which were in demand in New Town industries. Housing allocation was therefore directly linked to having a suitable job or the good prospect of getting one. This meant that the London New Towns particularly were an industrialist's dream. They combined modern, well-serviced locations, land and premises that were extremely good value for money with (almost literally) hand-picked workforces living in good-quality and inexpensive housing.

Many of the promised community facilities also began to appear during the 1950s and the



Figure 6.13 The early New Towns, especially around London, were often in the vanguard of wider social changes, mirrored to some extent in their physical planning. The photograph shows a neighbourhood shopping centre in Basildon c. 1961. We can detect the increasing motorization of society and the growing trend to vehicle/pedestrian segregation. Pervading everything is the sense of hitherto unknown working-class affluence.

New Town centres were well advanced by the middle years of the decade. Most were developed directly by the development corporations (with increasing Treasury approval) (Cullingworth, 1979). Private developers operated in six, however. Four were developed by a single company, Ravenscroft, which had established its reputation redeveloping the centres of blitzed cities, as noted earlier (Marriott, 1969). The appearance of these convenient modern centres of consumption (earlier than their equivalents in most older cities) was, of course, a foretaste of wider changes in British society. For those who were able to move there, they were an important means of opting into the affluent society, providing a setting for a new, and more materialistic, lifestyle.

Planning innovations

The New Towns were also one of the major sources of planning innovation in the 1950s and consequently received many visitors from Britain and overseas. There was little they did that was entirely new, but they provided an opportunity to adopt and refine a series of ideas that had been around for some time (Osborn and Whittick, 1977). A real innovation came with shopping precinct development. Stevenage vied with Coventry in producing the first pedestrianized central shopping precinct in Britain (Stephenson, 1992). In addition, the New Towns stood at the forefront of neighbourhood and social development ideas. There was certainly growing sociological scepticism about the wider validity of the concept of the neighbourhood unit as a physical means of creating social cohesion (Glass, 1948). But by the 1950s, the New Town planners were generally adopting an essentially pragmatic approach. They used the neighbourhood unit largely to provide a useful physical framework for the provision of essential social facilities in reasonable proximity to housing. The closely related idea of Radburn residential layouts also began to appear from the mid-1950s, most comprehensively at Cumbernauld, which was the first New Town plan to reflect increasing car ownership. And there were many other more minor instances where New Towns articulated what was seen as best practice in British planning during the 1950s.



Figure 6.14 The New and Expanded Towns were prime locations for manufacturing development. This shows the first of Swindon's industrial estates in the early 1960s. Already the presence of on-street parking suggests a growth of car-based travel to work that went beyond what was anticipated by planners, although the two pedestrians, significantly, are women.

Other dimensions of planned decentralization

New Towns were the main, but not the only, dimension of planned decentralization during this period. Little was achieved under the Town Development Act 1952 before the 1960s. By 1960 fewer than 10,000 dwellings had been provided through local overspill agreements. Swindon, where the requirements of planned decentralization from London was matched with a strong local desire for growth and diversification, was the only really successful example on a scale comparable to the New Town programme (Harloe, 1975). Other attempts to use the legislation on a bold scale foundered, for example at Lymm, Cheshire, noted above. By 1957 the LCC had become so frustrated with the 1952 Act and central unwillingness to designate further New Towns that it proposed its own project for a New Town at Hook, Hampshire (LCC, 1961). It fell following intense local opposition to the specific location, but Hampshire counterproposed a scheme for major town expansion at Basingstoke under the 1952 Act, which made an important contribution in the 1960s and beyond (Dunning, 1963).

A good deal of the 'planned decentralization' of the 1950s was actually just a modified version of old-fashioned municipal suburbanization in areas where the intention to develop was established before green-belt proposals were introduced (Clapson, 1998). Manchester, for example, met many of its housing needs by completing its massive Wythenshawe satellite town, begun between the wars (Deakin, 1989). Liverpool did the same at Speke and its larger post-war satellite town at Kirkby (Lawton and Pooley, 1986). And, despite Cumbernauld, Glasgow produced huge peripheral estates such as Drumchapel and Pollok (Smith and Farmer, 1985). In London, the LCC was engaged in the building of large 'out-county' estates at Debden, Elstree, Harold Hill and elsewhere (TPI, 1956; Young and Garside, 1982). The main problem with this approach was that, by 1960, these reserves of housing land were running out. Meanwhile the inner-city redevelopment programmes were moving into even higher gear. This meant that, even with the trend to high-density redevelopment noted above, ever larger numbers of people would be displaced from inner-city areas and need rehousing elsewhere. As if this were not enough, it was at this point that higher population growth forecasts were indicating a continuing high demand for additional (rather than just replacement) housing. Together, all this brought a remarkable renaissance of planned decentralization from 1960.

A policy renewed, 1960–74

New Town designations, 1961–64

By 1960 it was clear to Conservative ministers that their planning policies would soon collapse under the weight of their own contradictions without some new initiatives. The provincial cities of Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester were patently unable to resolve their needs for housing without some central assistance (Osborn and Whittick, 1977; Aldridge, 1979; Cullingworth, 1979). Accordingly, New Towns were designated for Birmingham at Dawley (1963) and Redditch (1964) (Anstis, 1985); for Glasgow at Livingston (1962); for Liverpool at Skelmersdale (1961) and Runcorn (1964). Manchester was once more left out, partly because past battles had by now completely soured relations with neighbouring Cheshire. Schemes for Risley, near Warrington, and Leyland-Chorley were being considered, although neither was as straightforward as those for other cities.

In addition to this fairly conventional use of the New Town, for big-city overspill, these years were marked by an explicit recognition of the advantages of the New Town in regional



Figure 6.15 The new city of Milton Keynes epitomized much of the spirit of 1960s' planning. Its American-inspired grid road layout reflected the presumption of far higher car-ownership than in earlier New Towns (and lent itself to easy expansion should growth pressures continue).

development. This was most marked in Lord Hailsham's 1963 proposals for the north east, noted earlier, which included a specific proposal for Washington as a growth point/overspill New Town south of Tyneside. There were important local steps towards planned decentralization on the north side of the Tyne with the inception of Killingworth (1960) and Cramlington (1963) (Byrne, 1989; Ward, 1999). These were large satellite towns uniquely initiated as CDA partnerships between Northumberland County Council and private developers to take overspill from north Tyneside. The government was attracted to the arguments for merging New Town and regional growth point policies because that allowed more direct central control over growth policy and Washington was duly designated in 1964 (Hole et al., 1979; Holley, 1983). There were similar though less directive intentions in Scottish proposals of the same year for a fifth Scottish New Town at Irvine.

New Town designations, 1964–70

The issue of further New Towns for the south east came to the fore with the publication of the South East Study in 1964, noted above (Cullingworth, 1979). Without being specific as to the mechanisms for development, it proposed major new cities for Bletchley (Buckinghamshire), south Hampshire and Newbury (Berkshire), new towns for Stansted (Essex) and Ashford (Kent) and large expansion of the existing large towns of Ipswich, Northampton, Peterborough and Swindon, all of which were actually just outside the south east itself. Labour ministers were profoundly sceptical about favouring the most prosperous region with such massive investment compared to less favoured regions. Yet this was at just the time that the population forecasts were suggesting the biggest increases, giving the study considerable credibility. On this basis a MHLG–DEA coalition of Crossman and Brown carried the day against the scepticism of the Board of Trade and the Scottish and Welsh Offices.

The Bletchley new city, renamed Milton Keynes, was designated in 1967 (Bendixson and Platt, 1992; Clapson et al., 1998). Peterborough was also designated in 1967 (Bendixson, 1988) and Northampton (Barty–King, 1985) the following year. Both were New Towns, although created with the intention that their development corporations would operate more in partnership with local government. South Hampshire's expansion was left to the local authorities. Ipswich got to the stage of a public inquiry in 1969 but was then dropped. Agricultural opposition was a major factor, although by that stage the population projections were shrinking, casting doubt on whether it was really necessary. Declining growth expectations also allowed the remaining proposals to be dropped or severely trimmed. Thus Newbury and Stansted were dropped, Swindon continued as a large 1952 Act Expanded Town and Ashford became a small one. There were additions to the targets of some earlier New Towns to compensate for these changes.

These important developments in the planned decentralization of the south east were paralleled by provincial initiatives (Aldridge, 1979; Cullingworth, 1979). Irvine, recommended in the 1963 Central Scotland Report, was designated in 1966. In 1967 a small New Town was designated, appropriately enough, at Newtown, to secure rural regeneration in mid-Wales. It represented the cautious implementation of a proposal for a much larger development based on Caersws. The following year Manchester finally got a New Town at Warrington, where the Risley proposal was incorporated in a wider scheme for renewing an older industrial town. Also in 1968 Dawley New Town was greatly expanded to become Telford, following the general trend by incorporating several existing small towns. Finally, in 1970, the long-promised Central Lancashire New Town was designated to serve Manchester overspill and regional development objectives. Much of the delay had been because of the need to address fears in north-east Lancashire that the area would be left behind by the new growth point based on Preston/Leyland/Chorley.

New Town designations, 1970–74

Although the peak of growth expectations had by now passed, government commitment to New Town policies was undiminished by the return of the Conservatives in 1970. Yet, following Ipswich, there were more signs that the New Town solution might not be as relevant as it had seemed a decade earlier (Aldridge, 1979). Thus a draft designation order was laid in 1972 for Llantrisant New Town in south Wales, to serve a regional regeneration function, as recommended in a study published in 1969. However, a public inquiry in 1973

brought fierce opposition from the nearby local authorities, worried about their own viability, and the proposal was dropped. In Scotland, yet another Glasgow overspill/regional growth point New Town was designated at Stonehouse in 1973. Significantly, the new Strathclyde Regional Council (the post-reform, upper-tier 'county' authority for the Glasgow area) was soon criticizing its irrelevance for Glasgow's needs. Moreover, no action was taken on the major planned population and economic expansions mooted for Severnside, Humberside and Tayside at the high point of mid-1960s' growth optimism. Perhaps the last breath of this optimism came in a further new city proposal that was announced to accompany the decision (subsequently reversed) to develop Maplin (Essex) as London's third major airport in 1973 (Hall, 1980). Although it was not immediately apparent at the time, a new agenda was already in the making.

Later New Town plans

This later wave of New Towns showed many important differences from the earlier New Towns, except Cumbernauld (Osborn and Whittick, 1977). Most obvious were the higher population targets. All the 1955–64 New Towns had population targets of 65,000–90,000 at designation; most were 70,000. Thereafter, with the exception of Newtown, which had a target of only 11,500, the target figures moved up even more dramatically. Irvine, the first of the post-1966 group, had a target of 116,000, but Peterborough (175,000), Warrington (205,000), Northampton and Telford (220,000), Milton Keynes (250,000) and Central Lancashire (500,000) soon breached this. The targets of the 1955–64 New Towns were further increased (typically by 10,000–20,000) in the later 1960s, reflecting the pressure of upward population projections.

All the later New Towns were planned with a much stronger awareness of the motor car than earlier examples, although there were important variations in how planners interpreted this. A high degree of vehicle/pedestrian segregation was now usual. Runcorn, though, was unusual in having a strong public transport orientation, based around a figure-of-eight busway that was essentially a closed adaptation of the Soviet and MARS linear city idea of the 1930s (see Chapter 3). In most cases, however, planners absorbed the main message of *Traffic in Towns* (MT, 1963) and aimed to give the greatest possible freedom to car use. This was nowhere more so than at Milton Keynes (Bendixson and Platt, 1992; Clapson et al., 1998; Clapson, 1999), which aspired to be a little piece of southern California in north Buckinghamshire. Early ideas for a public transport-based city were quickly discarded in favour of a Los Angeles-type extensible road grid (although with very British roundabouts at the junctions). It was a solution which had already been rehearsed by the same planners at Washington. For the historian, though, it is the plan for Milton Keynes, a hugely optimistic scheme for planned affluence, that most perfectly epitomizes the 1960s' 'planning revolution'.

Detailed planning aspects

Reflecting these higher targets, most of these New Towns were planned at significantly higher densities than earlier ones. This encouraged a much stronger sense of design and architectural innovation, in contrast to the fairly conventional architecture of the earlier New Towns. The short brick-built terraces of pitched-roof dwellings characteristic of, for example, Stevenage or Hemel Hempstead gave way to tighter and more visually exciting groupings of flat or monopitch-roofed dwellings, often built by non-traditional means, in Cumbernauld, Livingston, Runcorn or Washington (although this is not to say that they were any more popular than the earlier schemes).



Figure 6.16 The 1960s' New Towns were often more adventurous in detailed design aspects than their predecessors. This shows the Donwell area of Washington, with full vehicle segregation from bicycle and pedestrian movement, careful landscaping, site planning and grouping of buildings.

This innovative modern architecture was partly compromised by the increasing emphasis on owner-occupation and private development in the later New Towns (Aldridge, 1979). Reflecting the manner of their growth, the New Towns contained many ambitious young working-class families who were anxious to take advantage of the bipartisan political push for home ownership that had dominated government housing policies since the 1950s (Clapson, 1998). Among other things, this suggested that the later New Towns ought to have a more equal balance of public and private housing development which, conveniently enough, also reduced the costs of New Town development to the Treasury. In 1966 the target of a 50/50 tenure split was adopted as policy for all New Towns. The southern and some of the midland New Towns attracted much private development, usually of rather more conventional design than public-sector schemes.

Other lifestyle changes were reflected in neighbourhood or district planning. Although it had become less fashionable to refer to neighbourhoods by the 1960s, the concept was very deeply embedded in New Town planning and was essentially adapted and often renamed (e.g. as a district) to reflect social changes. One of the most obvious changes came in local shopping. The earlier New Towns would typically include parades of small neighbourhood shops. Later New Town non-central shopping was more likely to be based around a large supermarket. This had a larger catchment area than the traditional neighbourhood, reflecting widening car ownership and the increasing prominence of larger retailers in food retailing. The higher densities of the later New Towns also allowed a greater reliance of many housing areas on central area shops. In Cumbernauld, this was a dominating principle of the whole plan, with limited development of retailing outside the centre.

Other aspects of planned decentralization, 1960–74

The New Towns invariably dominate any discussion of decentralization, planned or otherwise. In fact, however, town developments, although they never rivalled New Towns in the provision of planned decentralization, took on a new lease of life in the 1960s (Herington, 1984, 1989). Schemes such as Basingstoke, and several smaller schemes for Birmingham and Liverpool such as Tamworth, Daventry, Ellesmere Port and Winsford, at least showed the potential of this procedure during the 1960s. The larger schemes particularly took on something of the character of the New Towns, although were rarely able to generate the same degree of professional interest. Another interesting alternative to the New Town mechanism was that pursued for Cramlington and Killingworth, mentioned above. Meanwhile cities such as Sheffield, Leeds, Nottingham, Leicester, Bristol, Cardiff (and, possible growth areas notwithstanding, Hull and Southampton–Portsmouth) continued to order their own ‘planned decentralization’ largely through peripheral town extension or *ad hoc* arrangements with adjoining areas (Gordon, 1986). Even cities that did secure New Towns, like Birmingham, also continued to undertake these kinds of scheme, most notably at Chelmsley Wood, noted earlier (Sutcliffe and Smith, 1974).

‘Unplanned’ decentralization

Finally, we should note the growing significance of ‘unplanned’ decentralization, whereby largely private development occurred outside New Town, town development or other substantially planning-led schemes. (They were, of course, subject to local planning controls.) This became more important as the volume and relative importance of private building grew during the 1960s and early 1970s. Private housing completions (in the UK) were running at an annual average of a little over 200,000 in the ten years 1964–73, representing 54 per cent of total completions (McKay and Cox, 1979). Virtually all this development took place in urban-fringe locations. As a very rough comparison, New and Expanded Towns accounted for only 3.7 per cent of new public and private housing built in England and Wales between 1945 and 1969, although the proportions were higher in Scotland (and in metropolitan areas with well-established planned decentralization schemes, especially Glasgow and Liverpool) (Hall et al., 1973, vol. II).

The greater truth was that large, new, private, suburban or semi-suburban areas were rapidly developing. These were mainly grouped around smaller towns in outer metropolitan areas within or beyond green belts, or as peripheral developments around small and medium-sized free-standing towns and cities without green belts. In a loose way their development was being controlled by the planning system, but the strategic relationships of home, work and services were not planned in any overall sense. In some places a real functional coherence was maintained that exceeded that even of the New Towns (e.g. at Luton). There were also two attempts at private New Towns, in Kent (Cullingworth, 1979; Hebbert, 1992). The first was a 25,000 population scheme proposed by Costain, the major housebuilders, for the Isle of Grain in 1956, which was given short shrift by MHLG. As noted earlier, the much smaller 6,000 population scheme at New Ash Green was approved in 1964, although it never achieved the promised coherence.

In fact the cumulative outcome of ‘unplanned’ decentralization was more commuting and, although it is more difficult to quantify, journeys to services (Hall, 1963; Hall et al., 1973, vols I & II). Some differential shift in employment from the core big city areas to outer-city areas was already apparent by the 1960s. Only in the New and Expanded Towns was this occurring

in a reasonably coherent relationship with housing development. Retailing, especially of food and non-luxury items, was showing tendencies to shift to reflect population decentralization. As yet this was on a modest scale. The planned suburban shopping centre was the most typical manifestation, for example at Cowley in Oxford, opened in 1963 (DTEDC, 1968), but there were occasional glimpses of more dramatic North American-style decentralized retailing. In 1964, there was a major application for an out-of-town regional shopping centre on the American model at Haydock Park in Lancashire (DTEDC, 1971). The refusal of this application, following a public inquiry, combined with the tremendous encouragement given by planning to central area redevelopment had important long-term consequences for 'unplanned' decentralization in Britain.

OVERVIEW

The 1952–74 period and especially the 1960s were, then, tremendously important for planning. As this chapter has shown, the concerns were essentially urban and regional modernization, and managing growth within a mixed economy. The shifts in emphasis closely reflected the changing social and economic agenda, particularly fluctuating population projections and the general optimism about economic growth. More even than the last chapter, which showed some party differences in attitudes to the planning system, the theme has been one of party political continuity. Wider changes were mediated, not so much through party politics, as through the internal departmental politics of ministers and civil servants. The tensions between the Prime Minister, the MHLG and DEA over the creation of what might have been a radical new machinery of planning in 1964 clearly show this.

Yet while departmentalism was a crucial element in circumstances of high party political agreement, other elements were important. The growing significance of private development interests in central and inner-city redevelopment, although also in 'unplanned' and even planned decentralization, did much to shape the general course of urban planning over these years. Industrialists remained broadly committed to regional policies which basically paid them to locate in areas with a cheap labour supply. Agricultural interests and middle-class suburbanites were powerful forces shaping containment policies. Meanwhile urban and regional renewal was broadly seen as benefiting working-class interests, particularly by their elected leaders. As we have seen in practice, though, some of these benefits were, to say the least, dubious. Overall, therefore, there was a broad, not just a party political, consensus supporting the major strands of planning policy over these years.

The exact character of these policies and their evolution over time was, however, determined at the departmental and technical level by civil servants and professional planners. Again we have seen evidence of the tremendous fertility of planning ideas, especially in the 1960s. Yet all these ideas arose within the policy process or (in redevelopment partnerships, planning gain and package deals) at its interface with the private development industry. It was all a long way from the tradition of radical and independent thought from which planning had grown. At best the planning movement offered a critique of policies, but it was no longer a great source of new ideas for planning.

7

Remaking Planning: I. The Changing System, 1974–90

These years saw dramatic and unprecedented changes in town planning. Although the policy roles of planners became more varied and diverse than ever before, their strategic ability to shape or even to influence urban change was much diminished. The very notion of a comprehensive approach to urban and regional planning policy, pursued with a genuine (even if not always total) political and administrative conviction from the 1940s to the 1970s, now became fragmented into piecemeal and disjointed initiatives.

The most common explanation of this dramatic remaking of planning can be summed up in one word: Thatcherism. Certainly, the radical right-wing, pro-market Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher from 1979 to 1990 played a central role. Yet the end of the long post-war boom in 1973–74, the worldwide retreat from Keynesian economic management and the onset, before 1979, of economic restructuring and rising unemployment were also fundamental. It was these pressures and the responses of left as well as right which broke the political consensus about the mixed economy and the welfare state on which planning had rested since the 1950s.

More controversially, we will argue that the British planning movement must also carry some responsibility. Many planners had supported or acquiesced in profoundly unpopular planning solutions during the post-war years, undermining public support. With few exceptions, they had also allowed themselves to lose the strong independent tradition of radical thought from which their activity had sprung. By tying planning thought so closely to the policy process after 1945, planners had in effect lost their independent ability to reinvent their activity. It is particularly significant that the new environmental ideas of the 1970s and 1980s did not originate from the planning movement (as they might well have done in the 1900s or even in the 1930s). These were, moreover, conceived in ways that saw planning more as problem than solution. The intellectual vacuum at its core made planning vulnerable to political shifts such as that from 1979. Before we can fully appreciate these problems, however, we must examine the economic, social and political underpinning to the specific changes within urban planning. Planning was remade as part of the wider creation of a new political economy.

THE MAKING OF A NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY

The economic and social context

The end of the long boom

The economy took a serious turn for the worse in 1973–74. Unwise budgetary stimulation of demand, the sudden quadrupling in oil prices imposed by the Arab-dominated oil producers' cartel, OPEC, and mounting industrial unrest in Britain precipitated serious

economic crisis (Blackaby, 1978; Morgan, 1992). In retrospect we can see that these events signalled the end of the long post-war boom and the certain expectation of economic growth and rising living standards. It was, though, more than a series of one-off shocks that ended the boom (Ball et al., 1989). Underlying everything was the chronic structural weakness of British manufacturing within a changing world economic system. The destabilization of the international economy in the 1970s heralded the disintegration of the Keynesian world system of monetary and economic management created in the 1940s. Within this wider instability, Britain was also struggling to find a new post-imperial economic role in the world. The sheltered markets of its former colonies, important still in the long post-war boom, were now gone for ever.

Such changes highlighted Britain's profound inability to compete in markets whose expansion was now less certain and which were now more open to international competition. The writing had been on the wall in the 1960s and earlier in the form of the UK's relatively poor growth performance. Despite the rhetoric of planned modernization, neither Macmillan's nor Wilson's economic planning experiments had tackled this central problem. Economic policies of Labour governments from 1974 to 1979 and Conservative governments from 1979 were dominated by short-term management of the consequences of this weakness (Morgan, 1992) and a search for alternative models of modernization.

De-industrialization

The most glaring symptom of Britain's economic woes was the serious and sustained contraction of manufacturing (Townroe and Martin, 1992). Between 1974 and 1991 its relative share of the UK's GDP, already declining, fell from 30.2 per cent to 21 per cent. Decline in manufacturing employment was even more dramatic. Between 1971 and 1988 there was a net loss of almost 2.9 million jobs in British manufacturing, taking it from 36.4 per cent of total employment to 23.1 per cent. This loss affected virtually all sections of manufacturing, but was particularly marked in traditionally dominant activities such as metal working, engineering, vehicles and textiles, often with devastating effects for the areas which had depended on them. There was, meanwhile, an even larger growth in services (although not sufficient to prevent a slight employment decline overall). Service employment grew by nearly 3.5 million, from 52.6 per cent of total employment in 1971 to 68.8 per cent in 1988. Yet there were marked variations in where old jobs went and new jobs appeared. To the traditional regional unevenness between the economically weaker north and west and stronger south and east was added a newer divide, between declining urban cores and buoyant outer cities and rural areas (Lewis and Townsend, 1989; Balchin, 1990). This underpinned a new spatial economic planning agenda, emphasizing an urban more than a regional dimension. It also exacerbated problems of unemployment.

Rising unemployment . . .

One of the most obvious manifestations of these shifts came in the abandonment of the hitherto sacrosanct post-war political commitment to ensuring full employment. In truth, it was a shift which was effectively forced on governments faced with the greatest wholesale economic restructuring since the 1930s. We can, though, be certain that the application of more traditional policies would have produced lower unemployment in the 1980s, at least in the short to medium term. UK unemployment, measured in Department of Employment figures (which inherently understated the true dimensions of the problem) rose from an

average 3.5 per cent in 1971 to 6.2 per cent in 1977 (Law, 1981). And, despite significant modifications in the method of compilation which further reduced the recorded rate, these figures rose even higher in the following decade. From 8.1 per cent in 1981, the figure climbed to 11.1 per cent in 1986. It then fell to 5.8 per cent in 1990 before moving sharply upwards again to 8.1 per cent in 1991.

... And rising affluence

For all the misery and uncertainty that unemployment, even short-term unemployment, created, the overwhelming majority of workers were in work. Moreover, many continued to experience improvements in their standards of living, especially in the inter-crisis periods of economic growth of the later 1970s and 1983–89. The pursuit of affluence was very much alive and well, even within a troubled economy. Thus home ownership rose from 52.7 per cent of all British households in 1974 to 67 per cent in 1990. And, despite serious oil price increases in the 1970s, car ownership in Britain rose from nearly 12.6 million in 1971 to 20.25 million in 1991. Nearly a quarter of all households had regular use of two or more cars. The same trends could be found repeated across the whole range of consumer items as a wide section of the population felt better off than ever before. The story of the 1970s and especially the 1980s was at least as much one of easy credit and conspicuous consumption as of unemployment and economic restructuring.

The 'culture of contentment'

The co-existence of affluence with high unemployment (and the increased poverty that went with it) created an altogether more divided and fragmented society than at any other time since the 1930s and perhaps earlier. For all its faults, the 'affluent society' that J. K. Galbraith had written about in the 1950s had been a way of life that virtually all could realistically aspire to in 1960s' Britain. His 1992 book, *The Culture of Contentment*, described a society where the gap between the lifestyle of the contented and affluent majority and the poor minority had become unbridgeable. Once again he drew largely on the example of America, but there were clear parallels in the Britain of the 1980s. The legacy of social cohesion from the war years that had shaped the post-war politics of social welfare was all but exhausted (Deakin, 1987). It was true that opinion polls consistently showed a wide social commitment to interventionist welfare policies, especially in health and education (Crewe, 1988; Rentoul, 1989). Yet actual voting patterns suggested a widespread social unwillingness to pay more taxes to sustain policies of income redistribution. If it was not yet literally true that there was, in Margaret Thatcher's memorable 1987 phrase, 'no such thing as society' (Benton, 1987), the concept was certainly seriously weakened.

The realities of discontentment

In line with all this, the symptoms of social fragmentation and breakdown multiplied (Ball et al., 1989). The annual divorce rate more than doubled over these years, often pushing single mothers into poverty. Homelessness soared and every city experienced a very visible increase in numbers of people 'sleeping rough', a problem which had virtually disappeared in the welfare-oriented 1940s. Crime, especially violent crime, rose alarmingly, a reflection in part of the frustrated material aspirations of those outside 'contented' society. Racist attacks became more common and more blatant. There were also more instances of serious collective disorder and violence, notably at football matches, in industrial disputes and in the increasingly frequent

riots which began to occur, mainly in inner-city areas, from 1980 onwards. None of these things had been entirely unknown before this time, but by the early 1990s they had become a familiar part of British life. The traditional, if rather romanticized, post-war notion of Britain as a disciplined and compassionate society was seriously eroded. It was a shift which was both reflected and influenced by political changes.

Politics, state intervention and the demise of economic planning

Political changes

The two general elections in 1974 saw the Conservatives lose, but did not give any decisive mandate to Labour (Childs, 1992). The first election returned Harold Wilson as head of a minority government. The second gave him 39.2 per cent of the vote and a tiny parliamentary majority. This disappeared by 1976 and Labour (by now led by James Callaghan) ruled until 1979 as a minority government, dependent on Liberal and fringe-party support. The 1979 general election broke the political impasse, giving a decisive majority to the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher, with 43.9 per cent of the vote. Her stridently successful leadership in the Falklands War, the serious divisions within Labour and the creation of the new Social Democratic Party allied with the Liberals ensured that her parliamentary majority was handsomely increased in 1983. Better economic conditions saw her parliamentary majority barely dented in 1987. Thereafter the Conservatives weakened, although their fortunes improved after ridding themselves in 1990 of their (by then) hugely unpopular leader in favour of John Major. This whole period was thus dominated politically by the Conservatives. They used their power to reshape the agenda of state intervention, with widespread implications for planning in the broadest sense.

Politics and state economic planning, 1974–75

The prelude was a period of policy uncertainty. Labour in the 1970s was pulled in two directions (Coates, 1980; Holmes, 1985). Following its 1970 election defeat, the party had moved decisively to the left. There was a rejection of the mixed-economy planning of the 1964–70 Wilson governments and a reassertion of a more directive, state economic planning approach. These concerns were evident in the formation of the National Enterprise Board in 1975. This was originally intended to extend nationalization into profitable sections of industry to facilitate more effective government economic planning. Provision was also made for (economic) ‘planning agreements’ with private companies, committing them to agreed growth and other objectives (Ganz, 1977).

In practice, however, such hopes soon shrivelled. As the economy worsened in the middle 1970s, the government found itself drawn into supporting loss-making industries whose very future was threatened. This ‘lame ducks’ approach began before 1974, following the Heath government’s famous ‘U-turn’. Now the Labour government found itself taking over aircraft and shipbuilding and the only large British-owned section of the motor industry. Far from being considered acts of economic planning, these takeovers were products of desperate necessity.

The origins of monetarism, 1975–79

This was all the more striking because the whole style of macro-economic management was also changing by 1975 (Peden, 1991). In the face of mounting unemployment and rising

inflation, the government turned from traditional Keynesian remedies to favour more deflationary approaches (Healey, 1990). As Callaghan told the 1976 Labour conference, ‘You cannot now, if you ever could, spend your way out of a recession’ (cited in Morgan, 1992, p. 382). The Environment Secretary, Anthony Crosland, a hitherto committed Keynesian, had already instituted controls on local authorities’ expenditure. ‘The party’, he had told them in May 1975, ‘is over’ (cited in Morgan, 1992, p. 378). Many town planners and other local government officials saw this as a clear shift from former priorities.

Mounting crisis in late 1976 necessitated a loan from the International Monetary Fund. The price of this was further heavy cuts in public expenditure in 1977–79 (and, incidentally, the first privatization, of most state holdings in British Petroleum). Although in the event the cuts were not as severe as at first feared, a new orthodoxy of macro-economic policy, based on monetarism and cutting state expenditure, had already been fashioned by 1979. But while Labour had moved in this direction out of perceived necessity, the Thatcher governments were to pursue it with missionary zeal.

Thatcherite political economy

The philosophy of what was soon dubbed ‘Thatcherism’ essentially involved the wholesale re-establishment of market processes and the reassertion of individual or private responsibilities in all spheres of economic and social life (Hall and Jacques, 1983; Gamble, 1988; Skidelsky, 1988). State expenditure was accordingly to be cut and government responsibilities passed into private hands. Although it took some time for critics to recognize this, it represented a serious attempt to modernize Britain through the supposed purifying effects of unfettered and widespread capitalism. Instead of the mixed economy, where the state supposedly sapped enterprise by excessive taxation and dependency on state benefits, a new ‘enterprise culture’ was to be fostered.

The philosophy which underlay it was not particularly new. In many respects it derived from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political economists such as Adam Smith or Samuel Smiles, whose ideas of individual self-help and enterprise retained a strong appeal among rank-and-file Conservatives. Yet it marked a clear contrast with what had become orthodox post-war Conservatism, which (as we saw in Chapter 5) placed more emphasis on the need for government intervention, social welfare and a high degree of political consensus. Ideologically, though, the ‘Thatcherite’ approach had been gaining ground for some time, even before Thatcher became party leader. It had, for example, been apparent in the Selsdon Programme which had formed the basis of the 1970 Conservative manifesto. Heath, however, had quickly allowed himself to be deflected from it. Thatcher made no such ‘U-turn’.

‘Rolling back the frontiers of the state’

In fact, she applied this philosophy with a single-mindedness that was very unusual in a Prime Minister. She did not shrink from using state power in an authoritarian way to assert the legitimacy of market processes, as urban planners soon found (Gamble, 1988; Thornley, 1991). Alternative centres of power and authority, such as local authorities or trade unions, which threatened to frustrate the achievement of her strategy, were emasculated (Young, 1989). A climate of public expenditure restraint was instituted, far more severe than that under Labour. There was little attempt to use government spending to shield the economy or the workforce from the impacts of the severe recession of the early 1980s. Unemployment, as we have seen, rose alarmingly, but this was explained as part of the re-establishment of market processes. The shake-out of labour was justified as a necessary precondition for creating a leaner and more

competitive economy. Small business formation was encouraged as a way of creating new sources of wealth.

Gradually, and especially when her position had become more firmly entrenched after 1983, extensive privatization was introduced (Riddell, 1989; Ball et al., 1989). Telecommunications, airlines, gas, electricity, water, steel, aerospace, car making, shipbuilding and others were returned to the private sector. The profitable public utility sales particularly encouraged a threefold increase in popular share ownership in ten years, to about 22 per cent of adults in 1989. Moreover, there was no immediate prospect of these changes being undone by a future Labour government as the opposition tacitly accepted much of what had been done. In other spheres, too, the state was pushed back, notably in 'right to buy' housing legislation. This allowed council tenants to buy their homes, a major element in the jump in owner-occupation from 57 to 67 per cent over the 1980s. And there were many other examples of such policies; few areas of the public services remained untouched.

'Ever closer union'?

There was meanwhile one hugely important area of policy which largely transcended the traditional divisions of party politics (Nugent, 1993). This was the matter of Europe. Edward Heath had finally secured British membership of the European Economic Community in 1973, although continued membership was only confirmed following a referendum in 1975. Despite this, British participation was normally less than wholehearted. The reasons were complex but they reflected Britain's traditions as a world power and trading nation operating on a much wider stage than Europe (Morgan, 1992). Its links with the USA and other parts of the English-speaking world remained strong. Its suspicions of other major European nations, particularly the French and Germans, remained profound. This kind of thinking was reinforced by Thatcherism, which emphasized the notion of Britain as a strong and independent nation state, still able to play a world and quasi-imperial role (such as saving the Falklands for democracy).

There was, moreover, resentment at the strongly interventionist tendencies of the Community, which were particularly galling to a national government committed to cutting state intervention within its own borders. The notion of a single market within Europe was approved of, but attempts to harmonize European currencies and perhaps move towards a single new currency met strong opposition. So too did the attempts to develop a stronger social dimension, for example in reinforcing workers' rights or providing more regional assistance. The growing environmental dimension of European policy was met with a rather sulky and half-hearted compliance within the British government (McCormick, 1993). Yet by 1990 few could deny the logic of some kind of closer union growing out of ever-stronger trading links and symbolized by the building of the Channel Tunnel (eventually opened in 1994). Certainly many town and country planners found much to approve of in European regional and environmental initiatives and saw the Community as a partial antidote to the broad anti-planning ethos of 1980s' Britain.

The end of consensus

The political changes of the last 1970s and 1980s were therefore profound. Most importantly, the broad, if sometimes rather battered, all-party consensus over the mixed economy and the welfare state that had shaped British politics since the 1950s was finally broken. We have seen in previous chapters how the comprehensive approach to physical and land use planning had

been an integral part of this broader consensus. Physical planning too was now remade as part of a wider political reorientation. Its story parallels the wider changes, beginning with increasing strains on familiar policy assumptions during the later 1970s (Donnison and Soto, 1980).

THE CHANGING PHYSICAL PLANNING SYSTEM

The limits of Labour intervention, 1974–79

'Positive planning'

Physical planning reflected exactly the same contradictory pressures that were apparent across the whole spectrum of Labour policies. By 1974 the left had been able to set a physical planning agenda for Labour that was much more radical than that of the 1964–70 governments. The property boom of the Heath years and its precipitate collapse amidst numerous scandals in 1973–74 had created public sympathy for a stronger dose of state control of the land market (Reid, 1982). The Conservatives themselves had moved in this direction in 1973, with proposals for a development gains tax, actually enacted by Labour in 1974. There was much talk of 'positive planning' (McKay and Cox, 1979), a theme developed in the White Paper *Land*, issued in the same year:

Public ownership of development land puts control of our scarcest resource in the hands of the community, and thereby enables it to take an overall perspective. In addition, by having this land available at the value of its current use, rather than at a value based on speculation as to its possible development, the community will be able to provide, in places that need them, the public facilities it needs, but cannot now afford because of the inflated price it has to pay the private owner. (DoE, SO and WO, 1974)

This policy statement was largely authored by John Silkin, the left-wing Minister for Planning and Local Government at the DoE. It heralded the most radical attempted solution to the development land values question since Silkin's father, Lewis, had introduced the 1947 legislation (Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975; Ratcliffe, 1976). Indeed, it was in some key respects even more radical than 1947 and marked a return to the principles of the Uthwatt Report of 1942 (and the even older ideas of the pre-1914 land nationalizers and early planners such as Nettlefold). It was an approach which Environment Secretary Anthony Crosland, Silkin's superior, endorsed, although the department's civil servants sought, unsuccessfully, to delay the proposals (Silkin, 1987, p. 109).

Community Land Act 1975 and Development Land Tax Act 1976

The 1975 Community Land Act gave local authorities greatly enhanced opportunities (and ultimately duties) to acquire development land by compulsion at (or initially near) the existing use value. The 1976 Development Land Tax Act introduced a new tax on land value increases, initially set at 80 per cent (lower on the first £150,000), but with the intention that it would rise to 100 per cent as the Community Land Act became fully operational. The ultimate intention of these Acts was that development land would be publicly owned at the crucial point when the planning decision to develop was made. It might then be sold on, at development value, to private developers, but retaining the increase in land value that arose from the planning decision to allow development. Developers whose land remained outside

public ownership would enjoy no financial advantage under the final scheme because of the 100 per cent development land tax which was ultimately intended. In the interim, however, local authorities were to build up their land acquisition capacity gradually as resources and expertise permitted. They were also supposed to improve their working relations with developers, so that the scheme would, it was hoped, ultimately take on something of the character of a partnership. There were many promised opportunities for exemptions and exceptions, especially of smaller and socially desirable developments.

The Community Land Scheme in operation

The Community Land Scheme, as the two Acts were termed, differed from the Land Commission by relying on local authorities as the land acquisition agencies (except in Wales where a principality-wide Land Authority was created). Local authority mistrust had been one of the main reasons for the failure of the Land Commission, as Labour itself readily acknowledged. Despite this, however, the new scheme fared no better than its predecessors, although for somewhat different reasons. The Conservatives, predictably, soon committed themselves to repealing it, but reaction from the property industry was surprisingly muted (Pilcher Committee, 1975). The new approach came at a time when the property market was seriously depressed after the Heath boom. There were, no doubt, hopes that it would act in the same way as the 1964 'Brown Ban', discouraging new commercial development and thereby protecting the profits of office schemes initiated before the downturn (Ambrose and Colenutt, 1975, p. 170). The promise of a more stabilized property market must also have seemed attractive to many commercial property developers, who, rather like a group of wild partygoers, were nursing colossal hangovers from a boom that had turned sour.

Despite such unlikely allies, Labour's policies fell victim to the tighter restraints on public expenditure introduced in 1975–76. Neither Crosland, who remained at Environment until 1976, nor his left-wing successor, Peter Shore, were able to give sufficient encouragement to local authorities to operate the Scheme at anything like the intended level (McKay and Cox, 1979). Both, in effect, subordinated their beliefs in positive planning to the new straitjacket of monetarism. By 1979 little of significance had been achieved and the Community Land Act had become another failed solution, ripe for destruction. One of the most palpable signs of that failure was the growing number of large derelict or vacant sites in the inner cities, which became an important new focus for planning concern under Peter Shore from 1976.

The origins of inner-city policies

The reorientation of urban planning towards the inner cities from this time was of such fundamental significance that it brought important intrinsic policy shifts within the planning system itself. We will address the detail of inner-city policies more fully in the next chapter, but they must also form part of the overall story.

The prelude had been a series of essentially social and community-based initiatives in the later 1960s, involving the Home Office and the Department of Education and focusing very much on the perceived inadequacies of the urban poor (Edwards and Batley, 1978). Such initiatives added a new emphasis to planning policies that were still dominated by clearance and redevelopment. However, a political reconceptualization of the inner city as a spatial coincidence of more fundamental social, economic and environmental problems began to occur in the 1970s (Lawless, 1986, 1989). We saw some of the early consequences of this in the last chapter, in a move towards gradual renewal, but it went much further after 1974. The

redefinition was essentially driven by the specific local effects of wider economic problems. As the location of many of the oldest industries and factories, inner cities were obviously most vulnerable to economic downturn. Closures and redundancies increased and unemployment in these traditional Labour strongholds rose well above the national average, worsening the already present problems of poverty and deprivation.

All this meant that inner-city policies were no longer just the prerogative of the social professions; they were becoming a problem for planners, requiring a more comprehensive approach. The DoE commissioned three important inner-area studies, of inner Liverpool, Birmingham and London, in 1972. There was also a growing volume of other work, notably from the Community Development Projects begun by the Home Office in 1969, stressing the inner city as a serious and deeply rooted problem. It was a conclusion which the DoE studies cautiously endorsed when they reported in 1977 (DoE, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c).

Inner Urban Areas Act 1978

Following an important 1977 White Paper (DoE, 1977d), a new policy framework emerged, the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act giving the necessary additional powers. The main intention was to empower inner-city authorities, largely Labour controlled, to encourage economic development. In the longer term this approach was important because it showed a central faith in inner-city local government that was to be conspicuous by its absence over the following years. At the time, however, its chief significance was that it marked a clear break with the housing and roads emphases of earlier post-war planned inner-city change.

Three new categories of policy areas were created: partnership, programme and designated, to all of which additional funding and special new powers were granted. The partnership areas covered the severely deprived areas of the big cities and were managed by committees of representatives from central and local government, health and police authorities and voluntary agencies. Simpler arrangements were operated by local government in the other areas. The new powers available to all these areas allowed loans and grants for industrial building and the creation of Industrial Improvement Areas (DoE, 1986). The latter allowed for the renewal and improvement of run-down industrial areas in a way that had been pioneered under local powers earlier in the decade in Tyne and Wear and Rochdale.

Plan making and inner-city problems


Another feature of the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 was the power to expedite local plan preparation in inner-city areas, even in advance of approved structure plans. It was, admittedly, of minor significance, but it illustrated an attempt, at least, to integrate the new inner-city policies within mainstream plan-making activity. Paradoxically, though, it also showed the strains that the new problems and policies were placing on the 1968 Act system. Inner-city disinvestment was bringing rapid changes that could not wait for structure plans to be prepared. Many local authorities judged that they could not wait for local plans to be prepared either, or otherwise doubted the real value of statutory plan making in a period when the wider economic and public expenditure parameters were changing so dramatically (Healey, 1983; Healey et al., 1989).

The structure plans

Despite these increasing doubts, the statutory structure planning process was in full swing during these years (Cross and Bristow, 1983; Bruton and Nicholson, 1987). By March 1979, 51 English structure plans had been submitted, including 17, mainly for the west midlands,

before local government reorganization took effect in April 1974. Twenty-five of the plans submitted had received final approval by 1979. The first approvals were for Coventry (which also managed the first local plan), Solihull, Warwickshire and Worcestershire, in 1975. By 1979 20 plans still had to be submitted, although most were in an advanced state. This rate of progress fell rather below the original hopes of PAG and the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act. In part this had institutional causes. As we noted in Chapter 5, local government reform had taken a rather different course from that presumed in the late 1960s. Instead of the unitary authorities assumed by the 1968 Act, a two-way split of planning between counties and districts tempted many counties to include excessive detail in their structure plans to preempt the districts' local plans and assert overall county dominance in plan making.

More seriously, structure planners in the main urban areas were also handicapped by the wider economic and expenditure uncertainties noted above. Forecasts had to be revised and the agenda for action extended to address the new economic problems, even though financial restraint was encouraging greater caution. Tensions were therefore building up, especially in the metropolitan areas, between planning aspirations and expenditure realities. The presence of a Labour government in the 1970s still allowed local policy-makers to believe that resources




Figures 7.1 and 7.2 One of the major discoveries of the 1970s was the 'inner-city problem' with its interlinked economic, social and environmental dimensions. These diagrams, from the 1977 DoE study, *Inner London*, show how previous planning efforts in the inner city were now being criticized. The level of crime on flatted estates was directly correlated with the number of dwellings accessible from a single entry point. The criticism of deck-access blocks (see Figure 6.8) was particularly damning. Planned parking arrangements on inner-city estates were similarly attacked as often aiding the vandal.

would eventually be available when the economy improved. They were forced to relinquish such illusions in the following decade.

The emerging environmental agenda

In addition to the planning issues raised by a faltering economy and falling public expenditure, a third, less immediate, pressure for change was also emerging during these years (e.g. Nicholson, 1970). Environmentalist thinking and environmental control had a long history, although they became more prominent during the 1960s, reflecting both the waste-making, affluent society and vaguer worries about possible limits to growth. What was new was the way that issues such as pollution, waste disposal, land and energy use were increasingly seen as parts of a single ecological whole, rather than as separate and specific topics. The establishment of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in 1970, with a remit to report regularly on relevant issues, marked some official recognition, serving to inform and focus these mounting concerns (Cullingworth, 1976).

In 1973 the Conservatives introduced a Protection of the Environment Bill, but hopes that it would live up to its name, for example by requiring environmental impact assessments for major new developments, soon faded. The bill was enacted by Labour as the Control of Pollution Act 1974, its title reflecting its more limited conception. The truth was that no political parties were willing to see really decisive new intervention on these questions. Government environmental concern was still minor, even token, compared to the maintenance of economic growth.



TYNE AND WEAR ACT

Tyne and Wear Act, 1976

The Act, in part, enables the County and District Councils to tackle in a comprehensive way, the problems of older industrial areas and proceed beyond the mere identification and analysis of these problems towards implementing practical measures that will considerably enhance the employment opportunities in declared I.I.A.'s by providing a firm foundation for private investment.

Although the Act specifically mentions a number of works which may be carried out in I.I.A.'s, a wide range of works which will improve the amenities of an area or buildings within it can be undertaken either by the Council or in conjunction with individual industrialists. To maximise the potential of vacant derelict sites, for example, authorities may prepare them for development by a combination of reclamation works, provision of access roads and ensuring an adequate supply of services. The land is then available for either release to a private developer or for development by the local authority. The County Council has successfully provided a number of nursery and factory workshop units within I.I.A.'s and elsewhere. Similarly, redundant buildings may be refurbished and brought up to basic industrial standards for re-use or demolished to allow for the expansion of an existing industry, or redevelopment by a new industry.

In carrying out many of these works, the provisions of the Tyne and Wear Act 1976 are augmented by various other Acts. The main ones are:

- Local Authorities (Land) Act 1963 (for factory building).
- Inner Urban Areas Act 1978 (for grants and loans to industry).
- Local Employment Act 1972 (for grants towards the costs of the provision of access roads).
- National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949 (for site purchase in connection with reclamation schemes).



Figure 7.3 The Industrial Improvement Area marked the beginnings of local economic planning in inner-city and older industrial areas. Tyne and Wear were one of the pioneers, using local powers, although the approach became widespread under the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978.

Environmental concerns and roads

Far from lessening worries, the end of the long boom in 1973–74 seemed merely to heighten popular environmental awareness, particularly as the OPEC oil price increases reminded everyone of the perils of heavy reliance on the motor vehicle. Road-building plans, already under serious assaults from increasingly militant protesters, were thrown into increasing question (Tyne, 1978). Disruption of major public inquiries, such as those for the Archway Road in London in 1976–77, became usual. The Leitch Committee (1977) Report on Trunk Road Assessment promised a more considered approach to new schemes. Public transport, rather unfashionable in the 1960s, now enjoyed a revival, something which most planners were glad to encourage. The new Tyneside Metro rapid-transit system became a showcase for the new approach. Significantly, though, its wider emulation was prevented by public expenditure constraints that were pervading all aspects of planning action (Hill, 1986). Meanwhile Callaghan's pragmatic decision in 1976 to take transport planning away from the DoE, creating a new Department of Transport, seriously weakened the ideal of integrated strategic planning.

Planners and the new environmentalism

By the later 1970s planners were becoming increasingly affected by environmental concerns. Yet despite their traditional interest in amenity and landscape protection, they played little active part in developing the new environmental discourse. For all their recent flirtation with

ADVERTISEMENT

Your Chance to Comment...

In preparing the Draft Structure Plan certain key choices had to be made.

They concerned for example:-

- ★ Which areas should have priority for investment?
- ★ Which facilities should have priority for investment?
- ★ Where should new development be located?
- ★ Which social groups should receive special attention?

This questionnaire is YOUR OPPORTUNITY to comment on the choices made in the draft plan. It is particularly important to know whether you agree or disagree with the priorities and general approach expressed under each topic below

Please fill in this questionnaire, go to one of the exhibitions* or to a public meeting* if you can.

1. **EMPLOYMENT** *The growth of employment will be encouraged throughout the county but local authority resources will be concentrated on increasing the number and variety of jobs in areas with the worst unemployment and the worst prospects for the future.*
Please comment
2. **ENVIRONMENT** *Environmental improvements, such as land reclamation and increased urban space provision, will be concentrated in areas with the worst environmental problems.*
Please comment
3. **TRANSPORT** *Transport policies concentrate resources on maintaining cheap bus fares and improving services to provide an attractive public transport system.*
Please comment
4. **HOUSING** *Housing policies provide for small amounts of new housing throughout the county to cater for local needs and concentrations of new housing in a few attractive areas close to job opportunities and the four main centres.*
Please comment.
5. **SHOPPING** *Shopping policies allow some growth of the four main centres, encourage trade in the district and small town centres, and strongly discourage the development of large superstores outside existing centres.*
Please comment
6. **RECREATION** *Recreation policies give top priority to local authority schemes which promote the maximum use of existing facilities and provide more urban open space.*
Please comment
7. **SURFACE MINERALS** *Demand for mineral extraction will be catered for, but steps will be taken to keep environmental problems to a minimum and to restore land to a suitable after-use.*
Please comment

If you wish to enlarge on any of the above subjects or, indeed, express opinions on any other policies please comment on separate sheets of paper. Send in the completed form to the County Planning Officer, FREEPOST (BY 158), South Yorkshire County Council, County Hall, Barnsley S70 2TN, by April 4, 1977. No stamp needed. Please write your name and address here if you so wish
Name Mr /Mrs /Miss

Address

• SHEFFIELD

Structure Plan Exhibitions
Sheffield Town Centre
W. H. Smith, Fargate

Wed, 28 March
Tue, 29th March

MOBILE CARAVAN EXHIBITIONS

(Opening hours 10 a.m.-5 p.m.)

STOCKSBRIDGE, Library

CHARLTON, Chapman Working

Man's Club

DARNALL, Pennell Crossroads

MOORBOUGH, The Royal Oak,

High Street

HILLBROUGH, The Old Blue Bell,

Brothwood Road

SHEFFIELD, Challenge Supermarket,

Eastwood Road

GLEADLES, Co-op, The Ridgeway

PUBLIC MEETINGS

(beginning 7.30 p.m.)

STOCKSBRIDGE, Shearbridge Welfare Hall

THORNHALL, Wesley Church Hall,

Thornthorpe Road

SCOLEFIELD, Eckwithall Comprehensive School

SCOLEFIELD, Woodhead School

DARNALL, Greenlands Middle School

SWIFT PARK, Park Park School

SHEFFIELD, Channing Hall,

Barnby Street

Wed, 28 March
Tue, 29th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Tue, 22nd March

Wed, 23rd March

Fri, 25th March

Mon, 28th March

Mon, 28th March

Thurs., 31st March

Fri., 1st April

• BOTHERHAM

Structure Plan Exhibitions
Rotherham Town Centre
Rotherham Central Library

Open

Weds, 28 March

Tue, 29th March

MOBILE CARAVAN EXHIBITIONS

(Opening hours 10 a.m.-5 p.m.)

will be centrally situated in the following towns:

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

Wed, 15th March

Thurs, 16th March

Fri, 17th March

Tue, 14th March

quasi-scientific systems planning, they lacked the genuine scientific expertise to handle issues such as pollution and its ecological impacts. There were also more fundamental differences of ideology. Planners, and the policy system of which they were part, had always been about much more than simply protecting the environment. They had to balance such concerns against those needs for development and growth which were accepted as essential for national social and economic well-being. Alone among the bodies of the planning movement, only the Town and Country Planning Association showed a real inclination to engage at the creative edge of the new environmental radicalism (Hardy, 1991b). It was newer pressure groups like Friends of the Earth, its British arm established in 1971, that set the pace and caught the imagination of the young with the single priority of saving the earth (Porritt and Winner, 1988). In the eyes of these groups, planners often seemed little more than an institutionalized bureaucracy that legitimated ecologically wasteful development and road-building.

Planners in the later 1970s

This might have been true in the mid-1960s, but by the later 1970s most of the old post-war planning certainties had either gone or were seriously in doubt. The faltering economy, public expenditure restraint, the end of clearance policies, the new economic focus on the inner city (with all its potential implications for the traditional decentralist thrust of urban planning), the increasing questioning of road-based planning and other changes threw many of the traditional planning responses into doubt (Donnison and Soto, 1980). There was widespread professional guilt at what had been done to cities in the name of slum clearance and redevelopment (Thomas and Healey, 1991). These wider changes combined with the continuing effects of adjusting to the new management structures of the post-reform local authorities to undermine the self-confidence and sense of manifest destiny that planners had seemed to possess in the 1960s.

Planning and critical theory

An important aspect of this uncertainty was the growth of critical planning theory in the 1970s. This added an intellectual dimension to the 'planner-bashing' that was already common in newspaper journalism from the late 1960s. Several different intellectual traditions were represented, including anarchism (Ward, 1973, 1976) and free-market ideology, especially in the work of Americans such as Banfield (1970). In Britain, however, the main influences in the 1970s were the neo-Weberians, led by Pahl (1970), Dennis (1970, 1972), Davies (1972) and Saunders (1979). They based their interpretations on the work of the sociologist Max Weber, seeing planners and other officials as 'gatekeepers' or 'urban managers', managing the consumption of urban space. Increasingly, though, neo-Marxism became more fashionable (Cooke, 1983), with Harvey (1975, 1982), Cockburn (1977) and Castells (1977) as major influences. Their approach viewed planning as part of a state apparatus that essentially facilitated the reproduction of capitalism, while reflecting the strains of class conflict. It was an approach that acquired greater credibility as structural economic change became more evident, reminding everyone how much planning was conditioned by the wider capitalist economy.

Corporate planning

The problem for practising planners was that critical theory, however important intellectually, had no immediately obvious application in their work, except to increase their self-doubt. This effect was greater because the supply of bright ideas that were applicable had rather dried

up. Yet there was one important planning idea that temporarily captured mainstream professional attention in these years. This was corporate planning, a supposedly rational approach to intra-corporate organization, programming and budgeting (Friend et al., 1974). A product of American management theory, its coming had been encouraged by local government reform and specifically by the Bains Report (1972). It was not the exclusive property of town planners, but some thought it would strengthen the profession's role in local government. This view was encouraged as several town planners became chief executives of the new authorities, most notably Jim Amos at Birmingham and Ken Galley at Newcastle. The problem was that the approach added to the growing confusion of what planning actually was, without being an appropriate tool for the harsher climate of expenditure restraint that was just beginning.

In truth town planners were no better equipped to handle these unpleasant realities than were other professions. Rather they merely seemed to mirror the larger confusions. Not unlike Britain itself, they had lost an empire as the dreams of the 1960s faded but failed to find a real role in the troubled 1970s (Underwood, 1980). Their search was not made easier by the ascent of a new and strident vision of Britannia after 1979.

Thatcherite ideology and physical planning, 1979–90

Planning and the enterprise culture

Consistent with her larger mission to give a new direction to post-war British politics, Thatcher's governments also imposed major changes on physical planning. These proved particularly damaging to the traditional comprehensive and strategic approach. They also weakened many detailed aspects of planning, although less than many critics at the time feared. These changes essentially reflected an ideological reassertion of the legitimacy of market processes and individual freedoms in determining the nature of urban change. With a few exceptions, they did not draw on the mainstream traditions of British planning thought, although some North American planning thinkers such as Jane Jacobs (1964) were important inspirations. More specifically, it was the work of right-wing think-tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs and, even more, the Centre for Policy Studies (e.g. Denman, 1980) that developed the new policy agenda (Thornley, 1991).

From such standpoints, physical planners were obstructive bureaucrats, all too ready to stifle wealth-creating private enterprise by unnecessary curbs on development applications. As early as 1979, Michael Heseltine, Thatcher's first Environment Secretary, was complaining that 'thousands of jobs every night are locked away in the filing trays of planning departments' (Heseltine, 1979, p. 27). Although the critique was of dubious validity, Heseltine had articulated a deeply popular Thatcherite theme, blaming governmental regulation for market failure. It was a sentiment which recurred regularly in ministerial rhetoric and, as we will see, inspired specific changes in the planning system.

Planning and shrinking public expenditure

Planners, especially in the main (and largely Labour-voting) urban areas, were also perceived as being far too wedded to high public spending in their whole approach to plan making and implementation. Much was made of the unpopularity of 1960s' mass public-sector housing redevelopment of the inner cities: 'social vandalism, carried out with the best of intentions but the worst of results' (Thatcher, 1989, p. 128). The fact that the practice had by then

changed was rarely mentioned. There were also profound central suspicions of the new 'municipal socialism' (Boddy and Fudge, 1985), especially the council-led initiatives to regenerate employment that were being launched in some metropolitan areas (Cochrane, 1986). The whole debate acquired greater piquancy as councils in several of the big cities moved decisively to the left during the early 1980s and mounted an unsuccessful challenge to central policies. Central government looked for ways to make such authorities toe the Thatcherite line or marginalize them. Many of the shifts in physical planning directly reflected these concerns.

Thatcherism and the public interest

Market principles were advocated as a way both to create new wealth and to give people what they actually wanted, rather than what planners or other professional bureaucrats thought they needed. The role of planner as guardian of a professionally determined public interest was weakened as the political advocacy of popular capitalism gave more scope to market processes to shape urban change (Thornley, 1991). The traditional planning mission to protect the wider public interest was increasingly supplanted by the enhancement of private interest. In many respects, indeed, the public interest was almost redefined in terms of the functional requirements of private wealth creation.



Figure 7.5 Although the practice had changed during the 1970s, the dire record of much post-war planning for the inner cities presented an easy target for Thatcherite criticisms of interventionist policies in the 1980s. Derelict blocks of flats were depressingly common, such as these awaiting their end in the London Borough of Newham in 1988. Sisters of the notorious Ronan Point (Figure 6.9), they had been strengthened following the disaster, but intractable structural, design and social problems remained.

Planning and 'nimbyism'

What mainly stopped this redefinition being complete was an ideological contradiction between the enterprise culture and traditional Conservatism. The fact was that many Conservative voters living in outer-city and urban-fringe areas wanted a planning system that would stop their areas being changed by large-scale developments. However much they might approve of the enterprise culture in other walks of life, they did not want it, in the form of opportunistic developers, shaping their immediate home environment. Even modest moves to relax planning controls in such areas by Heseltine and later Environment Secretaries, notably Patrick Jenkin and the ultra-Thatcherite Nicholas Ridley, quickly provoked opposition from their own side (Ridley, 1992). Significantly the American acronym 'nimby' – 'not in my back yard' – came into common British usage during the late 1980s, accurately describing this sentiment of selfish protectionism. It was the environmental embodiment of Galbraith's culture of contentment.

The extent of the market-oriented changes to the planning system in the 1980s should not disguise the continuing strengths of such pressures for negative planning (Healey et al., 1989). If the developer-led approach was replacing the ideas of public-sector-led 'positive planning' in the urban cores, its writ certainly did not run in the Tory heartlands of the outer cities and rural areas (Brindley et al., 1989). Even leading Conservative ministers such as Heseltine and Ridley were personally deeply imbued with this contradiction between enterprise and environment. In office they both favoured the former, although as private members they were at least as 'nimbyist' as their constituents. It was a dilemma that socialist author John Mortimer savoured, fictionally, in his satirical novel, *Titmuss Regained* (1990).

Other pressures for intervention

Various other pressures also obliged the Thatcher governments to maintain a more interventionist approach than they would ideally have liked. In historic conservation, or heritage as it increasingly became known, the story had some parallels with the rise of nimbyism. Early Thatcherite desires to exploit the built heritage on a commercial basis quickly ran into opposition (Hewison, 1987; Delafons, 1997). Although there were certainly shifts in this direction, there was also a strong and widening lobby (including many natural Conservative supporters) that wanted protection of the historic environment for its own sake (especially if it thereby enhanced the value of their own property). It also helped, of course, that the historic environment in general was an important contributor to national income from tourism. Another pressure came from the European Community (EC) which was pushing a new environmental agenda. Compared to this, Britain had become, by the mid-1980s, the 'Dirty Old Man of Europe' (Cullingworth, 1988, p. 213; McCormick, 1993). Europe was also important in maintaining something of the traditional planning commitment to the older industrial regions, which suffered so badly from the economic changes of the 1980s. Meanwhile Thatcherite emphasis on the private car, reversing late 1970s' scepticism, necessitated a new round of roads planning.

Thatcherism and the fragmentation of planning

In planning as in other policy spheres, critics of Thatcherism expected it to collapse under the weight of its own inner contradictions. Instead it was planning which began to fall apart. The strains which were already apparent by 1979 grew as planning action was obliged to become increasingly schizophrenic (Brindley et al., 1989). The Thatcher governments faced

powerful contradictions between their own beliefs in a market-led approach to planning and the obvious desires of many of their own supporters for strong regulatory planning, along with various other pressures to intervene. The response was simply to loosen the strategic bonds of comprehensivity that had held together post-war planning. It was allowed to break down into a series of disjointed and pragmatic initiatives, operating very differently in different areas and policy settings. This was consistent with other strands of Thatcherism. If there was 'no such thing as society', then it made no sense to plan as if there were. We must now begin to examine in detail how this retreat from comprehensivity occurred.

Early Thatcherism and the changing planning system, 1979–83

Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980

The first decisive step was not long in coming. Here, in a single piece of legislation, were most of the main elements of the Thatcherite approach to urban planning (Thornley, 1991). The repeal of the Community Land Act was a decisive rejection of public sector-led planning (although the Land Authority for Wales survived, albeit in more market-sensitive guise). The extension to all areas of the power to adopt local plans in advance of structure plans (available in inner-city areas since 1978) and a decisive downward shift in development control powers from counties to districts were symptomatic of the retreat from wider strategies. The introduction of monetary charges on applicants for processing planning applications was part of the wider erosion of a state funded by taxation. It also openly challenged the presumption of planning as a service run in the public interest in favour of one which explicitly serviced the private interests of developers. Much the most important innovations of the 1980 Act were, however, the Enterprise Zone (EZ) and the Urban Development Corporation (UDC).

Enterprise Zones

The Enterprise Zone, which had been unveiled in the 1980 Budget, was heralded as the very essence of the new enterprise culture. Surprisingly, though, the Chancellor had credited the planning academic Peter Hall, then a Labour supporter, as inventor of the idea (Butler, 1981; Hall, 1982; Massey, 1982). Although a geographer rather than a professional planner, Hall had been one of the most influential and prolific writers on planning matters since the 1960s. An ardent advocate of strategic planning, it was perhaps his misfortune to enter the political spotlight with an idea that was widely seen as anti-planning. The Chancellor's reference was to Hall's occasional calls for experimental unregulated zones, based on Hong Kong and elsewhere in the Far East, where highly profitable, if rather low-wage, enterprises had flourished.

The 1980 Act exhibited a cautious implementation of this concept. An Enterprise Zone (EZ) was a run-down urban area where a much simplified planning regime was agreed by local planners and central government (DoE, 1987b). Thereafter there was none of the normal local planning discretion over details of site development. There were also important fiscal bonuses in the form of a ten-year exemption from local taxes and 100 per cent capital allowances against national taxation. Yet although the EZ was founded on the notion of freedom from governmental interference, many of the areas designated were actually owned by local authorities. Moreover, the DoE very closely supervised their creation.



Figure 7.6 Thatcherite ideology emphasized the notion of planning as bureaucratic interference in wealth creation. Enterprise Zones were heralded, somewhat fancifully, as a decisive break with this tradition, a theme which was taken up in this 1981 photo-opportunity. Michael Heseltine symbolically cuts the 'last piece of red tape' to inaugurate Britain's first such zone.

Urban Development Corporations

In the case of the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), the more authoritarian face of Thatcherism was plain (Imrie and Thomas, 1993a). The corporations were development and planning agencies intended to facilitate urban regeneration in a way that entirely bypassed local government. Based on the unelected development corporations created under the New Towns Act 1946, UDCs had even more draconian powers, especially in relation to planning. They were, moreover, exercised in the midst of existing cities, replacing established frameworks of local democracy. From the government's point of view, the UDCs' main advantage was that they were uncompromised by local, almost invariably Labour, politics. In sharp contrast to the original New Town development corporations, the UDCs used their powers of land assembly and preparation almost exclusively to promote private development.

The use of these two new planning instruments will be examined in the next chapter. It is important to note, however, that they were initially used on a modest scale. Only 11 EZs were created in the first round and just two UDCs. They were essentially a demonstration of Thatcherite planning principles, rather more tentatively than its advocates were claiming. This was a rehearsal of new styles of planning, not the creation of an entirely new system.

Changes in development control practice

Such trends were consistent with other changes in these early years (Thornley, 1991). In 1980 there were important modifications to official guidelines on development control practice,

discouraging detailed planning controls on design matters. The following year a new General Development Order was issued, shifting the definitions of what constituted development requiring planning permission. It brought additions to permitted development rights in relation to small house and industrial extensions. Yet although this change reflected the general thrust of Thatcherism, it was also more widely agreed. Crosland had balked at the streamlining proposals of the Dobry Report (1975) but, in 1977, Shore had almost adopted changes very similar to those now implemented by Heseltine.

Planning gain

Also in 1981 the DoE's newly established Property Advisory Group issued a highly critical report on planning gain. We have noted the origins of this practice in the 1950s in Chapter 6, but it became more prominent in the later 1970s. Using Section 52 of the 1971 Act, more local authorities sought to offset declining public funds by making planning agreements with private developers. Such agreements typically involved developer funding of infrastructure or amenities associated with their developments, although occasionally straight cash payments were involved. The latter prompted accusations that planning gain was simply 'selling planning permission', although advocates argued that it could be a way of securing 'betterment by stealth' (DoE, 1992b). It was against this background that the report was issued (Property Advisory Group, 1981). The Group wanted to discourage local planning authorities from pressuring developers by such bargaining. Yet the even greater strains on public spending in the 1980s meant this was hardly realistic. Although the crudest manifestations of planning gain were curtailed, the practice of negotiating for infrastructure and amenity provision has become commonplace and was officially endorsed in 1983.

The later structure plans

More immediately important was Heseltine's mauling of the later structure plans, especially those for the metropolitan counties (Heseltine, 1979, 1987). The expunging of proposals to restrain development in buoyant localities and to encourage faltering areas to revive was particularly notable, effectively asserting the primacy of market considerations (Jowell, 1983; Thornley, 1991). Many public expenditure commitments and vaguer social planning aspirations were also struck out, an early skirmish in a much larger battle with the big city Labour strongholds.

The emergence of heritage

Of longer-term importance was the retreat from comprehensivity signalled in the National Heritage Act 1983. Many matters related to conservation and historic buildings in England, including listings and area schemes, were removed from the DoE (Delafons, 1997). A new autonomous executive body was formed, the Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England, usually known as English Heritage (EH). In Scotland, however, the equivalent body remained a Directorate of the Scottish Development Department, although Cadw, a direct parallel to EH, was established in Wales.

We should not underestimate the significance of these changes. Historic conservation had been a core dimension of comprehensive planning since its inception. Its importance had grown hugely since the 1960s. Now, despite strong opposition, it was being hived off to the new policy area of heritage and pursued more single-mindedly. Heritage itself was a deeply mistrusted concept (at least in Thatcherite hands), viewed by many as a commercialization of

history (Hewison, 1987). It took time for EH to recover from these perceptions, particularly since it quickly adopted a far more business-like style that contrasted with the previous rather ‘crusty’ academic approach. Over time, however, the worst fears have diminished and the single-minded approach has brought some dividends. Certainly those aspects of conservation traditionally most related to planning have flourished. The numbers of listed buildings jumped by over 60,000 in the first two years of EH’s existence to reach 373,000. By 1990 there were 400,000. The number of English conservation areas also grew rapidly, from 5,500 in 1985 to over 7,000 in 1991. This growth has continued subsequently, so that there were 453,000 listed buildings and 8,800 conservation areas in 1999 (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2002).

Towards a new Thatcherite planning system, 1983–87

The entrenchment of the Thatcherite approach

Following the 1983 election, Thatcherite thinking became firmly entrenched and its proposals for planning lost much of their tentative, experimental air. The first reforms began to make their mark. In addition there had, since 1981, been a multiplication of initiatives for the inner city, including the designation of more EZs in 1983–84. We will examine the detail of these changes in the next chapter, but note here how they helped further to strengthen the credibility of the Thatcherite approach to urban planning. Planners were increasingly supposed to encourage rather than regulate private developers, still less to think in terms of old-fashioned public-sector development. By 1984–85 the scene was set for further, more ambitious, changes to the planning system. The first moves came as part of the final showdown with the metropolitan counties.

Unitary development plans

The Thatcher government saw these upper-tier local authorities as unnecessary, a view strongly encouraged by the fact that all had become Labour strongholds. Several, particularly the Greater London Council (GLC) under the leadership of ‘Red Ken’ Livingstone, openly challenged central policies during the early 1980s (Livingstone, 1987) and pioneered important radical planning initiatives, to be discussed below. The government’s vengeful response was simply to abolish these troublesome bodies under the 1985 Local Government Act (DoE, 1983). Admittedly, except for London, the loss was not deeply mourned. From planning’s point of view, however, this action had the familiar effect of weakening the strategic dimension of planning (Cullingworth, 1988). At a stroke it removed the structure planning authorities for England’s main urban concentrations. A new type of unitary development plan for each metropolitan district, combining the characteristics of structure and local plans, was introduced, formally coming into operation during 1988–90. What remained of conurbation-wide strategic planning relied on inter-district consultations and, later, central guidance. Meanwhile other changes had already begun.

Lifting the Burden

The already familiar theme of planning as a burden on enterprise began to be voiced more prominently. Thatcher herself told the 1984 Conservative Party conference that planning was ‘one thing that can sometimes delay the coming into existence of new jobs’ (Thatcher, 1989, p. 102). The message was subsequently pushed by the ultra-Thatcherite Lord Young, Minister without Portfolio, and incorporated into the 1985 White Paper, *Lifting the Burden* (Minister

without Portfolio et al., 1985). Among many other proposals covering the full range of government, this listed several important ways in which planning could be altered supposedly to make life easier for developers and, by extension, wealth- and job-creating entrepreneurs. Most prominent were the proposals for Simplified Planning Zones (already aired extensively in 1983–84) and revisions of the Use Classes and General Development Orders. In contrast to the creation of special zones, the latter were fundamental to all planning control. A further change was that approved plans would henceforth become merely one of several ‘material conditions’ considered when deciding planning applications. In other words, a plan could be ignored if development was judged more expedient. The potential this created for delays by encouraging general uncertainty and more appeals against planning decisions was rather overlooked.

Housing and Planning Act 1986

Many changes were introduced through DoE circulars, telling local authorities of the new emphases. The introduction of Simplified Planning Zones (SPZs), however, became the main planning element of the Housing and Planning Act 1986. As a pre-defined scheme for land use which effectively gave permission for development that met the stipulated zoning, an SPZ was similar to the EZ (DoE, 1991). It had much in common with the zoning-based planning of other European countries (or much pre-1947 Act planning). Yet there were two important differences between EZs and SPZs. The latter could be initiated by the private sector, a gesture towards the enterprise culture. More importantly, however, they lacked the fiscal incentives of the EZs. This absence of tax breaks together with rather cumbersome procedures discouraged widespread adoption of SPZs, particularly as the property boom faded in the late 1980s. By summer 1991 only two, in Derby and Corby, were operative with a further 11, mainly for industrial areas, at various stages of preparation. Despite streamlining of procedures, the reality hardly fulfilled the promise. However, SPZs did encourage local authorities to evolve less cumbersome ways of accelerating planning for business development. Rather surprisingly, the 2004 Act has attempted to revive the concept.

Revision of the Use Classes Order 1987

More significant were the revisions of the Use Classes Order (UCO) and the General Development Order (GDO) (Home, 1989). The former specifies the different categories of land use for planning purposes. It is important because the tightness or liberality of the categories directly affects whether developers need to apply for planning permission for changes of use between, for example, different business activities. Relaxing the use classes effectively reduced the number of land use changes that required planning permission. The interest of the Thatcherites in such a relaxation is therefore immediately apparent, although its origins were economic as well as political. By the 1980s it was widely acknowledged that the existing UCO, introduced in 1948 and modified only slightly since then, was out of date. The late twentieth-century economy ordered urban space in different ways from building types generated originally in the late Victorian city (and reproduced in the 1948 UCO). More specifically, some traditional land and building use distinctions, such as that between ‘high-tech’ manufacturing and offices, were becoming blurred (Goobey, 1992, p. 41).

Political and practical concerns came together in the mid-1980s and the DoE charged its Property Advisory Group with producing a new scheme. (It was incidentally very expressive of the times that planning should be reshaped by a property group.) In the event the new UCO fell well short of what had been originally intended by the Property Advisory Group.




Figure 7.7 By 1988 Nicholas Ridley wished to abolish structure plans and replace them with district-wide local plans that would, it was hoped, speed the development process. Existing local plan coverage was, however, distinctly patchy.

Proposals to end the distinction between shops and other services (e.g. building society offices) and to relax the residential category to allow small businesses to operate from home met widely-based opposition, not least from Conservative areas. The ending of the distinction between light industrial and office uses was accepted, however, becoming the most important of the changes in the new UCO.

The future of development plans

Following hard on the abolition of the metropolitan counties and the 1985 White Paper came a 1986 DoE Green (i.e. consultation) Paper, *The Future of Development Plans* (DoE and WO, 1986). It rehearsed the government's desire to extend unitary planning to non-metropolitan counties. Explaining these intentions, the Environment Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, criticized the existing two-tier system as 'too cumbersome' and 'overburdened with unnecessary detail' (Ridley, 1987, p. 41). Instead he proposed mandatory district development plans, replacing existing structure and local plans. There was certainly some validity in his criticisms, although the frequently voiced disdain of Thatcher's ministers for development planning had hardly encouraged local efforts. The last of the 'first round' structure plans was not finally approved until 1985. Progress on local plans was extremely slow. Ignoring subject plans, only about one-fifth of England and Wales (by population) was covered by adopted local plans by mid-1988 (PPG12, 1988). Only 54 of the 333 non-metropolitan districts had local plans on deposit or adopted which covered the whole of their areas.

Yet although Ridley's mind seemed set, moves to reform the system proceeded only slowly. It was not until early 1989 that specific proposals for action appeared, in a White Paper also called *The Future of Development Plans* (DoE and WO, 1989). This stuck to what had been unveiled three years earlier, but the basic philosophy of the changes seemed to be shifting. The original Thatcherite project for a more deregulated, enterprise-oriented planning system was clearly being questioned. There was a growing (and rather belated) acknowledgement within government that a tighter planning system providing more certainty would probably benefit developers more than a more deregulated system which increased uncertainty (Thornley, 1991). Some developers and property professional interests had been making this point for several years. They were now saying it with an authority which could finally be heard above the Thatcherite obsession with deregulation. It all pointed in a different direction from *Lifting the Burden*, to a more plan-led approach comparable to the zoning systems of other European countries, with rather less of the traditional planning discretion at the development control stage (e.g. BPF, 1986).

Yet the thrust of this important rethink was itself about to be challenged. If the Thatcherites had envisaged remaking the planning system solely with developers' interests in mind, another perspective, reflecting more traditional Tory values, was rapidly asserting itself. The whole Thatcherite project for planning faced its most serious challenge as the endemic 'nimbyism' of these years, noted earlier, began to be expressed in wider environmental concerns. To understand this and set it properly in context, we must consider the ideas that were challenging the dominant thrust of policies for planning and development in the 1980s.

Green ideas and radical planning initiatives

The green movement

In the vanguard of this opposition was the new green movement, which had developed from the emergent environmentalism of the 1970s (Porritt and Winner, 1988). The movement was

internationally based and had a genuine popular appeal in Britain far greater than anything mere planning had ever been able to muster, except perhaps during the Second World War. Membership of environmental groups in Britain doubled to about 5 million in 1990, with growth concentrated in the global and more explicitly green organizations (McCormick, 1993). This mass interest was manifest in many social, political, economic and cultural changes, from green consumerism and recycling to the formation of a British Green Party in 1985 to greater ecological discussion in the mass media. The appeal of such themes to the young, already evident in the 1970s, increased greatly in the 1980s.

Conceptually the green agenda was more holistic than the environmentalism of the 1970s, encompassing a complete programme for world reform. Yet, although the movement scored some important victories, progress on the whole agenda was distinctly limited. With a few exceptions, the apostles of the new movement found it difficult to organize effectively and internal dissent was rife. There were serious tensions within the movement between left and right and, perhaps more damagingly, between the rationalist, scientific greens and the mystical, quasi-religious greens. As a whole, they were always too easy to mock to be taken seriously enough.

The green movement and planning ideas

Yet much of what the green movement was saying was of great interest to physical planners (Hardy, 1991b). As in the 1970s, the planning movement (which was tiny compared to the wider green movement) played only a small part in the conceptualization of the new green agenda. Ninety years earlier it might have been different. We might reasonably speculate that Ebenezer Howard, who suffered a fair degree of mockery himself, would have readily found common ground with a green programme to change the world by following environmental principles. As it was, the professionalization and institutionalization of the planning movement, particularly since 1945, meant that by the 1980s its independent tradition of radical thought and innovation was somewhat atrophied. As we noted in Chapters 5 and 6, planning thought had become a prisoner of the policy process. This was something which served it well from the 1940s to the early 1970s, but thereafter the triumph of anti-interventionist policies left planners confused and uncertain.

Radical planning initiatives

It would be wrong to suggest that all planners were devoid of alternative ideas, however. The scattered elements of a radical planning approach had begun to appear in the 1970s, concerned mainly with securing meaningful public involvement, especially of less powerful social groups, in planning and urban change. In Macclesfield, for example, a young architect called Rod Hackney helped orchestrate a challenge to official planning, launching community architecture on the British scene (Knevt, 1975). About the same time, in 1973, the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA) initiated its planning aid service, helping to strengthen the representation of ordinary people in the planning process (Hardy, 1991b). There was a growth too in locally-based anti-developer protests, most famously at Coin Street on London's South Bank, where a combination of residents, younger planners and other professionals began in 1977 to challenge more powerful interests and establish a genuine community plan for the area (Tuckett, 1990). In 1979 the TCPA launched its proposal for a third garden city, asserting a need to return to the co-operative principles of Ebenezer Howard while embracing some of the new environmental concerns.

Radical planning under Thatcherism

Many of these initiatives began to receive wider attention in the 1980s. The concept of self-help that underlay some of them chimed in nicely with the new *laissez-faire* ideology of the Thatcher years. Community architecture (Wates and Knevitt, 1987) was particularly applauded (not least by Prince Charles), perhaps because its direct challenge was to the planners and only indirectly to private developers. Lightmoor in Telford New Town, a tangible, if minute, self-built outcome of the third garden city initiative, was admired on all sides (Hall, 1988). More controversial were those initiatives that sought to challenge the private development machine or to establish a genuinely popular basis for active local government. The new 'municipal socialism' of the big cities in the early and mid-1980s provided a conducive setting for such radicalism to flourish (Boddy and Fudge, 1985). Until its demise Ken Livingstone's GLC sponsored many such initiatives (Mackintosh and Wainwright, 1987). A so-called People's Plan was prepared for the Docklands that challenged the legitimacy of the new UDC (Brownill, 1990a). GLC action secured the victory of the Coin Street Action Group in 1984 (Tuckett, 1990). Attention was focused on the specific planning concerns of women (Foulsham, 1990), black people (Grey and Amooquaye, 1990; Hossain, 1990), the disabled (Bennett, 1990) and other traditionally neglected groups. Other left-wing authorities such as Sheffield launched local economic policies based on worker co-operatives (Mawson and Miller, 1986). Yet others, for example Walsall, led the way in taking local service delivery out of the town hall and closer to the people (Burns, 1990).

To those who were affected by them, many of these initiatives seemed very important and



Figure 7.8 Lightmoor, in Telford New Town, was an attempt to recapture the community co-operation of Howard's original garden city vision and harness it to newer concerns for the environment and community architecture.

relevant. But this alternative approach, usually associated with high local spending, was opposed by Conservative voters particularly in the suburbs and the outer cities. And because it failed to reach this contented majority, the flame of this radicalism never burned strongly enough to withstand the harsh wind of Thatcherism. The ideas and some of the initiatives lived on, but the policies had largely been extinguished by the late 1980s. This failure of radical planning rather contrasted with the spread of green ideas, which were both radical and capable of reaching out to the self-interests of the contented classes.

Sustainable development

The key green idea that began to permeate planning thought in the late 1980s was that of sustainability. The concept itself had evolved during the 1970s and early 1980s (Wheeler, 1998). It had its origins in the rather apocalyptic literature of environmentalists predicting global meltdown. These ideas entered the ‘respectable’ mainstream of international governance during the 1980s. They were essentially a synthesis of these environmentalist fears and the rather different priorities of the development movement, concerned with improving the poorer countries of the world. So far as the latter were concerned, stopping development was not an option.

In 1987, sustainability began to become a fully global approach, capable of being applied in developed countries such as Britain. The agent of this widening was the Report of the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future*. Known as the Brundtland Report after its chairwoman, Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Prime Minister of Norway, the report gave a much quoted definition of sustainable development: ‘development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland, 1987, p. 8). By the end of the 1980s it was being actively incorporated in planning thinking about the urban future, most notably in the European Commission’s Green Paper on the Urban Environment, published in 1990 (CEC, 1990a, 1990b). This included the vision of a ‘compact city’, running counter to the traditional garden city-inspired decentralist thrust of British planning. Not that such notions, implying more active government, could automatically be expected to find favour in 1980s’ Britain. Yet that is exactly what they did, for reasons that need some discussion.

Greening Thatcherism and repleving planning, 1987–90

The ‘turquoise tendency’

In 1985 the Centre for Policy Studies, the Thatcherite think-tank, had noted the lack of any obvious affinities between the green vanguard and their own supporters: ‘For many Conservatives, the word “green” conjures up the most disagreeable images . . . of eccentric, muesli-crunching peace fanatics in open-toed sandals . . . Germanic intellectuals of the far Left, the animal rights campaigners or, even worse, the benign socialist environmental planners with little respect for private property’ (Porrirt and Winner, 1988, pp. 81–2). Yet the same pamphlet perceptively recognized the potential appeal of green ideas to ordinary Tories:

We are indeed a green nation, but not in the way the Left would like. We care about the details of our immediate surroundings, street corners and hedgerows, our parks and fens, our rivers and hillsides – small pockets of sustenance – which protect our sense of community, of history, and of beauty. We care too most of all for our own property – and widespread property ownership is the natural friend of environmental responsibility. (Porrirt and Winner, 1988, p. 82)

Here then was the connection between narrow 'nimbyism' and wider environmental concerns, a potential link which began to come alive in the late 1980s. The main preconditions for this quite sudden transition were partly economic. By 1987 the economic problems of the early 1980s had receded and many Conservative supporters were enjoying the rewards of the 'Thatcher economic miracle'. In such circumstances the continual need to stimulate enterprise appeared less of a priority and the question of how economic success was to be enjoyed began to assume greater prominence (Ridley, 1992). Given the heightened environmental awareness of these years, green issues provided an obvious focus for such concerns. It was, however, the unexpectedly strong showing of the Green Party, especially in Tory areas, in the 1989 European parliamentary elections which brought green issues decisively to the fore (McCormick, 1993). The electoral system denied the Greens any actual seats and the breakthrough was modest and very short-lived, but it sent out important signals. Thatcher moved quickly to appease the 'turquoise tendency' of green Tories, most immediately by replacing the abrasive Ridley as Environment Secretary with the more emollient and environment-friendly Chris Patten.

Late Thatcherism and the planning system

The final months of Ridley's tenure had seen a few notable changes in planning policies (particularly in relation to new settlements, to be examined more fully in the next chapter). Generally, though, central attacks on the planning system had slackened since the 1987 election. Earlier proposals continued to run their course, as noted above for the rather leisurely progress of the proposed revisions to the development plans system. The one remaining major pledge arising from *Lifting the Burden*, the revision of the General Development Order (GDO), was also implemented in 1988 (Thornley, 1991). It extended the permitted development rights introduced in 1981, mainly for extensions to business premises, although with some very un-Thatcherite tightening up in relation to building conservation. There were also other signs of a more interventionist approach developing for the inner cities, albeit still in a very fragmented, Thatcherite way, as we will see in the next chapter. Another important sign was the belated implementation of the 1985 European directive on environmental impact assessment for major projects in 1988 (DoE, 1989). More fundamental shifts were on the way, driven by this combination of domestic and European pressures.

This Common Inheritance

By 1990 it was clear that the language of the Brundtland Report had entered government policy-making. The environmental White Paper, *This Common Inheritance* (actually a lavishly illustrated book, fortunately printed on recycled paper), marked a decisive shift in the presentation of central thinking about planning compared with *Lifting the Burden* five years earlier (DoE et al., 1990). Its primary purpose was the promise of strengthened and integrated environmental policies and the Environmental Protection Act 1990 which soon followed gave some substance to that commitment (DoE et al., 1991, 1992). Yet this was not a complete U-turn. The Act's new powers were important, although they continued to ensure that environmental planning developed in a way that was partially detached from the main body of planning (and other) policies (McCormick, 1993). It was still therefore perpetuating the general trend of a fragmentation of planning into a series of disjointed initiatives.

But there was a definite sense within the White Paper that a strategic, comprehensive

approach to planning as a whole was beginning to come back into fashion. In a marked policy reversal, structure planning was to be revived in streamlined form to supplement the new mandatory district development plans. Just a year earlier, it will be recalled, Ridley had wanted structure plans abolished altogether. There was also a commitment to develop a nationwide system of regional policy advice. Together with simultaneous shifts to revive strategic transport policies, it seemed to many commentators that the corner had been turned.

Town and Country Planning Acts 1990

In the same year the many changes to the planning system since 1971 were consolidated. Although the new legislation was non-controversial, its general character highlights much about planning in this period. The first point is that planning actually had survived and was, for most areas, recognizably the same system as that which had operated in the early 1970s. Thatcherism and the other pressures of these years had wrought important but not decisive changes. At the same time, though, the symptoms of planning's fragmentation were palpable even in the very form of the new legislation. Instead of one Act, there were now four. As well as the main statute, called simply the Town and Country Planning Act, there were separate planning Acts subtitled Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas (LBCA), Hazardous Substances (HS) and Consequential Provisions (CP).

The LBCA Act reflected the growing central separation of policy for heritage from the rest of planning (and leaving to local authorities the problems of reintegrating it). It continued the trend begun with the National Heritage Act 1983 (and was itself taken further when John Major created the Department of National Heritage in 1992, entirely divesting DoE of its historic conservation policy role and leaving it only minor casework details). The HS Act arose primarily from provisions in the Housing and Planning Act 1986 that had never been brought into operation. Although partly a product of longer-term worries about health and safety, they also reflected the need for specific controls as more general controls on business uses were deregulated, creating real risks that hazardous situations could arise. Finally the CP Act essentially reflected the tremendous complexity of the whole system!

The 1990 legislation was also important for what it left out. With the exception of specific planning instruments, most inner-city policy remained separate from the planning system. We have already noted the separate development of environmental planning powers. Even within the principal Act, important areas such as minerals were now virtually detached from the main body of planning legislation, following changes introduced in 1981. Taken together, all this was ample testimony to a planning system that was less coherent than two decades earlier. Overall, therefore, the 1990 Acts embodied both the changes and continuities, weaknesses and strengths in the planning system as the Thatcher era ended.

OVERVIEW

During the 1960s and early 1970s it was increasingly necessary to remind observers that physical planning really was political, such was the strength and persistence of the bipartisan consensus on planning matters. Following the experiences of the late 1970s and 1980s, such reminders became redundant. Planning's politicization became totally obvious, although it was not the only source of change. An increasingly troubled economy, the associated crisis of Keynesian economic management, the emergence of monetarism, increasingly sharp political

polarization, Thatcherism and the pressures of environmentalism have together wrought dramatic changes on the planning system.

Paradoxically, planners actually had wider duties in the early 1990s than 20 years earlier. Yet no one was quite sure any longer what it was that held all their manifold responsibilities together. It was green ideas that articulated the new radical path that began to offer new arguments for coherence. Essentially, though, planners were waiting for someone to put planning back together again, with some forceful reassertion of the comprehensive and strategic dimension that had been so important in the 1960s' heyday of the post-war consensus. The consequences of this fragmentation were all too apparent in the more detailed applications of planning policies, as we will see in the next chapter.

8

Remaking Planning: II. Specific Policies, 1974–90

In Chapter 6 we examined the four major strategic planning policies that were applied, with varying commitment, during the long post-war boom. This chapter extends this examination to the years when the boom ended and political consensus about these policies began to disintegrate. It is a story of both change and continuity, paralleling that of the planning system itself. In some policy areas, such as the pursuit of regional balance, the story is of wholesale retreat. Regional planning shrank in the 1970s and virtually disappeared in the 1980s while regional policy was dramatically diminished and partially reoriented. There are similarities in planned decentralization. The emergence of inner-city policies and the 1980s' assault on state spending virtually ended the New Towns programme. Yet continuing heavy development pressures in outer-city areas brought an intriguing Thatcherite flirtation with the idea of private new settlements.

Little very substantial followed, partly because of the immense strength of urban containment policies. Despite frequent alarms, green belts remained the enduring rock of urban planning in these years. There is most to report, however, in the urban cores where planned redevelopment had traditionally been favoured. Some central area private redevelopment continued, but much of the action now switched to the inner cities. The emphasis there shifted decisively from public-sector housing-led approaches to the attraction of private developers and diversification of activity. It is with these regeneration policies that we begin.

REGENERATING THE URBAN CORES

Implementing Labour's inner-city policies, 1976–79

The Urban Programme

The most important of Peter Shore's policy changes of 1977–78, noted in the last chapter, was the creation of the Urban Programme. This initially formed seven partnerships, for London's docklands, Hackney–Islington, Lambeth, Newcastle–Gateshead, Manchester–Salford, Liverpool and Birmingham (Lawless, 1986, 1989). In Scotland, meanwhile, the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) Project, an initiative broadly equivalent to the partnerships, had already appeared in 1976. There were also a further 15 programme areas and 16 designated districts in England, although significant alterations were made in 1986–87. Between them, programme and designated areas included most of the remaining big cities with classic inner-city problem symptoms, including Leeds, Leicester, Sheffield, Hull, Bradford and Nottingham. They also included many other industrial towns, such as Sunderland, Oldham, Bolton, North and South Tyneside, Hartlepool and Burnley. In Wales all local authorities were eligible and the equivalent Scottish scheme was almost as wide-ranging.

Against the odds, the Urban Programme survived the Thatcher years. By the early 1990s 57 English authorities were still benefiting.

The new policies in operation

Even at the outset, the Urban Programme's most serious problem was that which bedevilled all Labour's urban and planning policies: inadequate funding. The very economic ills that were worsening inner-city conditions were also pushing the government towards public expenditure restraint (especially on capital projects), preventing a really bold government-funded response. The initial distribution of these limited funds was also questionable and the promised shift to economic development was slow to appear. Local authorities at that time had little experience of economic promotion and development, so they found it difficult to generate credible projects. Work on Industrial Improvement Areas and other economic development measures eventually widened the relevant expertise among planners and other local officials, but there was an inevitable delay (DoE, 1986). Social, community and recreation projects thus dominated early expenditure.

The sources of inner-city action since 1979

A Thatcherite paradox?

Rather surprisingly, the Thatcher administration did not roll back the frontiers of state spending on inner-city programmes. Expenditure continued the upward trend established under Labour (Robson, 1987, 1988; Lawless, 1991; Middleton, 1991). Allowing for inflation, real spending in the 1983/84 financial year was more than twice the 1978/79 level. It dwindled very slightly until 1986/87, but then doubled again by 1990/91, when it exceeded £800 million. Yet the wider Thatcherite commitment to reducing public spending brought a more general loss of central grants to inner-city authorities many times greater than the specific assistance granted. Between 1979 and 1984 alone, the designated London boroughs gained roughly £300 million in inner-city money, but lost £1,530 million in rate support grant. Not that this was the whole story either, because some inner-city areas (particularly the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs)) have certainly received considerable additional funding that has not appeared in inner-city programmes. The net result was that a commitment to targeted public spending was maintained, something which needs explanation in view of Thatcherite ideology.

A worsening problem

One reason was simply that the problem got significantly worse after 1979. The acceleration of economic change brought very high inner-city unemployment (Robson, 1988). In 1986, the worst year of the decade, the jobless rate in the worst inner-city ward of Manchester, Hulme, stood at 48 per cent, over four times the UK rate. Most other inner ward rates in the city were roughly three or more times the national average. The same basic pattern was apparent in every large inner-city area, especially in the north. Even as recovery occurred nationally, inner-city unemployment remained obstinately high. In 1988 the worst wards in Nottingham and Middlesbrough recorded unemployment rates of 38 and 34 per cent, respectively, compared with a UK rate of 8.1 per cent (Audit Commission, 1989).

When the impact of this unemployment was added to already low economic activity rates (reflecting, for example, higher than average proportions of lone parents unable to work or,

in some cases, old and chronically sick people) and the generally low wages of many of those in low-skill work, the impact on poverty can be imagined. In turn the erosion of the relative value of state benefits during the 1980s had an especially marked effect on such highly dependent populations. Cuts in housing grants to councils also further degraded the quality of the residential environment, to the point of dereliction in many areas. Economic change itself also added more dereliction in the form of abandoned factories, warehouses, docks, shipyards, etc.

A threat to social order

For all this, the Conservative Party, which drew its support largely from outer-city and rural areas, remained woefully ignorant of the inner city. Many Conservatives were prone to attribute its problems merely to the inadequacies of individuals and the policies of Labour councils. The increasing marginalization under Mrs Thatcher of the ‘one nation’ Tories, who remained committed to a welfare state, made such viewpoints more influential than they would have been under Churchill, Macmillan or Heath (Hall and Jacques, 1983; Deakin, 1987; Skidelsky, 1988). But if familiar arguments for intervention deriving from the politics of consensus were losing ground, new ones based on real threats to urban social stability began to take their place. In 1980 came the first serious outbreak of inner-city rioting in the St Pauls



Figure 8.1 In the early 1980s the resentment of inner-city, mainly black, populations at the bleak economic prospects, run-down environments and, not least, heavy-handed policing of their areas finally boiled over into serious unrest. The photograph shows the Brixton riots of 1981.

district of Bristol. The following year much more serious disturbances occurred in several inner-city areas, including Brixton in London, Moss Side in Manchester and Toxteth in Liverpool (Scarman Report, 1981). And there have been further outbreaks.

Often triggered by disputes over policing, the riots essentially highlighted the extent of social alienation in many inner-city areas. Unemployment and poverty, often combined with racial discrimination, had together denied many young people the fruits of mainstream contented society. The riots were the inarticulate but unmistakable voice of the substantial excluded minority. Other manifestations came in higher than average crime, including, by the early 1990s, the spectre of widespread drug trafficking and associated violence centred on inner-city areas such as Moss Side. All these images, with their overtones of American cities, made powerful arguments for intervention.

Yet for all this the natural instincts of many Conservatives looked to tighter policing and individual self-help. These sentiments were certainly shared by some Cabinet ministers. Speaking at the 1981 party conference, the ultra-Thatcherite Norman Tebbit summed up the prevailing political ethos when he recalled his father's unemployment in the 1930s: 'He didn't riot. He got on his bike and looked for work' (Tebbit, 1988, p. 187). To understand why inner-city policies moved beyond such Thatcherite nostrums, we need to give credit to the politician who carried the message, the Environment Secretary from 1979 to 1983, Michael Heseltine.

The Heseltine factor

Like Mrs Thatcher, Heseltine was a charismatic and relentlessly ambitious populist (Critchley, 1987). Unlike her, though, he tempered his commitment to the new ascendancy of the market by appreciating the real value of a pragmatic approach to state intervention (Heseltine, 1987). He was, in short, capable of reaching the parts other Thatcherites could not reach. As Shadow Environment Secretary at the time of the 1978 Inner Urban Areas Act, he had actually criticized Shore for the inadequate funding of the programme (McKay and Cox, 1979). Not that he actually intended to increase spending at that time. What he sought was a redirection of public funding so that it would attract rather more private investment than Labour's proposals could achieve. Heseltine's initial understanding of inner-city problems rested on the vast and very visible example of London's docklands. It was, in his perception, a problem to be addressed principally by a decisive approach to the promotion of development, so that dereliction could be banished and new activities established.

His fuller understanding of the social dimension of inner-city problems came in the aftermath of the 1981 riots. In a move reminiscent of Lord Hailsham's temporary role in the north east in 1963 (although without the flat cap), Heseltine went to Liverpool as an unofficial 'Minister for Merseyside', intent on seeking new remedies. It was, in his own words,

one of those priceless formative experiences from which every politician takes strength; it tested many of my deepest political beliefs and instincts and intensified my convictions . . . it showed me how quickly we had to act and it greatly sharpened my appreciation of the scale and nature of the human and social crises with which the inner cities were struggling. (Heseltine, 1987, pp. 139–40)

Heseltine returned from Merseyside convinced that market solutions alone were insufficient to address such problems. Significantly, greater public spending, and much else, was essential. Putting all this to Cabinet in a paper provocatively entitled 'It Took a Riot', he won Thatcher's

support but fell foul of Treasury caution. Nevertheless a modest expansion of the programme was sanctioned, although, significantly, it then lost momentum after he left Environment in 1983.

'Those inner cities'

We can also detect a specifically political reason for the resumption of increasing expenditure in the later 1980s, after several years of stagnation. The occasion was the immediate aftermath of the 1987 election, when a victorious Mrs Thatcher commented to party workers (and a television-watching nation) that 'we have a big job to do in some of those inner cities' (cited in Robson, 1988, p. vii). Quite what she meant was debatable (e.g. Robson, 1988; Burton and O'Toole, 1993). At one level there was crude party political concern. In stark contrast to most of the rest of Britain, the inner cities had decisively rejected Thatcherism at the ballot box. This was irrelevant to the election outcome, but it acquired significance because Thatcher was by then seeking fundamental and enduring change to Britain's whole political culture.

The inner cities stood as a direct challenge to complete dominance of the new ideology, their seemingly intractable problems an ugly scar on Thatcherite success. They had to be integrated into the great political project. Inner-city policy was thus given higher priority during the third Thatcher administration (e.g. Cabinet Office, 1988; Thatcher, 1989, pp. 128–9). It is also significant that 1987–89 represented the high point of Thatcherite confidence about its economic success. In part, perhaps this encouraged a more charitable attitude to areas not sharing in the good fortune (just as Special Area policies had grown with economic recovery in the late 1930s).


Inner-city policy under Thatcher

The restlessness of policy

The Thatcher years saw an extraordinary restlessness in inner-city policy-making, producing an ever changing array of initiatives (Lewis, 1992). Much of this reflected the reliance of policy development on the concerns of particular politicians at particular times. Shore had given the DoE an early co-ordinating role. This strengthened under Heseltine, but it then languished as his successors failed to match his enthusiasm for the inner city. Moreover, as the content of inner-city policies widened in the middle and late 1980s it was natural that the role of other central departments would strengthen. The land, planning and development initiatives favoured by Shore and Heseltine, such as Industrial Improvement Areas, Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations, were increasingly supplemented by enterprise, business funding, training and other concerns by the middle and late 1980s. The roles of the Departments of Trade and Industry, Employment, Education and the Home Office accordingly widened. By 1987 the Prime Minister herself had become personally involved through the Cabinet Office. It was often unclear which minister was actually in charge of policy and there were occasional inter-departmental disputes.

Lifting the 'dead hand of socialism'

Despite this regular rearrangement of policies, several underlying themes were apparent. These translated Thatcherite principles into the specific context of the inner city. Most prominent was the reduction in local government's role, as Shore's Urban Programme became progressively less significant. Responsibility shifted directly to the centre or to new agencies



There's life in the old docks yet

Merseyside's docklands were once the heart of a thriving community.

The centre of its activities.

The source of its prosperity.

Today life is returning.

In a massive wave of activity we are clearing the docks of their silt, creating almost 70 acres of superb enclosed waterspace.

On 125 acres of dereliction we've planted the world's premier Garden Festival of 1984.

We've moved mountains of rubbish and rubble and formed a bright new landscape on the once barren waterfront.

Derelict buildings have been demolished. Historic ones restored. Albert Dock, Britain's largest grade 1 listed building, is being transformed into a first class environment for commerce, housing and leisure.

Opportunities are here to be taken – the potential too great to be ignored.

Prime development land is now available – uniquely situated on the Mersey waterfront close to Liverpool city centre. Sites for industry, housing, commerce and leisure.

And with the new developments will come people. To work. To live. To relax.

Every dock has its day. Our day is dawning.

WDC Merseyside
Development
Corporation

TURNING THE TIDE ON MERSEYSIDE

Contact: Alex Anderson at
Merseyside Development Corporation Tel: 051-236 6090.

Figure 8.2 The Thatcher governments favoured a market-led approach to urban regeneration, epitomized by the promotional efforts of the Urban Development Corporations. This 1984 advertisement by Merseyside DC celebrates the Garden Festival then under way and anticipates the US-style restoration of the Albert Dock.

that were more amenable to central desires: ‘the dead hand of Socialism should be lifted’, as Heseltine put it (1987, p. 136). Most prominent of the new agencies were the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) noted in the last chapter. Others included the seven City Action Teams (created in 1985 and 1988) and the 16 Task Forces (set up in 1986–87), both involving central officials shaping and co-ordinating policies at the local level in ways that bypassed local government. There were also specific initiatives targeted on run-down areas of council housing, designed to reduce the role of municipal landlords. These included Estate Action (launched in 1987, but based in a pilot initiative begun in 1979) and Housing Action Trusts. The latter, announced in 1987, were bolder in their intention to take control from local authorities. As a result, they encountered early mistrust by tenants and did not actually get underway until after 1990.

The UDCs in operation

The UDCs became the showpieces of inner-city policies over these years. Just two were formed initially in 1981: for Merseyside (MDC) and London Docklands (Brownill, 1990b; Imrie and Thomas, 1993a). The latter covered an area of 2,150 hectares, with 40,000 population within its boundaries. MDC originally covered just 360 hectares (960 following enlargement in 1988) and an original population of 450. Five years on, these pioneer UDCs, especially the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC), had made a major impact. It was therefore natural to repeat the formula as the third Thatcher government sought to strengthen its inner-city policies.

New UDCs were designated for the Black Country, Tyne and Wear, Trafford Park, Cardiff Bay and Teesside in 1987, Sheffield, Leeds, Bristol and Central Manchester in 1988 and Laganside (Belfast) in 1989. Although the UDCs for Teesside (4,858 hectares) and the Black Country (2,598 hectares) covered larger areas than the LDDC, none of these later designations had budgets comparable with the first two. All also had much shorter life-spans. Several later designations, from 1988, were dubbed ‘mini-UDCs’ because of their small areas and budgets. Central Manchester, for example, covered just 187 hectares and had a budget of just £44 million compared to MDC’s £247 million and LDDC’s £1,370 million.

Encouraging the private developer

The UDCs were created essentially to stimulate profit-seeking private investment within their areas. Yet they had no monopoly on this objective, which has permeated all post-1979 inner-city initiatives (Healey et al., 1992). It was apparent, for example, in a widespread desire to lure a more middle-class and entrepreneurial population back to live in inner-city areas. It was evident too in many specific policy measures (Heseltine, 1987). For example, it underpinned the recasting of the derelict land grant (DLG) in 1980–81. New initiatives, such as the urban development grant (UDG), created in 1982, urban regeneration grant (URG), introduced in 1987, then merged as City Grant (CG) in 1988, also embodied this same philosophy. It had, however, already been apparent for several years in the first major move in this direction, the Enterprise Zones.

The Enterprise Zones in operation

In 1981 the first round of Enterprise Zones (EZs) was announced (DoE, 1987b). They were not, however, exclusively focused on the inner cities. Some, such as Salford/Trafford, Tyneside or London Docklands (the latter not finally designated until 1982) covered classic inner-

NO RATES

SALFORD CITY CENTRE

Willan E21

M602 MOTORWAY

M63

A superb location

E21 is a superb distribution location. Not only does it gain all the Enterprise Zone benefits, but it is strategically placed both for ready access to Manchester and Salford city centres and to the regional motorway network. The terminus of the new M602 extension, open in early 1983, is within about 300 yards of the estate and joins the M62/M63 within a few minutes driving time.

EZ benefits make your company more competitive!

- The following special benefits will be available to new and existing businesses in the Salford Docks/Trafford Park Enterprise Zones:
 - exemption from rates on industrial and commercial property.
 - simplification of planning procedures and speedier administration of planning and other controls on development.
 - priority consideration of applications for customs facilities known as 'customs warehousing' and 'inward processing relief' as well as relaxing the criteria applied to decisions on private customs warehousing.
 - reduction to a minimum of Government requests for statistical information.
 - exemption from the requirements of Industrial Training Boards.

NEW WAREHOUSE OR INDUSTRIAL UNITS IN SIZES TO MATCH YOUR EXACT NEEDS

500 sq ft
750 sq ft
1,000 sq ft
1,250 sq ft
2,000 sq ft
2,500 sq ft
or combined!

Willan E21

SALFORD ENTERPRISE ZONE GREATER MANCHESTER

Figure 8.3 Enterprise Zones became an important marketing device, applied with great enthusiasm by pragmatic Labour councils such as Salford. Note, however, how the absence of rates (i.e. local taxes) was the most powerful incentive. Streamlined planning procedures were of somewhat lower significance.

conurbation areas. In addition there were several run-down sites in smaller industrial centres such as Swansea or Dudley, which had not featured in Peter Shore's initiatives, and a few were relatively open sites not in inner-city locations, for example at Wakefield and Corby. This heterodox pattern was repeated in the second round of EZs, designated from 1983. By 1985 there were 25 but they fell from favour under Ridley and subsequently were only rarely used. Although the zones themselves have attracted much new development, they did not generally add to its overall amount. Mainly they subsidized developments that were already proceeding, or that would have happened without EZs, or that were simply diverted from nearby areas. Nevertheless they were an important early encouragement to private developers and a powerful place marketing tool.

Urban development grant and its successors

Another important new approach attracting private development into inner cities was that represented by UDG, URG and CG. UDG grew from Heseltine's post-riot initiatives as he tried to persuade major financial institutions to put invest in inner cities (Heseltine, 1987). They (and civil servants) recommended the American urban development action grant, used there to apparently good effect in many older cities (DoE, 1988). Unlike any previous British grants, these were available for a wide range of private development projects and were calculated on a basis that would allow the project to proceed. They addressed the problem of negative value, whereby the costs of development exceeded likely returns. Government was thereby protecting developers from losses. After the modest success for the original UDG, the URG and CG extended the approach to larger schemes. By 1992, 267 City Grant schemes had been approved since its inception in 1988, amounting to £238 million of public funds and £1,040 million of private investment.

Leverage planning

At the heart of these grants was a novel concept in British planning practice: leverage (Healey et al., 1992; Lewis, 1992). It was something which permeated virtually all aspects of urban regeneration during the 1980s. What it meant, essentially, was that development projects were conceived to secure the maximum private investment for minimum public spending (a relationship often called the gearing ratio). Leverage (and the term itself, serving as both noun and verb) came from the USA, particularly the cities of Baltimore and Boston (Parkinson et al., 1988). The leverage approach there had rested on partnerships of private investors and municipal authorities, creating local 'growth coalitions'. These had proved able to reverse urban decline and regenerate the cities as impressive post-industrial tourist and service centres. At the same time they had apparently been able to secure some important community benefits by bargaining and agreements.

Inner-city initiatives and promotional planning

This private development-oriented approach created a style of planning rather different from that traditionally dominant. As noted in the last chapter, inner-city policies contributed to the fragmentation of comprehensive planning into a series of more disjointed initiatives, requiring rather different styles of action. Most striking in the inner-city and older industrial areas was the growth of local economic promotion and development activity, in which more planners became involved during the 1980s (Mills and Young, 1986). Hitherto the preserve of regional policy, economic promotion and development now acquired a much stronger local dimension,

operated by both the new central agencies, especially the UDCs, and local authorities. Another symptom was the growth of place marketing, led by the LDDC and Glasgow city council, especially the famous 'Glasgow's Miles Better' campaign, launched in 1983 (Ward, 1998).

Local authority regeneration policies

Where Glasgow led, other local authorities quickly followed. During the early 1980s they used a variety of powers, sometimes of dubious legality, to promote economic development in their areas (Mawson and Miller, 1986). Some Labour metropolitan authorities such as the GLC and Sheffield saw such policies as a way of challenging Thatcherism. In contrast to the central emphasis on attracting private capital, which most local authorities soon followed, the radical Labour councils wanted to extend municipal and co-operative enterprise. Yet this 'municipal socialist' challenge was always limited (Cochrane, 1983, 1986). By the late 1980s this challenge had virtually been defeated. Most Labour councils were pursuing the same broad approach as central government (Audit Commission, 1989). By 1989 ministers believed that local authorities could now be trusted enough to grant them explicit economic development powers under the Local Government and Housing Act. In practice the new measure made little difference to most inner areas which already had some powers under the 1978 Act. But it was an early symptom of a different, more trusting, relationship between central and local government that grew during the 1990s.

The limited role of plans

The promotional emphasis was rather different from post-war planning's traditional mainstream roles (Lyddon, 1987). Instead of regulating private developers, planners were now encouraging them. Instead of actively shaping public-sector projects (the traditional form of planning intervention in the inner cities), they were negotiating the form of private developments (Brindley et al., 1989). Of course, this kind of planner-developer relationship was not entirely new. It had gradually become more common throughout the planning process during the 1970s, particularly in the growth of planning gain. In the inner cities of the 1980s, however, this negotiative, bargaining style was being taken much further. The more pragmatic approach meant that formal conventional land use plans, reconciling a wide variety of public and private interests, played very little part. Such plans as existed in the UDCs, for example, were largely promotional in character, designed to appeal to private investors.

A new partnership of planner and developer?

A common buzzword of inner-city policies in the 1980s (and even more, to anticipate, the 1990s) was 'partnership' (Robson, 1988; Lewis, 1992; Imrie and Thomas, 1993b; Ward, 1999). It was, though, a deceptively slippery term, whose meaning changed over time. The Thatcherite conception of partnership was different from that which Shore had unveiled in 1977, between government agencies. During the 1980s, 'partnership' meant a relationship between public and private sectors, very much privileging the latter. In that sense it had something in common with planned central area redevelopment since the 1950s. It was, though, now moving into the less favourable territory of the inner city, with the explicit intention (not always fulfilled) that most investment would come from the private partners (Healey et al., 1992). For several decades the private development industry had ventured into inner cities only as contractors to local authorities, with public funds directly guaranteeing

their construction profits. The new form of partnership now envisaged private developers carrying most of the risk.

Not surprisingly, the developers did not immediately jump at the chance. For all the government's willingness to create a developer-friendly environment in the inner cities, a great deal of ministerial persuasion was necessary in the early days. Much of it occurred away from the public gaze. A notable public instance came when Heseltine got 30 top financial decision-makers together on a bus to show them the horrors of inner Liverpool in August 1981, soon after the riots (Heseltine, 1987). He won their sympathy and the secondment of some of their staffs but little else. No instant American-style growth coalitions appeared to provide the relatively spontaneous private-sector solution the government wanted. For all the public investment, subsidies, tax breaks (and a virtual giving away of inner-city land) that occurred, it also took a great deal of behind-the-scenes persuasion and arm-twisting to initiate private development, even in areas, like London Docklands, which had most profit potential (Brownill, 1990b). Benefits to the wider community were accordingly slow to appear.

Late 1980s' success?

Thanks to such expedients and a rapidly accelerating property boom, an impressive momentum had been generated by the late 1980s that spread even into less promising inner-city areas (Healey and Nabarro, 1990; Goobey, 1992). Docklands attracted many established national and international developers, but this was unusual. Most inner-city areas were reliant on local and regional developers, some making their reputations on prestigious regeneration schemes. At the zenith of the property boom, it seemed that government really had forged a new kind of partnership with private developers that went beyond anything achieved during the 1950s or 1960s. Whereas the inner city had traditionally been a no-go area for the private developer, by the late 1980s every £1 of public investment in the inner cities was leveraging roughly £4 of private investment (Potter, 1990). LDDC managed, at best, a 1:12 ratio. Trafford Park and Sheffield UDCs managed similar rates in the late 1980s. The less-publicized MDC achieved only 1 to 1.2 in the same, very favourable period. Overall, by the early 1990s, it could boast only £0.23 private investment for every £1 it had spent since 1981.

Yet this was the exception. It seemed, for a moment at least, that the Thatcher 'economic miracle' might just be able to sustain a leveraged regeneration of the inner cities, successful on its own terms. There was even some promise that the trickle-down of social benefits might become more rapid. That moment soon passed, however, as property boom turned to slump. Even so, a great deal was actually achieved.

Inner-city regeneration in practice

Land reclamation

Some 16,500 hectares of derelict land were reclaimed in England between 1979 and 1992, mainly in inner-city and older industrial areas (DoE, 1987a). This was a marked increase on 1970s' reclamation rates, although in fact it barely kept pace with the rate of new dereliction arising from economic change. In many local areas the amount of derelict land actually increased. Yet the local effects of reclamation were often impressive. Most spectacular in the short term were the Garden Festivals held in Liverpool (1984), Stoke (1986), Glasgow (1988) and Gateshead (1990) (Middleton, 1991). The idea was originally German, a device for

regenerating post-war bomb sites by imaginative reclamation. The results attracted visitors and commercial sponsorship and stimulated some permanent developments on profoundly unpromising sites. Their British innovator was Heseltine during his period as 'Minister for Merseyside'. In practice, though, their planning was very rushed and long-term investment benefits were poor except where, as in Glasgow, they were part of a wider regeneration package. Yet they were generally popular events which helped, albeit temporarily, alter perceptions of former derelict sites.

New infrastructure

Many inner-city areas, especially docks, suffered from poor accessibility. The transport networks based on water and rail which had serviced their initial development were now barriers to their integration with the rest of the city. London Docklands particularly experienced these problems (Brownill, 1990b). Fifty-five miles of new road had been built there by 1992, with further major links envisaged. The same area also saw the construction of the entirely new Docklands Light Railway (DLR) rapid-transit system, opened in 1987. There were also improvements to the few parts of the existing London Underground system that served Docklands, although the critical extension of the Jubilee Line was long delayed. Finally, a new urban airport, London City, was added in 1987 to service the emergent business community of Docklands. Similar infrastructure and transport investments were undertaken or planned elsewhere, although nowhere on the scale of Docklands.



Figure 8.4 Opened in their new guise in 1973, St Katherine Docks, London, were the first British example of US-style 'post-industrial' dock regeneration based on tourism, leisure and offices, together with some GLC housing. The location, adjoining the Tower of London, brought immediate success, although it was more difficult to apply the same formula to the huge dock areas further east.

Heritage, leisure and tourism

Improving accessibility encouraged leisure and tourism schemes, especially in redundant dock areas. Again following Baltimore and Boston, the potential of waterfront development was quickly recognized, particularly when former dock buildings had great historic and architectural quality (Middleton, 1991). The development at St Katherine's Dock adjoining the Tower of London was a very early British example, opened in 1973. Much more was done in the 1980s especially in London Docklands and, above all, at the Albert Dock in Liverpool. Here Grade I listed Victorian dock buildings were imaginatively converted into a leisure, cultural and residential complex, opened in 1988. Another notable scheme with a significant leisure content was Salford Quays (the former Manchester Docks) where a pragmatic Labour local authority, armed with Urban Programme and DLG funds, showed itself capable of 'doing a Docklands' (Robson, 1988; Law, 1992). Unlike most other schemes, the original dock buildings, which had little architectural interest, were demolished. A few cranes, bridges, etc., were kept, but otherwise conservation played little part.

Post-industrial development

Along with leisure and tourism, a striking feature of 1980s' inner-city regeneration was the amount of commercial development, a marked break with previous practice (Goobey, 1992; Healey et al., 1992). The general 1980s' climate of post-industrial pessimism meant that few expected that traditional industrial employment would ever return to urban cores. Some industrial development did occur, most notably with the shift of newspaper printing presses into London Docklands, but this was unusual. Manufacturing also remained important in some UDC areas, such as Trafford or Tyne and Wear, but there were few new manufacturing jobs. Many areas also had small warehousing developments, but they generated little employment. Apart from leisure and tourism, the new jobs came with shops and offices.

Retailing

Shopping was a boom industry of the 1980s. Its unprecedented growth reflected a mass indulgence in private consumption that was celebrated and fostered by Thatcherism. It also had important implications for urban change (Montgomery, 1990). Following the already well-established decentralization of food retailing, the bigger furniture, electrical goods, DIY and other retailers began to seek larger sites where they could cater more effectively for car-using customers. This trend offered opportunities for the inner cities because of their liberal planning regimes, particularly since firm planning controls restricted urban fringe developments on green-field sites. An important new type of development was the retail warehouse park, where bulky household items were sold to car-based shoppers from warehouse-type buildings. Compared to traditional central area retailing, the cheapness of land in urban regeneration areas allowed larger, single-storey premises and ample car parking. Some EZs particularly attracted this kind of development, notably in Swansea and Dudley.

Regional shopping centres and urban regeneration

Much more dramatic, however, were the very large out-of-town shopping malls on the North American pattern (DoE, 1992a). These were purpose-built centres with the same kind of shopping mix as traditional city centres, although with vast amounts of free car parking. In Britain planning policies had traditionally discouraged such developments, to protect

established centres. The first such scheme, an 0.79 million gross square feet centre at Brent Cross in north-west London (opened in 1976) was allowed only because it would not damage existing centres.

The prospects for out-of-town malls improved during the 1980s, especially those urban regeneration areas which had good road links (Middleton, 1991; Goobey, 1992). Relaxed planning controls in the EZs and UDCs reduced the ability of local planning authorities with established shopping centres to stop such developments. Moreover this deregulation came at the same time as easy consumer credit was intensifying the demand for new shopping space. The first of the new wave was the Gateshead MetroCentre (1.36 million gross square feet) in the Tyneside EZ, created by local developer John Hall, and opened in 1986. Other large schemes (over 1 million square feet each) were Merry Hill, in the Dudley EZ, and Meadowhall in the Sheffield UDC area, both opened in 1990. Like the MetroCentre they were also brainchildren of local entrepreneurs (the Richardson brothers and Eddie Healey, respectively).

A fourth example, also opened in 1990, was Lakeside in Thurrock, Essex. Although not at the time in a regeneration area, it was built on a derelict site close to the M25 motorway and presaged what became the major regeneration project of the following decades, the Thames Gateway. By the end of the 1980s many similar malls were being proposed but the recession and a re-tightening of planning controls killed off most and delayed the remainder for several years.



Figure 8.5 The property-led urban regeneration of the 1980s weakened traditional planning concerns to protect established retailing areas (evident in Figure 7.4). Several American-style, out-of-town shopping centres appeared, such as here at Meadowhall, opened in 1990 in the Lower Don Valley, Sheffield's former steel belt.

Office development

The 1980s saw a huge growth in the financial sector as exchange controls were removed (Diamond, 1991). The 1986 'Big Bang' deregulated London financial dealings and introduced electronic trading. In turn this growth triggered a huge office development boom, especially in London, following the abolition of office development permits in 1979. Docklands and other inner-city areas were marketed as new office centres, with rents well below those of city centres. Nearly 9 million square feet of office space, much of it high quality, was started in the LDDC area between 1988 and 1990 alone. Typically, however, there had been little strategic thought about the relationship of these new developments to existing central business districts. As with retailing, the presumption was that the developer knew best; planning in any wider sense was not deemed necessary.

Canary Wharf

Nowhere illustrated this more graphically than Canary Wharf in Docklands (*Building*, 1991; Goobey, 1992). The proposal was conceived in the mid-1980s by American G. Ware ('Gee Whizz') Travelstead, but taken over in 1987 by Canadian developers Olympia and York (O & Y), headed by the Reichmann brothers. Benefiting doubly from a location in both the LDDC and the Docklands EZ, 10.5 million lettable square feet of office space were proposed. It was nothing less than the establishment of an office centre to rival the City of London itself. Fresh from huge successes on a comparable development at Battery Park in New York, the Reichmanns were able to do what Travelstead never could: establish the financial credibility of the scheme. The first two phases, including the 50-storey centrepiece tower, took shape in 1987–90, during the heady post-'Big Bang' years.



Figure 8.6 Canary Wharf was another monument to the weakening of traditional planning controls. Developed as a huge new office centre in the London docklands, its postmodern design looked back to the classically-inspired boosterist aesthetic of American 'City Beautiful' planning and provided London with a striking new landmark tower.

Unfortunately, the boom had evaporated when the buildings were finished in 1991. The City of London also had not idly accepted its new rival and had in the meantime sanctioned major new office developments (particularly the huge Broadgate scheme) (Diamond, 1991). By 1991, there were some 2 million square feet of vacant office space in the City so that the rent advantage of Canary Wharf's off-centre location had diminished. Quite apart from the reduced demand for new office space, potential tenants were also still worried about poor transport links. The capacity of the DLR was inadequate and the Jubilee Line extension was still awaited (dependent in fact on O & Y's contributions from their rental income on the first phases of Canary Wharf). Not even the legendary Reichmanns were able to overcome this combination of problems and the development, still largely empty, went into receivership in 1992, awaiting the next boom.

Housing

Another important contrast with previous inner-city policies was in housing. The shift to attracting business activity meant less emphasis on housing (Potter, 1990). By 1992 only about 25,000 dwellings had been completed or started in all the UDCs combined. There was also little interest in social housing. New council house building dwindled to practically nothing. Private housing developers became dominant, in some cases taking over older council housing for refurbishment and disposal. Residential development was undertaken like other developments, to make profits. Once initial developer reluctance was overcome, often with free or very cheap land, a new inner-city housing market was created, based on the affluent, childless middle classes. UDCs, especially the LDDC, and local councils such as Salford were heavily criticized for subsidizing 'yuppie' housing and neglecting the poor of the inner city. Moreover, this new housing market also proved very fragile when the property market fell, especially in London (Brownill, 1990b). It was becoming a familiar story.

Changing city centres

Central area anxieties

A key feature of 1980s' inner-city regeneration was the lack of consideration of wider impacts. Yet adjoining areas, particularly city centres, were clearly affected by both decline in the inner cities and subsequent efforts aimed at their regeneration and diversification. The introduction of major commercial and retailing activities into urban regeneration areas during the 1980s began to threaten traditional central area roles. There were also understandable fears of a much more general Thatcherite deregulation of planning controls to allow extensive decentralization of major retailing and offices. The example of American cities with their declining centres – the 'hole in the doughnut' – did not go unnoticed (Davies and Champion, 1982; Law et al., 1988; Healey et al., 1989).

But there were also other, more positive effects of regeneration efforts in some cities. The prevailing property emphasis of much urban regeneration meant that some initiatives blurred into the city centres (Law, 1992). Thus Birmingham during the 1980s conceived an ambitious scheme for the north-west fringes of its city centre, creating a new convention and cultural quarter, begun in 1986 (Cherry, 1994). The mini-UDCs for Central Manchester and Leeds (Roberts and Whitney, 1993) also promoted development in the equivalent areas of their cities, building on earlier local initiatives. Overall, though, the late 1970s and 1980s were marked more by a re-orientation of planning thinking about central areas rather than, as yet, large-scale changes.

Exploiting area heritage

There were some signs, however, of what was to come. To address the underlying threats, city-centre planners began to widen their horizons (Bianchini et al., 1988). There was greater exploitation of the historical and cultural associations of central areas. In the big cities, conservation and adaptive reuse became the typical pattern for new shopping and commercial developments. Thus, in contrast to Manchester's earlier purpose-built Arndale Centre, it was the restoration of the redundant Royal Exchange and its conversion to shopping and theatre use, the restoration of the Victorian arcades and the creation of the GMEX exhibition centre from the defunct Central Station that set the pattern for 1980s' change (Healey et al., 1989). Leeds also made much more of its Victorian buildings, refurbishing and extending its arcade complex, converting the Corn Exchange and retaining façades in new developments. The pattern was similar in Glasgow and Bristol (Punter, 1991; Jones and Patrick, 1992). In contrast, however, the City of London saw another round of entirely new major developments, notably at Broadgate, prompted by the removal of the Office Development Permit (ODP) and 'Big Bang' (Diamond, 1991; Goobey, 1992).

Promoting new central area activities

Heritage also became a way of introducing new activities into central areas, especially leisure and tourism (Middleton, 1991). Manchester's Castlefields urban heritage park was a notable pioneer, but the trend was general. The renewal, largely through conservation, of dock areas close to the centres of cities as varied as Liverpool, Hull and Gloucester became an important element in the reinvigoration of the centres themselves, very much on the Baltimore and Boston pattern. We have already noted Birmingham's efforts to raise its profile as a convention (and cultural) venue. Another widespread trend was that to encourage a modest reversal of the long-term decline in central area residential population with the creation of new housing, often in converted warehouses or similar, as in Glasgow's 'Merchant City' (Jones and Patrick, 1992).

Public transport and city centres

Urban public transport had been noticeably worsened by the undermining of the 1970s' cheap fares policies of South Yorkshire, Lothian, the GLC and other authorities and the deregulation of bus services under the 1985 Transport Act (Hill, 1986; Pickup et al., 1991). Many city centres in the late 1980s became cluttered with old buses offering confusing services and adding directly to air pollution. The environmental benefits to central Newcastle of the only major urban public transport investment of these years, the Tyneside Metro, were compromised. The bigger picture was the continuing shift to the car. Yet central areas could never compete with the growing numbers of out-of-town developments for car-based access. This brought the beginnings of moves to improve public transport and pedestrian circulation in central areas. Britain's cities belatedly started to recognize the benefits of large-scale pedestrianization of existing streets. Leeds (and the smaller city of Norwich) had been the British pioneers in the later 1960s. Yet it was not until the mid-1980s that the traditionally pro-car city of Birmingham began to contemplate extensive closures of major central streets (Cherry, 1994). Manchester also started to pedestrianize significant areas, initially around the historic St Ann's quarter. Even more dramatic moves came in the late 1980s when a new light rail 'supertram' system was begun for the city. This had tremendous potential both for city-centre development and environmental improvement. In this field, as more generally, the continued health of central areas depended on ever more imaginative approaches.

ACCEPTING REGIONAL IMBALANCE?

The erosion of regional assistance**The north–south divide**

As we have seen, the shift to urban regeneration occurred against a background of cuts in mainstream local spending. Established approaches to spatial economic development also suffered. Regional planning virtually disappeared and regional aid was sharply curtailed from 1977, especially during the 1980s, when it was halved in real terms (Townroe and Martin, 1992). This was despite worsening unemployment everywhere, but especially in the traditional depressed areas. In 1986, the worst year of the decade, Scotland recorded 13.3 per cent unemployment, Wales 13.5 per cent, the north west 13.7 per cent, the north 15.3 per cent and Northern Ireland 17 per cent. Yet even a former prosperous area such as the west midlands was now, at 12.9 per cent, significantly above the UK average of 11.1 per cent. Contrasting with an ‘economic miracle’ in the south, there was much public discussion of a ‘north–south divide’, expressed in wealth, well-being, politics, culture and even diet (Lewis and Townsend, 1989; Balchin, 1990). But post-1979 governments, consistent with their general philosophy, put little faith in regional policies.

Regional policies and planning, 1974–79

The impact was all the more profound because Labour, at least until 1977, had managed to maintain its traditional strong commitment to regional policies (which largely aided the very regions where it was strongest). Initially Labour enhanced the already elaborate regional aid structure that it inherited from the Conservatives in 1974 (McKay and Cox, 1979). The downturn began in 1977, a product of wider public expenditure restraint and a growing recognition of the new spatial policy paradigm of the inner city. The latter cut across the traditional thrust of regional policies, which had tended to encourage outer-city developments in the assisted regions. But this new concern was still quite minor by 1979, limited mainly to a partial reversal of the Location of Offices Bureau’s traditional concern to promote dispersal from the cores of big cities. These changes were sufficient, though, to prompt the pessimistic but prescient comment from an academic commentator that ‘a consensus of nearly fifty years in the making is probably collapsing’ (McCallum, 1979, p. 38).

The Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies

Yet a very significant reinforcement of regional policies had come with the creation of a partial framework for more interventionist economic planning at regional level. We saw in the last chapter how the National Enterprise Board (NEB) was conceived in 1975 as the centrepiece of Labour’s national economic strategy. NEB was also intended to have a specifically regional development function within England, although this withered with the wider strategy (Holland, 1976). More enduring were the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies (SDA and WDA), also created under the 1975 Act (Wannop, 1984; Balchin, 1990). These were conceived as executive economic development agencies for the two most distinctive ‘regions’ within Britain.

The claims for special treatment reflected the growth since the 1960s of active separatist sentiments in both the Celtic nations of Britain (Parsons, 1986). This peaked in 1976–79 as the Labour government attempted to meet nationalist sentiment halfway with proposals for

devolution of power to Edinburgh and Cardiff (Glasson, 1978). It was a solution that satisfied few and failed to gain sufficient support in the 1979 referenda, so was never implemented. But the devolution question reminded politicians of the distinctiveness of Britain's subordinated nations. The SDA and WDA became the enduring legacy of this awareness, allowing more unified approaches to economic development that have survived even the Thatcher era. As bodies that played key roles in spatial economic development and urban regeneration in the 1980s, they promised and, in SDA's case, delivered a rather more integrated and strategic quality to planning than was apparent in England (Donnison and Middleton, 1987; Boyle, 1988; Hague, 1990). The WDA proved more opportunistic, though not so much as to negate all the advantages of the development agency model (Lewis, 1992; Morgan and Henderson, 1997).

The end of negative regional controls, 1979–81

Most of the key changes to regional policy after 1979 were quick to appear (Balchin, 1990). As noted earlier, the office development permit, introduced in 1965 to encourage regional dispersal of offices, was immediately jettisoned. The Location of Offices Bureau continued to play its changed promotional role until it too was abolished in 1981. The industrial development certificate (IDC), one of the linchpins of post-war regional policy, was also suspended in the same year and finally abolished under the Housing and Planning Act 1986. The certificate had allowed national control over the location of factory building, intended to discourage new factories in the buoyant areas. Now growing unemployment throughout the country, notably in parts of the generally prosperous south, had made it increasingly difficult to countenance IDC refusals. Between 1975 and 1981 there had been only 28 refusals out of some 7,000 applications. It had also become very easy to evade the controls by using existing vacant premises, which became easier to find as economic change intensified.

New policies for regional aid

More significant than the loss of the negative controls was the reduction in regional assistance. The Thatcherites had little economic faith in regional aid (Parsons, 1986). Consistent with their overall philosophy, they saw market forces as the long-term solution to regional problems and saw no reason why they should indefinitely subsidize industry to move to areas of cheap labour. Policy, in this view, fulfilled an essentially short-term, residual role, with social rather than economic objectives. They preferred to see areas marketing themselves for new investment rather than being feather-bedded by generous regional grants. The reality was a good deal more pragmatic than the philosophy, especially when a nationally important investment such as the Japanese car company Nissan was being pursued in 1981–85, but the ideals were certainly reflected in actual policy changes.

A changed pattern of regional aid

In 1982 and 1984 important changes were made to the structure of regional assistance (DTI, 1984). The 1982 alterations dramatically reduced the extent of the assisted areas. The result was that they included only 27.5 per cent of the working population compared to 44 per cent in 1978. Yet the established assisted area categories of Special Development, Development and Intermediate Areas were retained, for the moment at least. There was, however, some acknowledgement of the changed economic circumstances of former prosperous areas in the midlands as the steel closure area of Corby received Intermediate status. The changes of 1984

went much further, abolishing the Special Development Areas to leave just two categories, although the total assisted area was increased to cover 35 per cent of the working population. This apparent paradox reflected the granting of Intermediate Area status to the economically depressed and politically sensitive west midlands. The significance of this was, however, outweighed by the generally reduced eligibility for automatic grants and much greater emphasis on selective assistance.

The European Regional Development Fund

In contrast to the shrinking UK commitment to regional policies, the European Community's Regional Development Fund (ERDF) has grown markedly since it was formed in 1975 (Mackay, 1992). Its objectives were the redress of regional imbalances, assisting areas of serious industrial decline and structural change in agriculture and combating unemployment. Reflecting the extent of change in its economy during the 1980s, the UK did rather well out of the ERDF. Between 1984 and 1987, for example, it received nearly 606 million ECU (roughly £420 million), compared to West Germany's 102 million. Only the larger countries of southern Europe, Italy and Spain, with their extensive residual rural poverty, did better. In theory, ERDF assistance was based on the principle of 'additionality'. This involved substituting European in place of national aid for approved schemes, with the intention that national aid would then go towards additional projects. The principle was, however, rather difficult to enforce and became something of a charade. Despite increasing protests, UK governments in the 1980s used European monies simply as a way to cut national spending on regional aid.

The disappearance of regional planning

Planning the south east

Yet at least regional assistance survived. Regional planning shrank during the 1970s, as growth and public-spending projections withered, and was then all but abolished in the 1980s (Hall, 1989, 1992). The plans for the most populous region, the south east, focus of so much planning attention in the 1960s (MHLG, 1964; SEEPC, 1967), were subject to successive downward revisions in the later 1970s (SEJPT, 1970, 1976). On each occasion the documents became more slender. By 1978 it was being dealt with in just 37 pages (DoE, 1978). Yet this was nothing compared to the 1980s, when a series of three ministerial letters in 1980, 1984 and 1986 were supposed to cover it all. Collected together as a Planning Policy Guidance Note they amounted to just nine A4 pages (PPG9, 1988). It had, of course, very little to do with established ideas of regional planning as a reconciliation of varied sectional interests. This was peremptory direction from the centre. The only non-central planning input was heard through SERPLAN, a non-statutory agency maintained by local authorities to give the region a voice. It was all a far cry from true regional planning.

The other regions

Although the south east had important peculiarities, the pattern was broadly similar in the other English regions. The Regional Economic Planning Councils, forged in the white heat of the 1960s' technological revolution, had always been denied real importance by established local and central governmental interests. Yet they had done some useful work in formulating thinking about regional development, especially in the 1960s. To the incoming Thatcher

government they were, however, expendable and were abolished in 1979 (Cullingworth, 1988). Along with the abolition of the metropolitan counties, the weakening of the planning role of the non-metropolitan counties and the erosion of structure plans, it amounted to the abandonment of all pretence of regional planning. Only Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales were able to maintain some regional planning coherence, a legacy of the abortive 1970s' devolution debates. Some English regions (such as the west midlands) fared better than others, reflecting locally orchestrated collaboration rather than any real central encouragement. In 1990, though, came some small signs of change. *This Common Inheritance* (DoE et al., 1990) and PPG15 (1990) promised a more sympathetic approach to regional guidance, although this was only achieved in the post-Thatcher years.

The need for regional planning

The general retreat from strategic regional planning was all the more remarkable when set against the dramatic urban and regional economic changes of these years (Hall, 1989). As we have seen, the primary response of the Thatcher governments was to encourage a local patchwork of economic promotion and regeneration, with no overall strategic planning framework to give coherence (Brindley et al., 1989). Localized place marketing took over from regional planning. The spectacle of Docklands competing as an office centre with the City of London arose because strategic planning policies had been removed. Meanwhile outer-city areas, especially in the south, were facing formidable growth pressures that showed no signs of abating. There were major infrastructure developments, including the completion of the M25 London orbital motorway in 1986, the continued growth of the region's international airports and the starting of the Channel Tunnel. Had this been the 1960s, regional planning studies would certainly have been commissioned to devise strategies to address these diverse regional needs and pressures. Yet, as we have seen, the spirit of Thatcherism proved allergic to such devices.

DECENTRALIZATION AFTER THE NEW TOWNS

The end of the New Town programme

New Towns and inner cities, 1976–79

In the absence of real regional planning strategies, the accommodation of outer-city growth pressures became one of the most vexed planning questions of the 1980s. The traditional response had been to create New Towns, or major expansions of existing towns. These solutions had fallen from grace by the 1980s. The first shift came in 1976, when Peter Shore's new concern for the inner city brought a questioning of the role of New Towns (Aldridge, 1979). Shore clearly acknowledged that inner-city decline could not be blamed on the New Towns, because the major part of metropolitan decentralization went elsewhere. But he had serious doubts as to whether the New Towns could be any long-term part of a solution to the newly identified problem. Reflecting this new mood, the already designated (but barely started) Glasgow New Town of Stonehouse was abandoned and its expertise diverted into the new GEAR inner-city project. Further south, the proposed new city of Maplin in Essex ('Heathograd' as Crosland dubbed it) had been quietly dropped, along with the airport that would have provided its *raison d'être* (Hall, 1980).

New Towns and Thatcherism

Apart from these shifts, Shore contented himself with trimming the ultimate targets of the New Towns. The Thatcher administrations, while fully sharing the new inner-city focus, also saw the New Towns as profitable, publicly-owned plums ripe for privatization (Hebbert, 1992). They accelerated the winding up of the remaining development corporations. Traditionally, the assets of the development corporations had gone to the Commission for the New Towns. Yet this too was eventually to be wound up, under the New Towns and Urban Development Corporations Act 1985. Valuable commercial assets were progressively sold off and private developers took on increasing importance in completing the unfinished New Towns.

The changing New Towns

Meanwhile existing tenants began to become owner-occupiers, a process which predated, but was greatly encouraged by, Mrs Thatcher's 'right-to-buy' legislation of 1980. In the south particularly, the public housing emphasis which had from the outset characterized New Towns was finally shed. This change highlighted a broader process of upward social mobility among New Town residents which had begun when they (or their parents) sought to better themselves by moving from London. Given early perceptions of the New Towns as Labour-voting enclaves in Conservative shire counties, it is ironic that it was the New Town (or former New Town, as it was now termed) of Basildon that was widely held, by the late 1980s, to most epitomize Thatcherite values.



Figure 8.7 Stockley Park, near Heathrow Airport, was one of the new generation of 1980s' business parks, bridging the traditional divide between industry and office activities. It was developed on a former derelict site abutting the inner edge of the metropolitan green belt and offered a superb environment, designed to attract prestige companies.

After the New Towns

The pressures for outer-city development

The disappearance of a formal need for public overspill housing following slum clearance and redevelopment in inner cities did not diminish private developer pressures for additional housing land in outer-city areas, especially in the south. Migration from the bigger cities continued, but the main pressures now arose from the demographic and economic buoyancy of the outer cities themselves (Herington, 1984). Household formation rates in rural counties surrounding major metropolitan areas were appreciably higher than elsewhere. Job growth was also higher as new 'high-tech' manufacturing and service industries developed in these same areas (Phillips, 1993). Symptomatic were Cambridge Science Park in the 1970s (Carter and Watts, 1984) and Aztec West business park, close to the M4/M5 junction near Bristol, in the 1980s. Another example was Stockley Park, abutting the green belt near London's Heathrow Airport (SPCL, c.1992).

Accommodating growth

The problem, especially severe for a Conservative government whose main support came from these very areas, was how to accommodate all this growth. The 1970 'Strategic Plan for the South East', reflecting the 1960s' commitment to active regional planning, had identified several important areas. These were being built on through the late 1970s and 1980s, but it was clear that more were needed. Without major growth areas being identified, the solution inevitably involved piecemeal development around existing settlements, putting strain on existing infrastructures and services.

It was a solution which spread the misery and the political damage. County and increasingly district councils, the latter becoming a more powerful local voice in 1980s' planning, frequently railed against growth projections and sought to allocate less development land. The housebuilders' organizations were quick to press the opposite view with equal vigour (Rydin, 1986). Not surprisingly, therefore, Mrs Thatcher's Environment Secretaries contemplated planning solutions which concentrated development where they felt it was appropriate. Large developments required more preliminary work and investment before building could start but, in the long run, they were more profitable for the housebuilders. This therefore offered the possibility of securing private provision of infrastructure, services and amenities through planning agreements. Inevitably, though, growing reliance on these methods strengthened the overall influence of the private developer on the planning process, compared with the traditional reliance on public-sector provision.

Large private developments

A perceptible shift towards private new settlements began during the later 1970s, for example at South Woodham Ferrers in Essex, developed from 1975 for a population of 17,500 (Neale, 1984; Hebbert, 1992). The hand of planning was still relatively strong here. The land was originally owned by the county council and provision of roads, public sites, etc., was undertaken conventionally, by the usual public agencies. The first large example of a more completely developer-oriented approach was at Lower Earley, adjoining Reading, in the growth corridor along the M4 motorway (Healey et al., 1982; Hall, 1989; Ward, 1999). The broad decision to develop Lower Earley actually came from early 1970s' regional planning. Yet the manner of its detailed planning and implementation made it the harbinger of a new approach. Over 6,000 dwellings were built between 1977 and the early 1990s by a consortium



Figure 8.8 Lower Earley emerged from 1970s' regional planning proposals for a growth area around Reading, yet as the largest single private-sector housing development in the UK, it presaged a new, more developer-led approach to new settlement building, laying much of the basis for the ill-starred Consortium Developments initiative. The photograph shows part of the south-eastern corner of the development.

of private builders, on land entirely owned by them. The negotiated planning gain amounted to 8 per cent of the selling price of the houses, used to finance roads and leisure facilities, along with land gifts for open space and preferential options for school sites.

'Heseltown'

Development had already begun when, in 1980, Michael Heseltine forced Berkshire to find land for 8,000 extra houses in its structure plan (Short et al., 1986; Short et al., 1987). The fiercely contested target area for most of these dwellings, north of Bracknell, was quickly dubbed 'Heseltown', although local resistance prevented it from becoming reality. Instead, the county attempted to meet some of the new housing requirement, at least in the short term, by accelerating development at Lower Earley. And when critics looked for a tangible example of what Thatcherite principles might mean for the outer city, for a real 'Heseltown', it was invariably Lower Earley they chose, despite its pre-Thatcher origins.

Consortium Developments Ltd

The next step was completely developer-initiated private new towns (Ward, 1992a). It was in 1983, at the high point of Thatcherism, that the main private housebuilders formed Consortium Developments Ltd (CDL). Their intention, through CDL, was to build new, relatively self-contained, country towns of at least 5,000 dwellings, with employment and social amenities (Lock, 1989; Northfield, 1989; Hebbert, 1992). There was no regional planning direction in the location of the intended settlements. They arose, as RTPI President Francis Tibbalds put it in a 1988 Channel 4 television programme, from 'rather opportunistic developers waving chequebooks at farmers' (*Dispatches*, 'The Battle for Stone Bassett').

The intention was a variant of the formula Ebenezer Howard had advocated: buying land cheaply, nearer agricultural than usual development land values, then benefiting by both economies of scale and the rise in land values that followed development. Unlike Howard, however, much of the betterment would be retained by the developers rather than being

passed to the community, although infrastructure and public facilities were to be provided by the developer as planning gain. The problem, from CDL's point of view, lay in the traditionally obstructive potential of planning. CDL made the mistake of entirely believing Thatcherite rhetoric about deregulation. It took them some time (and much money) before they realized their mistake. Over the next few years CDL initiated proposals to build four new towns: in Essex ('Tillingham Hall'), Hampshire ('Foxley Wood'), Oxfordshire ('Stone Bassett') and Cambridgeshire ('Westmere').




Figure 8.9 'Westmere', near Cambridge, was the last of Consortium Developments' attempts to promote a new country town. Despite sympathy from Cambridgeshire planners, the proposal was rejected following an inquiry in 1991.

The fate of the new country towns

'Tillingham Hall', in the London green belt, was rejected by Nicholas Ridley (Herington, 1989). He made it clear, though, even in his refusal, that he strongly sympathized with the concept of new, privately developed settlements, a view elaborated in several DoE statements during his tenure. With supreme irony, the third of these proposals, Stone Bassett, was in the constituency of Michael Heseltine, then out of office. Predictably neither he nor his constituents wanted to see another 'Heseltown' in their backyards. He and Ridley fought publicly over the issue in 1988, personalizing the essential planning dilemma of 1980s' Conservatism, between the enterprise culture and 'nimbyism'. For a time, in 1989, it seemed that enterprise had won the day.

The real breakthrough for the developers seemed to come on the second proposal, Foxley Wood. The area was, in Ridley's own words, 'hardly a jewel of the English countryside' (Ridley, 1992, p. 116) and he provisionally approved CDL's proposal, in July 1989. Approval was short-lived, however, as the pendulum swung sharply in favour of green issues and the Conservative 'turquoise tendency'. Within a few months his successor, Chris Patten, had overturned the decision. Stone Bassett (and, slightly later, Westmere) also suffered rejection. Overall CDL's new country towns were a provocative but failed 1980s' experiment.

Other private new settlements

Developers did, however, achieve some success in less pressured locations where local authorities were more amenable (Amos, 1991). In 1987, for example, a consortium of housebuilders (many also CDL members) began building Bradley Stoke on the outskirts of Bristol. This was a very large peripheral expansion of some 8,500 dwellings (approximately 20,000 population) adjoining Aztec West business park and with some other local employment, public services and facilities. In Essex, a development of about 5,000 dwellings was approved in 1987 on former chalk pits at Chafford Hundred in Grays. But large green-field developments in the south east were more difficult to steer through local opposition. Brenthall Park (now Church Langley) was also approved in 1987, to provide 3,500 dwellings on the edge of Harlow. (Even after their original areas were built up, the former New and Expanded Towns have continued to be relatively soft locations for additional large developments). In general, though, private new towns (or anything approaching them) were a spectre more than a reality. They remained a sign of what might have been if Thatcherite commitment to enterprise and deregulation really had ousted traditional Conservative faith in regulatory planning in the outer cities.

PLANNED CONTAINMENT

Green belts: the exception to Thatcherism?

The expansion of green belts

The most obvious evidence that this tradition remained relatively unscathed was the increased dominance of green-belt policies (Elson, 1986, 1993; DoE, 1993). From being merely a sacred cow of planning in the 1950s and 1960s, the green belt became a supreme deity in the 1970s and 1980s. The amount of approved green belt increased dramatically as structure plans were approved (PPG2, 1988). In 1974 there had been 14,468 square kilometres subject to green-belt policies in England, although only 6,928 were actually approved. By 1989 the approved area had grown to 15,485 square kilometres. Most of this increase reflected the extension of

existing approved or outline green belts, embracing more settlements in outer metropolitan areas. Distinctively, new green belts were added around the north-east Lancashire towns, Lancaster, the Fylde Coast and Burton-on-Trent, however. Taken together, approved green belts amounted to some 13 per cent of the area of England.

In Scotland, a 1,000 square kilometre Glasgow greenbelt (*sic*) was approved in the 1980 Strathclyde Structure Plan (Elson and MacDonald, 1997). Much larger and more continuous than that previously approved, it finally fulfilled the promise of the 1946 Clyde Valley Plan. Yet the Scottish conception of the green belt remained slightly different from the English one, its symbolic status not quite so exalted. Dundee actually abandoned its formal green belt in 1978, seeing fit to manage the urban fringe through countryside protection policies. Even for Scotland this was a singular perspective, however. Virtually everywhere in the UK green belts or quasi-green belts were in the ascendant. In Wales, for example, Clwyd's 'green chains' were an important new initiative. Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, Belfast's 'stopline', established in the mid-1960s, was upgraded to a fully-fledged green belt (Murray, 1992).

Attempts to erode the green belt, 1983–84

Yet this overall trend of expansion concealed a serious attempt by the second Thatcher government to loosen the grip of the green belt. It was part of the wider Thatcherite project to give greater freedom to the private developer. The agent of this was the then Environment Secretary, Patrick Jenkin (Elson, 1986). In 1983 he issued draft circulars on the green belt and housing land. These were far from being an overt frontal assault on green belts. An innocent reader, unused to the coded nature of the public discussions of such politically sensitive issues, might easily have assumed they were offering unswerving support for the green belt.

In fact the circulars were advocating a loosening of green-belt boundaries. As Jenkin himself said, 'they must not be pulled so tightly that there is no room left for development in the future' (Jenkin, 1984, p. 17). Yet to urban-fringe Tory MPs and conservation lobbies such as the Council for the Protection of Rural England, this was the thin end of a very fat wedge. Certainly the creation of CDL in 1983 (noted above) suggested that the major private housebuilders were preparing to move into the urban fringe in a big way. Jenkin was forced to retreat, with lasting damage to his political career. The final circulars in 1984 duly sustained the sense of certainty and permanence which had been such a key feature of green belts since their inception.

The significance of the retreat

The truth was that many politicians (and planners, for that matter) would have dearly loved to have a more flexible interpretation of green-belt policies, with less sense of them merely as a 'stopper' of development. Yet no subsequent minister was foolish enough to repeat Jenkin's mistake of trying to do something about it. Even Ridley, often seen as an enemy of the green belt, largely respected it in practice. The political realities were stated with great clarity by a junior Environment Minister of the mid-1980s, William Waldegrave:

You would need a brave and confident minister to try and change the policy now, to point out that there is actually a lot of derelict land in the Green Belts, so why do we not try and create something attractive instead of, for instance, these terrible old gravel pits. The trouble is, everybody believes this would be seized upon as a wonderfully convenient opening by the developers. It's like the First World War: any movement might produce a huge collapse. So it has become almost impossible to change it. (Porritt and Winner, 1988, pp. 83–4)




Figure 8.10 Following Patrick Jenkin's ill-judged moves to relax green-belt policies in 1983–84, they became progressively more entrenched during the rest of the decade, surviving all deregulatory impulses. The challenge for the 1990s became to make them into something that is more than just a 'stopper', with a more positive role in strategic planning and the promotion of sustainable development.

In a wider sense, 1983–84 saw the first real sign of the limits to Thatcherite deregulation of planning, at least when it applied to the outer cities.

New justifications for containment

Green belts, the green movement and compact cities

Although scarcely needed, more support for the traditional conception of the green belt as a ‘stopper’ came from the strengthening green movement of the 1980s. As we noted in the last chapter, green sympathies flourished on the interface between narrow ‘nimby’ sentiments and growing awareness of wider global issues. They allowed an aura of spurious radicalism to surround the contented society of the outer cities, defending not just their own backyards but the altogether grander notion of ‘the environment’ from the incursions of the builder. To the more committed greens, the green belt gave a glimpse of planning at its best, stopping the sprawling city. More authoritative reinforcement for these views came as the new decade began. The European Commission (CEC, 1990a, 1990b), Friends of the Earth and the Policy Studies Institute (Elkin et al., 1991) pressed the case for compact cities (Dantzig and Saaty, 1973). The call was to become much stronger in the post-Thatcher years.

Green belts and urban regeneration

The most important formal addition to green-belt policies in the 1980s was to assist inner-city regeneration. Effectively this became part of policy from 1980, although the 1984 green-belt circular gave it formal status (Elson, 1986). It was further reiterated in PPG2, *Green Belts*, published in 1988. The logic was that harsh restriction of land availability in the urban fringe would force developers to use ‘brownfield’ land (a newly-introduced term for previously developed land) in the inner city. This was a politically neat solution, since it united inner- and outer-city authorities in defence of the green belt. It also gave a veneer of coherence that bound together the promotional planning of the inner city and the negative planning of the outer city. Yet the link was valid only to the extent that inner-city problems could be solved within the existing urban cores.

The lack of strategic planning for containment

In practice only a very small part of total housing demand could at that time be met in the inner cities (although this has risen sharply since 1990). More importantly, many new sources of employment demand locational characteristics found only in the urban fringe. Major international airports, the most potent employment generators of recent years, provide a general example of this (not contradicted, incidentally, by the very small London City airport in the LDDC area). More specific instances were Birmingham’s National Exhibition Centre and the Nissan car plant at Washington, Tyne and Wear. Both were ‘flagship’ investments of immense symbolic and actual importance for local and regional economies. Both involved major relaxations of green-belt policies, sought by urban local authorities for developments of major economic importance.

While maintaining a formal commitment to tight green-belt policies, urban authorities facing major regeneration tasks have tried to be pragmatic in practice. We can readily concede that complete abandonment of the green belt would certainly have made it more difficult to regenerate the inner city, simply because it would have allowed extensive urban-fringe development. Yet, as we have seen, this has never been a realistic option. The more typical

question has not been whether a tight green belt might deflect development to the inner city, as intended, but would it push development beyond the green belt or choke it off completely. A more convincing response would have been to strengthen the strategic and regional planning dimensions of urban containment, something which 1980s' governments conspicuously failed to do (DoE, 1993).

OVERVIEW

Taken overall, urban planning's evolution during these years reinforces the broad conclusions of the last chapter. There were some important continuities, especially in urban containment policy, but economic and political changes had palpable effects on other policy areas. They were particularly evident in the inner cities, which both bore the brunt of economic change and hosted the most radical Thatcherite planning experiments. The demise of traditional regional policies and planned decentralization also reflected economic changes, although there was much that was also politically motivated. It is difficult to imagine policies in these fields following quite the same path after 1979 had there been a Labour or coalition government. Overall, the consistent political antipathy to coherent strategic planning remains the strongest impression of these years. The decline of economic optimism and certainty played a part in the retreat from strategy, but it would still have been possible for governments to have pursued a more comprehensive and coherent approach. The weakening and fragmentation of planning was a matter of political choice at least as much as of economic predetermination.

The effects of this broader political choice were felt further down the line. In contrast to the importance of officials and professionals during the 1960s, when planning actions had rested much more on agreed general principles, policies in the 1980s became far more reliant on politicians than was usual in the post-war period. The detailed shaping of planning policies also became much more obviously political in a wider sense. In the urban fringe and outer cities, many planning battles became undisguised tussles between developers and 'nimby'/environmental lobbies. They were often resolved by political pragmatism rather than through broader planning principles. In the urban cores (and what remained of the assisted regions), developers and investors found themselves freer to shape urban and regional change. Overall, therefore, planners found themselves forced to become active promoters of development (in the inner cities and the assisted regions) or rather ineffective umpires (in the urban fringe and outer cities). Either way they had become mere extras on the sidelines in a confused and disjointed narrative in which others had the best lines and seemed to get the glory. But the story, and planners' part in it, were about to change, if not dramatically then at least in ways that planners found easier to welcome.

9

A New Consensus? – Planning since 1990

Even the most ardent Thatcherites had begun by 1990 to see planning as more than a bureaucratic drain on enterprise. In its final months, Mrs Thatcher's last administration showed itself eager to flaunt its environmental credentials. This change in governmental mood increased the salience of planning. After the ideological onslaughts of the 1980s, planners could now feel themselves part of a new, almost visionary, project to promote 'sustainable development'. This recently coined (and vaguely defined) term came into increasingly common use in professional and political circles during the 1990s. It seemed to promise a return to a more holistic and comprehensive planning approach in contrast to the fragmentation of the previous decade.

This chapter shows how political changes after 1990 reinforced this growing optimism among British planners. Yet the legacy, positive and negative, of the 1980s remained profound. This expressed itself in an enduring concern with enhancing competitiveness in an increasingly globalized economy. Public spending, in pre-Thatcher days one of the main tools available to implement plans, remained severely constrained, at least until the early years of the new century. Planners still had to try to achieve their goals by working with an overwhelmingly private-sector led development process. The public interest, in other words, still had to be sought by largely private means.

Nowhere was this more apparent than in the big cities where the demonstration projects of the 1980s had forged a new orthodoxy of urban regeneration. During the 1990s, however, the crude imperatives of property development were softened by growing interest in social issues and design quality. The newer interest in sustainable development also strengthened the cause of regenerating cities by encouraging the reuse of previously developed brownfield sites. It also buttressed historic commitments to urban containment and green belts. There were, though, increasing worries over the predicted housing deficit. Eventually, this brought grudging recognition that not all housing needs could be met by brownfield development. The result put large-scale green-field developments back on the planning agenda by the early 2000s. In some cases these were peripheral urban expansions, but around London bigger actions were needed. Meanwhile, it was at the regional level that the moves towards a new coherence bore the most obvious fruit, as new agencies appeared and new powers were promised. Even so, the tendency to compartmentalize planning did not end, especially within central government. As previously, however, these changes within planning need to be understood in a wider context.

THE POST-THATCHER ERA

The economic and social context**A strong economy?**

Viewed in the longer term, the most striking feature of Britain at this time was its remarkable economic strength (GBONS, 2001; www.economist.co.uk). Quite how much individual Britons benefited from this perception depended on their own rather divergent experiences. By 2001, service industries accounted for 77.1 per cent of all UK jobs while manufacturing had shrunk to a mere 14.1 per cent. To an extent that many commentators found worrying (or at least distasteful), Britain's growth was now disproportionately dependent on rising house prices and relentless consumption funded by easy credit. Measuring the health of the economy by its manufacturing exports was a notion that now belonged to another age.

Yet growth, whatever its source, was still growth. Despite a downturn in the early 1990s, Britain during these years largely shed its old reputation as weakest among the advanced economies. Now, with the USA, it consistently boasted one of the strongest growth rates (albeit in a period of generally modest growth). In a way that would have been unbelievable before the 1980s, its growth performance regularly outstripped that of continental neighbours.

Towards 'full' employment

Even more marked was the international differential in unemployment. The flexibility that the Thatcher governments had forced upon the labour market paid dividends with the appearance of many new jobs. Britain's unemployment rate fell below 5 per cent (on the internationally recognized definition) in 2001. This did not match the extraordinarily low levels of the early post-war years but the pursuit of 'full' employment began to look like a realistic policy for the first time since the early 1970s. There were certainly abundant signs of labour shortages in the most prosperous regions. Together with the comparative ease of entering Britain's labour market, this prosperity triggered a growing net inflow of migrants from other countries, amounting to over 180,000 people annually by the turn of the century.

Not all indicators were so rosy, however. Overall investment, productivity and innovation rates remained low. There was certainly strong growth in fields such as finance and business services, information-based industries and high technology, which demanded and rewarded creativity and skill. Yet many of the new jobs fulfilled only routine service functions, requiring low skills and offering only low pay. Many were also part-time and semi-casual, although the shift away from long-term, regular career employment was not as marked as had seemed likely in the 1980s.

Globalization and Americanization

One reason for Britain's strong growth performance was its eager embrace of globalization. This term began to be widely used in the post-communist world of the 1990s to describe the ever-growing scale of internationalization of economic activity, information and culture. Britain was already a very strongly trade-dependent country with comparatively few inhibitions about welcoming foreign products, investment or acquisitions of British companies. For their part, British-owned multinational companies were as rapacious as any in their pursuit of overseas investments and markets. London was also one of the world's most truly internationalized cities, long a premier, global financial centre and greatly strengthened in this during the 1980s. Despite a growing consciousness of its European identity after 1990,

Britain continued to align itself closely with the USA, the principal driving force of globalization. The rather transatlantic character which Thatcher had given Britain's economy persisted. At the start of the new century, it was still noticeably more flexible, less regulated and less taxed than its European neighbours.

An unequal society

Many features of British society were also more 'American' than 'European'. For example, the beneficial effects of relatively low unemployment were partly offset by low pay and social benefits that were ungenerous by western European standards. Together these helped perpetuate many of the inequalities that had opened in the 1980s. The legacy of large-scale de-industrialization remained the main source of deprivation in less prosperous regions, where the replacement of lost jobs was on too small a scale. There were, however, more geographically widespread problems of poverty among the growing numbers of elderly people and single-parent families, groups that were disproportionately dependent on social benefits.

At the other end of the income scale, growing numbers of people were able to aspire to a material standard of living which only a few decades earlier would have seemed the prerogative of the super rich. By the end of the century, for example, some 28 per cent of households enjoyed regular use of two or more cars. Moreover, the proportion was growing quite rapidly even though that for households without any car remained almost static at 27 per cent. Meanwhile the amount of owner-occupied housing, another traditional post-war indicator of expanding wealth, grew more slowly during the 1990s than in the previous decade. By 2000 it had reached about 70 per cent of households. By contrast, the numbers of households with second homes (in Britain and other countries) increased more than fourfold over the 1990s, involving nearly 6 per cent of households by 2001.

Changed political times?

The eclipse of the Conservatives . . .

On the face of it, the late 1990s saw one of the most dramatic political shifts of the twentieth century. Rather surprisingly, the 1992 election saw the Conservatives under John Major returned to power with a small majority (Kavanagh and Seldon, 1994). But this government proved weak and divided, suffering also from a growing weariness of the Conservatives. Despite a steadily improving economy, his government grew in unpopularity. In 1997 Labour (albeit calling itself 'New' Labour) was finally returned to power (Kavanagh, 1997; Dell, 2000; Seldon, 2001). Led by Tony Blair, it won a huge parliamentary majority. Even more remarkably, Blair and Labour (no longer quite so eager to call itself 'New') managed almost to equal that success in 2001. Yet the size of the popular votes on which these two victories rested were disappointing. In 2001, only 59 per cent of the electorate even bothered to vote, the lowest proportion since 1918.

. . . Or a triumph of conservatism?

Nor did the political transformation bring policy changes anything like as dramatic as the scale of the victories might have promised. After the fall of Thatcher in 1990, the two Major governments followed a somewhat softer line than previously. Thatcher-style privatization continued, most importantly (and disastrously) of the railways. Yet in other fields, including relations with the European Union (and, as we will see, urban and environmental policies), the general approach was more moderate than under Thatcher.

The Blair governments followed a line that differed surprisingly little. The reconstruction of Labour as a real political force from the late 1980s saw a growing (though whispered) acceptance of much of the Thatcher/Major approach (Ramsay, 2002). To replace Labour's traditional socialist foundations, Blair's 'New' Labour borrowed from President Clinton's Democratic Party in the USA. The new approach was called the 'third way' (between unmediated market capitalism and traditional democratic socialism) (Giddens, 1998, 2000; Fairclough, 2000). In practice, it provided an ideological legitimization for 'New' Labour's adoption of near Thatcherite policies while allowing party leaders to believe they were doing more than simply stealing conservative policies. Another closely related idea was that of the 'stakeholder society'. Again, the concept was vague but in practice it meant individuals taking more responsibility for their own lives, relying less on state benefits and redistribution through the tax system. A Conservative party less bereft of ideas than that of the 1990s might itself easily have adopted a variant of the same concept.

Policies of the Blair governments

Many policies of the first Blair government seemed amply to justify such a cynical assessment. There was, for example, no reversal of Conservative privatizations (Seldon, 2001). The parlous state of the rail infrastructure brought the only significant retreat from this cornerstone principle of Thatcherism (in 2002). Even here, though, the not-for-profit infrastructure company which resulted was scarcely old-style socialist nationalization. The high profits of former nationalized industries were also occasionally harvested by the Treasury but that was about as far as it went. In other respects, the Blair administrations have been enthusiastic in their embrace of market principles and generally friendly to business. There were even modest extensions of privatization (into air traffic control, for example).

More striking was Labour's growing reliance on partnerships with private companies for major public investments and associated services. Known as private finance initiatives (PFIs), these were introduced in 1992 by the Major government but were used more freely after 1997. Such arrangements did not remove public services from the public sector and have often deferred rather than replaced public spending. Yet they allowed profit-making to penetrate more deeply into services such as health or education than under Mrs Thatcher.

'New' Labour's approach

'New' Labour ideology helped shape these policies, although they also reflected Blair's determination to be more than just a one-term wonder. The new Prime Minister was confident of success in 1997 but was haunted by Labour's electoral record of rarely consolidating its few victories. It had never won successive elections with comfortable majorities of the kind which had allowed Thatcher to establish her hegemony. The normal pattern was of Labour governments blown off course by economic crises. In part, these crises resulted from Labour having lost the confidence of business and large sections of the electorate in its ability to manage the economy. The first Blair government was accordingly dominated by an overwhelming desire to alter this perception. Its tremendous success in doing this (together with the continued disarray of the Conservatives) was the main reason for the 2001 electoral victory.

Slow improvements to public services

Everything else the first Blair government did in its domestic policy was subordinate to this imperative (Seldon, 2001). Business and middle opinion were not to be frightened. Thus,

although the use of PFIs began to grow, public spending continued until 2000 to follow the modest trajectory set by the Major government. The inevitable result was that policy areas traditionally cherished by Labour, such as education, health, pensions, transport and housing, failed to get better as quickly as the electorate (and especially Labour supporters) hoped.

Meanwhile 'New' Labour's approach to social problems could often seem almost as hard-faced as that of Thatcherism. There was certainly much attention lavished on 'social exclusion', the favoured 'New' Labour term for poverty (and one with direct implications for urban regeneration). This new label usefully recognized some of the wider dimensions of poverty, which literally caused poor people to be excluded and alienated from mainstream society (Fairclough, 2000). Unfortunately, it also thereby managed to give less emphasis to poverty's essential characteristic, which is (to state the obvious) about not having enough income to afford the essentials of a decent life. It also led to policies which enforced strict and sometimes harsh personal disciplines on the socially excluded.

Such social authoritarianism was even more apparent in the rhetoric (and to some extent the reality) of the treatment of social problems as diverse as crime or asylum seekers. In general, though, it has continued to find favour with public opinion. Yet the wider failure to deliver real improvements in public services had, by 2001, become the major priority for both the electorate and, to a large extent, business. In response the second Blair government promised a more energetic period of delivery. It remains to be seen whether the strain of doing this will also bring a recurrence of the usual political problems experienced by previous Labour governments. Thus far, the evidence is mixed.

CHANGING THE PLANNING SYSTEM

Planning and the new discourse of sustainability

The s word

These various political, economic and social trends greatly influenced the specific course of planning history after 1990. So too did the newly fashionable way of thinking (and talking) about the wider relationship of nature and development. Throughout planning history, there have been periods when new professional and policy discourses have emerged. Within short periods new terms – sometimes signifying new concepts, sometimes rebadging old ones – start to be used freely. Thus it was when the term 'town planning' itself came into general use after 1905. So it also was in the 1990s when 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' entered mainstream planning discourse. As noted in Chapter 7, these terms appeared as part of the language of environmental radicalism in the 1970s (Wheeler, 1998), but they were not widely adopted by British planners until after the Brundtland Report of 1987 and, even more, the environmental White Paper *This Common Inheritance* (DoE et al., 1990).

Sustainable development as a new policy paradigm

From then, uses of these terms multiplied rapidly (Barton, 2000; Cullingworth and Nadin, 2002). It helped, of course, that they were part of a global discourse. The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the promulgation there of Agenda 21 (for sustainable development in the twenty-first century) and its spawning, in turn, of Local Agenda 21 all played important parts in diffusing these new words and the thoughts behind them. Although the more obvious

political pressures that had prompted the greening of Thatcherism in the late 1980s were no longer so pressing, the Major government responded very positively to these international initiatives. It also participated with something close to enthusiasm in European Union (EU) initiatives on sustainability which had more direct links with urban planning.

Britain's environmental record during these years also improved in some important respects (DETR, 1999). The reorientation of electricity generation away from coal, although it devastated coalfield communities, paid handsome environmental dividends. On matters closer to urban planning, such as transport or waste management, Britain's record remained dismal by the high standards of its northern European neighbours. But Britain's leadership was now, at least, trying to sing from the same global hymn sheet. In a fairly seamless fashion, the new government after 1997 built on these successes and tried to do more, although still not always very much, about the failures.

Sustainability, economic growth and social progress

What was also apparent during the 1990s was a growing elasticity in the meaning of sustainability, beyond a solely environmental focus. The potential for this was intrinsic within a concept which rather vaguely embraced both growth and conservation. The claims of the former were underlined in the short term by the early 1990s' recession and, even more, the intractable economic and social problems of many towns and cities. Although nature still periodically gave politics sharp reminders of its potential, it was the more human problems which dominated. The result was that sustainable development came, by the end of the century, to be explicitly concerned with maintaining high and stable levels of economic growth, increasing investment and improving social well-being (DETR, 1999). Environmental protection was still there, of course, but certainly not as the overarching priority that environmentalists wanted. Sustainable development seemed now to be as concerned with enhancing long-term UK economic competitiveness as with earth, water, air, plants or animals.

Sustainability as an influence on planning

By 2000, therefore, sustainability was a term saturated with competing meanings. It conferred even less precision than it had in 1987. Yet in a slightly mystical, transcendental fashion, it still offered a broad legitimating ideology for an evolving and more rational discourse about specific initiatives (these to be considered more fully below). The looser definition of sustainability made it easier for planners, politicians and developers to embrace the language. In truth, it did not greatly help them clarify what they were actually talking about. What did help planning greatly, however, was that many of the specific initiatives associated with sustainability were directly concerned with the interrelationships of human activity and land use. In this specific but also a more general sense, therefore, sustainability provided a calming and restorative set of values, ideas and practices that helped renew the traditional core of urban and regional planning in the 1990s.

The Major government's reforms

A new consensus?

All of this also contributed to a mood of increasing optimism among planners. The fall of Mrs Thatcher following a challenge by Michael Heseltine, now apparently a staunch interventionist

on planning matters, encouraged the belief that the late 1980s' rise in planning's fortunes would continue. There was growing talk of a new post-Thatcher consensus that incorporated the more useful changes of the Thatcher years into an increasingly more coherent approach to planning (see, for example, Thompson, 1990; Colenutt, 1993). Mrs Thatcher's successor, John Major, gave credence to this, particularly when he appointed Heseltine as his first Environment Secretary. After the 1992 election, Heseltine was replaced by John Gummer, who remained in post until 1997, winning wide support for his commitment to planning and environmental matters.

Planning and Compensation Act 1991

Even before this, however, the 1991 Planning and Compensation Act became the first tangible sign of post-Thatcherite intentions for planning (Heap, 1991). Promised in *This Common Inheritance* (DoE et al., 1990), it amended the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which remained the principal measure. It gave legal authority for new streamlined structure plans and mandatory district-wide local plans. Also included were other measures that strengthened planning controls. Greatest symbolic importance was attached to the restoration of the primacy of the plan in the determination of planning applications. Such a 'plan-led' approach marked a clear retreat from the high Thatcherite philosophy of *Lifting the Burden* (Minister Without Portfolio et al., 1985). Yet its adoption was motivated as much by a desire to reduce developer uncertainty (and costly planning appeals) as by a commitment to strong public interest planning for its own sake.

The Act's other important provision concerned planning obligations, formerly called planning agreements. The clear intention was to create the sense that it was a normal duty of developers to contribute to infrastructure and other public benefits. In contrast to previous provisions, these arrangements could be undertaken unilaterally and no longer needed formal agreement. All this represented a further institutionalization of planning gain. The long retreat from the 1947 Act principle of a general betterment tax thus continued.

Local government reform and the 1991 system

The adoption of the new system was complicated by the move, initiated almost simultaneously by Heseltine, to end two-tier local government (Kavanagh and Seldon, 1994; Cullingworth and Nadin, 1997). The 1986 abolition of the metropolitan counties had already implemented this principle in the biggest urban areas. Now the drive for leaner, fitter local government led to proposals for unitary local governments in all areas. Local government in Wales and Scotland duly became entirely unitary. But in England the two-tier system proved more resilient. The bigger non-metropolitan cities had for many years found irksome their subordination to county authorities. Bristol, Leicester, Nottingham, Stoke, Plymouth, Hull and others embraced the proffered unitary status with alacrity. Elsewhere, though, the reform process was messier, with much opposition. The outcome was more piecemeal than Heseltine or Gummer had hoped and only 46 new unitary authorities were finally created in England.

The 1991 Act system in practice

Within a few years, it became clear that the new planning system was not fulfilling all the hopes which had attended its birth (Cullingworth and Nadin, 1997). In particular, the greater ambition of the district-wide development plans, together with the emphasis on a plan-led system, made them more complex and contentious documents than previous local plans. The process of approval proved lengthier and the timetable soon slipped. Just over half of English

local authorities had adopted (i.e. finalized) plans by the end of 1997, although the proportion reached 87 per cent four years later. The streamlining of structure plans was also complicated by the need for collaborative preparation by adjoining unitary authorities, broadly mimicking former county areas.

Yet such delays were not the whole story. The 1991 system operated alongside other central elaborations of planning policy during the 1990s. The central government policy guidance notes which had first appeared (for England and Wales) in 1988 multiplied during the early and mid-1990s. By 1996 England had 22 Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) notes and 15 Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) notes (including two supplementaries). Comparable systems existed for Scotland and Wales, the former started far earlier than the English system (from 1974) (Rowan-Robinson, 1997). The Welsh system was less complete, reflecting the idiosyncrasies of a Thatcherite Welsh Secretary from 1993 to 1995 (Tewdwr-Jones, 1997). Despite this, though, the general pattern was that guidance, especially for the English regions, had been strengthened since the Thatcher years. The overall result was a mutually congruent hierarchy of plans and planning guidance that allowed a quiet coherence to settle upon the planning system after the turbulence of the 1980s. Although it was anything but an instrument for radical change, the 1991 Act system allowed plans to express in fairly neutral fashion some of the emergent priorities of the decade.

The changing planning system since 1997

The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions

The early actions of the new government in 1997 encouraged many planners to expect a bolder approach (Seldon, 2001). For the first time since the 1970s, planning was reintegrated with transport to create the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). The last part of the title also signified a new commitment to regional matters. Moreover, the new department's political leader, Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, seemed to match its ambitious remit. On paper, at least, Prescott stood high in the new government. He was certainly a political heavyweight, well able to fight his cause. In practice, however, Prescott's record mirrored that of the first Blair administration: a few significant achievements (to be examined later) but not the dramatic changes that had been expected.

The Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions

In the event, the DETR itself did not survive beyond the 2001 election. Blair's first government had not anticipated that rural matters would become as important a political issue as they actually did. A new countryside lobby rallied an astonishing 300,000 supporters on London's streets in 1998. Its appearance was triggered by Labour's traditional antipathy to hunting but it gathered around it a much broader spectrum of rural grievances, real and imagined. All too real was a series of devastating blows to the rural livestock industry, culminating in the foot and mouth outbreak of 2001.

One administrative result was a shift in central responsibility for the environment, rural issues and sustainable development (but not planning) to a new Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (www.defra.gov.uk). (DEFRA was, however, largely constructed from the former Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food.) Stripped of environment, the former DETR thus became the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DfLR) (www.dflr.gov.uk). Its new Secretary of State was

Stephen Byers, a Blair loyalist who soon unveiled important proposals for reforming the planning system. Yet both Byers's tenure and the DTLR itself proved very short-lived. The vastness of Britain's transport problems made them difficult to handle as part of a wider remit. Byers also proved disastrously unwise in his choice of political advisers, whose widely leaked antics showed 'New' Labour acolytes in an unsavoury light.

The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister

Byers's inevitable resignation came in May 2002. What followed was the re-establishment of a separate Department for Transport and the moving of the remainder of DTLR to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (still John Prescott) (www.odpm.gov.uk). How long this solution survives remains to be seen. What is most striking is the extraordinary and rather opportunistic restlessness in central leadership of planning matters since Blair took office. Although intentions in 1997 had been otherwise, the most recent changes have further fragmented central responsibilities in the wider planning field. Not all of this was Labour's doing, however. The Major government had begun the process in 1992 by blurring the responsibilities for historic conservation planning between the then Department of National Heritage (after 1997 called the Department for Culture, Media and Sport) (www.culture.gov.uk) and the then DoE. Now, by removing those intra-departmental interests that formerly championed environmental or transport matters, the changes of 2001–02 have allowed a perceptibly different governmental conception of planning to emerge.

Scotland and Wales

Compared to previous Labour governments, those after 1997 were slow to begin major planning reforms. There were, though, important organizational changes that acknowledged as never before the plurality of British nationalism (Bogdanor, 1999; Morrison, 2001, Tewdwr-Jones 2002). In 1998, 'New' Labour finally implemented the party's long-sought project for Scottish and Welsh devolution. It will be recalled that the first formal moves were initiated by the Callaghan Labour government. Then, however, the proposals had been insufficiently supported in referenda and were not adopted. That this outcome was not repeated in 1997 was a reflection on the impacts on Scotland and Wales of the intervening 18 years. Both Scots and Welsh had decisively rejected Thatcher and Major at successive general elections. Bitter memories of unpopular government thus overcame residual misgivings about creating these new halfway houses to full independence.

For Scotland, devolution created a Scottish Executive and Parliament, with powers to pass its own laws and to vary (slightly) the level of tax from the rest of Britain (www.scotland.gov.uk). The National Assembly of Wales, by contrast, was more obviously subordinate to Westminster (www.wales.gov.uk). Despite this, and other setbacks, however, the new bodies began to establish genuinely separate identities. A decisive moment came when the Scottish Parliament exercised its tax varying powers by removing the liability of Scottish students to contribute to university fees. This attracted support not only throughout Scotland but across the whole of Britain, showing that devolved government really could follow an alternative path to Westminster.

Planning and devolution

This potential for diversity has not, so far, had much effect on the respective planning systems (Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). The Welsh planning system remains very similar to the English (though

it operates through entirely unitary local governments). More important differences already existed in Scotland, which had had its own well-developed system of national planning guidance for many years before devolution (Rowan-Robinson, 1997). There was also a subtly different administrative tradition, partly reflecting distinctive features of Scottish law and land tenure, as well as political and geographical differences. Yet there have been some hints of a desire for greater change since 1998 (www.scotland.gov.uk; Lloyd, 2002). So far these have been largely symbolic. For example, Scottish planning was briefly made the responsibility of the Minister for Social Justice. This aspired (if only rhetorically) to an overarching social idealism within planning that in recent years has been glimpsed only rarely at Westminster. But the title soon disappeared. Planning guidance for Scotland is also being rebadged to make it even more distinctively Scottish. Yet, so far at least, the intrinsic, systemic powers of planning remain broadly similar to those in the rest of Britain.

Reforming the English and Welsh planning systems

For England these devolutionary measures were palely imitated in the 1998 Regional Development Agencies Act and the 1999 Greater London Authority (GLA) Act (DETR, 1997; Morrison, 2001). There will be more about the new regionalism in a later section, but it should here be noted that the 1998 Act created eight English regional chambers (in most cases called regional assemblies). From 2004, these will become new statutory regional planning bodies. The second measure was really a reform of local government, recreating a London-wide elected authority. Yet the new GLA, led by the charismatic and ever rebellious Ken Livingstone, last leader of the old Greater London Council, had regional status. Thus its strategic planning powers presaged those of the other regional chambers/assemblies. It also had its own regional development agency.

Other than these preliminary changes, however, it was not until late 2001 that systemic planning reforms were unveiled (DTLR, 2001a). A broadly similar reform process occurred in Wales, although not (for the moment at least) in Scotland. A new Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act, relating to England and Wales, is set to become law in 2004.

Perceived weaknesses of the existing system

The stated rationale for the reforms had a familiar ring. Plans, it was stated, took too long to prepare and were often outdated before they were adopted. The planning system offered little scope for promoting good quality development. Not for the first time, we learnt that the development control process was too slow and cluttered with small applications, the vast majority of which were eventually approved. For all the measures to promote public involvement, communities still often felt excluded from decisions that shaped the destiny of their areas. In particular, negotiations over planning gain were often conducted beyond proper public scrutiny. At the same time, their 'one-off' character often created uncertainty for developers. Finally, the appeals and public inquiry process was expensive for all parties and often produced excessive delays in projects of national importance.

The philosophy of the new system

But what are the prospects that these familiar failings can finally be addressed by the promised new system? Launching the proposals, the DTLR claimed them to be the biggest shake-up of planning since 1947 (DTLR, 2001b). The underlying aims appeared in *Delivering a Fundamental Change*, the 2001 Green Paper (DTLR, 2001a) and (in a subtle dilution of

language and content) *Sustainable Communities: Delivering through Planning*, the paper issued after consultations in 2002 (ODPM, 2002a).

Both documents expressed rather vague and contradictory aspirations of a kind that are often deployed when planning reforms are contemplated, although which also seem to have characterized much policy-making by the Blair governments (e.g. Fairclough, 2000). There will be, it is asserted, a culture shift in planning, making it a positive tool for promoting change, instead of being narrowly defensive and reactive (ODPM, 2002a). This will apparently deliver the housing, economic development, transport infrastructure and other objectives that the nation needs. It will, moreover, provide these more quickly and, needless to say, in a sustainable fashion that protects the environment. The system is also promised to be more transparent and inclusive than ever before in its dealings with local communities.

A new array of plans

Whether all these worthy aims could ever actually be realized remains an open question. Of the specific changes, the most obvious involve replacing existing (English) structure, local and unitary development plans with new local development frameworks (LDFs). The LDF will be a collection of documents intended to deliver a spatial strategy for the local authority area. It will thus contain an indicative core strategy that is location- rather than site-specific. In addition there will be site-specific policies and proposals and action plans for key areas of change or conservation. Finally, the LDFs will nestle within a strengthened approach to regional planning. Existing regional planning guidance (and many sub-regional matters formerly dealt with by structure plans) will be superseded by statutory regional spatial strategies. The new regional chambers/assemblies will prepare these.

Business Planning Zones

Of the other reforms, the announced Business Planning Zones (BPZs) garnered greatest interest. These will be a re-energized version of the rather limp Simplified Planning Zones (SPZs) originated under the 1986 Housing and Planning Act. Like the original Enterprise Zones, this latest form of partially deregulated business zones has also reflected Treasury pressure. Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, remains anxious to remove barriers to competitiveness. The intention now is that new simplified business planning zones will be created in larger numbers than before, in areas of leading-edge technology and of economic decay. As previously, they will have flexible planning regimes which can respond rapidly to business needs. They will, though, be subject to initial environmental assessments (if needed) and safeguards about environmental quality. Although designated by local authorities, they will also be sanctioned within the new regional spatial strategies. Whether all this will make the BPZs any more successful than the original SPZs remains to be seen.

Other aspects of the reforms

Other important changes seek to streamline the development control system. They include a possible replacement of outline planning permission and an acceleration of appeals and decision-making more generally. Following the colossal public inquiry on the proposed Terminal 5 at Heathrow Airport, lasting four years, there were also measures to expedite planning decisions on major infrastructure projects (essentially by removing them from the local planning authority). Compulsory purchase procedures will also be simplified to expedite brownfield regeneration and other important development. The procedures for negotiated

planning obligations are also to become more transparent and predictable, with a tariff. Finally, there will be more encouragement of community participation, with funds for expert planning aid to local communities, easier access to planning documents and greater transparency.

Interim assessment

It is, of course, impossible to judge the operations of a system which, at the time of writing, had not even been created. Overall, however, and despite many cross-currents, it seems to favour development interests more than has the 1991 Act system. The ODPM rather pointedly stressed the notion of sustainability in response to consultation. This was doubtless to dampen anti-development opposition, even though ODPM's own understanding of this term was diminishing environmental meanings. Throughout the reform process, there has been a pervasive, almost Thatcherite, emphasis on competitiveness, to make development happen, and happen more quickly. The other important theme of the reforms was the new regionalist agenda, something Mrs Thatcher would *never* have supported.

We might surmise that the breaking of planning's traditional central departmental partnership with environment has allowed these two new emphases to arise. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Deputy Prime Minister are now, seemingly, key actors in central planning reform. We may doubt, though, whether outcomes will really change as much as intentions might suggest. Stripped of its ambitious presentational rhetoric, the new system disturbs in only a few respects the powers, responsibilities and rights of what are now, inevitably, called planning's major 'stakeholders'. Despite initial promises of fundamental change, there is no redistribution of the relative positions of these 'stakeholders' comparable in scale to that which occurred, for example, in 1947. As such, it seems unlikely that the new system will change as much as its initiators appear to hope.

SPECIFIC PLANNING POLICIES

The new regionalism

Britain's centralized state

An optimist might well claim that, in time, the 2004 Act system will be remembered for its innovations in regional planning. Readers should not, however, hold their breath waiting for this historical recognition to dawn. Much will depend on the wider success of the new regionalism which began to appear during the 1990s. This needs to be understood against the background of the extraordinarily centralized nature of the British state by the end of the Thatcher era. The cumulative effects of many changes over many centuries, certainly since the reign of Henry VIII, had formed this identity. Regional sentiments had been denied meaningful governmental expression as a unitary national state was formed. Nor had this been mitigated at the local level. The local government system had, since the Victorian period, been formed in a way that was extremely dependent on the central state. Britain's great industrial and port cities of the nineteenth century never became 'city states' on the continental European pattern. The scope and conduct of their public affairs was always conditional on central approval. The further reductions of local freedom during the 1980s merely continued the trend. By 1990 most of the remaining vestiges of local autonomy had vanished.

A cautious revival

But why, against this seemingly remorseless trend of centralization, was there a modest flowering of British regionalism in the 1990s? In part, it was triggered by a growing awareness of developments in the rest of Europe. Even in what had so recently been the most centralized of nation states, such as Spain or France, centralism seemed to be on the way out as new regional institutions appeared during the 1980s. And as the regional cities of these and other countries began to shine on the European and world stages, the envy grew. Here, it seemed, were lessons from which centralized Britain could usefully learn. The European Committee of the Regions, on which Britain's regions were represented, was established in 1994 and helped to encourage British regionalist hopes.

Regionalism under the Major government

Before 1997, however, such thinking was better understood in Edinburgh, Cardiff, Manchester or Newcastle than it was in Westminster. The post-Thatcher Conservatives, although beginning to look on Europe with more sympathy, remained dead set against creating new tiers of government. Even so, the 'top-down' approach became less haughty than in the Thatcher years. Regional planning issues were treated in a more considered way. This was most obviously so in the ambitious project unveiled in 1995 to develop the Thames Gateway (to be discussed more fully below) (RPG9a, 1995). The centrally-issued RPGs also won greater respect than had the first, perfunctory efforts of the late 1980s.




Figure 9.1 When the Thames Gateway was launched in 1995, it seemed to epitomize a wider return to strategic regional planning. In fact, its indicative approach was revisited in 2003 when this enlarged and more directive version was unveiled.

Even more important were the moves in 1994 to shift government away from Whitehall. These involved establishing the Government Offices for the (English) Regions (GOs), to which the then DoE and other central departments devolved some functions (Baker, 2002). The GOs coincided with changes in regional boundaries, so that the old north region was split between a new north-east region and an extended north-west region. The old south-east region was split, so that London acquired regional status. A new eastern region, mainly comprising the former East Anglia, also acquired parts of the former south east. (Despite this, the former wide definition of the south east has also, confusingly, remained important in physical planning.) The DETR extended the responsibilities of the GOs from 1997. The GOs have thus become another means of moderating the centralism of the British state and focusing regionalist sentiments.

'Old' regionalism

Political geography has given Labour a greater vested interest in regional matters than the Conservatives. Labour politicians have been more likely to represent areas that needed special assistance. They had, though, begun to see the dangers of a regional dependency culture. Regionalism had to be made to mean more than just special pleading for central funds. As theorists of regionalism had shown in the 1970s and 1980s, traditional regional assistance made it more, not less, difficult for regions to solve their underlying problems (Holland, 1976; Massey, 1984). It had largely reinforced an approach to spatial development that encouraged only the creation of less skilled jobs in the less favoured regions. The innovation and command functions that decided what products should be made in these regions were elsewhere (increasingly in a different country). In crude employment terms, this traditional kind of regional policy might ultimately produce a sort of regional balance. Yet huge imbalances – of income, innovation potential and power – would still remain. By 1997 no serious Labour politician, 'new' or 'old', was denying the need for a new approach to the regional question.

'New' Labour, new regionalism

Quite what that new approach would be was less certain. Since the late 1980s, there had been a growing interest in the perceived greater successes of continental European regionalism. Out of this came a strong emphasis on 'institutional thickness' or 'associational economies' in regional success (e.g. Amin and Thrift, 1994; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Such perspectives maintained that successful regions were characterized by a plethora of genuinely regional private and public institutions with overlapping memberships and showing strong networking characteristics. It was these, rather than the national state or unmediated market processes, which laid the basis for robust and self-regenerating regional economies. These new ideas, of course, closely echoed the kind of thinking which was then appearing across a wider front, informing the emergent vision of the 'third way'.

The Regional Development Agencies

The 'New' Labour government, in the person of John Prescott, played an important part in further raising regionalist expectations (DETR, 1997; Morrison, 2001). The initial steps were, however, modest. The national development agencies established for Wales and Scotland in the 1970s provided what were perceived as positive and proven models for economic promotion. It was not, therefore, surprising that, in the wake of devolution, aspects of the concept were repeated for England under the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998,

mentioned earlier. In 1999, eight new agencies were formed for the English regions. They initially reported to the DETR although the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) took over responsibility in 2001. The ninth agency, for London, was formed in 2000, reporting directly to the new Greater London Assembly.

Early experience of the Regional Development Agencies

The new bodies were promoted, in the joint words of Prescott and Byers, as 'economic powerhouses for sustainable growth' (DTLR, 2002, foreword). And they were, indeed, laden with many duties to enhance regional economic well-being. Unfortunately, they were granted few real powers or funds to fulfil these duties (Morgan, 2002; Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). Although their roles are evolving, the RDAs were still, in early 2002, directly responsible for only about 1 per cent of public spending within their areas. Most enthusiastic were those in traditionally weaker regions – the north west, Yorkshire, the north east, the west midlands – and London, which each spent over £100 million in 2000–01 (DETR, 2001c). The RDA expenditure for the north west and Yorkshire in 2001–02 each exceeded £200 million, while London was over £300 million. The others remain modest in their spending (e.g. Musson et al., 2002).

Many roles of the GOs are gradually being transferred to the RDAs (which have identical boundaries). By 2002, the RDAs were responsible for most regeneration programmes and for Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) to assist business development. Significantly, though, this only applied to RSA assistance up to £2 million. The bigger grants remained under direct central control. In the same year, RDAs were permitted to combine their funds into a single budget, offering greater flexibility. Even so, these were only quite marginal changes. Thus far, real power remains at the centre, or at least within the GOs.

Regional assistance since 1990

In 2001, central responsibility for the RDAs shifted to the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), reasserting a more traditional pattern (www.dti.gov.uk). Under 'old' regionalism, most power had resided in the DTI which controlled regional assistance for industrial and other economic development. This assistance was increasingly supplanted during the 1990s, though not so much by the new regionalism as by European assistance (Lloyd, 1996). As noted in Chapter 8, European funds became more significant during the 1980s, growing further in the 1990s. In 1993–94, for example, direct regional aid from the British government was £287 million, roughly a quarter that of the early 1980s. By contrast, the UK was annually receiving £980 million regional aid from the European Union by the mid-1990s. By 2000, regional aid accounted for more than one-third of the European Community budget.

Major assistance to specific areas focused on lagging regions (Objective 1) and those undergoing structural changes (Objective 2). The Objective 1 areas received most aid. Until 1999, these were Northern Ireland, the Highlands and Islands of Scotland and Merseyside. Only the latter retained this status after 2000, although West Wales and the Valleys, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly and South Yorkshire were added. Special transitional arrangements applied to the two deleted regions. The Objective 2 areas (from 2000) included most remaining parts of Wales, large parts of Scotland, much of the rest of northern England, along with parts of the midlands, together with a few areas in East Anglia, the south west, London and the south east. Most of these southern areas became eligible for British regional assistance

in 1993. Following European Commission guidelines, the British government by 2000 regraded its own assisted areas into three tiers. These virtually matched those eligible for European funds, although there was a third tier of areas eligible for enterprise grants (which mainly went to smaller businesses). This third tier covered wider areas than the other two tiers, especially so in London, the south east and eastern regions.

Regional planning and new regionalism

The distribution of these funds was a crude form of 'top-down' regional spatial planning. The new regionalism, though, would allow more scope to regions themselves to shape their own destinies. Yet the RDAs' actual role in regional planning is rather ambiguous (Alden, 2002; Cochrane, 2002; Goodwin et al., 2002). They are certainly not physical and land use planning bodies. They do, however, have to develop regional economic strategies, through which each region will essentially maximize its growth potential. This inevitably creates tensions with regional physical planning, presently expressed through RPGs (relating in some cases to boundaries which still differ from the RDAs). The potential disagreements between the two are especially strong within prosperous regions such as the south east and the east. Here restraining the wider consequences of growth has seemingly become physical planning's major preoccupation. A critical issue is whether there will be sufficient housing to accommodate the workforce needed for growing regional economies.

The future of regional planning

Under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, though already trailed in PPG11 (2000), the RPGs become regional spatial strategies. Preparation and revision responsibilities will lie with the Regional Chambers/Assemblies (also already begun in most regions). At least some of these bodies may also, from 2004, become directly elected. In essence therefore, regional planning is set to become a more 'bottom-up' process. This is a familiar promise, supposedly incorporated in the current round of RPG revision undertaken from 1999, although with less than perfect realization (e.g. Williams, 2002). Moreover, even if it is achieved under the 2004 Act system, the tensions between the RDAs' growth maximization strategies and the often more cautious approaches of regional physical planning will not evaporate. One is bound to wonder whether the much vaunted 'institutional thickness' that is being so assiduously fostered will be robust enough to manage such matters at the regional level.

Still pursuing regional balance?

Faced with many new bodies with new responsibilities it is easy to lose sight of overall intentions. Previous chapters have traced a strategic policy objective of regional balance. From its 1930s' origins, it was pursued with varying commitment until the Thatcher era, when economic change and political ideology caused it to be substantially abandoned. A key question must therefore be whether the new regionalism of the Blair era is a new way of pursuing regional balance. Or is it closer to the Thatcher philosophy, accepting that global economic realities preclude the luxury of restraining the growth of dynamic regions in order to bolster weak ones?

Again, definitive answers are impossible when policies are still unfolding. Thus far, though, the evidence is mixed. A majority of English regions, along with Scotland and Wales, languish well down the European scale of economic performance. The new bodies in these peripheral

nations and regions undoubtedly want to improve their rankings. They certainly are animated by hopes of a more even pattern of inter-regional development. Much depends on what happens in the 'greater south east' – London, the south east and east. Although experiencing decline in some areas, these regions really are the powerhouse of the UK economy. Here lie the real roots of Britain's recent economic strength. In London regional development powers have been seized on with alacrity, partly for political reasons, although the 'new regionalism' is relatively weak in the south east and east (Musson et al., 2002). Whatever role regional institutions ultimately play, the signs are that the Westminster government will not allow anything to obstruct the continuing prosperity of this traditionally favoured corner of Britain (e.g. ODPM, 2003a).

Regenerating the cities

A verdict on the 1980s

An obvious connection between the new RDAs and planning was in their growing responsibilities for urban regeneration. The previous chapter showed that property-led inner-city regeneration was a key facet of 1980s planning. Promotion, leverage and subsidies were used to lure private developers into what was hitherto seen as hostile territory. To anyone who remembered the urban dereliction of the 1970s, it was difficult not to be impressed by the scale and panache of the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs). Yet physical results were often mediocre and woefully lacking in key aspects of strategic planning, especially transport.

Nor did property-led regeneration address the social issues of unemployment and multiple disadvantage that lay at the heart of inner-city problems (House of Commons Select Committee on Employment, 1989). By 1992 something like 100,000 extra jobs had reportedly been created in the UDC areas since designation, an impressive enough total although puny compared with total unemployment. Many of these were actually jobs transferred rather than created (77 per cent of new jobs in the LDDC area 1981–90, for example) (Potter, 1990). And it was generally only lower-paid employment, such as cleaning, security work, etc., that was available to existing inner-city populations who lacked the skills to do the higher-paid jobs of the post-industrial economy. Much the same story of unequal benefit was played out for housing. The poor could only benefit indirectly, after the well-off had been assisted.

The most damning criticism of inner-city regeneration, 1980s style, was that it failed on its own terms. Quite simply, it only worked if there was a property boom. Yet the freer approach to development that partly fuelled the boom also hastened market saturation. Then, when property values fell, as they did rather spectacularly from the late 1980s, private developers reneged on their promised infrastructural contributions. The delivery of even half decent transport and social infrastructures had to wait. By the early 1990s inner-city skies were dark with the wings of Thatcherite chickens coming home to roost.

City Challenge

The result was a welcome outbreak of common sense in 1991. Shortly after returning to government, Heseltine launched the City Challenge initiative (Colenutt, 1993; Russell et al., 1996). For the first time in many years, this vested a real measure of central trust in local authorities. Eleven authorities were initially involved, with central government committing £82.5 million a year for five years. There was a second round, with 20 successful authorities, in 1992–93. Not that the initiative was above criticism, of course. To receive money, local



Figure 9.2 Hulme, Manchester was the most impressive City Challenge project. Shown here is Stretford Road, eliminated by earlier redevelopment but now restored as a traditional street linking to neighbouring areas via the new Hulme Arch bridge. The entrance to the area's new park can be seen, along with the generally low-medium rise, high-density built environment.

authorities had to endure a highly politicized process of competitive bidding. This was essentially to show that they accepted central strictures. There had, it goes without saying, to be genuine private-sector involvement in regeneration schemes. But this was now tempered by the required involvement of the voluntary sector and local communities. This was to become a defining characteristic of subsequent regeneration policies. Admittedly, it created much potential for disagreement, but, at its best, it worked well and some impressive results have followed.

Hulme Regeneration Ltd

The most impressive use of City Challenge funds was at Hulme, Manchester, whose history and serious problems have previously been mentioned (HRL, 1994). In 1992 Hulme Regeneration Ltd was formed essentially as a partnership between the City Council and the developers AMEC (also active in other regeneration projects around Manchester). A wide group of other public, private and community interests were also involved. From 1997, when City Challenge ended, the Moss Side and Hulme Partnership continued its work with much the same partners. The overall plan reflected what was increasingly called (following an American term) the 'new urbanism'. This meant that it echoed many of the principles of more traditional urban patterns. There were continuous building frontages along streets that combined moderate (and calmed) traffic movement with traditional pavements. The street pattern was also fully connected, unlike the cul-de-sac layouts of much post-war development. Existing landmarks (such as churches) were given visual prominence and new

ones created. There was a general emphasis on 'legibility', making the area easy to understand.

Several estates of flatted, largely system-built council housing were replaced eventually by about 4,000 new or refurbished dwellings. Although the building profile was quite low, densities are high by recent British standards (over 30 dwellings per hectare). They were actually higher than the housing they replaced, where apparently high densities of multi-storey flats were dissipated by large adjoining tracts of open space. In contrast to these rather purposeless areas, a major new public park was formed in the new Hulme, with much attention to detailed design. Commercial development has occurred alongside the main road to the east of Hulme. Not least, a new 'high street' was created, with major shops, a market and other public facilities. Overall, it became a showpiece of British inner urban regeneration during this period.

Continuities with the 1980s

Although City Challenge marked an important shift, many favoured initiatives of the Thatcher era continued into the early years of the decade (Atkinson and Moon, 1994). The garden festivals, most of which contributed little to longer-term regeneration, ended at Ebbw Vale in 1992. The ten-year-life span of the Enterprise Zones meant that many finished during the early 1990s. However, a few more were designated between 1990 and 1996 in areas seriously affected by shipyard and colliery closures. The 1980s' initiatives to boost decaying public housing estates – Estate Action and Housing Action Trusts – actually flourished during the 1990s, benefiting from a growing trust between locality and centre.

Much more significant, however, were the UDCs, which dominated urban regeneration spending in the early 1990s (Imrie and Thomas, 1999). Their dominance partly reflected the need for greater public action in a more depressed property market. Two additional Corporations, for Birmingham Heartlands (1992) and Plymouth Dockyard (1993) were also established. From the mid-1990s, however, the Thatcher and Major UDCs began to be abolished. Apart from Cardiff Bay (which survived until 2000) the others had gone by spring 1998. Yet this apparent repudiation by 'New' Labour of the favoured urban policy instrument of previous governments was itself reversed in 2003 (ODPM, 2003a). As part of his regeneration action programme, Prescott announced two further UDCs within an enlarged Thames Gateway Strategy.

English Partnerships

Even before the change of government, the 1990s saw many new initiatives and agencies. Soon after City Challenge came the Urban Regeneration Agency created under the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. Known in practice as English Partnerships (EP), this was a rebranding of English Estates, which itself had evolved from the government industrial development companies of the 1930s (www.englishpartnerships.co.uk). Now, though, it acquired important new roles. English Partnerships had some characteristics of a UDC without being as spatially bounded. Like the UDCs, its main functions were land related, reclaiming derelict and contaminated sites and promoting their regeneration. As the UDCs were wound up, their land assets were transferred to EP. Like them, it effectively subsidized sites whose condition would otherwise preclude profitable development.

Yet its style was altogether more '1990s' than '1980s'. Like City Challenge, its objectives (and name) required it to promote partnerships with other agencies, public and private. Linked

with this, it was also much more strategically-minded (more like the older development agencies in Scotland and Wales). These characteristics have ensured EP's continuing relevance since 1997. Its regional strategic roles have shifted to the RDAs although EP remains a key institution in promoting partnerships and executing developments. In 1999 it took over the more profitable land development functions of the Commission for the New Towns (CNT), shifting the locus of its operations.

Single Regeneration Budget

Although deriving some income from land assets, EP's core funding came from the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), another policy innovation of the Major years. A recurrent criticism of 1980s-style urban policies (though almost equally justified since then) was that they were too fragmented, with too many different initiatives, creating confusion and waste. In response, several programmes, including the veteran Urban Programme, were brought together into the SRB in 1994. The budget was not as consolidated as appeared at first sight, with various favoured initiatives given protected status. Yet it was another sign of the more consensual approach that typified the post-1990 period. It maintained the City Challenge approaches of competitive bidding and, even more, the promotion of partnerships. And it too survived after 1997, although, again, the creation of the RDAs changed this. The SRB thus ended as an expenditure item in 2000. However, the principle of regeneration budget consolidation has been reproduced in the new RDA single budgets, introduced in 2002.

Social exclusion and urban regeneration

Replacing Estate Action, which dwindled rapidly after 1997, and Housing Action Trusts which did not grow, the first Blair government unveiled the New Deal for Communities (NDC) (www.neighbourhood.gov.uk). Originating within the Cabinet Office Social Exclusion Unit, it epitomizes 'New' Labour's social conscience (www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk). The aims are noble, the funding modest, the results variable. Eligible areas were invited in 1998 to make proposals for regenerating deprived communities (covering up to 60,000 people). The inevitable partnerships of local agencies and community stakeholders had to be formed to ensure delivery.

NDC concentrated on the most deprived urban areas, measured by poor job prospects, crime, educational under-achievement and poor health. By focusing efforts on these concerns, NDC sought a holistic, largely non-physical, approach to regeneration, although more traditional urban planning matters were subsequently included. Seventeen 'pathfinder' areas were selected, the largest in Liverpool (Kensington) and Hackney (Shoreditch) with a further 22 in the second round. Overall NDC has raised many expectations and helped to energize run-down areas. Yet the communities and partnerships have often not shown the harmony and co-operation that these labels would suggest. A further elaboration of this approach came in 2000 with the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, available to many more areas, not necessarily in big cities.

Millennium Villages

There were also other, more design-oriented, ways of trying to promote the ideal of community within cities. Since the early 1990s there had been a growth in interest in 'urban villages', fed by an Urban Village Forum. Some examples appeared within British cities, such as that at Bordesley Green, Birmingham (Barton, 2000). An urban village was to be a design

(and by extension, it was hoped, social) concept for a cohesive community housing about 5,000 people. The idea tapped a strong tradition in British planning thought which sought community by using designs that evoked the village ideal. The main influence of this thought in the 1990s was on housing developers, tending to produce rather bland results.

The Blair government, however, raised the tempo by its announcement in 1997 of the Millennium Villages. These are to be models of sustainable development, showing how urban regeneration can help create attractive and ecologically advanced communities with less car-based lifestyles. The first, adjoining the Millennium Dome in Greenwich, east London was begun in 1999. It is a high-density community of some 1,400 dwellings (www.greenwich-village.co.uk). The second, a smaller development at Allerton Bywater, a former mining village south-east of Leeds, was launched in 1999 but development has been seriously delayed. More recently, other millennium communities have been announced for east Manchester and Kings Lynn, with others promised for East Ketley in Shropshire, Milton Keynes and Hastings. Thus far, though, the programme has had only limited significance.

Urban regeneration companies

Yet another new initiative, launched in 1999, following the recommendations of the Rogers Report (1999), whose wider significance is discussed below, were urban regeneration companies (URCs) (www.urcs-online.co.uk). These were intended to lead and co-ordinate redevelopment and new investment in declining urban areas. Being area- and property-based,



Figure 9.3 Another key regeneration project, in east Manchester. A failed bid for the 2000 Olympics became the springboard for staging the 2002 Commonwealth Games, for which Sportcity was created at Beswick. In 1999 a URC was formed to harness this momentum to wider regeneration, an early sign being this large new superstore, opposite the main stadium.

URCs had some of the characteristics of UDCs but were less 'top-down'. The major actors in their formation and work were local authorities, RDAs, EP, private developers and other agencies.

In usual fashion, they appeared first on an experimental pilot basis. Three were created initially: Liverpool Vision, New East Manchester and Sheffield One. The first has promoted development in central Liverpool, most notably (in 2002) the 'Fourth Grace' project for a new landmark building on the Pier Head (www.liverpoolvision.co.uk). The Manchester company had the most impressive start, overseeing the completion of the new Sportcity in time for the 2002 Commonwealth Games (www.neweastmanchester.com). Its main responsibility, however, is continuing the momentum of physical regeneration over a wider area. By 2003 a further nine URCs had been created, operating in Bradford, Corby, Hull, Leicester, Sunderland, the Tees Valley, Swindon, Camborne–Pool–Redruth and Furness–West Cumbria.

Initiative dazzle or urban regeneration policy?

This list of initiatives is already quite long. Several, especially those with less implications for traditional planning matters, have not even been mentioned. It is clear, though, that fragmented programmes did not end with the creation of the SRB. Further complexity arose from the proliferation of agencies and partnerships, sometimes with overlapping functions, called into being to chase funds. The various initiatives often had different eligible areas and different funding rules. All of this indicates the downside of this particular manifestation of 'institutional thickness'. Even more fundamentally, we need to ask whether, behind this initiative dazzle, there actually was a comprehensive urban policy.

Density and urban regeneration

Certainly there were signs of what was increasingly called 'joined-up thinking'. Concern was evolving beyond specific areas with problems to cities more widely. In part, this reflected the new international interest in sustainability. It was apparent, for example, in attempts to restrict the development of previously unbuilt land. These became much stronger in 1995 when the DoE frightened itself with estimates that it needed enough land to accommodate 4.4 million new households by 2016 (DoE, 1996). One consequence was an attempt to boost densities in new residential developments, an important theme in the revised PPG3 (2000). Ironically, PPG3's minimum advised density was only 30 dwellings per hectare. This was exactly the standard promoted as *low density* by garden city proponents a century earlier! It does, however, show how much prevailing densities had dwindled. An important factor was the amount of residential space now allocated for cars. Significantly, PPG3 also put stronger pressure on local authorities to link new residential developments with public transport, the economics of which tended to prioritize more 'urban' densities.

Brownfield development and urban regeneration

Closely related was the growing pressure to use previously developed land, mainly located within urban areas. In 1995 the DoE adopted a 50/50 split between housebuilding on previously undeveloped green fields and previously developed 'brownfields'. It was already clear, however, that the aspiration was to increase the latter proportion to 60 per cent, which became the DETR's official target in 1998 (DETR, 1998a). The proportion achieved in practice (including conversions of existing buildings) has crept up, during 2001 for the first time slightly exceeding 60 per cent in England.

The largely urban locations of brownfield land and higher preparation costs have favoured relatively high redevelopment densities, above the PPG3 minimum. One of the most visible signs of the shift to brownfield has been the growth of dwellings in city centres. A few adventurous developers, most prominently Urban Splash, founded in 1993, began to convert existing buildings in central Liverpool and Manchester (www.urbansplash.co.uk). Their success meant that, ten years later, mainstream residential developers were building or converting in such locations in all big and many smaller cities.



Figure 9.4 Bluewater in Kent, opened in 1999, is the largest out-of-town shopping mall in Britain. Despite growing scepticism about such developments, it found favour because of its imaginative re-use of a former chalk pit in the emergent Thames Gateway. Its triangular form and striking design differentiate it from other British examples. Like them, though, car parks occupy much of the area.

Recentralizing towns and cities

This growing fashion for central living showed a widening appreciation of the value of centrality. We should not exaggerate its quantitative significance, when set against what remains the dominant British desire for a low-density, car-based lifestyle. Yet there were some important changes in actual policies during the 1990s. The early 1990s, for example, saw growing concerns about the growth of out-of-town shopping developments. Although many played a part in urban regeneration in the biggest cities, they had often damaged existing nearby town or city centres. This ran counter to emergent thinking about sustainable development, not least because it encouraged a shift from public transport-based to car-based shopping.

Changing retail policy

As smaller town centres (including many in Conservative heartlands) felt the effects of peripheral superstores and retail warehouses, the Major government decided to act. PPG13 on transport (PPG13, 1994) and PPG6 on town centres and retail development, issued in 1993 and strengthened in 1996, marked a shift from out-of-town developments (PPG6, 1993, 1996). Of course, there were still important out-of-town regional shopping centres in process. The Trafford Centre at Dimplington near Manchester opened its doors in 1998 (www.traffordcentre.co.uk), as did Cribbs Causeway near Bristol. Bluewater in Kent, part of the Thames Gateway (and, to date, Britain's biggest mall), opened the following year (www.bluewater.co.uk; Lend Lease, 1999) but by then a corner had been at least partly turned.

The position on individual superstores (often more locally damaging to smaller town centres) remains more fluid. Major retailers, although modestly reinvesting in existing town and city centres, also persist with this form of out-of-town development. But existing centres are increasingly trying to retaliate. New measures introduced under the 2003 Local Government Act will permit existing centres to be designated as Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). These will encourage local businesses to act collectively to boost investor and consumer confidence, funded partly by special levies on the areas affected. The initiative draws directly on the success of similar measures in the USA, particularly in New York.

Regenerating central areas: Manchester

In Britain, there had already been much physical regeneration of central areas, especially in the biggest cities. The outstanding example was Manchester (Peck and Ward, 2002). Here a cluster of separate initiatives have together had a major impact. The Metrolink, opened in 1992, was the first of a new generation of 'supertram' systems. Combining suburban commuter rail links with on-street central operation, it quickly proved very successful and encouraged new investment in the central area. From the later 1980s Central Manchester Development Corporation also had important impacts on the southern fringe of the city centre (Deas et al., 1999). These included offices, major public buildings, hotels, leisure facilities and housing.

However, it was the huge IRA bomb which exploded in Manchester's central shopping area in August 1996 (fortunately without casualties) which triggered the biggest phase of new investment in the central core. There was major redevelopment of part of the 1970s Arndale Centre, whose original blind exterior walls could now be re-designed. With reduced traffic flows, and a major new public space nearby in Exchange Square, the area became more

pleasant for pedestrians. Several important new stores were constructed, along with a major new urban museum, Urbis. Finally, we should note the impact of Manchester's (unsuccessful) bids for the Olympic Games of 1996 and 2000, especially the second, and the successful hosting of the 2002 Commonwealth Games. Although the main direct impact was, as indicated, in east Manchester, a large indoor arena was also created in the centre. All this also helped encourage a minor boom in central hotel provision.

The bomb and the Olympics/Commonwealth Games brought with them extra central



Figure 9.5 One of the most impressive pieces of 1990s' regeneration was on the western fringes of central Birmingham. Following major public investments in a major convention centre and indoor sports arena (visible in the background), major private developments created the attractive canalside Brindley Place complex.

government funding. In a more general sense, central Manchester also benefited from the unusual clustering of major regeneration initiatives in the Greater Manchester core. Apart from Hulme, Salford Quays, whose development continued through the 1990s and beyond, was nearby, benefiting by connection to the Metrolink system (in 2000). The Lowry Centre and Plaza (2000) and the slightly later Imperial War Museum North (2002) just across the Ship Canal in Trafford Park introduced major cultural elements (and finally brought some real architectural distinction) to the area.

Regenerating central Birmingham

Without Manchester's atypical assistance, central Birmingham underwent a broadly similar transformation. The city council began redeveloping the north-western fringes of the centre in the 1980s. The first, publicly-funded, phase came to fruition in 1991 with the International Convention Centre, National Indoor Arena and Centenary Square (Cherry, 1994; Loftman and Nevin, 1998). The private development of the adjoining Brindley Place was delayed by the property slump but started in earnest from 1993 when building of the Water's Edge restaurant and leisure area began (www.brindleyplace.com). The main office buildings and the National Sealife Aquarium followed from 1995, along with a new public space. Nearby areas were also transformed, most notably the Mailbox, a mixed retailing, residential, office and leisure development, reusing a former Royal Mail sorting depot.

Even more ambitious were the changes in the historic central area and its eastern fringes. The extensive pedestrianization planned in the 1980s was completed and a major new public space opened at Victoria Square in 1993. Extensive deployment of public art added interest to the new



Figure 9.6 The main central core of Birmingham also underwent important improvements, including extensive pedestrianization and creation of large public spaces. Public art was widely used, for example here at Victoria Square, opened in 1993.

spaces. More dramatic was the proposed redevelopment of the 1960s' Bull Ring shopping centre (and markets) (www.thenewbullring.com). Like Brindley Place, the project was delayed but the new markets opened in 2000 and the new Bull Ring in 2003. Like Manchester, the design rejected the blind-wall, fully enclosed mall style favoured in the 1960s. The landmark 1960s' Rotunda tower will, however, be retained. Meanwhile the inner ring road of the same vintage is being downgraded and its elevated structures removed. This will facilitate major regeneration on the eastern side of the centre. The first major element was the publicly-funded Millennium Point, an interactive science museum, technology centre and IMAX cinema, opened in 2001.

Other cities

Similar trends were apparent elsewhere. In Newcastle and Gateshead, the momentum created by the Tyne and Wear UDC continued (Byrne, 1999; www.newcastle.gov.uk/ccap.nsf). The Quayside, long abandoned as the hub of Tyneside life, now saw more entertainment, cultural, residential and commercial development, with major public spaces. As elsewhere, public projects (largely funded by Gateshead) were crucial (www.gateshead-quays.com). The remarkable Gateshead Millennium Bridge (opened 2001), the Baltic centre for contemporary art, reusing a vast flour mill (2002), and the Sage music centre (2004) have transformed the development potential of the Tyne's south bank. A further wave of private development, mainly residential, is currently underway.

Few other cities could boast central area developments quite as spectacular as those already discussed. But most showed at least some elements, especially the creation of major new public



Figure 9.7 Newcastle also extended its central area, in its case down to the Quayside. By the early years of the new century iconic new developments such as the magnificent Gateshead Millennium Bridge and Baltic arts centre were carrying this momentum across the Tyne.

spaces. Thus Leeds's impressive history of central pedestrianization (the most sustained of any British big city) continued with Millennium Square (Smales and Whitney, 1996; www.leeds.gov.uk/millenniumsquare). During its short life, the Leeds Development Corporation also facilitated the impressive re-integration of the dingy riverside area, particularly the historic Calls district, with the main city centre.

Regenerating London

All this provincial regeneration put London rather in the shade during the 1990s. Until 2000 the absence of an effective London-wide authority meant that regeneration was more disjointed than elsewhere. (Matters have improved since then, although tensions remain.) Highlights included the ambitious conversion of Bankside power station into a major art gallery (opened in 2001) along with a beautiful (though initially unusable) pedestrian bridge across the Thames. Together, these encouraged further regeneration of the south bank. However, London's main regeneration achievements continued to be in the east. The belated arrival of the Jubilee underground line helped fuel a further property boom in Docklands from the late 1990s, particularly at Canary Wharf (Brownill, 1999). Still more ambitious regeneration efforts lay further downstream, on the Greenwich peninsula (www.greenwichpeninsula.co.uk). Much public money went into the Millennium Dome. To date this has been a white elephant, although, with the Greenwich Millennium Village, it launched the most important regeneration project in early twenty-first-century London.

The Thames Gateway

The Greenwich peninsula marked the inner edge of the most ambitious regeneration project in Britain during the 1990s. Called the Thames Gateway, its scale was regional rather than merely urban. (As we will see, it also had important implications for outer metropolitan growth.) Although the basic idea had been previously aired, it effectively began in 1991, when Heseltine commissioned the East Thames Corridor study. A more specific approach then evolved, emerging in 1995 as the Thames Gateway Strategy (DETR, 2001b). The intention was to regenerate a great swathe of riverside from the London Docklands to south Essex and, especially, north Kent. In 1995, some 110,000 new dwellings were eventually anticipated, 70,000 of them by 2006 (RPG9a, 1995). The strategy did not set specific employment targets, but later estimates indicated a potential for up to 200,000 new jobs. Much that was to be redeveloped was brownfield, associated with dock and industrial activity and extensive mineral exploitation. It included large amounts of seriously contaminated land.

Implementing the Thames Gateway Strategy

It was symptomatic of British planning in the 1990s that boldness of aims was not matched by the means with which to achieve them. The minister who introduced the strategy described it as 'providing runway landing lights' (DETR, 2001b, s. 2.12), meaning that it was indicative rather than directive. The idea was that it would capitalize on existing and new public infrastructure assets. As well as the M25 motorway, these included the Docklands Light Railway (extended in 1994 and 1999), the Jubilee Line (extended in 1999) and various trunk road improvements. The spine holding the whole Gateway together will be the high-speed rail link from the Channel Tunnel (itself opened in 1994) to London. This was begun, belatedly, in 1998 and will be completed in 2007.

The specific mechanisms to exploit this growing development potential were more diffuse.

EP played an important role, reclaiming derelict land, and SRB funds were a vital early endorsement. But implementation increasingly relied on private developers delivering public benefits through planning gain. There was no single Thames Gateway development authority, and public–private development partnerships of varying effectiveness appeared in different parts of the Gateway area (e.g. www.kent-thameside.org.uk)

The revised strategy

In 2003 the strategy was revised beyond a ‘landing lights’ approach (ODPM, 2003a). We will say more later about the Gateway beyond London but should note here that, within London, its area now included the Isle of Dogs and parts of Lewisham. As noted earlier, two new UDCs are to operate in specific areas, ostensibly to enhance established partnerships. The real reason may be the old Thatcherite one of limiting the hand of potentially troublesome local political interests. Certainly this is a tempting analysis of the rationale for the London Thames Gateway UDC, operating in the capital, particularly since the Mayor’s London Development Agency might otherwise seek the key role. Meanwhile, management of the Gateway project will be strengthened and a Cabinet Committee will consider overall development issues. Over the whole Gateway there will be an additional £446 million of government funding over three years for land assembly, housing, neighbourhood renewal and what, since 1999, was termed ‘urban renaissance’.

Towards an urban renaissance?

Even before 2000 the many actions underway in Britain’s big cities were beginning to take on a more coherent appearance. As in the 1890s, the approach of a new century (indeed in the 1990s, a new millennium) encouraged much thought about the common future. Thanks to the National Lottery, created in 1994, large funds were also channelled into public projects (including many of those mentioned) to celebrate the arrival of the ‘magic’ year 2000. Of course, the answer to the urban question of the 1890s had been to escape the city. The answer to that of the 1990s was about trying to find ways to return.

The Rogers Report

An important symptom of this mood was the Urban Task Force established by Prescott at the DETR. It was chaired by Lord (Richard) Rogers, one of Britain’s most internationally renowned architects. Designer of the ill-starred Millennium Dome (although not its dismal contents), Rogers had contributed significantly to 1990s’ debates about Britain’s urban future (Rogers, 1997). His Task Force also included leading academics, professionals and developers. Their final report, *Towards an Urban Renaissance* (Rogers Report, 1999), signalled an important turning point in official British planning thinking. Its main points of international reference were European, especially from the Netherlands, Germany and Barcelona. There were also American lessons but no longer the uncritical admiration of the 1980s. The report’s essential message was that, despite recent regeneration efforts, far more had been achieved in continental European cities than in British ones. It argued therefore for a European-style cherishing and repopulation of cities. The dominant British desire for low-density, car-based living was challenged by this vision of a more vibrant, higher-density way of living. Among much else, the report pressed for increased government commitment to public transport and the public environment of cities.

Delivering an urban renaissance?

The report's 105 recommendations set the agenda for the urban White Paper, *Our Towns and Cities: The Future – Delivering an Urban Renaissance* (DETR, 2000). More a review of what was already being done than itself a major policy shift, it accepted the broad logic of the Task Force's arguments and showed how it was adopting some of its recommendations, albeit on a small scale. For example, nine pilot 'home zones' were established in 1999. These emulated a long-established Dutch initiative called the *woonerf* (living yard), itself partly inspired by Buchanan's 1960s' concept of the 'environmental area' (Hass-Klau, 1990). Essentially home zones were areas where movement priorities were changed, slowing motor traffic and giving equal weight to pedestrians and cyclists. The first examples were in Ealing and Lambeth in London, Leeds, Manchester, Magor in Monmouthshire, Nottingham, Peterborough, Sittingbourne and Plymouth.

Yet the tendency to talk big and act small left the strong impression (not least on Rogers himself) that the big questions would not be decisively addressed. At least initially, the Treasury did not want major public spending increases. The government has also remained cautious about transport matters. Although investment in urban public transport increased significantly after 2000, restricting car use has proved an altogether more difficult matter. The truth is that most British people live in places and have (or aspire) to a lifestyle requiring extensive use of the car. A 2002 survey showed the bungalow to be England's favourite dwelling, grotesquely at odds with the Rogers vision (www.cabe.org.uk). Public transport improvements may change matters at the margins but it will take a long time before any major shift occurs, especially if governments remain unwilling to restrict car use. The introduction of congestion charging in central London in 2003 reflects the uniquely bold political leadership of Mayor Ken Livingstone. Were it all to go wrong, there is no doubt the government would happily let him take the blame. If it succeeds (and the early signs have been very promising), it may facilitate a profound change in urban planning.

The 2003 action programme: building for the future

There are also real signs of a growing boldness at central government level. The 2002 Urban Summit gave unprecedented political attention to urban matters. This turned from presentation to substance in 2003 when Prescott issued an action programme, *Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future* (ODPM, 2003a). The words of the title were scarcely the most precise in the planner's dictionary but the programme transcended the 'aspirationism' of the early Blair years. It made real commitments and contained big expenditure increases, amounting to a total planned spend of nearly £22 billion over the period 2003–06.

Its main concern was meeting national (English) housing needs. The funds were allocated differently, as between the less prosperous north and (parts of) the midlands and the buoyant south. For the former, improving rundown council housing and preventing the collapse of housing markets in older urban areas were the major objectives. For the 'greater south east', the problems were building affordable housing and accommodating growth. Along with the enhanced Thames Gateway Strategy, mentioned earlier, several other growth areas were identified (to be discussed in connection with outer metropolitan growth management). In addition, more attention was given to reclaiming derelict land and creating new urban parks.

An economic policy for cities?

This programme also showed real Treasury commitment to urban regeneration. Perhaps this is because, as always, a prudent Chancellor wants major funds to be spent wisely. Yet it may

reveal a widening of government thinking about cities. The long-standing urban regeneration preoccupations have been with physical area regeneration, developer profits and social palliatives. Conspicuously absent has been any real economic policy for cities. One by-product of the new regionalism has been to highlight the central importance of European cities in the enviable performance of their wider regions. Cities are not just sites of dereliction and social dysfunction, they can be centres of innovation. Barcelona, Lille, Hamburg or Helsinki do not just look good as physical entities or deliver effective welfare to their citizens, they do these things because they also perform well as engines of their respective regional and national economies. Therein lies the key to true regeneration. The challenge to practitioners will be to facilitate this transition in British urban policy.

Planning outer metropolitan growth

The forgotten issue?

So great was official interest in the new regionalism and urban regeneration that it might seem that urban planning's other strategic dimensions had quietly been forgotten. It will be recalled that the 1980s saw important conflicts over outer metropolitan development. The statutory New Towns, especially the later ones, contained the last large green-field areas allocated for development around London and, to a lesser extent, other metropolitan areas. These were used extensively by private builders in the 1980s and 1990s. By 1994, however, only the Scottish New Town development corporations remained (and these not for long). The Commission for the New Towns (CNT) and later (in England) EP continued to make land available for new developments in the former New Towns but their quantitative significance for housing supply obviously dwindled.

Large private housing developments

As we saw, the most ambitious 1980s' applications for entirely new large-scale private developments in the outer city were rejected. Consortium Development's 'Westmere' near Cambridge, and Eagle Star's proposed new market town at Micheldever, Hampshire, fell in 1991 and 1993 (Hebbert, 1992; Cullingworth and Nadin, 1994). Yet a few large private developments had been approved and were built up in the 1990s (Breheny et al., 1993). Bradley Stoke near Bristol became Britain's biggest private residential development and was close to its planned size of 8,500 dwellings (approximately 20,000 inhabitants) by 2003. A few other large scale developments were also substantially completed during the same period, such as Church Langley, Harlow. Another was Chafford Hundred in Essex, about two-thirds complete by 2003.

Problems with large developments

A fundamental problem was that these large new settlements took a long time to develop. Apart from a lengthy planning process, with a high risk of rejection, most required costly infrastructure before houses could be built and sold. This in turn posed financing problems. In former days the public sector, mainly as New Town Development Corporations, had absorbed the heavy 'front-end' costs of building new settlements, eventually receiving income from rents (and later, sales). But since the 1970s, the emphasis had shifted to private developers. In practice, this meant consortia of several volume housebuilders who provided infrastructure and public facilities through complex planning agreements. The need for developers to secure

returns on investments earlier than public authorities effectively limited the scale of development they could contemplate.

As previously, therefore, much new housebuilding continued to take place on many smaller sites on the edge of small towns and large villages. As already noted, government policies also pushed volume builders into discovering the (for them) surprising possibilities of brownfield sites. Yet, as also noted, most British people remained profoundly unimpressed by living in cities, where most brownfield land was located. Certainly such sites existed elsewhere (typically former mineral workings, like Chafford Hundred, and ex-military sites). One problem was that financing and planning agreements/obligations on such sites were far more complex than on previously undeveloped sites. Nor did the brownfield label (itself often not as clear-cut as might be imagined) automatically guarantee that local resistance to development would evaporate. The fundamental problem, however, was that there was simply not enough brownfield land, especially in the outer metropolitan areas of southern England, to avoid building on green fields.

Compact city arguments

The anti-development lobby meanwhile took comfort from the growing interest in sustainability. In particular, the 1990 European Commission *Green Paper on the Urban Environment* authoritatively endorsed the concept of the compact city (CEC, 1990a, 1990b). Such views were further reinforced by Friends of the Earth and the Policy Studies Institute (Elkin et al., 1991). Both criticized the traditional decentralist thrust of British planning and its rigid separation of land uses. Instead, the case for higher-density urban living was articulated, allowing better access to urban services, closer proximity to work and less commuting. As we have seen, such arguments had a growing influence on policy and were particularly encouraged in the Rogers Report (1999). Yet these views were not accepted wholeheartedly (e.g. Breheny, 1992b; Breheny and Rookwood, 1993; Hall and Ward, 1998). Many pro-decentralist critics remembered British planning's disastrous post-war dalliance with high-density social housing. More neutral commentators also questioned some of the more simplistic assumptions of the model (Jenks et al., 1996; Williams et al., 2000). But these doubts did not seriously damage the growing hold exerted by compact city arguments on the thinking of policy-makers.

Green belts in the 1990s

The prevention of urban sprawl, and therefore a strengthening of containment policies, were seen as an integral part of this approach. Not that green belt and other countryside protection policies were in danger of significant relaxation. They had, after all, prospered in the 1980s under the most avowedly pro-market government of recent times. The political rhetoric (and reality) of the 1990s was much less threatening. As previously, developers met with precious little success when they tried to get approval to build on green-belt land (Cullingworth and Nadin, 1997, 2002). The area of approved green belts in England also increased slightly in the 1990s, from 15,485 square kilometres in 1989 to 16,523 in 1997. The slightly less reverential Scottish approach was apparent in a slight decline there, mainly around Glasgow (Elson and MacDonald, 1997). Even so, a new Scottish green belt, for Clackmannan, was added in the mid-1990s and there are strong pressures for a further one around St Andrews. Although Wales remains without green belts, one has (yet again) been mooted for the Cardiff–Newport area.

Strategic gaps, green wedges and rural buffers

There were also growing signs that planning authorities were inventing new categories of urban fringe protection, known variously as strategic gaps, rural buffers or green wedges (DETR, 2001a). These were intended, respectively, to protect the separate identity of settlements, to prevent coalescence and to protect open land near urban areas. These were broadly identical to the aims of green belts. The proposed areas were, however, on a smaller scale. Moreover, unlike the nationally approved green belts, they were purely local designations, with correspondingly less expectation of their permanence. Yet they were stated with increasing boldness in structure plans and influenced development control decisions. They also met with growing national acknowledgement (e.g. ODPM, 2003a).

By 1999, 17 English counties, mainly in the south, had defined such areas. In many cases, they were 'consolation prizes' following refusal of green belt status. Several of the largest were just beyond the outer edge of the London green belt. In some cases, for example, in Hampshire, they began to look like green belts achieved by stealth. Yet they were not just a southern phenomenon. In north east Wales, for example, green barrier areas protected the outer flanks of the Cheshire green belt. They were also used in different circumstances in Scotland, for example by Inverness.

Household growth and housing needs

The hegemony of containment and restraint in urban-fringe areas thus went largely unchallenged during the 1990s. Yet a major problem was looming, already mentioned but with huge implications for outer metropolitan development. From 1995 the government ratcheted up its commitment to brownfield development (DETR, 1998a). Yet this still meant that half of future housing needs (40 per cent from 1998) would need to be met by *green-field* developments. Moreover, during this same period came the official estimates that up to 4.4 million new dwellings would be needed by 2016 (DoE, 1996). Of course, there was (and continues to be) much dispute about the reliability of these estimates. But it is clear that, even with higher densities, much farmland would have to be developed, particularly in the south east and eastern regions surrounding London.

Throughout the 1990s, however, there was no clear indication where these green fields suitable for housebuilding would be. The volume housebuilders bought land in likely areas. But Gummer and Prescott felt that rushing to make large-scale planned allocations of previously unbuilt land for development would damage the ongoing shift to brownfield. They also recognized that, in most such areas, serious local resistance (and political damage) would follow even the merest hints of major housing developments. To a large extent, therefore, local planning authorities during the 1990s had to grapple with these questions themselves.

New ideas for new settlements

Even so, debates about new, or substantially new, settlements began to become more animated. Prince Charles, no less, made his own contribution to new community planning at Poundbury, an extension of Dorchester (Thompson-Fawcett, 1998; www.princeofwales.gov.uk). It was planned as a neo-traditional village, sparking great interest about how to make new developments feel more like 'real' communities (rather as the urban villages tried to do within cities, although more impressively). This was important because large developments had become equated with undistinguished examples like Lower Earley. Although much smaller, Poundbury suggested that things could be different. The centenary in 1998 of Ebenezer

Howard's book, *To-morrow*, also triggered some updating of the garden city vision for the twenty-first century. Peter Hall and Colin Ward unveiled an equally visionary proposal to create regional networks of rail-oriented new garden cities throughout southern England (Hall and Ward, 1998).

There was also important new research. In 1993, for example, the DoE published a study on new settlements (Breheny et al., 1993). This stated the case for relatively large developments of about 10,000 dwellings (comparable to the original garden cities). On the whole, though, such large new settlements were not built because of a lack of research. It was true that no one had lately thought very deeply about these issues, but the reasons lay more in the economics of their development and, even more fundamentally, a lack of political will by local (and especially central) governments. Even smaller new settlements were difficult enough to bring to fruition.

Cambridgeshire's new settlement policies

An exception was Cambridgeshire, whose planners and politicians recognized that small new settlements had real advantages in managing Cambridge's growth. In 1994 the new settlement of Cambourne received planning approval, its development (by three volume housebuilders) beginning in 1998 (www.cambourne-uk.com). Some 3,300 dwellings were initially intended,



Figure 9.8 Although not above criticism, Cambourne, near Cambridge, was an interesting new settlement of the late 1990s. It followed many of the precepts of Poundbury, transcending the worst aspects of normal housing estate development. This view shows part of Cambourne's developing centre with the business park in the background.

with a maximum population of perhaps 10,000. It also had its own local services and a sizeable business park. By 2003, however, there were criticisms that Cambourne was too small and too low-density to be truly sustainable. Current proposals would take it to 5,000 dwellings. Cambridgeshire is also inclined to move further with new settlements. A more ambitious example, yet to be named, is proposed in the current structure plan, for 6,000 dwellings by 2016 but with the ultimate potential for 10,000. Other planning authorities have also considered similar possibilities, in some cases on old military sites. Few others seem likely to go very far along this route, however, without more central backing.

Large urban expansions

PPG3 *Housing*, as revised in 2000, was ostensibly quite positive about new settlements, provided they were in the 'right location' and had the 'right concept' (PPG3, 2000, ss. 72–75). In particular, they should be sufficiently large to be planned on sustainable principles, having good public transport links, local services and employment. Generally, though, the guidance saw planned urban extensions as the better option, second only to urban infill (usually brownfield) development. It did, however, acknowledge that new settlements might actually be large urban extensions, rather than being completely freestanding. Such an expansion was, in fact, already proposed for West Stevenage, extending the pioneer New Town into the green belt (www.weststevenage.co.uk). Hertfordshire and Stevenage had suggested it to meet a shortfall in the county's housing land allocation. Its fate was being considered in 2003 but local opposition and Hertfordshire's recent conversion to brownfield development raise doubts about whether (or when) it will be built.

Predicting and not providing

By this time wider changes were beginning, although not before the final piece of 1990s' wishful thinking about housing land, especially in the 'greater south east'. This was that the predicted tide of household formation could somehow be stemmed if houses were not actually built in the quantities implied by the predictions. This argument appealed to planners in the most pressured regions who feared forcing large-scale housing developments on their reluctant authorities. As so often, the government (like its predecessors) found a way of sitting on the fence. In 1998 there was a change in the language of policy, from 'predict and provide' to 'plan, monitor and manage' (DETR, 1998a). Basically this avoided any immediate need to take major action over housing land in the hope that the problem might diminish. Of course, there was no realistic chance this could actually happen without draconian and immediate actions to reduce regional imbalance. A communist regime might have done this, even wartime Britain, but certainly not 'third way' new regionalism.

Discovering a housing crisis

Some significant shifts in planning policies towards housing did occur. From 1998, for example, the government pressed developers of housing schemes of over 25 dwellings (15 in London) to include some affordable housing or risk refusal of planning permission (DETR, 1998b). Although this was moderately successful, it did not tackle the generally low level of housebuilding. By 2002 there were more households than dwellings. These years also saw a giddy rise in housing costs, fuelled by low interest rates, high economic growth and, of course, scarcity. Although rising house prices encouraged short-term prosperity by fuelling consumer confidence, they also threatened longer-term economic growth. This was because, without

enough affordable housing in the buoyant regions, it would be difficult to attract and retain workers, especially in key services such as transport, education or health. There was, in short, a housing crisis. After more than a decade of ostrich-like behaviour by successive governments, the second Blair administration actively began to facilitate housing supply. They recognized that they had to return to allocating sizeable areas for outer metropolitan development in the south east and east (ODPM, 2003a). Even so, Prescott resisted the strongest pressures, from the public examination panel which reported in forthright terms in 1999 on the draft RPG for the south east (Cullingworth and Nadin, 2002) and from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation in 2002 (JRF, 2002).

Revisiting the Thames Gateway

What Prescott did do, as we have noted, was to extend the Thames Gateway and try to move its development into higher gear (ODPM, 2003a). Its location and extensive recycling of brownfield land had always made it particularly attractive to local authorities in the south east and east. Yet, although there had been some progress, continuing infrastructure and other problems had ensured that it was too modest in scale to address the mounting housing crisis. A 2001 review (DETR, 2001b) revealed problems tackling the more difficult sites on a planning obligations basis. Naturally, the easier sites had been used first, so that the problems would become progressively more difficult. And, since developer profits were the key to planning gain, they would be further compounded by a growing emphasis on building less profitable, lower-cost housing and associated community provision. There were also problems of overall image and definition of the Gateway and its component elements.

The outer metropolitan Gateway

In 2003, after extensive negotiations with the Treasury, Prescott unveiled his development plans for the Thames Gateway (ODPM, 2003a; 2003b). In 2001, the Gateway had been enlarged to include more of south Essex (RPG9, 2001). Key zones of change were identified, outside London covering Mid-Gateway (Thurrock and Ebbsfleet), Essex towns (Southend and Basildon) and Medway cluster (Medway, Sittingbourne, Sheerness and Grain). Together with the inner and outer London zones, these could eventually accommodate up to 200,000 new dwellings, many more than originally contemplated, though only 120,000 of these could be built by 2016. At the core of the whole project was the cross-Thames Mid-Gateway, capable of providing up to 47,300 homes and 51,600 new jobs. Substantially defined by the M25 and the Channel Tunnel rail link (with a major international station and freight hub at Ebbsfleet), it includes the recently developed Lakeside and Bluewater regional shopping centres, along with Chafford Hundred. A cluster of new settlements is being promoted to reuse former chalk pits in the Ebbsfleet valley, beginning at Eastern Quarry (www.easternquarry.co.uk). This area particularly is likely to provide an early glimpse of large-scale planned outer metropolitan development in the twenty-first century.

Changing development mechanisms

This area of Kent-Thameside has been particularly successful in forging an effective development partnership (www.kent-thameside.org.uk). This may reflect the extensive property holdings there of a single and very large developer, Land Securities. As in London, public-private partnership remains the preferred development approach but in 2003 the balance perceptibly shifted towards a more active public-sector role. This is particularly evident

in the Essex half of the Mid-Gateway zone. Here the Gateway's second UDC is being created at Thurrock, to channel public funds into land assembly and reclamation and create a stronger marketing identity. EP and, although probably to a lesser extent than in London, the RDAs, will also play important roles.

Milton Keynes–South Midlands

Alongside this, several new major urban expansions look likely to proceed on substantially undeveloped sites around London, although the exact strategies are not finalized at the time of writing (www.go-se.gov.uk; ODPM, 2003b). Clearest is that for the Milton Keynes area, including also Northampton, Wellingborough, Corby, Bedford and Luton. All these can expect very substantial housebuilding. With less spectacular growth of other settlements in the wider area, perhaps as many as 134,000 new dwellings could be accommodated by 2016. Although doubts remain as to the exact development mechanisms, some building is likely to begin quite soon. This is especially so at Milton Keynes itself where EP (as successor to the CNT) is the major landowner and infrastructure is already very good. Catalyst Corby, the former New Town's recently created URC, is also pushing strongly for expansion (www.urcs-online.co.uk).

Ashford and London–Stansted–Cambridge

In Kent, the long-anticipated major expansion of Ashford finally looks set to occur, by up to 31,000 new dwellings and 28,000 new jobs by 2031 (www.go-se.gov.uk; ODPM, 2003b). Here suggestions that a New Town Development Corporation should be created have been rejected in favour of a local partnership approach. However, this is dependent on substantial central funding for infrastructure and social provision and town centre regeneration. Reflecting rapid economic and airport growth, very large-scale expansion (currently of undecided scale and spatial distribution) is also being contemplated for the London–Stansted–Cambridge area. It seems likely there will be major growth in the Harlow–Stansted area and around Cambridge (the latter perhaps implying a scaling-up of the existing new settlement policy).

Major growth and urban containment

These last three urban expansions will involve major incursions into green belts or otherwise valued areas of open countryside. Prescott's 2003 action programme promises to strengthen protection (ODPM, 2003a). Yet this does not seem to mean that currently protected land may not be developed, rather that further open land will be protected. At the time of writing there are definite signs of green belts being loosened (in the sense of being moved outwards) to facilitate expansion around Cambridge, in the east Midlands and around Bristol and Bath. Even in the metropolitan green belt, some loosening around Luton and Dunstable looks likely. In a more general sense, a debate of sorts about the future of green belts is also taking shape. The Royal Town Planning Institute is currently pressing for green-belt modernization (www.rtpi.org.uk). This would involve green belts, rather than remaining simply as traditional 'stoppers', being properly integrated with other facets of spatial planning, including promoting sustainable developments.

It is, however, debatable whether technical changes to green-belt policies are needed to achieve such objects. As always, the question is essentially political. Despite (or perhaps because of) Britain's highly urbanized character, a wide spectrum of society, including many of its most powerful members, see rural protection as planning's principal function. Major urban

development on green fields in the regions surrounding London will undoubtedly trigger strong opposition. To confront such deep social convictions with reality requires a level of political leadership and courage that only occasionally surfaces. Whether the early twenty-first century will be such an occasion remains to be seen.

OVERVIEW

The years since 1990 have therefore seen a slow revival in planning's fortunes and the emergence of a new consensus. Even if the rhetoric of a 'plan-led' system belied a reality that has still been essentially market-led, political onslaughts on the idea of planning have largely ceased. The concept of partnership has allowed an ideological reconciliation of public and private interests. It has also allowed some degree of genuine popular involvement, even though its real scale has been exaggerated. For all its elastic meaning, sustainability has simultaneously underpinned a new belief in planning, and self-belief within the planning movement. Urban and regional regeneration have meanwhile fostered a new interest in the changing face of cities. There are now the welcome glimmerings of high-level political recognition that the fate of cities is central to national economic and social well-being. Most importantly of all, there are a few signs that the political weakness or timidity of the 1990s is beginning to be replaced in the new century by a greater willingness at least to face the bigger issues. Acting effectively enough on them, especially with regard to infrastructural investment, may yet prove a step too far but there are some grounds for optimism.

For all this strengthening of the ideological and, to some extent, the real position of planning, most planners did much the same things in 2003 that they had in 1990. The note of confidence in their voices certainly became stronger, their message a little more coherent, their impact on urban change consequently a little greater. Yet, when a new agenda is so evidently in the making, other voices also grow in confidence. Having discovered the concept of sustainability, the architectural profession was itself seized with the urge to ride to the rescue of planning. Less individually obvious, but collectively important nevertheless, were the voices of those with land and development, environmental, transport and other expertise. Mainstream local authority planners were meanwhile left largely watching from the wings as new agencies and partnerships, and their consultants, articulated planning's new directions. Although the message was now more palatable, the process by which planning was changed was not that different from the 1980s after all.

10

Planning Impacts since 1945 and the Future

In previous chapters we have often considered the specific effects of particular planning policies and initiatives. This final chapter steps a little further back and starts to assess planning's collective long-term impacts, before offering some final thoughts on the future. A welcome by-product of Thatcherite scepticism about planned intervention has been to encourage the evaluation of individual policy initiatives. But any kind of overall assessment, comparable to the Barlow Commission in the late 1930s, has been lacking. All too often planners (and decision-makers) have mistaken the latest policy initiative for a future urban trend. Yet if we try to look beyond intention, we must rely on unofficial, incomplete and sometimes rather biased assessments. The nearest thing to an exception to this generalization was Political and Economic Planning's weighty study, *The Containment of Urban England* (Hall et al., 1973). Yet there has been nothing to match it over the last three decades. A recent collective effort (Cullingworth, 1999) has combined an overview of policy with some useful reflections on impacts, although very much as a minor theme. Meanwhile the research surrounding the recent Urban Task Force reveals growing governmental interest in wider and longer-term impacts, though without so far focusing very precisely on planning (Robson et al., 2000).

It is, of course, very difficult to assess overall impacts because they are actually an interaction between intentions, policies and instruments and the other powerful and diverse economic, social and political forces that shape urban change (e.g. Cooke, 1989; Fielding and Halford, 1990; Whitehand, 1992). Since planners have, mainly, tried to plan with, rather than against, these broad trends of change, it remains difficult to determine what part of urban change is attributable to planning, or what would have happened without planning. But the issues are so important that we must try, using both evidence from previous chapters and such impact studies as exist. We focus initially on planning's effects on the spatial arrangement of cities and regions.

SPATIAL IMPACTS OF PLANNING

The city centre

Protecting commercial functions

Despite some wavering in the 1980s, planning's main direct long-term impacts here have been to protect and enhance established commercial functions. As we have seen, planners played important roles in facilitating the renewal and extension of the commercial fabric of city centres, creating new shops and offices. Already declining central area land uses such as manufacturing, wholesale warehousing and distribution and, at least until recently, residential have been further diminished. A change of heart on the latter is now underway, seemingly with some success (Robson et al., 2000). Planning's key intervention in producing these effects

has been facilitating the formation of large redevelopment sites from previous, often fragmented, ownerships. This role, sometimes achieved by compulsory purchase, would certainly have been very difficult for individual private developers to do alone. Without such planned intervention, it seems likely that private redevelopment efforts would have been either rather piecemeal or limited exclusively to parts of city centres where large land holdings were typical. Inevitably, off-centre and suburban commercial development would have seemed much more attractive, as in most North American cities. Yet in Britain the positive role in central area site assembly was accompanied by strong negative controls. Until the 1980s at least, planning policies discouraged commercial development outside the established centres and especially on the urban fringe.

Relative decline and decentralization

This is not the whole story, however. Despite planned redevelopment, central areas in big cities have not generally matched national trends of growth in retailing and office-based activities. Such statistics as there are suggest a marked long-term relative decline, and occasionally absolute decline, in central areas within big cities, although not on the scale of many American cities (Law et al., 1988). The experience of the centres of smaller towns and cities has been more varied, and some in more buoyant places have performed well. Everywhere food and bulky non-food retailing have shifted away from central areas, especially since the 1970s (e.g. Dawson, 1991). Office employment has also shown somewhat weaker shifts in the same direction.

These trends are to some extent planning impacts, in that post-war strategic policies to reduce population densities in the inner areas of the big cities, to be discussed more fully below, meant that correspondingly fewer people used central areas for their local shopping needs. More recently, planners have often acquiesced, usually fairly pragmatically, in off-centre superstore and retail warehouse developments. Recent attempts at inner-city regeneration have also more explicitly encouraged development of retailing, office and other traditional central area functions outside central areas. The effects of these moves on central areas have been varied. In some cases, such as Birmingham, an enlargement and strengthening of the central area is visible. In others, for example Sheffield, central areas have been damaged by retailing developments in urban regeneration areas.

Other processes of change

We must also recognize the crucial role of more general factors in this partial decentralization of traditional central area functions. Even without planning there would still, for reasons we will outline below, have been marked declines in inner-city populations, with big knock-on effects for central areas. The growing post-war reliance on the car has also had a huge negative effect on the relative attractiveness of central areas for both shopping and office development. Of course, planners are not free of involvement in this. Planners and politicians, especially in the 1960s, tried to make central areas into car-friendly places. Yet their success was limited and usually came at the cost of seriously damaging the interests of other users of central areas (including motorists themselves when they actually left their cars).

Since Victorian times, the pre-eminence of central areas has reflected their optimum accessibility within a city based on public transport. An (at best) half-hearted post-war approach to public transport, mounting traffic congestion and parking difficulties in central areas has shifted the optimum location for the car-using shopper and office worker. Major

motorway intersections have replaced central rail and bus stations as the most accessible hubs for some traditional central-area functions (although, of course, it still requires planners to permit development to occur in these locations). Improvements to public transport and pedestrian environments have offered a partial antidote for some central areas. However, these have not so far been on a scale sufficient to counter Britain becoming a car-based society, less dependent on traditional central areas. The American-style 'hole in the doughnut' has never seemed a likely scenario for the biggest British cities. Yet recent policy shifts, promoting leisure, tourism, speciality retailing and the restoration of some residential population in central areas show a sense of vulnerability that was absent in the first two decades after 1945.

The inner city

Replacing the slums

Planned redevelopment also had a profound effect on the inner cities during the two decades from the mid-1950s. Many of the oldest and most decrepit dwellings, the street corner shops, many public houses and other smaller places of business were removed. They were replaced by entirely new urban landscapes with new roads, more open space, new areas of municipal housing (often provided as multi-storey flats), new schools and new service centres. This was only part of the impact of redevelopment, however. Despite a strong policy push for high-density housing forms, overall population densities in areas of redeveloped housing were invariably much lower (usually between one-third and two-thirds) than before clearance. This change was most dramatic in the biggest cities (e.g. Coates and Silburn, 1980; Smith and Farmer, 1985). There was, accordingly, a very marked population decline directly associated with redevelopment. In the same way, the removal of shops and backyard industries also reduced business activity, although the decline was smaller than that of population. Bigger factories were usually untouched by the clearance process. An estimate of a 25 per cent inner-city job loss directly attributable to redevelopment in Manchester was probably fairly typical of the bigger cities (Law et al., 1988, p. 127).

Housing and population decline

Yet again, planned redevelopment was only part of the story. Other factors contributed to a huge decline in inner-city populations over the post-war period. Between 1961 and 1981 alone, populations in the urban cores (that is inner and central areas, mainly the former) of Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham and London declined by 46.1, 43.4, 39.9 and 28.4 per cent, respectively (Law et al., 1988, pp. 89–91). This was far more than could be explained by redevelopment, which generally affected only the most decrepit quarters. In most English cities, population decline was the net result of complex inward and outward movements, as Caribbean and south Asian immigrant communities established themselves in areas which were being left in even larger numbers by indigenous white populations (Redfern, 1982). By contrast, cities in the less prosperous regions, such as Newcastle, Liverpool or Glasgow, received fewer immigrants so that population decline was usually more dramatic.

The growing desire for (and achievement of) owner-occupation was also important in encouraging outward movement. This was because inner-city areas were dominated by rented, increasingly public rented, housing (Herington, 1984). Moreover, owner-occupation has been less easy to achieve in the inner cities because it is generally easier to secure bigger mortgages (requiring less previous saving by the buyer) on newer rather than on older housing. This

automatically tends to favour the suburbs and outer cities, where (apart from public rental housing) the average age of housing is generally lower than in the inner areas. The problem was compounded by the long-term unwillingness of building societies to advance loans on any terms to buy housing in many specific 'red-lined' inner-city areas (Boddy, 1980, pp. 68–71, 176). Such practices have now largely ceased (although former council housing in some inner-city areas is still often treated with disdain by mainstream lenders). These practices undoubtedly influenced the decline of inner-city housing markets over several post-war decades. Often it was only Commonwealth immigrant communities who bought housing in many of these areas, partly reflecting their racial exclusion from the main suburban housing markets and reliance on non-mainstream housing loans.

Meanwhile many existing (i.e. white) inner-city populations, who lived outside clearance areas found themselves eligible for council housing on 'general needs' criteria. (This meant, for example, that although their existing home did not need to be demolished, it lacked enough bedrooms for their family's size or was without a bathroom). Generally, such people moved from the inner city to suburban council estates or, to a lesser extent, to New or Expanded Towns (Herington, 1984; Ermisch and Maclennan, 1986). It was true, of course, that planners substantially shaped the physical character of the council estates to which these inner-city leavers were moving. But this influence did not extend to council housing allocation policies and the other more general housing and migration processes that played a central role in inner-city population decline.

Economic change and planning

Planning's role in inner-city economic decline was also limited. In addition to the direct effects of redevelopment, noted above, planners certainly eradicated many other 'non-conforming' industries, mainly those in areas zoned for housing (Buck et al., 1986, pp. 56–7). Planned industrial moves from the inner city to New or Expanded Towns also produced some employment decline, an estimated 14 per cent of London's total job loss between 1960 and 1978, for example (Fothergill et al., 1982). However, none of these planning actions was sufficient to explain the scale of decline in inner-city employment. In the six main conurbations of London, Greater Manchester, West Midlands, Merseyside, Tyneside and Clydeside, manufacturing employment in the inner areas (defined more widely here as including centres, inner cities proper and some inner suburban areas) declined by 8 per cent in 1951–61, 26.1 per cent in 1961–71 and 36.8 per cent in 1971–81 (Begg et al., 1986). The main sources of decline were broadly structural, in that inner-city areas contained older industries and less efficient plants, more vulnerable to closure or job loss in periods of national economic strain.

It is fair to ask whether planners might have encouraged the growth of new manufacturing jobs in the inner cities. In contrast to the effort that went into planned redevelopment, almost nothing was done for manufacturing. Yet the national dwindling of manufacturing employment makes it very doubtful whether enough new manufacturing jobs could ever have been attracted into the inner cities to offset their decline (Fothergill and Gudgin, 1982). This certainly was the experience of conurbations in the assisted regions, as we will see below. Inner-city areas had few large sites, certainly none that could be used without extensive (and costly) preparation prior to reuse. Inner cities were, moreover, characterized by workforces with low or redundant skills, inappropriate to the requirements of new 'high-tech' manufacturing (e.g. Buck et al., 1986). We can therefore conclude that, through their policies

of planned redevelopment, planners had some role in inner-city employment decline during the first three post-war decades. But it was a minor one. Moreover, as more recent policy initiatives have shown, it would not have been easy to swim against the growing tide of de-industrialization. This does not mean, though, that regeneration policies have not had some impact.

Urban regeneration and population change

The shift towards housing rehabilitation and away from planned inner-city redevelopment, together with the ending of crude 'red-lining' of areas by building societies, showed signs of being able to slow the 'white flight' to the suburbs during the 1970s. Small-scale, middle-class 'gentrification' of some more attractive inner-city enclaves in prosperous cities was also recognizable (e.g. Ferris, 1972; DoE, 1977a). (This did not always stem population decline, however, since the more affluent usually occupied their homes less intensively than poorer households.) The more dramatic initiatives since the late 1970s have, though, had some more positive impacts.

Thus there was growing evidence during the 1980s and 1990s that rates of inner-city population decline were first slowing and then reversing in many places (e.g. Robson, 1988; OPCS, 1992; Robson et al., 2000). In inner London (covering the central area and the inner city) the picture was especially cheering. Thus a population decline that had been 13 per cent in 1961–71, rising to 18 per cent in 1971–81, had slowed to 6 per cent in 1981–91. The following decade, however, showed a remarkable population *growth* of 18 per cent. Moreover, Tower Hamlets, the inner London borough most affected by urban regeneration, was in the vanguard of this trend, growing at over 7 per cent in 1981–91 and almost 28 per cent in 1991–2001.

Yet London is not typical, because it benefits from an exceptionally buoyant global city economy, attracting substantial inward migration from overseas that more than offset its migrational losses to other parts of Britain. Manchester (a city whose tight boundaries give it an overwhelmingly central and inner-city character) probably captures more of the impact of policy on the urban core of a less economically favoured city. Here massive regeneration efforts have slowed decline from over 17 per cent in 1971–81 to 11 per cent in 1981–91 and only 2 per cent in 1991–2001. Apart from Glasgow, Liverpool and Newcastle, the other big cities show modest increases in the 1990s. However, in the absence of small area analysis, it is difficult to know how far this reflects regeneration-related changes in their cores rather than growth in their suburban fringes. The signs, though, are generally optimistic.

Urban regeneration and economic change

On the economic side, localized inner-city initiatives have claimed impressive new job totals within their areas. By 1997, for example, 222,194 new jobs (gross) had been created within all the UDCs (Imrie and Thomas, 1999). Some clearly replaced other jobs, so overall impacts must necessarily be more limited. Other important economic impacts followed from the reintegration into the wider economy of former derelict areas and the general improvement of inner-city infrastructure and accessibility. More generally, inner-city planners began to protect existing businesses and to nurture small business development. Yet the question is not just about specific small areas and should be examined at a broader scale. (This is because reliable employment data relate to wider areas that more meaningfully capture the realities of urban labour markets.) Some big cities, although fewer than the number showing population

increases, appear to show overall employment growth during the 1990s (Robson et al., 2000). This reflects a growth in private service employment that has finally begun to outweigh de-industrialization, at least in Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and, of course, London. The key questions, however, are not about how many of these new jobs are actually in the inner-city areas of these cities. They are how far the workers living in these areas have the skills to do them and how far do the new jobs give them real prospects of improving their lives and those of their children. On these matters the answers must still be more pessimistic.

The suburbs

Infilling and intensification

The remainder of the continuously built-up area of cities has been less dramatically affected by planning. In the biggest cities, the essential character of these suburban areas was largely set before 1945 (Hall et al., 1973, vols I & II). Planning, particularly in cities where tight containment policies have operated, has encouraged some infilling and intensification of land uses in the suburbs (Whitehand, 1992). Thus the remaining large areas of open land suitable for building within the pre-1945 urban area were typically developed in the first half of the post-war period, usually for public-sector housing. In many cities there were also significant extensions to the suburban area, usually initiated in the first post-war decade. The creation of green belts for many provincial cities and the strengthening of the London green belt in the later 1950s were important in curtailing this expansion. Meanwhile those towns and cities without strict containment policies, or where growth was actively encouraged, have continued their peripheral expansion, albeit in a more tightly controlled way than before 1939 (e.g. Herington, 1989).

Planning and the suburban environment

These controls meant that post-1945 peripheral suburbs showed more of the impress of planning than their pre-1939 equivalents (Clapson, 1998). In public housing areas particularly, neighbourhood principles were usually adopted, producing more careful grouping of dwellings around shared facilities or amenities. Planned employment areas were created in some estates, drawing on the inter-war satellite town idea, although rarely producing anything resembling employment self-containment. On the LCC's post-war 'out-county' estates, for example, the ratio of resident workers to local jobs was about 4:1 (TPI, 1956). All suburbs showed much greater attention to the planned provision of shopping areas and communal services, although adequate facilities did not always materialize, especially on the more isolated peripheral council estates. Gradually, too, more attention was given to the accommodation of motor vehicles, with greater pedestrian-vehicle separation. Inevitably, though, public-sector suburbs remained very dependent on public transport.

Demographic and economic changes

Generally speaking, the more freestanding cities, where planning constraints on peripheral growth have tended to be slacker, have experienced growth in their contiguous suburban areas for longer. By the 1970s, however, virtually all the biggest cities, including most conurbation cities, were showing marked declines in suburban populations and in economic well-being, if not yet on anything like the scale of the inner cities (Redfern, 1982; OPCS, 1992). And it was usually the most planned parts of the suburbs, the public-sector estates, inhabited by the least affluent suburbanites, where these problems were greatest (e.g. Smith and Ford, 1990).

In extreme cases, such as Glasgow or Liverpool, problems are at least as severe as in the inner cities proper (e.g. Meegan, 1989). Some such areas have been defined as inner cities for policy purposes. Many of their problems are familiar, including unemployment arising from a changed economy, poverty, family breakdown, poor educational attainment, drug abuse and crime. Nor were these issues confined to cities with serious economic problems. Even the rather more prosperous cities of Oxford, Bristol and Cardiff experienced serious social unrest on peripheral council estates during 1991. Everywhere a contributory factor to their mix of problems, as in inner-city areas, were the planned living environments. Although often having many pleasant and popular features, community facilities have, almost always, been inadequate. In part, this reflects the prevailing low densities so that, for example, bigger retailers especially have been reluctant to maintain shops, invariably so where there is serious poverty. Moreover, all the other problems are compounded by the greater isolation of suburban locations (a reflection both of density and public transport) which bear particularly disproportionately on the poor.

The outer city

The physical character of the outer city

Beyond the continuously built-up area of the big cities a new outer city has developed, functionally related to the urban cores (though less obviously than was the suburban ring) yet physically separate and lacking in coherence (Herington, 1984). For this reason it has proved difficult to conceptualize. It is, in the 1990s, a landscape of villages and small and medium-sized towns within a setting of green fields (and other space-extensive land uses, including airports, garden centres and gravel pits). Most settlements result from organic growth, and their historic character is typically protected, to some extent, by conservation area policies and green belts. Yet most of the towns are also swollen with more recent accretions of private housing estates, business parks and rustic superstores.

Functional patterns in the outer city

This combination of new and old urbanization within a rural setting has seen the highest rates of population growth of any parts of the urban system since 1945 (OPCS, 1992; Robson et al., 2000). Yet the physical concentration of building and emphasis on the prevention of urban sprawl has rarely produced the urban functional coherence or self-containment that planners have traditionally sought. Patterns of working, shopping and use of services are not as localized as the physical structure of settlements in the outer city superficially suggests. Workers typically travel to work across wide areas that include conurbation core areas, rather than just in the small town or village where they live. Shopping normally involves journeys to a large superstore or comparison shopping between several retail parks. The corollary is that the motor car is an all-pervasive influence, underpinning journeys to work, shop or school to a far greater extent than in concentrated city areas. New motorways and other road improvements, easily inserted in the comparatively open landscape of the outer city, have provided the infrastructure for such movements and, in turn, further stimulated outer-city developments.

Planned decentralization?

This is all very different from what planners intended in the early post-war years or even the 1960s. At those times it was assumed that planned decentralization of the concentrated cities

would play a key role in outer-city development. Some of the larger and fastest-growing towns in the outer-city areas, typically around the biggest cities in more prosperous regions, have indeed been deliberately planned New or Expanded Towns (Clapson, 1998). But these are very much exceptions, accommodating less than 5 per cent of the total UK population and accounting for only small proportions of out-migrants from the concentrated metropolitan areas, far fewer than originally intended.

The Greater London Plan of 1944 (Abercrombie, 1945) had envisaged that almost three-quarters of migration from the capital would be to new satellites or planned country town expansions. By the 1960s the expectations of planned decentralization were being lowered, so that the South East Study (MHLG, 1964) envisaged it accounting for only one-third of outer-city growth. Yet such revisions were still well in excess of the reality. Only about 15 per cent of migrants from London went to such settlements up to the 1970s, a proportion which has fallen dramatically since then (Buck et al., 1986, p. 59). Nor was the pattern very different elsewhere. The 1946 Clyde Valley Plan (Abercrombie and Matthew, 1949) envisaged 60 per cent of Glasgow's out-migrants, virtually all those remaining in the region, going to New Towns. Even during the 1960s, however, when planned decentralization was at its peak, the actual proportion was barely 30 per cent (Smith and Farmer, 1985, p. 63). Significantly, no other city with formal decentralization policies was able to better Glasgow's record. Overall demographic evidence suggests that planned decentralization policies of all kinds had only a rather limited impact on outer-city development.

New and Expanded Towns as employment and service centres

Yet to concentrate on population data understates planning's role. New Towns and many Expanded Towns were relatively large growth centres in the outer city which have done more than just house people. Despite a relatively small direct role in the relocation of existing jobs from big cities, most have performed relatively well in attracting new employment in the post-war growth industries (e.g. Buck and Gordon, 1986). Some, certainly, are now suffering decline, especially those in less favoured regions, but for most the general point remains valid. Moreover, their size and planned development meant that they also acquired good shopping and community facilities (markedly better than the big city suburban public-sector estates mentioned above) which served more than just their own residents (Donnison and Soto, 1980). New forms of retailing and leisure provision have recently brought some changes, although these have only been dramatic in a few cases. (Basildon's centre has lost ground to the Lakeside regional mall, for example.) Although employment and services were initially planned to implement self-containment, these characteristics meant that New and Expanded Towns became focal points for outer-city growth in many areas and this seems set to continue. (It has helped that 'nimby' sentiments are usually less developed among their inhabitants than elsewhere in the outer city.) On balance, it seems that without them outer-city development would be even less co-ordinated than has actually been the case. There would be less concentration of employment and services and even heavier dependence on the car.

Planned containment

There is little doubt about the long-term impact of containment policies (and more general planning restraints on development of rural land) in the outer city. As we have seen, restraint policies, particularly green belts, have been pursued with a sustained rigour that, although not absolute, has not been equalled in any other major aspect of planning (DoE, 1993). The

long-term effects are clear. We must recall that the average annual transfer of land from agricultural to urban use in England and Wales, largely on the urban fringe, had been running at 25,100 hectares per annum in the 1930s (Best, 1981). There was then a post-war decline from 17,500 hectares per annum in 1945–50 to about 15,000 per annum in 1950–65 and a slight rise to 16,800 in 1965–70 (a period which included the all-time housebuilding peak). This was followed by a marked decline to 9,300 in 1975–80, with further falls to about 6,500 hectares per annum in 1985–89. Over time this loss of agricultural land has moved progressively farther away from the big cities, reflecting the impact of green belts and avoiding inter-war-style continuous suburbanization (e.g. Gregory, 1970; Longley et al., 1992).

The dimensions of the general trend have been contested, however, particularly when proposals to weaken restraint policies were mooted in the 1980s. Official figures were challenged as reliable indicators of the loss of rural land. In 1992, for example, the Council for the Protection of Rural England (CPRE) alleged an annual loss of 12,000 hectares of English rural land during the 1980s, compared to official figures of only 5,000 hectares (Sinclair, 1992). Yet this alleged disparity between official and unofficial statistics is of a far greater order than that for earlier post-war decades. Even the CPRE does not quarrel with the long-term trend. There is general agreement that, compared to pre-1945, post-war planning (and policies for agricultural support) have greatly reduced rural land loss.

Outer-city growth management?

Such policies have had much wider effects, mainly in conjunction with forces over which planners had little control. (Although the already noted intermittent policy commitments to planned decentralization were crucially important.) More pervasive, however, were the weaknesses of later and less ambitious attempts at outer-city growth management (Elson, 1985, 1993). The broad aims were to produce a planned spatial coincidence of (largely private) housing, jobs and services in towns, deflecting development pressures from the fringes of London, larger cities and villages. Such strategies drew on the same conceptual tradition as the New and Expanded Towns, but involved little by way of formally planned overspill from larger centres. These apparently neat solutions have also proved even more elusive. The location of employment has been impossible to control effectively in a period of wholesale economic change, major changes to the outer-city transport, mainly road, infrastructure, and weakening planning controls over business. Traditional patterns of shopping are also changing in ways that apparently contradict planning intentions.

Planned or unplanned?

All this begs a similar question to that posed in Chapter 3 about inter-war suburbanization: how far are planners responsible for what is frequently, beneath an outward attention to physical design details, a confusing functional mess, seemingly remote from any stated planning intentions? In other words, is outer-city growth essentially unplanned? The answer is that planning has actually created some of the important preconditions of the recent patterns of outer-city change. Private housing developers have followed, grudgingly in some cases, some of the growth management cues provided by planners, while also opportunistically seeking (and finding) areas beyond or in gaps and weak points within green belts. Moreover, despite these restrictions on land availability, average densities of new housing estates have not been noticeably higher than the inter-war suburbs (Rogers Report, 1999). Paradoxically, though, garden sizes have shrunk (e.g. Winter et al., 1993), but this mainly reflects more space for cars,

rather than an increased overall residential density. Planning's impacts have been even weaker in locating shopping and employment, particularly outside the New and Expanded Towns.

The dominant forces creating the outer city, especially over the last 30 years, have thus been private developers, mortgage lenders and the private car. To this process politicians and planners in central and local governments have given, or been empowered to give, little positive direction. This has given a more piecemeal quality to outer-city urbanization than planners would have wished. In turn, the lack of spatial congruence of homes, jobs and shops has necessitated more daily travel to big cities but increasingly also to other parts of the dispersed outer city. Yet the negative controls of containment and countryside protection were crucial in maintaining the open character of the immediate urban fringe, facilitating the expansion of the road infrastructure which carried most of these daily movements. This, in turn, did much to allow the bewildering changes in outer-city living, employment and shopping patterns (e.g. Headicar and Bixby, 1992).

The regional and national dimensions

Regional policies and employment

Thus far we have treated the city as a standard national entity. We have, though, shown how growth trends were more pronounced in the most buoyant and prosperous parts of the UK and the decline trends in the more depressed and poorer areas. Since part of post-war planning's mission was to address such regional unevenness, it is also important to consider these spatial impacts. Although there are many counter-claims (e.g. Martin, 1988), the most careful analysis of the subject (Moore et al., 1986) has shown that in the years 1960–81 604,000 manufacturing jobs were directly created in the assisted areas by regional policies. About one-quarter of these jobs did not survive to 1981 (roughly the same loss rate as elsewhere), leaving a net job creation of 450,000, at a cost to the Exchequer of roughly £40,000 per job (1982 prices). The standard regional multiplier of 1.4 indicates a further 180,000 service jobs as a result of this, making a grand total of 630,000 in 1981.

By any standards this was a hugely impressive achievement. It was a powerful, but largely ignored, case for more active regional policies in the 1980s. Less successful, however, were office dispersal policies. Only 25 per cent of the 160,000 private office jobs leaving central London between 1963 and 1979 actually left the south east; only 9 per cent actually reached the assisted regions (Balchin, 1990, pp. 66–7). This was partly counteracted by government office dispersals, which moved about 55,000 jobs from London in the 12 years from 1963, many to assisted areas.

A regional solution?

Yet all this effort certainly did not 'solve' the regional problem, as conventionally defined, by bringing unemployment levels in the assisted areas to the national average. To achieve this, regional policies should have been roughly two to three times more effective than they actually were in the 1960s and three times more than in the 1970s. Clearly they would have needed to be very much more than this in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the regional problem was more complex than disparities in unemployment. After Massey (1979, 1984), it was more commonly understood as disparities in economic power. In such a view there was a southern core region dominated by business headquarters, research and development, and key financial services, and the rest, characterized by more dependent 'branch plant' economies, reliant on decisions made in Britain's (or other countries') core regions. Traditional regional policies

tended to encourage branch plants of multinational companies to replace older more regionally based industries, and these were part of the problem, not the solution (e.g. Hudson, 1989). And although office dispersal policies had some (very modest) successes in encouraging office development in some assisted regions, these too were the office equivalent of the branch plant, undertaking routine functions such as issuing driving licences (in Swansea) or various state social security benefits (in the north east). As we noted in the last chapter, it remains to be seen how far the 'new regionalism' will be able to create more robust peripheral regions and, if so, whether this will lead to greater regional balance.

Regional policy and urban change

A key question is also how regional policies affected cities. Clydeside, Merseyside and Tyneside were the main conurbations in the regions that received most assistance. Yet they received fewer regionally aided jobs than might have been expected given their existing share of manufacturing jobs (Moore et al., 1986). This was particularly evident for new firms moving into the assisted areas, underlining our earlier point about the unattractiveness of the inner city for new manufacturing. Nor is this point contradicted by the rather more limited effects of office dispersal policies. Some central or core areas of cities in the assisted areas or other less prosperous regions have certainly benefited by new office developments. Yet it is also clear that many government offices moving from London have favoured suburban or outer-city areas in their new provincial locations.

More generally, regional policies also played a modest role in the run-down of employment in the inner cities of the prosperous regions. Dennis (1980) has estimated that 9 per cent of London's job loss in 1960–74 was attributable to shifts encouraged by regional policies. The main spatial impact of regional policies on urban areas has, then, been to reinforce urban decentralization processes, encouraging the development of suburban and outer-city areas in the less prosperous regions at the expense of core, especially inner-city, areas everywhere.

Unresolved questions

It is uncertain how far regional policies prevented jobs being created by refusing permission to build at preferred locations if these fell outside the assisted regions. This argument has long been voiced in the west midlands, asserting that regional policies inhibited continuing diversification of the economy (Sutcliffe, 1986). Thus Birmingham and its neighbours, which enjoyed great prosperity and growth based on the motor and metal industries from the 1940s to the 1960s, lacked the new activities that would have allowed it better to withstand economic change from the 1970s to the 1990s. This may be so, but to sustain the general argument would imply fairly wholesale policy changes, including other aspects of planning. In particular we need to ask where the people to sustain the extra growth would have come from and how physical growth would have been accommodated.

It was this kind of rather open-ended hypothesizing that led Hall et al. to suggest, somewhat tentatively, that post-war urban and regional planning has broadly sought to promote social stability, if at the expense of overall national economic growth (Hall et al., 1973, vol. II, pp. 375–7). Three decades and three very serious economic downturns later, this has, arguably, changed. We might suggest, with equal caution, that planning (particularly the selective relaxations of it) in the 1980s and 1990s sought national economic growth at the expense of social stability. If nothing else, these speculations remind us that spatial impacts are not the whole story.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS

Planning, land and capital**Planning and development land prices**

Planning's most important net effects on the national economy arose directly from its restriction of the supply of development land. Between the wars, before an effective planning system operated, land costs typically accounted for about 5 per cent of the price of new private suburban housing in provincial towns and cities. The proportion was often greater around Greater London, especially at the height of the 1930s' boom, when it sometimes touched double figures (Carr, 1982; Jackson, 1991). Yet everywhere this land component started to rise from the mid-1950s as large-scale speculative housebuilding reappeared and development plans began to impose restrictions on the supply of development land. By 1960 land costs as a proportion of new housing prices had not apparently moved much beyond inter-war levels in the north, though in the west midlands and south east they had already risen to 10–12 per cent (Hall et al., 1973, vol. II, p. 214). By 1970 the proportion had dramatically increased to 20 per cent or over in many parts of provincial England and 30 per cent in the London fringe. By the late 1980s' boom, land costs were accounting for well over 40 per cent of new house prices in the south east (DoE, 1992c). Even Yorkshire and Humberside, the English region with least restrictions on land supply, had reached 20 per cent.

There is little doubt that this escalation, paralleled for all types of development land, was largely due to planning restrictions. Although there was a general rise in agricultural land prices, it was far less than the rate of increase for development land, suggesting that the right to develop, that is, planning permission, was the crucial consideration. This then became a factor in the general escalation in housing and other building costs, with knock-on effects for the wider economy. One rather alarmist estimate suggested that higher land costs alone accounted for a 4 per cent national reduction in real incomes in 1983 with a cumulative loss of perhaps 10 per cent of national income (Evans, 1988). Meanwhile, other commentators (e.g. Bramley, 1993) have argued, less didactically, that house prices would not fall even if there were a sudden easing of planning restrictions on land supply. Certainly rising house prices have, since the 1980s, become a key factor in national economic growth and confidence (not to mention individual smugness). This suggests that there are powerful vested interests in maintaining a degree of scarcity sufficient to keep house prices rising. For all its direct and cumulative long-term impacts on development land costs, planning restrictions may be little more than a sideshow in all this. It will therefore, be interesting to monitor the fate of the government's recent conversion to affordability by greatly accelerating land availability and housing supply in London and its neighbouring regions.

Developer certainty and planning

Yet by restricting permissions (and through planning agreements/obligations and encouraging public–private partnerships in some circumstances), planning has also fostered a degree of developer certainty, reducing the risks of unprofitable investment. It is almost impossible to estimate precisely the overall importance of this. Since 1959 the principle has been that where planning does not create certainty, that is in situations of planning blight, then compensation up to the value of the established use of the land may be payable. Such exceptional

circumstances are not an adequate surrogate for the more general uncertainties of a free land market, although they do suggest that certainty is worth a great deal to developers.

More anecdotally, the story of Canary Wharf in the 1980s and early 1990s was a cautionary tale of developers liberated from a more directive planning system: other developers have the same idea, increasing the chances of speculative over-provision and undermining the original calculations of the competitive rental advantage of the new location. Developers, of course, face many more and greater uncertainties than those decreased (or increased) by planning actions, but there is no doubt that the certainties traditionally provided by planning are significant.

Other economic impacts

There have been many other assertions about the overall national economic impacts of planning, especially in the 1980s. As inferred in earlier discussion, it is very difficult to assess planning's overall impact on manufacturing and service industries. Planners have certainly played a part in extinguishing jobs and creating new ones, this often involving locational changes. At times they have undoubtedly prevented some developers and businesses building and operating in what were seen, rightly or wrongly, as optimal locations, where greatest profits could be extracted. Such studies as there are inevitably focus on what planning has prevented, giving little credit for what it has allowed or created.

It is worth remembering that the most complete exercises in British town planning, the New and Expanded Towns, have proved among the finest settings for capital accumulation created anywhere in the urban system of post-war Britain. Some, certainly, have aged better than others. But all in their heydays provided good, well-serviced employment sites in close proximity to good-quality, low-cost housing with good community facilities. Not surprisingly, the labour market characteristics and general ambience of these towns were particularly attractive to larger manufacturers. Workforces were more flexibly skilled and less wedded to restrictive practices than in established industrial locations in the older cities. They looked forward to bettering themselves in the new post-war affluence and placed less emphasis on old allegiances of class.

Had such new planned environments formed a more significant part of post-war urban change, then it is arguable that the national economy would have been commensurately stronger. Of course the spatial problems of the inner city might arguably have been relatively worse as a result. And of course the opportunity costs of building many more new settlements would have been very great. It is this need to consider the impacts of alternative courses of action that make it difficult to push the more general economic arguments very much farther. Nor can counterfactual approaches ever provide definitive answers. Although we can point to important direct impacts on the land market, the broader question of effects on the national economy must remain unresolved.

Economic gainers

From the above discussion we can conclude that developers and property owners have derived tangible net benefits from post-war planning, chiefly through the greater certainties provided by the system and the possibilities of large increases in land value arising solely from the grant of planning permission. It is important to note that such benefits have been characteristic of practically the whole post-war period and may even have been slightly undermined by the limited deregulation of planning since 1979. Equally important is the point that land value

policies have generally meant that gainers have not usually borne the costs of these benefits themselves. We have also suggested, more tentatively, that other forms of capital (for example, industry) have also experienced net benefits.

Social impacts

Different tenure groups

(i) The owner-occupiers It is somewhat easier to grasp the essentials of the social balance sheet. A convenient way to begin is to focus on housing tenure groups, qualified where necessary by income and other criteria (Hall et al., 1973, vol. II, pp. 405–8). The main beneficiaries of post-war planning have undoubtedly been affluent owner-occupiers. Whether they have chosen to live in an outer city or green-belt village or small town, expensive suburban areas or inner-city enclaves, they have benefited particularly from planning's protection of their residential environment. Compared to a freer market, they have more security against unwelcome developments. Many of them have thus been able to enjoy enhanced social exclusivity of their residential environment in the outer city. Moreover, they are less troubled by higher land costs associated with planning since they find least difficulty in becoming owner-occupiers and can pay more to buy larger houses. They are also more able to bear any extra costs of travelling that may arise from their residential choice. Finally, they have derived particular benefit from rising house values, fuelled at least partly by high land costs.

By contrast, less affluent owner-occupiers have done less well. Higher land costs essentially increase the costs of buying, implying higher mortgage debts and greater financial vulnerability. Eventually, though, most of this group have benefited from subsequent house price inflation. Yet the accumulating long-term value of their asset will be lower than for the more affluent, because lower incomes mean it is more difficult to afford to live in areas on which planning has conferred particular protection or amenity value. In some inner-city or former council rental housing areas, they may have bought a depreciating asset. More than the better off, this group has to weigh general locational attractiveness against other desirable qualities, such as dwelling size or convenience for work, social amenities, etc., in the search for affordability (Pahl, 1970). Higher land and housing prices mean that many live in small dwellings with less space. For those in suburban and outer-city locations, the expense of travelling is also likely to be considerable, with longer commuting distances and times, reflecting the impact of containment policies on outer-city development.

(ii) Public-sector renters Their benefits from planning vary considerably. At one extreme the residents of New and Expanded Towns, especially in affluent regions, have secured far better living and working environments than otherwise would have been possible. In most cases they enjoy good-quality housing with better internal and external space standards than comparable private housing. Thanks to planning, employment and social amenities have been conveniently located and environmental qualities are usually protected. Until recently, however, these tenants have not been able to benefit from rising house values. Moreover, recent purchasers, under right-to-buy legislation, have found it difficult to escape the legacy of the public sector. As noted, price rises have not so far matched those commanded by comparable privately built houses. The general point remains that their benefits from planning have been expressed in the use value of their living environment, rather than its capital value. Some benefits are shared

by tenants on the better low-density suburban estates, especially in smaller and more buoyant towns. In bigger cities, though, longer journeys to work and services have been more likely than in New or Expanded Towns. Moreover, in towns and cities (including a few New Towns) experiencing economic and social stress, wider problems might well severely undermine whatever previous attractiveness such areas might possess.

Many of these last characteristics have been shared by those public-sector tenants who have been rehoused in generally unpopular high-density housing forms, often in inner cities, although occasionally in suburban areas (Coleman, 1985). Inner-city council estates were usually convenient for employment and social amenities when they were built. But this is generally less true today because of economic change, declining public expenditures and continued population decline in these areas, undermining service viability. Moreover, the dwellings were all too often built by methods that were inadequately tested and with poor quality controls. Fewer tenants have sought to exercise their rights to buy in such settings (Sewel et al., 1984). Overall they are planned environments that have given little by way of use or capital values to their inhabitants, although regeneration in the 1990s, sometimes involving transfers to social landlords, has brought some improvements.

(iii) Private tenants Planning has done least for private renters. Despite a recent minor revival in the tenure, post-war planning has, with mainstream housing policies, directly contributed to their marginalization. By promoting first redevelopment and then rehabilitation, planning has contributed directly to the decline of the tenure in favour first of public-sector renting and owner-occupation, respectively. The housing situation of many former private renters benefited as a result, in that their new dwellings usually had better facilities, but this was often at immense cost to community cohesion. Moreover, those unable to become owners or less eligible for what is today increasingly scarce public-sector housing, have, at least until the recent revival, suffered declining choice and value for money. Beneath all others are the homeless, denied any living space. For them, too, an over-restrictive planning has now become part of the problem, not, as it once promised to be, part of the solution.

Other social criteria

Tenure and income have, then, been important primary determinants of the extent of planning's social benefit. This assumes, though, that every household member in the various categories benefits equally. Recently, mainly under the influence of equal opportunities concerns, more attention has been given to differential impacts of planning within households or for social categories more specific than tenure or income. By considering criteria such as gender, ethnic origins, age or disability, a picture of social impacts emerges that is more subtle and varied (e.g. Montgomery and Thornley, 1990; Imrie, 1996; Thomas, 2000). In general, women, ethnic minorities, old people, children and the disabled have been underrepresented within planning. Their needs have therefore been interpreted in rather idealized or insensitive ways, or simply ignored, at least for most of the post-war period.

All, moreover, tend to have lower personal mobility and greater likelihood of being poorer than basic indicators of their social class position might suggest. Both these factors have made them less likely to benefit from planning. Yet it is clear their own distinctive needs or requirements have interacted with planning intentions in specific ways. Without reciting chapter and verse, we can note that planning has had some detrimental impacts for all these social categories.

Race and planning

Ethnic minorities have often suffered from institutional racism within planning and related public-sector systems, such as housing (Thomas, 2000). This was because these systems operated on procedures and assumptions that were, albeit unconsciously, discriminatory. For example, the housing and employment selection procedures for New and Expanded Towns tended, at least until the 1970s, to favour white populations. Thus eligibility for public-sector housing, especially that of good quality, normally depended on residential qualifications in the 'exporting' big city area, privileging those with long residence. Recent arrivals were excluded or (as often now happens to asylum seekers) placed in the least popular public rental stock. Meanwhile employment selection procedures gave preference to those with skills. Many immigrants either did not possess those skills or, because employers did not recognize overseas qualifications, appeared not to have them. Despite later policy shifts, these planned new settlements remain disproportionately white.

Development control procedures have sometimes operated in ways that may be more consciously racist. In the past, it was not uncommon for ethnic minority applications for restaurants or places of worship to be handled with excessive 'zeal', usually reflecting the coded racism of local politicians (and less-coded views of some voters). Similar sentiments are today visible in some responses to planning applications associated with asylum seekers. The recent fashion for devolving planning powers to local area committees can sometimes exacerbate these tendencies.

Planning and the domestic ideal

More has been written about women and planning (e.g. *Built Environment*, 1984, 1990, 1996; Greed, 1994). Planning has generally responded slowly to the tremendous and permanent changes in women's lives since 1945. Despite the huge wartime importance of women in paid employment, generally perceived as temporary, the initial post-war planning stereotypes reflected the ideal of women only as wives and mothers. Accordingly, where planning was actively shaping new places, in New Towns and new estates, the focus was on perfecting a domestic environment centred on the home, but embracing schools and other local social facilities (Attfield, 1989). Land use zoning, however, substantially separated residential neighbourhoods from the realm of paid work, seen more as a male domain.

Yet within the confines of the domestic ideal, such early post-war planning did acknowledge many important needs of the domestic woman (Bowlby, 1984, 1988). Thus local shops were provided in residential areas and major shopping continued to be located in the parts of cities most accessible by public transport. This did not especially disadvantage the transport-poor and often child-accompanied woman. Women as childcarers, however, suffered particularly from the progressive degradation of external private space in the home environment produced by restrictions on land supply from the 1950s. Smaller gardens and the acute difficulties of child supervision in high-density flatted estates intensified the problems of mothers.

Employed women and planning

Meanwhile the whole planning approach established in the 1940s also created more fundamental problems for women as they increasingly sought paid employment in addition to their domestic labour during the following decades. The planning-sponsored spatial separation of the realms of home and work now posed serious difficulties for working wives, particularly since formal arrangements for childcare were largely non-existent (Roberts, 1991).

Planners lacked any formal authority to insist on such provision (although we can note their relative success in securing (unsupervised) play areas on public and private housing estates). They might, however, have been able to help change the climate of thinking on this question, not least in recognizing that childcare needed to be more than just a female duty.

All these problems were compounded by the simultaneous growth in motor car use and changes in retailing, which began to undermine the commercial basis of small local shopping provision during the 1960s (Bowlby, 1988). Planners increasingly acquiesced in the shift towards less localized shopping provision, which by the 1980s embraced out-of-town centres and retail parks. Such shifts particularly disadvantaged women, many of whom had much less access to cars than men.

Women's safety and planning

Finally, we should note how the increasing emphasis on planning for the motor vehicle from the late 1950s brought changes that have made cities seem less safe for women. This issue arose partly because women's increased economic role has both required them to use cities more independently of husbands or families and created a growing expectation of their rights to be able to do so. In one respect, mothers at least benefited by central area traffic-free shopping precincts since they required less close supervision of children (Roberts, 1981). Yet the growing separation of pedestrian and traffic circulation systems in city centres and Radburn-inspired residential areas often brought a growing reliance on underpasses, footbridges and landscaped footpaths that were often ill-lit and remote from roads or populated areas (Greed, 1994). Frequently unpleasant for any pedestrian, they were particularly disliked by women as rendering them more vulnerable to attack. Yet women were more likely to have to use them unless they had personal access to a car or were able or willing to limit their use of the city.

THE FUTURE

A balance sheet

Good in parts

Although planning has other important effects, for design or the environment, this glimpse at its differential social impacts completes this particular review. We must now ask an important question: has it all been worth it? The answer is somewhat equivocal. At best, planning has been an important minor influence on the overall course of urban change. With few exceptions, it has tended to benefit most those economic interests and social groups that would have done well even without planning. In short, we cannot claim that planning has been an unqualified success. Like the curate's egg, it has only been good in parts. In some instances where it has been good, such as the early New Towns, it has clearly been very good. Yet in some instances where it has been bad, such as much planned redevelopment of housing, it has been truly horrid.

Much of it, though, has been between these extremes. Most planners for most of the time have blandly adjusted a pattern of urban change that has essentially been shaped by powerful economic, social and political processes that were largely beyond their control. This minor

role of planning shrank even more during the 1980s but, from this low base, it is now undergoing a revival. It remains, though, a less comprehensive and more fragmented activity than in the 30 years from 1945. Not that we can automatically equate comprehensivity and strong planning with desirable outcomes. Moreover, the breakdown of the monolithic comprehensivity of the 1960s stimulated and allowed conceptual space to radical planning initiatives and a critical environmental discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. Part of the message of these new movements subsequently entered and enriched the mainstream of both planning thought and practice (e.g. Healey, 1997; Taylor, 1998).

Planning, public spending and partnership

But if fragmentation has encouraged qualitative innovation and new perspectives, its other side has been a weakening of the quantitative ability of planning to make a real difference. Planners might have learnt new (and arguably better) ideas and approaches, but they now had less ability to put them into practice. Ultimately much of this failure is because an associated feature of fragmentation has been a long-term shrinkage of public spending on towns and cities. Although there has been no shortage of targeted programmes, across the board real spending on urban areas remains much lower than in the post-war boom years. The trend is now upward but from a very low base. The recent rise in the fortunes of planning shows a fairly direct correlation with these trends. Planning's emergent new comprehensivity reflects a prevailing political attitude to government spending that has almost transcended Thatcherite paranoia. Yet there will certainly be no early return to the planner's intense relationship with the public purse that characterized the first 30 post-war years, especially the first ten of them. Instead, the favoured development mechanism of the new planning is multi-agency public-sector partnership with the private sector. This is not actually a new approach but now, in the era of the 'third way', a much more important one.

The new vision

A new language . . .

The underlying vision of early twenty-first-century planning can be gauged by the words in which it is expressed. Liberal use is made of terms that signify broad and vague ideals of harmony, wholeness and well-being, such as 'sustainability', 'community', 'prosperity', 'affordability', 'liveability', 'inclusivity' and 'connectivity'. There is also a sense of rebirth evident in words such as 'regeneration' and 'renaissance'. More recently favoured planning words, such as 'protection' or 'enterprise' (and especially 'heritage'), are still there but now less prominent than in the 1980s or 1990s. Throughout there is an omnipresent emphasis on 'delivery', involving planners being 'pro-active' with much 'enabling' and 'empowering'. Taking centre stage, inevitably, is 'partnership', along with 'assembly' (of land), 'monitoring' (of progress) and 'quality' (of output). Less apparent, at least at the time of writing, has been any corresponding emphasis on 'quantity'. The proliferation of words like 'pilot', 'pathfinder', 'beacon' or 'champion' suggest a vision that is still only being realized here and there with much yet needing to be done to get other places to follow.

. . . And its limitations

It is rather easy to satirize this new lexicon of terms as the product of some focus group word association game. More serious questions can be raised about the whole planning style they

imply. In particular, one is bound to wonder whether the extensive reliance on private developers signified by the partnership, enabling, assembly and monitoring roles of planning really can deliver the desired public benefits. Remembering the early 1990s, it becomes clear that this approach is especially vulnerable to an economic downturn. Despite an upward trend in government spending, it remains doubtful whether this is yet at a sufficient level. In particular, major infrastructure investments will certainly be needed to allow the desired forms of sustainable development to proceed in the identified growth areas. The governmental separation of transport (and environment) from planning in 2001–2 will not have helped in this respect.

It is important also to ask why a more aggressive approach to tackling regional imbalance seems no longer to be regarded as possible. As the European Union is enlarged eastward from 2004, it seems almost certain that European support to Britain's lagging regions will shrink. Clearly, in a global economy (especially one where the UK remains outside the euro currency zone) no government will wish to be too directive towards international investors over regional locations for fear that adjoining countries will benefit. But better linkages of Britain's peripheral regions to Europe would certainly improve matters, giving connections to the Channel Tunnel comparable to those on the French side, for example. Here again, however, there is a public expenditure mountain still to climb.

We can also query the micro-level of what is being proposed, bearing in mind the recently manifest national yearnings for a bungalow, rural way of life (www.cabe.org.uk). A reality of higher densities and smaller dwellings might be affordable, but is it really going to be sustainable or liveable in the longer term? A situation where only the less affluent have to live like this (as happened in the 1960s) can scarcely be called a success. Among many issues which have to be tackled to make denser urban living attractive to more people is the ubiquitous one of transport. Again, more public spending, together with a much bolder approach to restraint of car use, seem to hold the key to any solution. Finally, we can question the notion of community itself. Planners have always been attracted to the ideal but without ever fully comprehending its reality and dynamics. We may all abstractly like the idea of living in a local community but most of us have lifestyles (often adopted by choice) that severely limit the possibility of its emergence. One is bound to wonder why, therefore, planning has returned, yet again, to this comforting but profoundly problematic ideal and, yet again, sought to recreate it by physical means.

Things can only get better?

But, having voiced these many misgivings, it nevertheless remains important not to let an ideal of perfection prevent the welcoming of something that could, with commitment and resources, offer real benefits. For the first time in over three decades, government policies for urban Britain are now animated by a vision that gives planning, broadly defined, a significant role in its elaboration and realization. We may hope that this vision also proves sufficiently robust to allow refinements and adjustments that address and correct its weaknesses. These are most definitely not the heady days for planning of the early post-war period or the 1960s' technological revolution. Yet contemporary policies make the early twenty-first century the nearest thing to them we have experienced for many years. A still overcautious government and a sceptical public are looking to planners to prove again that they have positive relevance in building a better future. Success is by no means a foregone conclusion and will be judged by the quality, and quantity, of the results. There remain doubts whether the planning profession is yet sufficiently robust to move beyond the defensive mentality of the 1980s. But there is now, certainly, much to be done.

Bibliography

This bibliography contains only works cited in the text which are included to advise on further reading. Many other more original (and more inaccessible) sources have also been consulted. In the interests of brevity (and reflecting this book's role as a textbook rather than a scholarly monograph) I have not included these except where they are directly quoted or necessary to develop the argument. They include the RTPPI archives, various government records and numerous local sources. Other exclusions are local statutory plans and, with a few exceptions, other documents produced by non-central planning agencies. National and local press articles, television and radio programmes and informal personal interviews with many planning practitioners have also played their part, especially on more contemporary topics, but are not specifically acknowledged here. Nor is explicit reference made to standard statistical sources.

If readers require further details about sources used in this book, please contact the author at the Department of Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford OX3 0BP <svward@brookes.ac.uk>.

- Aalen, F. H. A. (1992) 'English origins', in S. V. Ward (ed.), *The Garden City: Past, Present and Future*. Spon, London.
- Abercrombie, P. (1945) *The Greater London Plan 1944*. HMSO, London.
- Abercrombie, P. and Kelly, S. A. (1932) *Cumbrian Regional Planning Scheme*. Hodder and Stoughton/Liverpool University Press, London/Liverpool.
- Abercrombie, P. and Matthew, R. H. (1949) *The Clyde Valley Regional Plan 1946*. HMSO, Edinburgh.
- Adams, T. (1929) 'The origin of the term "town planning" in England', *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, vol. XV, no. 11: 310–11.
- Addison, P. (1975) *The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War*. Cape, London.
- Alden, J. (2002) 'Scenarios for the future of regional planning within UK/EU spatial planning', in T. Marshall, J. Glasson and P. Headicar (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Regional Planning*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Aldous, T. (1972) *Battle for the Environment*. Fontana/Collins, Glasgow.
- Aldridge, H. R. (1915) *The Case for Town Planning: A Practical Manual for the Use of Councillors, Officers and Others Engaged in the Preparation of Town Planning Schemes*. National Housing and Town Planning Council, London.
- Aldridge, M. (1979) *British New Towns: A Programme without a Policy*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Ambrose, P. (1986) *Whatever Happened to Planning?* Methuen, London.
- Ambrose, P. and Colenutt, B. (1975) *The Property Machine*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (eds) (1994) *Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Amos, C. (1991) 'Flexibility and variety: the key to new settlement policy', *Town and Country Planning*, vol. 60, no. 2: 52–6.
- Anstis, G. (1985) *Redditch: Success in the Heart of England – The History of Redditch New Town 1964–1985*. Publications for Companies, Stevenage.
- APT (Arndale Property Trust) (c. 1965) *Arndale in Partnership*. APT, Bradford.
- Ardill, J. (1974) *The New Citizen's Guide to Town and Country Planning*. TCPA/Charles Knight, London.
- Ashworth, W. (1954) *The Genesis of Modern British Town Planning: A Study in Economic and Social History of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Atkinson, R. and Moon, G. (1994) *Urban Policy in Britain: The City, the State and the Market*. Macmillan: Basingstoke.
- Attfield, J. (1989) 'inside pram town: a case study of Harlow house interiors, 1951–61', in J. Attfield and P. Kirkham (eds), *A View from the Interior: Feminism, Women and Design*. Women's Press, London.
- Audit Commission (1989) *Urban Regeneration and Economic Development: The Local Government Dimension*. HMSO, London.

- Backwell, J. and Dickens, P. (1978) *Town Planning, Mass Loyalty and the Restructuring of Capital: The Origins of the 1947 Planning Legislation Revisited*. Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper No. 11, University of Sussex, Brighton.
- Bains Report (1972) *The New Local Authorities – Management and Structure*. HMSO, London.
- Baker, M. (2002) 'Government Offices for the Regions and regional planning', in T. Marshall, J. Glasson and P. Headicar (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Regional Planning*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Balchin, J. (1980) *First New Town: An Autobiography of the Stevenage Development Corporation 1946–1980*. Stevenage Development Corporation, Stevenage.
- Balchin, P. N. (1990) *Regional Policy in Britain: The North–South Divide*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Ball, M., Gray, F. and McDowell, L. (1989) *The Transformation of Britain: Contemporary Social and Economic Change*. Fontana, London.
- Banfield, E. C. (1970) *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis*. Little, Brown, Boston, MA.
- Barlow Commission (Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population) (1940) *Report* (Cmd 6153). HMSO, London.
- Barton, H. (ed.) (2000) *Sustainable Communities: The Potential for Eco-Neighbourhoods*. Earthscan, London.
- Barty-King, H. (1985) *Expanding Northampton*. Secker & Warburg, London.
- Beattie, S. (1980) *A Revolution in London Housing: LCC Architects and their Work 1893–1914*. Greater London Council/Architectural Press, London.
- Beaufoy, S. (1952) 'Presidential address', *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, vol. XXXIX, no. 1: 2–7.
- Beevers, R. (1988) *The Garden City Utopia: A Critical Biography of Ebenezer Howard*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Begg, I., Moore, B. and Rhodes, J. (1986) 'Economic and social change in urban Britain and the inner cities', in V. Hausner (ed.), *Critical Issues in Urban Economic Development* (2 vols), vol. I, pp. 10–49.
- Bellamy, E. (1888) *Looking Backward*. Ticknor, Boston, MA.
- Bendixson, T. (1988) *The Peterborough Effect: Reshaping a City*. Peterborough Development Corporation, Peterborough.
- Bendixson, T. and Platt, J. (1992) *Milton Keynes: Image and Reality*. Granta, Cambridge.
- Bennett, T. (1990) 'Planning and people with disabilities', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Benton, S. (1987) 'Death of the citizen', *New Statesman*, vol. 114, no. 2956: 21–2.
- Best, R. (1981) *Land Use and Living Space*. Methuen, London.
- Beveridge Report (1942) *Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services* (Cmd 6404). HMSO, London.
- Bianchini, F., Fisher, M., Montgomery, J. and Worpole, K. (1988) *City Centres, City Cultures*. Centre for Local Economic Strategies, Manchester.
- Blackaby, F. T. (ed.) (1978) *British Economic Policy 1960–74*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Block G. (1954) *The Spread of Towns*. Conservative Political Centre, London.
- Boddy, M. (1980) *The Building Societies*. Macmillan, London.
- Boddy, M. and Fudge, C. (eds) (1985) *Local Socialism*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Bogdanor, V. (1970) 'The Labour Party in opposition, 1951–1964', in V. Bogdanor and R. Skidelsky (eds), *The Age of Affluence 1951–1964*. Macmillan, London.
- Bogdanor, V. (1999) *Devolution in the United Kingdom*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Bogdanor, V. and Skidelsky, R. (eds) (1970) *The Age of Affluence 1951–1964*. Macmillan, London.
- Booth, A. (1978) 'An administrative experiment in unemployment policy in the thirties', *Public Administration*, vol. 56: 139–57.
- Booth, A. (1982) 'The second world war and the origins of modern regional policy', *Economy and Society*, vol. 11, no. 1: 1–21.
- Bor, W. (1974) 'The Town and Country Planning Act, 1968', *The Planner*, vol. 60, no. 5: 696–702.
- Bowden, P. (1978) 'The origins of Newton Aycliffe', in M. Bulmer (ed.), *Mining and Social Change: Durham County in the Twentieth Century*. Croom Helm, London.
- Bowlby, S. (1984) 'Planning for women to shop in post-war Britain', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, vol. 2: 179–99.
- Bowlby, S. (1988) 'From corner shop to hypermarket: women and food retailing', in J. Little, L. Peake and P. Richardson (eds), *Women in Cities: Gender and the Urban Environment*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Bowley, M. (1945) *Housing and the State, 1919–44*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Boyle, R. (1988) 'Private sector urban regeneration: the Scottish experience', in M. Parkinson, B. Foley and D. Judd (eds), *Regenerating the Inner Cities: The UK Crisis and the US Experience*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- BPF (British Property Federation) (1986) *The Planning System: A Fresh Approach*. BPF, London.
- Bramley, G. (1993) 'The impact of land use planning and tax subsidies on the supply and price of housing in Britain', *Urban Studies*, vol. 30, no. 1: 5–30.
- Breheny, M. J. (ed.) (1992a) *Sustainable Development and Urban Form*. Pion, London.
- Breheny, M. J. (1992b) 'Contradictions of the compact city', in M. J. Breheny (ed.), *Sustainable Development and the Urban Form*. Pion, London.

- Breheny, M. J. and Batey, P. W. J. (1982) 'The history of planning methodology: a preliminary sketch', *Built Environment*, vol. 7, no. 2: 109–20.
- Breheny, M. J. and Rookwood, R. (1993) 'Planning the sustainable city region', in A. Blowers (ed.), *Planning for a Sustainable Environment: A Report by the Town and Country Planning Association*. Earthscan, London.
- Breheny, M., Gent, T. and Lock, D. (1993) *Alternative Development Patterns: New Settlements*. Department of the Environment Planning Research Programme, HMSO, London.
- Briggs, A. (ed.) (1962) *William Morris: Selected Writings and Designs*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Briggs, A. (1968) *Victorian Cities*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Brindley, T., Rydin, Y. and Stoker, G. (1989) *Remaking Planning: The Politics of Urban Change in the Thatcher Years*. Unwin Hyman, London.
- Britton, S. (1971) *Steering the Economy: The Role of the Treasury*, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Brown, G. (1972) *In My Way: The Political Memoirs of Lord George-Brown*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Brownill, S. (1990a) 'The people's plan for the Royal Docks: some contradictions in popular planning', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Brownill, S. (1990b) *Developing London's Docklands: Another Great Planning Disaster*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Brownill, S. (1999) 'Turning the East End into the West End: the lessons and legacies of the London Docklands Development Corporation', in R. Imrie and H. Thomas (eds), *British Urban Policy and the Urban Development Corporations*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Brundtland, G. H. (1987) *Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Bruton, M. (1981) 'Colin Buchanan 1907–', in G. E. Cherry (ed.), *Pioneers of British Planning*. Architectural Press, London.
- Bruton, M. and Nicholson, D. (1987) *Local Planning in Practice*. Hutchinson, London.
- Buchanan, C. D. (1957) *Mixed Blessing: The Motor in Britain*. Leonard Hill, London.
- Buck, N. and Gordon, I. (1986) 'The beneficiaries of employment growth: an analysis of the experience of disadvantaged groups in expanding labour markets', in V. Hausner (ed.), *Critical Issues in Urban Economic Development* (2 vols), vol II. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Buck, N., Gordon, I. and Young, K. with Ermisch, J. and Mills, L. (1986) *The London Employment Problem*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Buder, S. (1990) *Visionaries and Planners: The Garden City Movement and the Modern Community*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Building* (1991) 'Supplement: Canary Wharf – A Landmark in Construction', *Building*, October.
- Built Environment* (1984) 'Women and the Built Environment', *Built Environment*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Special Issue).
- Built Environment* (1990) 'Women and the Designed Environment', *Built Environment*, vol. 16, no. 4 (Special Issue).
- Built Environment* (1996) 'Women and the Built Environment', *Built Environment*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Special Issue).
- Bullock, N. (1987) 'Plans for post-war housing in the UK: the case for mixed development and the flat', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 2, no. 1: 71–98.
- Bullock, N. (2002) *Building the Post-war World: Modern Architecture and Reconstruction in Britain*. Spon, London.
- Bulmer, M. (ed.) (1978a) *Mining and Social Change: Durham County in the Twentieth Century*, Croom Helm, London.
- Bulmer, M. (1978b) 'Change, policy and planning since 1918', in M. Bulmer (ed.), *Mining and Social Change: Durham County in the Twentieth Century*. Croom Helm, London.
- Burnett, J. (1978) *A Social History of Housing*. David & Charles, Newton Abbot.
- Burns, D. (1990) 'The decentralization of local authority planning', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Burns, W. (1963) *New Towns for Old: The Technique of Urban Renewal*. Leonard Hill, London.
- Burns, W. (1967) *Newcastle: A Study in Replanning at Newcastle-upon-Tyne*. Leonard Hill, London.
- Burton, P. and O'Toole, M. (1993) 'Urban development corporations: post-Fordism in action or Fordism in retrenchment', in R. Imrie and H. Thomas (eds) *British Urban Policy and the Urban Development Corporations*. Paul Chapman Publishing, London.
- Butler, S. M. (1981) *Enterprise Zones: Greenlining the Inner Cities*. Heinemann, London.
- BVT (Bournville Village Trust) (1941) *When We Build Again: A Study Based into Conditions of Living and Working in Birmingham*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- BVT (1955) *The Bournville Village Trust 1900–1955*. Bournville Village Trust, Birmingham.
- Byrne, D. (1989) *Beyond the Inner City*. Open University Press, Milton Keynes.
- Byrne, D. (1999) 'Tyne and Wear UDC – turning the uses inside out: active deindustrialisation and its consequences', in R. Imrie and H. Thomas (eds), *British Urban Policy: An Evaluation of the Urban Development Corporations* (2nd edition). Sage, London.
- Cabinet Office (1988) *Action for Cities*. Cabinet Office, London.
- Cadbury, G. Jnr (1915) *Town Planning with Special Reference to the Birmingham Schemes*. Longmans Green, London.
- Calder, A. (1971) *The People's War: Britain 1939–45*. Panther, London.

- Carr, M. C. (1982) 'The development and character of a metropolitan suburb: Bexley, Kent', in F. M. L. Thompson (ed.), *The Rise of Suburbia*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- Carter, H. and Lewis, C. R. (1990) *An Urban Geography of England and Wales in the Nineteenth Century*. Arnold, London.
- Carter, N. and Watts, C. (1984) *The Cambridge Science Park*. Planning and Development Case Study 4. Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, London.
- Cassell, M. (1991) *Long Lease! The Story of Slough Estates 1920–1991*. Pencorp, London.
- Castells, M. (1977) *The Urban Question*. Arnold, London.
- CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (1990a) *Green Paper on the Urban Environment* (EUR 12902 EN), Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.
- CEC (1990b) *Green Paper on the Urban Environment: Expert Contributions* (EUR 13145 EN), Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.
- Chadwick, G. (1971) *A Systems View of Planning*. Pergamon, Oxford.
- Chamberlain Committee (Committee to Consider and Advise on the Principles to be Followed in Dealing with Unhealthy Areas) (1920) *Interim Report*. HMSO, London.
- Chamberlain Committee (1921) *Final Report*. HMSO, London.
- Charlesworth, G. (1984) *A History of British Motorways*. Thomas Telford, London.
- Chelmsford Committee (1931) *Interim Report of the Departmental Committee on Regional Development* (Cmd 3915). HMSO, London.
- Cherry, G. E. (1972) *Urban Change and Planning: A History of Urban Development in Britain since 1750*. Foulis, Henley.
- Cherry, G. E. (1974a) 'The Housing, Town Planning Etc Act 1919', *The Planner*, vol. 60, no. 5: 681–4.
- Cherry, G. E. (1974b) *The Evolution of British Town Planning*. Leonard Hill, Leighton Buzzard.
- Cherry, G. E. (1975a) *Factors in the Origins of Town Planning in Britain: The Example of Birmingham, 1905–1914*. Centre for Urban and Regional Studies Working Paper No. 36, University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
- Cherry, G. E. (1975b) *Environmental Planning 1939–1969. vol. II: National Parks and Recreation in the Countryside*. HMSO, London.
- Cherry, G. E. (1980) 'The place of Neville Chamberlain in British town planning', in G. E. Cherry (ed.), *Shaping an Urban World*. Mansell, London.
- Cherry, G. E. (ed.) (1981) *Pioneers in British Planning*. Architectural Press, London.
- Cherry, G. E. (1988) *Cities and Plans: The Shaping of Urban Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Arnold, London.
- Cherry, G. E. (1994) *Birmingham: A Study in Geography, History and Planning*. Wiley, Chichester.
- Cherry, G. E. (1996) *Town Planning in Britain since 1900: The Rise and Fall of the Planning Ideal*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Cherry, G. E. and Penny, L. (1986) *Holford: A Study in Architecture, Planning and Civic Design*. Mansell, London.
- Childs, D. (1992) *Britain since 1945* (3rd edition). Routledge, London.
- Churchill, W. S. (1951) *The Second World War. Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate*. Cassell, London.
- Clapson, M. (1998) *Invincible Green Suburbs, Brave New Towns: Social Change and Urban Dispersal in Post-war England*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Clapson, M. (1999) 'Technology, social change and the planning of a post-industrial city: a case study of Milton Keynes', in D. Goodman and C. Chant (eds), *European Cities and Technology: Industrial to Post-industrial City*. Routledge, London.
- Clapson, M., Dobbin, M. and Waterman, P. (eds) (1998) *The Best Laid Plans: Milton Keynes since 1967*. University of Luton Press, Luton.
- Coates, D. (1980) *Labour in Power? A Study of the Labour Government 1974–1979*. Longman, London.
- Coates, K. and Silburn, R. (1970) *Poverty: The Forgotten Englishmen*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Coates, K. and Silburn, R. (1980) *Beyond the Bulldozer*. Department of Adult Education, University of Nottingham, Nottingham.
- Cochrane, A. (1983) 'Local economic policies: like trying to drain the ocean with a teaspoon', in J. Anderson, A. Cochrane and R. Hudson (eds), *Redundant Spaces in Cities and Regions? Studies in Industrial Decline and Social Change*. Academic Press, London.
- Cochrane, A. (1986) 'Local employment initiatives: towards a new municipal socialism?', in P. Lawless and C. Raban (eds), *The Contemporary British City*. Harper & Row, London.
- Cochrane, A. (2002) 'Thinking about the English regions', in T. Marshall, J. Glasson and P. Headicar (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Regional Planning*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Cockburn, C. (1977) *The Local State: Management of People and Cities*. Pluto, London.
- Coleman, A. (1985) *Utopia on Trial: Vision and Reality in Planned Housing*. Hilary Shipman, London.
- Colenutt, B. (1993) 'After the urban development corporations: development elites or people-based regeneration?', in R. Imrie and H. Thomas (eds), *British Urban Policy and the Urban Development Corporations*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Collison, P. (1963) *The Cutteslowe Walls: A Study in Social Class*. Faber, London.
- Cooke, P. N. (1983) *Theories of Planning and Spatial Development*. Hutchinson, London.
- Cooke, P. N. (ed.) (1989) *Localities: The Changing Face of Urban Britain*. Unwin Hyman, London.
- Cooke, P. N. and Morgan, K. (1998) *The Associational Economy*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

- Cooney, E. W. (1974) 'High flats in local authority housing in England and Wales since 1945', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *Multi-storey Living: The British Working-class Experience*. Croom Helm, London.
- Cowan, P., Fine, D., Ireland, J., Jordan, C., Mercer, D. and Sears, A. (1969) *The Office: A Facet of Urban Growth*. Heinemann, London.
- Creese, W. L. (1966) *The Search for Environment: The Garden City Before and After*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Crew, I. (1988) 'Has the electorate become Thatcherite?', in R. Skidelsky (ed.), *Thatcherism*. Chatto & Windus, London.
- Critchley, J. (1987) *Heseltine: The Unauthorised Biography*. Andre Deutsch, London.
- Cross, D. T. and Bristow, M. R. (eds) (1983) *English Structure Planning: A Commentary on Procedure and Practice in the Seventies*. Pion, London.
- Cross, J. (1970) 'The regional decentralisation of British government departments', *Public Administration*, vol. 48: 423–41.
- Crossman, R. (1975) *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Vol. 1: Minister of Housing 1964–66*. Hamish Hamilton, London.
- Crossman, R. (1976) *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Vol. 2: Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons 1966–1968*. Hamish Hamilton, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1960) *Housing Needs and Planning Policy*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1970) *Town and Country Planning in England and Wales* (3rd edition). Allen & Unwin, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1975) *Environmental Planning 1939–1969. Vol. I: Reconstruction and Land Use Planning 1939–1947*. HMSO, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1976) *Town and Country Planning in Britain* (6th edition). Allen & Unwin, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1979) *Environmental Planning 1939–1969. Vol. III: New Towns Policy*. HMSO, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1980) *Environmental Planning 1939–1969. Vol. IV: Land Values, Compensation and Betterment*. HMSO, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (1988) *Town and Country Planning in Britain* (10th edition). Unwin Hyman, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. (ed.) (1999) *British Planning: 50 Years of Urban and Regional Policy*. Athlone Press, London.
- Cullingworth, J. B. and Nadin, V. (1994) *Town and Country Planning in Britain* (11th edition). Routledge, London.
- Cullingworth, [J.] B. and Nadin, V. (1997) *Town and Country Planning in the UK* (12th edition). Routledge, London.
- Cullingworth, [J.] B. and Nadin, V. (2002) *Town and Country Planning in the UK* (13th edition). Routledge, London.
- Culpin, E. G. (1913) *The Garden City Movement up to Date*. Garden City and Town Planning Association, London.
- Dalton, H. (1957) *The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931–1945*. Muller, London.
- Dalton, H. (1962) *High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945–1960*. Muller, London.
- Daniel, W. W. (1968) *Racial Discrimination in England*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Dantzig, G. and Saaty, T. L. (1973) *Compact City: A Plan for a Liveable Urban Environment*. Freeman, San Francisco, CA.
- Darlow, C. (ed.) (1972) *Enclosed Shopping Centres*. Architectural Press, London.
- Daunton, M. J. (1983) *House and Home in the Victorian City: Working-class Housing 1850–1914*. Arnold, London.
- Daunton, M. J. (ed.) (1984) *Councillors and Tenants: Local Authority Housing in English Cities 1919–1939*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- Davies, J. G. (1972) *The Evangelistic Bureaucrat: A Study of a Planning Exercise in Newcastle-upon-Tyne*. Tavistock, London.
- Davies, R. L. and Champion, A. G. (1982) *The Future of the City Centre*. Institute of British Geographers Special Publication No. 14. Academic Press, London.
- Dawson, J. A. (1991) 'Market services in the United Kingdom', in R. J. Johnston and V. Gardiner (eds), *The Changing Geography of the United Kingdom* (2nd edition). Routledge, London.
- Day, M. G. (1981) 'The contribution of Sir Raymond Unwin (1863–1940) and R. Barry Parker (1867–1947) to the development of site-planning theory and practice c. 1890–1918', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *British Town Planning: The Formative Years*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- De Soissons, M. (1988) *Welwyn Garden City: A Town Designed for Healthy Living*. Publications for Business, Cambridge.
- DEA (Department of Economic Affairs) (1965a) *The National Plan* (Cmnd 2764). HMSO, London.
- DEA (1965b) *The West Midlands: A Regional Study*. HMSO, London.
- DEA (1965c) *The North West: A Regional Study*. HMSO, London.
- Deakin, D. (ed.) (1989) *Wythenshawe: The Story of a Garden City*. Phillimore, Chichester.
- Deakin, N. (1987) *The Politics of Welfare*. Methuen, London.
- Deas, I., Peck, J., Ticknell, A., Ward, K. and Bradford, M. (1999) 'Rescripting urban regeneration the Mancunian way', in R. Imrie and H. Thomas (eds), *British Urban Policy: An Evaluation of the Urban Development Corporations*. Sage, London.
- Delafons, J. (1997) *Politics and Preservation: A Policy History of the Built Heritage 1882–1996*. Spon, London.
- Dell, E. (2000) *A Strange Eventful History: Democratic Socialism in Britain*. HarperCollins, London.
- Denby, E. (1938) *Europe Rehoused*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Denman, D. R. (1980) *Land in a Free Society*. Centre for Policy Studies, London.
- Dennis, N. (1970) *People and Planning: The Sociology of Housing in Sunderland*. Faber, London.
- Dennis, N. (1972) *Public Participation and Planners' Blight*. Faber, London.

- Dennis, R. D. (1980) 'The decline of manufacturing employment in London 1966–74', in A. Evans and D. Eversley (eds), *The Inner City*. Heinemann, London.
- Dennis, R. D. (1984) *English Industrial Cities of the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- DETR (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions) (1997) *Building Partnerships for Prosperity, Sustainable Growth, Competitiveness and Employment in the English Regions* (Cm. 3814). TSO, London.
- DETR (1998a) *Planning for the Communities of the Future* (Cm. 3885). TSO, London.
- DETR (1998b) *Planning and Affordable Housing*, Circular 9/98. DETR, London.
- DETR (1999) *Quality of Life Counts: DETR Indicators for the UK Sustainable Development Strategy*. DETR, London.
- DETR (2000) *Our Towns and Cities: The Future – Delivering an Urban Renaissance* (Cm 4911). TSO, London.
- DETR (2001a) *Strategic Gap and Green Wedge Policies in Structure Plans*. DETR, London.
- DETR (2001b) *The Thames Gateway Review*. DETR, London.
- DETR (2001c) *DETR Departmental Annual Report 2001*. DETR, London.
- Diamond, D. R. (1991) 'The City, the "Big Bang" and office development', in K. Hoggart and D. R. Green (eds), *London: A New Metropolitan Geography*. Arnold, London.
- DITRD (Department of Industry, Trade and Regional Development) (1963) *The North East: A Plan for Development and Growth* (Cmnd 2206). HMSO, London.
- Dix, G. (1981) 'Patrick Abercrombie 1879–1957', in G. E. Cherry (ed.), *Pioneers in British Planning*. Architectural Press, London.
- Dobry Report (1975) *Review of the Development Control System: Final Report*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (Department of Environment) (1972) Report of Working Party on Local Authority/Private Enterprise Partnership Schemes. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1977a) *Inner London: Policies for Dispersal and Balance: Final Report of the Lambeth Inner Area Study*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1977b) *Change or Decay: Final Report of the Liverpool Inner Area Study*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1977c) *Unequal City: Final Report of the Birmingham Inner Area Study*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1977d) *Policy for the Inner Cities* (Cmnd 6845). HMSO, London.
- DoE (1978) *Strategic Plan for the South East: Review Government Statement*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1983) *Streamlining the Cities: Government Proposals for Reorganizing Local Government in Greater London and the Metropolitan Counties* (Cmnd 9063). HMSO, London.
- DoE (1986) *An Evaluation of Industrial and Commercial Improvement Areas*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1987a) *An Evaluation of Derelict Land Grant Schemes*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1987b) *An Evaluation of the Enterprise Zone Experiment*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1988) *An Evaluation of the Urban Development Grant Programme*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1989) *Environmental Assessment: A Guide to the Procedures*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1991) *Simplified Planning Zones: Progress and Procedures*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1992a) *The Effects of Major Out of Town Retail Development*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1992b) *The Use of Planning Agreements*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1992c) *The Relationship between House Prices and Land Supply*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1993) *The Effectiveness of Green Belts*. HMSO, London.
- DoE (1996) *Household Growth: Where Shall We Live?* (Cm. 3471). HMSO London.
- DoE and WO (Welsh Office) (1986) *The Future of Development Plans*. Consultation Paper. HMSO, London.
- DoE and WO (1989) *The Future of Development Plans* (Cm 569). HMSO, London.
- DoE, SO and WO (Scottish Office) and WO (Welsh Office) (1974) *Land* (Cmnd 5730). HMSO, London.
- DoE, SO and WO (1990) *This Common Inheritance: Britain's Environmental Strategy* (Cm 1200), HMSO, London.
- DoE, SO and WO (1991) *This Common Inheritance: The First Year Report: Britain's Environmental Strategy* (Cm 1655). HMSO, London.
- DoE, SO and WO (1992) *This Common Inheritance: The Second Year Report: Britain's Environmental Strategy* (Cm 2068). HMSO, London.
- Donnison, D. and Middleton, A. (eds) (1987) *Regenerating the Inner City: Glasgow's Experience*. Routledge, London.
- Donnison, D. and Soto, P. (1980) *The Good City: A Study of Urban Development and Policy in Britain*. Heinemann, London.
- DTEDC (Distributive Trades Economic Development Council) (1968) *The Cowley Shopping Centre*. National Economic Development Office. HMSO, London.
- DTEDC (1971) *The Future Pattern of Shopping*. National Economic Development Office. HMSO, London.
- DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) (1984) *Regional Industrial Development* (Cmnd 9111). HMSO, London.
- DTLR (Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions) (2001a) *Planning Green Paper: Delivering a Fundamental Change*. TSO, London.
- DTLR (2001b) *Faster, Fairer Planning for All*, DTLR News Release 537. DTLR, London.
- DTLR (2002) *Your Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English Regions* (Cm 5511). TSO, London.
- Dudley Report (1944) *The Design of Dwellings: Report of the Sub-Committee of the Central Housing Advisory Committee*. HMSO, London.

- Dunleavy, P. (1981) *The Politics of Mass Housing in Britain 1945–75: A Study of Corporate Power and Professional Influence in the Welfare State*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Dunning, J. H. (1963) *Economic Planning and Town Expansion: A Case Study of Basingstoke*. Workers Educational Association, Southampton.
- Durant, R. (1939) *Walling: A Survey of Life on a New Estate*. King, London.
- Dyos, H. J. and Wolff, M. (eds) (1973) *The Victorian City: Images and Realities* (2 vols). Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Edwards, A. M. (1981) *The Design of Suburbia: A Critical Study in Environmental History*. Pimlico, London.
- Edwards, J. and Batley, R. (1978) *The Politics of Positive Discrimination*. Tavistock, London.
- Elkin, S. H. (1974) *Politics and Land Use Planning: The London Experience*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Elkin, T., McLaren, D. and Hillman, M. (1991) *Reviving the City: Towards Sustainable Urban Development*. Policy Studies Institute/Friends of the Earth, London.
- Elson, M. J. (1985) 'Containment in Hertfordshire – changing attitudes to land release for new employment generating development', in S. Barrett and P. Healey (eds), *Land Policy: Problems and Alternatives*. Gower, Farnborough.
- Elson, M. J. (1986) *Green Belts: Conflict Mediation in the Urban Fringe*. Heinemann, London.
- Elson, M. J. (1993) 'Old Symbols and New Realities: The Context for Green Belt Policies in the UK'. Oxford Brookes University Inaugural Professorial Lecture.
- Elson, M. J. and MacDonald, R. (1997) 'Urban growth management: distinctive solutions in the Celtic countries?', in R. MacDonald and H. Thomas, (eds), *Nationality and Planning in Scotland and Wales*. University of Wales Press, Cardiff.
- English, J., Madigan, R. and Norman, P. (1976) *Slum Clearance: The Social and Administrative Context in England and Wales*. Croom Helm, London.
- Ermisch, J. and McClennan, D. (1986) 'Housing policies, markets and urban economic change', in V. Hausner (ed.), *Critical Issues in Urban Economic Development* (2 vols), vol. II. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Esher, L. (1983) *A Broken Wave: The Rebuilding of England 1940–1980*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Estates Gazette*, issues as cited in text.
- Evans, A. (1988) *No Room! No Room! The Costs of the British Town and Country Planning System*. Occasional Paper No. 79. Institute of Economic Affairs, London.
- Evenson, N. (1979) *Paris: A Century of Change 1878–1978*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Fairclough, N. (2000) *New Labour, New Language*. London: London.
- Ferris, J. (1972) *Participation in Urban Planning – The Barnsbury Case: A Study of Environmental Improvement in London*. Bell, London.
- Fielding, T. and Halford, S. (1990) *Patterns and Processes of Urban Change in the UK: Reviews of Urban Research*. HMSO, London.
- Filler, R. (1986) *A History of Welwyn Garden City*. Phillimore, Chichester.
- Finer, H. (1941) *Municipal Trading: A Study in Public Administration*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Finer, H. (1950) *English Local Government* (4th edition). Methuen, London.
- Finnegan, R. (1984) 'Council housing in Leeds 1919–1939: social policy and urban change', in M. J. Daunton (ed.), *Councillors and Tenants: Local Authority Housing in English Cities 1919–1939*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- Finnemore, B. (1989) *Houses from the Factory*. Rivers Oram, London.
- Fishman, R. (1977) *Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier*. Basic Books, New York.
- Fogarty, M. P. (1945) *The Prospects of the Industrial Areas of Great Britain*. Methuen, London.
- Forshaw, J. H. and Abercrombie, P. (1943) *County of London Plan*. Macmillan, London.
- Forster, E. M. (1946) 'The challenge of our time', in E. M. Forster (1965) *Two Cheers for Democracy*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Fothergill, S. and Gudgin, G. (1982) *Unequal Growth: Urban and Regional Employment Change in the UK*. Heinemann, London.
- Fothergill, S., Kitson M. and Monk, S. (1982) *The Impact of the New and Expanded Town Programmes on Industrial Location in Britain 1960–78*. Working Paper No. 3, Industrial Location Research Project. Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Foulsham, J. (1990) 'Women's needs and planning – a critical evaluation of recent local authority practice', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Franks Committee (1957) *Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries* (Cmnd 218). HMSO, London.
- Fraser, D. (1979) *Power and Authority in the Victorian City*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Fraser, D. (ed.) (1982) *Municipal Reform and the Industrial City*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- Friend, J. K. and Jessop, J. N. (1969) *Local Government and Strategic Choice: An Operational Approach to the Processes of Public Planning*. Tavistock, London.
- Friend, J. K., Power, J. M. and Yewlett, C. J. L. (1974) *Public Planning: The Intercorporate Dimension*. Tavistock, London.
- Galbraith, J. K. (1958) *The Affluent Society*. Hamish Hamilton, London.
- Galbraith, J. K. (1992) *The Culture of Contentment*. Sinclair Stevenson, London.
- Galley, K. (1973) 'Newcastle-upon-Tyne', in J. C. Holliday (ed.), *City Centre Redevelopment: A Study of British City Centre Planning and Case Studies of Five English City Centres*. Charles Knight, London.

- Gamble, A. (1988) *The Free Economy and the Strong State*. Macmillan, London.
- Ganz, G. (1977) *Government and Industry: The Provision of Financial Assistance to Industry and its Control*. Professional Books, Abingdon.
- Garside, P. L. (1988) '“Unhealthy areas”: town planning, eugenics and the slums, 1890–1945', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 3, no. 1: 24–46.
- Garside, P. L. and Hebbert, M. (eds) (1989) *British Regionalism 1900–2000*. Mansell, London.
- Gaskell, S. M. (1981) '“The suburb salubrious”: town planning in practice', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *British Town Planning: The Formative Years*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- GBONS (Great Britain Office for National Statistics) (2001) *UK 2002 the Official Yearbook of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*. TSO, London.
- Geddes, P. (1968, orig. 1915) *Cities in Evolution: An Introduction to the Town Planning Movement and the Study of Civics*. Benn, London.
- George, H. (1911, orig. 1880) *Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the Cause of Industrial Depression, and Increase of Want with Increase of Wealth: The Remedy*. Dent, London.
- Gibberd, F., Hyde Harvey, B., White, L. et al. (1980) *Harlow: The Story of a New Town*. Publications for Companies, Stevenage.
- Gibbon, G. and Bell, R. W. (1939) *History of the London County Council 1889–1939*. Macmillan, London.
- Gibson, M. S. and Langstaff, M. J. (1982) *An Introduction to Urban Renewal*. Hutchinson, London.
- Giddens, A. (1998) *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Giddens, A. (2000) *The Third Way and Its Critics*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Gittins, D. (1982) *Fair Sex: Family Size and Structure 1900–1939*. Hutchinson, London.
- Glass, R. (ed.) (1948) *The Social Background of a Plan*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Glasson, J. (1978) *An Introduction to Regional Planning*. Hutchinson, London.
- Glendinning, M. and Muthesius, S. (1994) *Tower Block: Modern Public Housing in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland*. Yale University Press, London.
- Gold, J. R. (1997) *The Experience of Modernism: Modern Architects and the Future City 1928–1953*. Spon, London.
- Gold, J. R. and Gold, M. M. (1990) '“A place of delightful prospects”: promotional imagery and the selling of suburbia', in L. Zonn (ed.), *Place Images in Media: Portrayal, Experience and Meaning*. Rowman & Littlefield, Savage, MD.
- Gold, J. R. and Gold, M. M. (1994) '“Home at last”: building societies, home ownership and the rhetoric of English suburban promotion in the interwar years', in J. R. Gold and S. V. Ward (eds), *Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing to Sell Towns and Regions*. Wiley, Chichester.
- Gold, J. R. and Ward, S. V. (1994) '“We're going to get it right this time”: cinematic representations of urban planning and the British new towns 1939–51', in S. C. Aitken and L. Zonn (eds), *Place, Power, Situation and Spectacle: A Geography of Film*. Rowman & Littlefield, Savage, MD.
- Goobey, A. R. (1992) *Bricks and Mortals – The Dreams of the 80s and the Nightmare of the 90s: The Inside Story of the Property World*. Century, London.
- Goodwin, M., Jones, M., Jones, R., Pett, K. and Simpson, G. (2002) 'Devolution and economic governance in the UK: uneven geographies, uneven capacities?', *Local Economy*, vol. 17, no. 3: 200–15.
- Gordon, G. (ed.) (1986) *Regional Cities in the UK 1890–1980*. Harper & Row, London.
- Gould, P. (1988) *Early Green Politics: Back to Nature, Back to the Land and Socialism in Britain 1880–1900*. Harvester, Brighton.
- Graves, R. and Hodge, A. (1971) *The Long Weekend: A Social History of Great Britain 1918–1939*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Greed, C. H. (1994) *Women and Planning: Creating Gendered Realities*. Routledge, London.
- Gregory, D. J. (1970) *Green Belts and Development Control: A Case Study in the West Midlands*. Occasional Paper No. 12, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies. University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
- Gregory, T. (1973) 'Coventry', in J. C. Holliday (ed.), *City Centre Redevelopment: A Study of British City Centre Planning and Case Studies of Five English City Centres*. Charles Knight, London.
- Grey, G. and Amooquaye, E. (1990) 'A new agenda for race and planning?', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directives for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Hague, C. (1984) *The Development of British Planning Thought: A Critical Perspective*. Hutchinson, London.
- Hague, C. (1990) 'Scotland: back to the future for planning?', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directives for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Hailsham, Lord (1975) *The Door Wherein I Went*. Collins, London.
- Hall, P. (1963) *London 2000*. Faber, London.
- Hall, P. (1973) 'Manpower and education', in P. Cowan (ed.), *The Future of Planning*. Faber, London.
- Hall, P. (1980) *Great Planning Disasters*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.
- Hall, P. (1982) 'Enterprise Zones: a justification', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 6, No. 3: 416–21.
- Hall, P. (1988) *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Hall, P. (1989) *London 2001*. Unwin Hyman, London.

- Hall, P. (1992) *Urban and Regional Planning* (3rd edition). Routledge, London.
- Hall, P. (2002a) *Urban and Regional Planning* (4th edition). Routledge, London.
- Hall, P. (2002b) *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (3rd edition). Blackwell, Oxford.
- Hall, P. and Ward, C. (1998) *Sociable Cities: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard*. Wiley, Chichester.
- Hall, P., Gracey, H., Drewett, R. and Thomas, R. (1973) *The Containment of Urban England* (2 vols). Political and Economic Planning/Allen & Unwin, London.
- Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds), (1983) *The Politics of Thatcherism*. Lawrence & Wishart, London.
- Hannington, W. (1937) *The Problem of the Distressed Areas*. Gollancz, London.
- Hannington, W. (1977, orig. 1936) *Unemployed Struggles 1919–1936: My Life and Struggles amongst the Unemployed*. Lawrence & Wishart, London.
- Harborne Tenants Ltd (1907) *Harborne Tenants Ltd: Prospectus 1907–8*. Harborne Tenants Ltd, Birmingham.
- Hardy, D. (1991a) *From Garden Cities to New Towns: Campaigning for Town and Country Planning, 1899–1946*. Spon, London.
- Hardy, D. (1991b) *From New Towns to Green Politics: Campaigning For Town and Country Planning, 1946–1990*. Spon, London.
- Hardy, D. and Ward, C. (1984) *Arcadia for All: The Legacy of a Makeshift Landscape*. Mansell, London.
- Harloe, M. (1975) *Swindon: A Town in Transition*. Heinemann, London.
- Harris, R. and Larkham, P. (eds), (1999) *Changing Suburbs: Foundation, Form and Function*. Spon, London.
- Harrison, M. (1981) 'Housing and town planning in Manchester before 1914', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *British Town Planning: The Formative Years*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- Harrison, M. (1991) 'Thomas Coglan Horsfall and "the example of Germany"', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 6, no. 3: 297–314.
- Harvey, D. (1975) *Social Justice and the City*. Arnold, London.
- Harvey, D. (1982) *The Limits to Capital*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Hasegawa, J. (1992) *Replanning the Blitzed City Centre*. Open University Press, Buckingham.
- Hass-Klau, C. (1990) *The Pedestrian and City Traffic*. Belhaven, London.
- Hawtree, M. (1981) 'The emergence of the town planning profession', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *British Town Planning: The Formative Years*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- HDCCS (Housing Development Committee of the Corporation of Sheffield) (1962) *Ten Years of Housing in Sheffield 1953–1963*. City Architect's Department, Sheffield.
- HDL (Housing Department, Liverpool) (1937) *City of Liverpool Housing 1937*. Housing Committee, Liverpool.
- Headicar, P. and Bixby, R. (1992) *Concrete and Tyres: Local Development Effects of Major Roads: M40 Case Study*. Council for the Protection of Rural England, London.
- Healey, D. (1990) *The Time of My Life*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Healey, P. (1983) *Local Plans in British Land Use Planning*. Pergamon, Oxford.
- Healey, P. (1997) *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Healey, P. and Nabarro, R. (eds), (1990) *Land and Property Development in a Changing Context*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Healey, P., Davis, J., Wood, M. and Elson, M. J. (1982) *Wokingham: The Implementation of Strategic Planning Policy in a Growth Area in the South East*. School of Town Planning, Oxford Polytechnic, Oxford.
- Healey, P., Davoudi, S., O'Toole, M., Tavsanoglu, S. and Usher, D. (eds) (1992) *Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration*. Spon, London.
- Healey, P., McNamara, P., Elson, M. and Doak, A. (1989) *Land Use Planning and the Mediation of Urban Change: The British Planning System in Practice*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Heap, D. (1961) 'Green belts and open spaces: the English scene today', *Journal of Planning and Property Law*, January: 16–24.
- Heap, D. (1991) *An Outline of Planning Law*. Sweet & Maxwell, London.
- Hebbert, M. (1981) 'Frederic Osborn, 1885–1978', in G. E. Cherry (ed.), *Pioneers in British Planning*. Architectural Press, London.
- Hebbert, M. (1983) 'The daring experiment – social scientists and land use planning in 1940s Britain', *Environment and Planning B*, vol. 10: 3–17.
- Hebbert, M. (1992) 'The British garden city: metamorphosis', in S. V. Ward (ed.), *The Garden City: Past, Present and Future*. Spon, London.
- Heim, C. E. (1990) 'The Treasury as developer-capitalist? British new town building in the 1950s', *Journal of Economic History*, vol. L, no. 4: 903–24.
- Hennessy, P. (1993) *Never Again: Britain 1945–51*. Vintage, London.
- Hennock, E. P. (1973) *Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth-century Urban Government*. Arnold, London.
- Herbert Commission (Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London) (1960) *Report* (Cmnd 1164). HMSO, London.
- Herington, J. (1984) *The Outer City*. Harper & Row, London.
- Herington, J. (1989) *Planning Processes: An Introduction for Geographers*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Heseltine, M. (1979) 'Secretary of State's address', *Report of Proceedings of the Town and Country Planning Summer School 1979*, Royal Town Planning Institute, London, pp. 25–9.

- Heseltine, M. (1987) *Where There's a Will*. Hutchinson, London.
- Hewison, R. (1987) *The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline*. Methuen, London.
- Hill, D. M. (1970) *Participating in Local Affairs*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Hill, O. (1883) *Homes of the London Poor*. Macmillan, London.
- Hill, R. (1986) 'Urban transport: from technical process to social policy', in P. Lawless and C. Raban (eds), *The Contemporary British City*. Harper & Row, London.
- Hobbs, P. (1992) 'The economic determinants of post-war British planning', *Progress in Planning*, vol. 38, no. 3 (Pergamon, Oxford).
- Hobhouse Committee (1947) *Report of the National Parks Committee (England and Wales)* (Cmd 7121). HMSO, London.
- Hole, W. V., Adderson, I. M. and Pountney, M. T. (1979) *Washington New Town: The Early Years*. HMSO, London.
- Holland, S. (1976) *The Regional Problem*. Macmillan, London.
- Holley, S. (1983) *Washington: Quicker by Quango – The History of Washington New Town*. Publications for Companies, Stevenage.
- Holmes, M. (1985) *The Labour Government, 1974–1979: Political Aims and Economic Reality*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Home, R. (1989) *Planning Use Classes: A Guide to the Use Classes Orders*. Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford.
- Hornby, W. (1958) *Factories and Plant*. HMSO/Longman, London.
- Horsey, M. (1988) 'Multi-storey council housing in Britain: introduction and spread', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 3, no. 2: 167–96.
- Horsfall, T. C. (1904) *The Improvement of the Dwellings and Surroundings of the People: The Example of Germany*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Hossain, S. (1990) 'Race and planning – the Camden experience', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- House of Commons Select Committee on Employment (1989) *Third Report: The Employment Effects of Urban Development Corporations* (HC 3271 and II). HMSO, London.
- Howard, E. (1898) *To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*. Swan Sonnenschein, London.
- Howard, E. (1902) *Garden Cities of To-morrow*. Swan Sonnenschein, London.
- HRL (Hulme Regeneration Ltd) (1994) *Rebuilding the City: A Guide to Development, Hulme, Manchester*. Hulme City Challenge, Manchester.
- Hubbard, E. and Shippobottom, M. (1988) *A Guide to Port Sunlight Village*. Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.
- Hudson, R. (1989) *Wrecking a Region*. Pion, London.
- Hughes, M. R. (ed.) (1971) *The Letters of Lewis Mumford and Frederic J. Osborn: A Transatlantic Dialogue*. Adams & Dart, Bath.
- Hunt Committee (1969) *The Intermediate Areas: Report of Departmental Committee* (Cmd 3998). HMSO, London.
- Hyder, J. (1913) *The Case for Land Nationalisation*. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent, London.
- Imrie, R. (1996) *Disability and the City*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (eds) (1993a) *British Urban Policy and the Urban Development Corporations*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (1993b) 'Urban policy and the urban development corporations', in R. Imrie and H. Thomas (eds), *British Urban Policy and the Urban Development Corporations*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Imrie, R. and Thomas, H. (eds) (1999) *British Urban Policy: An Evaluation of the Urban Development Corporations* (2nd edition). Sage, London.
- Jackson, A. A. (1991) *Semi-Detached London: Suburban Development, Life and Transport 1900–1939* (2nd edition). Wild Swan, Didcot.
- Jacobs, J. (1964) *The Death and Life of Great American Cities: The Failure of Town Planning*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Jay, D. (1980) *Change and Fortune: A Political Record*. Hutchinson, London.
- Jefferys, J. B. (1954) *Retail Trading in Britain 1850–1950*. Economic and Social Studies No. 13, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Jenkin, P. (1984) 'Secretary of State's address [to the RTPI Summer School, September 1983]: the Rt Hon. Patrick Jenkin, MP', *The Planner*, vol. 70, No. 2: 15–17.
- Jenkins, S. (1975) *Landlords to London: The Story of a Capital and its Growth*. Constable, London.
- Jenks, M., Burton, E. and Williams, K. (eds) (1996) *The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form*. Spon, London.
- Jevons, R. and Madge, J. (1946) *Housing Estates: A Study of Bristol Corporation Policy and Practice between the Wars*. Arrowsmith, Bristol.
- Johnson, J. H. (ed.) (1974) *Suburban Growth: Geographical Processes at the Edge of the Western City*. Wiley, London.
- Johnson, J. H. and Pooley, C. G. (eds) (1982) *The Structure of Nineteenth-century Cities*. Croom Helm, London.
- Johnson-Marshall, P. (1966) *Rebuilding Cities*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
- Jones, C. and Patrick, J. (1992) 'The merchant city as an example of housing-led urban regeneration', in P. Healey et al. (eds), *Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration*. Spon, London.
- Jones, G. S. (1971) *Outcast London: A Study of the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Jowell, J. (1983) 'Structure plans and social engineering', in *Structure Plans and Local Plans – Planning in Crisis*. Occasional paper of the *Journal of Planning and Environment Law*. Sweet & Maxwell, London.
- JRF (Joseph Rowntree Foundation) (2002) *Britain's Housing in 2022: More Shortages and Homelessness?* Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York.
- Kavanagh, D. (1997) *The Reordering of British Politics: Politics after Thatcher*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
- Kavanagh, D. and Seldon, A. (eds) (1994) *The Major Effect*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Keynes, J. M. (1973, orig. 1936) *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Vol. 7: The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. Macmillan/Royal Economic Society, London.
- King, A. D. (1982) "'Town planning": a note on the origins and use of the term', *Planning History Bulletin*, vol. 4, no. 2: 15–17.
- Knevit, C. (1975) 'Macclesfield: the self-help GIA', *Architects Journal*, vol. 162: 995–1002.
- Kohan, C. M. (1952) *Works and Buildings*. HMSO/Longman, London.
- Kropotkin, P. (1974, orig. 1899) *Fields, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Larsson, L. O. (1984) 'Metropolis architecture', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *Metropolis 1890–1940*. Mansell, London.
- Law, C. M. (1981) *British Regional Development since World War I*. Methuen, London.
- Law, C. M. (1992) 'Property-led urban regeneration in inner Manchester', in P. Healey et al. (eds), *Rebuilding the City: Property-led Urban Regeneration*. Spon, London.
- Law, C. M., in association with Grime, E. K., Grundy, C. L., Senior, M. L. and Tuppen, J. N. (1988) *The Uncertain Future of the Urban Core*. Routledge, London.
- Lawless, P. (1986) *The Evolution of Spatial Policy*. Pion, London.
- Lawless, P. (1989) *Britain's Inner Cities* (2nd edition). Paul Chapman, London.
- Lawless, P. (1991) 'Urban policy in the Thatcher decade: English inner-city policy 1979–1990-', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, vol. 9: 15–30.
- Lawless, P. and Brown, F. (1986) *Urban Growth and Change in Britain: An Introduction*. Harper & Row, London.
- Lawton, R. and Pooley, C. G. (1986) 'Liverpool and Merseyside', in G. Gordon (ed.), *Regional Cities in the UK 1890–1980*. Harper & Row, London.
- LCC (London County Council) (1937) *London Housing*. LCC, London.
- LCC (1961) *The Planning of a New Town*. LCC, London.
- Le Corbusier (1922) 'Une ville contemporaine', in Le Corbusier and P. Jeanneret (eds) (1964) *Oeuvre Complète de 1910–1929*. Les Editions d'Architecture, Zurich.
- Le Corbusier (1925) 'Plan Voisin (de Paris)', in Le Corbusier and P. Jeanneret (eds) (1964) *Oeuvre Complète de 1929–1934*. Les Editions d'Architecture, Zurich.
- Le Corbusier (trans. F. Etchells) (1946, orig. 1927) *Towards a New Architecture*. Architectural Press, London (originally published in French in 1923 as *Vers Une Architecture*. Editions Cres, Paris).
- Lee, J. M. (1963) *Social Leaders and Public Persons*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Leitch Committee (1977) *Report of the Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment*. HMSO, London.
- Lend Lease (1999) *Vision to Reality*. Lend Lease Europe, London.
- Lewis, J. and Townsend, A. (eds) (1989) *The North–South Divide: Regional Change in Britain in the 1980s*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Lewis, N. (1992) *Inner City Regeneration: The Demise of Regional and Local Government*. Open University Press, Buckingham.
- LGB (Local Government Board) (1919) *Manual on the Preparation of State-aided Housing Schemes*. HMSO, London.
- Livingstone, K. (1987) *If Voting Changed Anything They'd Abolish It*. Collins, London.
- LLEC (Liberal Land Enquiry Committee) (1914) *The Land. Vol. 2: Urban*. Hodder & Stoughton, London.
- Lloyd, G. (2002) 'The regional agenda, planning and development in Scotland', in T. Marshall, J. Glasson and P. Headicar (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Regional Planning*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Lloyd, P. (1996) 'Contested governance: European exposure in the English regions', in J. Alden and P. Boland (eds), *Regional Development Strategies: A European Perspective*. Jessica Kingsley: London.
- Lock, D. (1989) 'Second honeymoon in the marriage of town and country?', *Town and Country Planning*, vol. 58, no. 6: 174–5.
- Lock, M. (1946) *The Middlesbrough Survey and Plan*. Middlesbrough Corporation, Middlesbrough.
- Loebel, H. (1988) *Government Factories and the Origins of British Regional Policy 1934–1948*. Avebury, Aldershot.
- Loftman, P. and Nevin, B. (1998) 'Pro-growth local economic development strategies: civic promotion and local needs in Britain's second city, 1981–1996', in T. Hall and P. Hubbard (eds), *The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime and Representation*. Wiley, Chichester.
- Long, J. R. (1962) *The Wythall Inquiry*. Estates Gazette, London.
- Longley, P., Batty, M., Shepherd, J. and Sadler, G. (1992) 'Do green belts change the shape of urban areas? A preliminary survey of the settlement geography of south east England', *Regional Studies*, vol. 26, no. 5: 437–52.
- Lonie, A. A. and Begg, H. M. (1979) 'Comment: further evidence on the quest for an effective regional policy', *Regional Studies*, vol. 13: 497–500.
- Lutyens, E. and Abercrombie, L. P. (1945) *A Plan for the City and County of Kingston-upon-Hull*. Brown, Hull.

- Lyddon, D. (1987) 'The development plan: vision or vacuum?', in B. Robson (ed.), *Managing the City: The Aims and Impacts of Urban Policy*. Croom Helm, Beckenham.
- M'Gonigle, G. C. M. and Kirby, J. (1936) *Poverty and Public Health*. Gollancz, London.
- MacDonald, R. and Thomas, H. (eds) (1997) *Nationality and Planning in Scotland and Wales*. University of Wales Press, Cardiff.
- Mackay, R. R. (1992) '1992 and relations with the EEC', in P. Townroe and R. Martin (eds), *Regional Development in the 1990s: The British Isles in the 1990s*. Jessica Kingsley/Regional Studies Association, London.
- Mackintosh, M. and Wainwright, H. (1987) *A Taste of Power*. Verso, London.
- Macmillan, H. (1969) *Tides of Fortune 1945–1955*. Macmillan, London.
- Mandelker, D. R. (1962) *Green Belts and Urban Growth: English Town and Country Planning*. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI.
- Manzoni, H. J. B. (1939) *The Building of 50,000 Municipal Houses*. City of Birmingham, Birmingham.
- Marley Committee (1935) *Report of the Departmental Committee on Garden Cities and Satellite Towns*. HMSO, London.
- Marmot, A. F. (1982) 'The legacy of Le Corbusier and high-rise housing', *Built Environment*, vol. 7, no. 2: 82–95.
- Marriott, O. (1969) *The Property Boom*. Pan, London.
- Marsh, D. L. (1965) *The Changing Social Structure of England and Wales 1871–1961*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Marshall, R. J. and Masser, I. (1982) 'British planning methodology: three historical perspectives', *Built Environment*, vol. 7, no. 2: 121–9.
- Marshall, T., Glasson, J. and Headicar, P. (eds) (2002) *Contemporary Issues in Regional Planning*. Ashgate: Aldershot.
- Martin, R. L. (1988) 'The political economy of Britain's north–south divide', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, vol. 13: 389–418.
- Martins, M. R. (1986) *An Organizational Approach to Regional Planning*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Marwick, A. (1964) 'Middle opinion in the thirties: planning, progress and political agreement', *English Historical Review*, vol. LXXIX, no. 311: 285–98.
- Marwick, A. (1967) *The Deluge: British Society and the First World War*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Marwick, A. (1970) *Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change 1900–1967*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Mason, T. and Tiratsoo, N. (1990) 'People, politics and planning: the reconstruction of Coventry's city centre, 1940–53', in J. Diefendorf (ed.), *Rebuilding Europe's Blitzed Cities*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Massey, D. B. (1979) 'In what sense a regional problem?', *Regional Studies*, vol. 13: 233–43.
- Massey, D. B. (1982) 'Enterprise Zones: a political issue', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 6, no. 3: 429–34.
- Massey, D. B. (1984) *Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production*. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
- Massey, D. B. (1989) 'Regional planning 1909–1939', in P. L. Garside and M. Hebbert (eds), *British Regionalism 1900–2000*. Mansell, London.
- Masterman, C. F. G. (1909) *The Condition of England*. Methuen, London.
- Maud Report (1967) *The Management of Local Government*. HMSO, London.
- Mawson, J. and Miller, D. (1986) 'Interventionist approaches in local employment and economic development: the experience of Labour local authorities', in V. Hausner (ed.), *Critical Issues in Urban Economic Development* (2 vols), vol. I, pp. 145–99.
- McAuslan, P. (1980) *Ideologies of Planning Law*. Pergamon, Oxford.
- McCallum, J. (1979) 'The development of British regional policy', in D. M. MacLennan and J. B. Parr (eds), *Regional Policy: Past Experience and New Directions*, Martin Robertson, Oxford.
- McCormick, J. (1993) 'Environmental Politics' in P. Dunleavy et al. (eds), *Developments in British Politics 4*. Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 267–83.
- McCrone, G. (1969) *Regional Policy in Britain*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- McDougall, G. (1979) 'The state, capital and land: the history of town planning revisited', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol. 3, no. 3: 361–80.
- McKay, D. H. and Cox, A. W. (1979) *The Politics of Urban Change*. Croom Helm, Beckenham.
- McLoughlin, J. B. (1969) *Urban and Regional Planning: A Systems Approach*. Faber, London.
- Meegan, R. (1989) 'Paradise postponed: the growth and decline of Merseyside's outer estates', in P. N. Cooke, *Localities: The Changing Face of Urban Britain*. Unwin Hyman, London.
- Meller, H. (1990) *Patrick Geddes: Social Evolutionist and City Planner*. Routledge, London.
- Meller, H. (1997) *Towns, Plans and Society in Modern Britain*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Melling, J. (ed.) (1980) *Housing, Social Policy and the State*. Croom Helm, London.
- Merrett, S. (1979) *State Housing in Britain*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Mess, H. A. (1928) *Industrial Tyneside: A Social Survey*. Benn, London.
- MH (Ministry of Health) (1921) *Report of the South Wales Regional Survey Committee*. HMSO, London.
- MH and MW (Ministry of Health and Ministry of Works) (1944) *Housing Manual*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (Ministry of Housing and Local Government) (1951) *Town and Country Planning 1943–1951. Progress Report* (Cmd 8204). HMSO, London.

- MHLG (1952a) *Town and Country Planning Act, 1947: Amendment of Financial Provisions* (Cmd 8699). HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1952b) *The Density of Residential Areas*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1955) *Green Belts* (Circular No. 42/55). HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1957) *Green Belts* (Circular No. 50/57). HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1958) *Flats and Houses 1958*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1962) *The Green Belts*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1963) *London – Employment: Housing: Land* (Cmd 1952). HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1964) *The South East Study 1961–1981*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1966) *The Deepthill Study: Improvement Possibilities in a District of Rochdale*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1968) *Report of the Inquiry into the Collapse of Flats at Ronan Point, Canning Town*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1970a) *Living in a Slum: A Study of St Mary's, Oldham*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG (1970b) *Moving out of a Slum: A Study of People Moving from St Mary's, Oldham*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG and MT (Ministry of Transport) (1962) *Town Centres: Approach to Renewal*. HMSO, London.
- MHLG and WO (Welsh Office) (1967) *Town and Country Planning* (Cmd 3333). HMSO, London.
- MHLG and WO (1968) *Old Houses into New Homes* (Cmd 3602). HMSO, London.
- Middleton, M. (1991) *Cities in Transition: The Regeneration of Britain's Inner Cities*. Michael Joseph, London.
- Miliutin, N. A. (1974) *Sotsgorod: The Problem of Building Socialist Cities*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Miller, M. (1989) *Letchworth: The First Garden City*. Phillimore, Chichester.
- Miller, M. (1992) *Raymond Unwin: Garden Cities and Town Planning*. Leicester University Press, Leicester, Leicester.
- Miller, M. (2002) 'The origins of the garden city residential neighborhood', in K. C. Parsons and D. Schuyler (eds), *From Garden City to Green City: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
- Miller, M. and Gray, A. S. (1992) *Hampstead Garden Suburb*. Phillimore, Chichester.
- Mills, L. and Young, K. (1986) 'Local authorities and economic development: a preliminary analysis', in V. Hausner (ed.), *Critical Issues in Urban Economic Development* (2 vols), vol. 1. Clarendon, Oxford.
- Minett, M. J. (1974) 'The housing, town planning, etc 1909', *The Planner*, vol. 60, no. 5: 676–80.
- Minister without Portfolio et al. (1985) *Lifting the Burden* (Cmd 9571). HMSO, London.
- Mitchell, E. (1967) *The Plan that Pleased*. Town and Country Planning Association, London.
- MLNR (Ministry of Land and Natural Resources) (1965) *The Land Commission* (Cmd 2771). HMSO, London.
- Montgomery, J. (1990) 'Counter-revolution: out-of-town shopping and the future of town centres', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directives for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Montgomery, J. and Thornley, A. (eds) (1990) *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Moor, N. (1979) 'The contribution and influence of office developers and their companies on the location and growth of office activities', in P. W. Daniels (ed.), *Spatial Patterns of Office Growth and Location*. Wiley, Chichester.
- Moore, B., Rhodes, J. and Tyler, P. (1986) *The Effects of Government Regional Economic Policy*. Department of Trade and Industry. HMSO, London.
- Morgan, K. (2002) 'The new regeneration narrative – local development in the multi-level polity', *Local Economy*, vol. 17, no. 3: 191–9.
- Morgan, K. and Henderson, D. (1997) 'The fallible servant: evaluating the Welsh Development Agency', in R. MacDonald and H. Thomas (eds), *Nationality and Planning in Scotland and Wales*. University of Wales Press, Cardiff.
- Morgan, K. O. (1984) *Labour in Power 1945–51*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Morgan, K. O. (1992) *The People's Peace: British History 1945–1990*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Morrison, J. (2001) *Reforming Britain: New Labour, New Constitution*. Reuters/Pearson, Harlow.
- Mortimer, J. (1990) *Titmuss Regained*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Mowat, C. L. (1955) *Britain between the Wars 1918–1940*. Methuen, London.
- MT (Ministry of Transport) (1963) *Traffic in Towns: A Study of the Long-term Problems of Traffic in Urban Areas: Reports of the Steering Group and Working Group appointed by the Minister of Transport*. HMSO, London.
- MTCP (Ministry of Town and Country Planning) (1945) *National Parks in England and Wales* (Dower Report) (Cmd 6628). HMSO, London.
- MTCP (1947) *Town and Country Planning Act, 1947: Explanatory Memorandum* (Cmd 7006). HMSO, London.
- MTCP (1948) *Town and Country Planning Act, 1947: Explanatory Memorandum, Part II – Notes on Sections*, HMSO, London.
- MTCP and SO (Scottish Office) (1944) *The Control of Land Use* (Cmd 6537). HMSO, London.
- Muchnick, D. H. (1970) *Urban Renewal in Liverpool: A Study of the Politics of Redevelopment*. Occasional Papers on Social Administration No. 33. Bell, London.
- Munton, R. (1983) *London's Green Belt: Containment in Practice*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Murray, M. (1992) *The Politics and Pragmatism of Urban Containment: Belfast since 1940*. Avebury, Aldershot.
- Musson, S., Tickell, A. and John, P. (2002) 'Building a world-class region: regional strategy in the South East of England', *Local Economy*, vol. 17, no. 3: 216–25.

- Muthesius, S. (1982) *The English Terraced House*. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
- Nairn, I. (ed.) (1955) 'Outrage', *Architectural Review*, vol. 117, no. 702 (Special Issue): 363–460.
- NCDP (National Community Development Project) (1976) *Whatever Happened to Council Housing?* CDP Information and Intelligence Unit, London.
- Neale, C. (1984) *South Woodham Ferrers – The Essex Design Guide in Practice*. Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors Planning and Development Case Study 3. Surveyors Publications, London.
- NEDC (National Economic Development Council) (1963) *Conditions Favourable for Faster Growth*. HMSO, London.
- NEPC (Northern Regional Economic Planning Council) (1966) *Challenge of the Changing North*. HMSO, London.
- Nettlefold, J. S. (1908) *Practical Housing*. Garden City Press, Letchworth.
- Nettlefold, J. S. (1914) *Practical Town Planning*. St Catherine Press, London.
- New Townsmen [Howard, E., Osborn, F. J., Purdom, C. B. and Taylor, W. G.] (1918) *New Towns after the War*. Dent, London.
- Nicholson, H. (1967) *Diaries and Letters 1939–1945*. Collins, London.
- Nicholson, M. (1970) *The Environmental Revolution*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Northfield, Lord (1989) 'Private sector development of new country towns', *Town and Country Planning*, vol. 58, no. 1: 14–15.
- NPD (Newcastle-upon-Tyne Planning Department) (1973) *Planning Progress and Policy 1973: Newcastle-Upon-Tyne*. Planning Department, Newcastle.
- Nugent, N. (1993) 'The European dimension', in P. Dunleavy et al. (eds), *Developments in British Politics 4*. Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 40–68.
- ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) (2002a) *Sustainable Communities – Delivering through Planning*. TSO, London.
- ODPM (2002b) *Regional Governance: Strengthening the English Regions*. ODPM: London.
- ODPM (2003a) *Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future*. TSO, London.
- ODPM (2003b) *Creating Sustainable Communities: Making it Happen: Thames Gateway and the Growth Areas*. ODPM, London.
- Ogilvy, A. A. (1975) *Bracknell and its Migrants: 21 Years of a New Town*. HMSO, London.
- Oliver, P., Davis, I. and Bentley, I. (1981) *Dunroamin: The Suburban Semi and its Enemies*. Barrie & Jenkins, London.
- OPCS (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys) (1992) 1991 *Census: Preliminary Report*. HMSO, London.
- Orlans, H. (1952) *Stevenage: A Sociological Study of a New Town*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Orwell, G. (1962, orig. 1938) *Homage to Catalonia*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Orwell, G. (1970) *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell. Vol. 1: An Age Like This*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Osborn, F. J. (1959) *Can Man Plan? and Other Verses*. Harrap, London.
- Osborn, F. J. and Whittick, A. (1977) *The New Towns: Their Origins, Achievements and Progress*. Leonard Hill, London.
- PAG (Planning Advisory Group) (1965) *The Future of Development Plans*. HMSO, London.
- Pahl, R. E. (1970) *Whose City?* Longman, London.
- Parker-Morris Committee (1961) *Homes for Today and Tomorrow: Report of the Committee Appointed by the Central Housing Advisory Committee to Consider the Standards of Design and Equipment Applicable to Family Dwellings and Other Residential Accommodation whether Provided by Public Authorities or Private Enterprise*. HMSO, London.
- Parkinson, M., Foley, B. and Judd, D. (eds) (1988) *Regenerating the Inner Cities: The UK Crisis and the US Experience*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Parsons, D. W. (1986) *The Political Economy of British Regional Policy*. Croom Helm, Beckenham.
- Patton, K. (1978) 'The foundations of Peterlee New Town', in M. Bulmer (ed.), *Mining and Social Change: Durham County in the Twentieth Century*. Croom Helm, London.
- Pearce, D. C. (1989) 'The Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council 1965–1979', in P. L. Garside and M. Hebbert (eds), *British Regionalism 1900–2000*. Mansell, London.
- Pearson, L. (1988) *The Architectural and Social History of Co-operative Living*. Macmillan, London.
- Peck, J. and Ward, K. (eds) (2002) *City of Revolution: Restructuring Manchester*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Peden, G. C. (1991) *British Economic Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher* (2nd edition). Philip Allan, Hemel Hempstead.
- PEP (Political and Economic Planning) (1934) *Housing England*. PEP, London.
- PEP (1939) *Report on the Location of Industry*. PEP, London.
- Perry, C. A. (1939) *Housing for the Machine Age*. Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
- Phillips, A. (1993) *The Best in Science, Office and Business Park Design*. Batsford, London.
- Pickup, L., Stokes, G., Meadowcroft, S., Goodwin, P., Tyson, B. and Kenny, F. (1991) *Bus Deregulation in Metropolitan Areas*. Avebury, Aldershot.
- Pilcher Committee (1975) *Commercial Property Development: First Report of the Advisory Committee*. HMSO, London.
- Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (1970) 'Bread and circuses? The Conservatives in office 1951–1964', in V. Bogdanor and R. Skidelsky (eds), *The Age of Affluence 1951–1964*. Macmillan, London.
- Pitfield, D. E. (1978) 'The quest for an effective regional policy 1934–7', *Regional Studies*, vol. 12: 429–43.
- Plowden, S. (1972) *Towns Against Traffic*. Andre Deutsch, London.
- Plowden, W. (1973) *The Motor Car and Politics in Britain*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.

- Porritt, J. and Winner, D. (1988) *The Coming of the Greens*. Fontana, London.
- Potter, S. (1990) 'Britain's development corporations', *Town and Country Planning*, vol. 59, no. 11: 294–8.
- PPG2 (1988) *Planning Policy Guidance 2: Green Belts*. Department of Environment/HMSO, London.
- PPG3 (2000) *Planning Policy Guidance 3: Housing*. DETR/TSO, London.
- PPG6 (1993) *Planning Policy Guidance 6: Town Centres and Retail Development*. DoE/HMSO, London.
- PPG6 (1996) *Planning Policy Guidance 6: Town Centres and Retail Development*. DoE/HMSO, London.
- PPG9 (1988) *Planning Policy Guidance 9: Regional Guidance for the South East*. Department of the Environment/HMSO, London.
- PPG11 (2000) *Planning Policy Guidance 11: Regional Planning*, DETR/TSO, London.
- PPG12 (1988) *Planning Policy Guidance 12: Local Plans*. DoE and Welsh Office/HMSO, London.
- PPG13 (1994) *Planning Policy Guidance 13: Transport*, DoE/HMSO, London.
- PPG15 (1990) *Planning Policy Guidance 15: Regional Planning Guidance, Structure Plans and the Content of Development Plans*. DoE/HMSO, London.
- Property Advisory Group (1981) *Planning Gain*. HMSO, London.
- Punter, J. (1985) *A History of Aesthetic Control 2: The Control of Development in England and Wales 1947–1985*. Department of Land Management, University of Reading.
- Punter, J. (1991) 'A microcosm of design control in post-war Britain: a case study of office development in central Bristol 1940–90', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 6, no. 3: 315–47.
- Purdom, C. B. (1925) *The Building of Satellite Towns: A Contribution to the Study of Town Development and Regional Planning*. Dent, London.
- Ramsay, R. (2002) *The Rise of New Labour*. Pocket Essentials, London.
- Ratcliffe, J. R. (1976) *Land Policy: An Exploration of the Nature of Land in Society*. Hutchinson, London.
- Ravetz, A. (1974a) *Model Estate: Planned Housing at Quarry Hill*. Croom Helm, London.
- Ravetz, A. (1974b) 'From working-class tenement to modern flat: local authorities and multi-storey housing between the wars', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *Multi-storey Living: The British Working-class Experience*. Croom Helm, London.
- Ravetz, A. (1980) *Remaking Cities: Contradictions of the Recent Urban Environment*. Croom Helm, London.
- Ravetz, A. (1986) *The Governance of Space: Town Planning in Modern Society*. Faber, London.
- Read, D. (1972) *Edwardian England 1901–15*. Harrap, London.
- Reade, E. (1987) *British Town and Country Planning*. Open University Press, Buckingham.
- Redcliffe-Maud Commission (Royal Commission on Local Government in England) (1969a) *Local Government Reform: Summary* (Cmnd 4039). HMSO, London.
- Redcliffe-Maud Commission (1969b) *Report* (Cmnd 4040, I–II) (3 vols). HMSO, London.
- Redfern, P. (1982) 'Profile of our cities', *Population Trends*, no. 30: 21–32.
- Reid, M. (1982) *The Secondary Banking Crisis*. Macmillan, London.
- Reith Committee (1946a) *Interim Report of the New Towns Committee* (Cmd 6759). HMSO, London.
- Reith Committee (1946b) *Second Interim Report of the New Towns Committee* (Cmd 6794). HMSO, London.
- Reith Committee (1946c) *Final Report of the New Towns Committee* (Cmd 6876). HMSO, London.
- Reith, J. C. W. (1949) *Into the Wind*. Hodder and Stoughton, London.
- Rentoul, J., with Ratford, J. (1989) *Me and Mine: The Triumph of the New Individualism?* Unwin Hyman, London.
- Reynolds, J. (1983) *The Great Paternalist: Titus Salt and the Growth of Nineteenth Century Bradford*. Temple Smith, London.
- Reynolds, J. P. (1952) 'Thomas Coglan Horsfall and the town planning movement in England', *Town Planning Review*, vol. XXII, no. 1: 52–66.
- Richardson, H. W. and Aldcroft, D. H. (1968) *Building in the British Economy between the Wars*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Riddell, P. (1989) *The Thatcher Decade: How Britain has Changed during the 1980s*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Riden, P. (1988) *Rebuilding a Valley: A History of Cwmbran Development Corporation*. Cwmbran Development Corporation, Cwmbran.
- Ridley, N. (1987) 'Address by Nicholas Ridley, Secretary of State for the Environment [to the Town and Country Planning Summer School 1986]', *The Planner*, vol. 73, no. 2: 39–41.
- Ridley, N. (1992) *'My Style of Government': The Thatcher Years*. Fontana, London.
- Roberts, J. (1981) *Pedestrian Precincts in Britain*, Transport and Environment Studies. TEST, London.
- Roberts, M. (1991) *Living in a Man-made World: Gender Assumptions in Modern Housing Design*. Routledge, London.
- Roberts, P. and Whitney, D. (1993) 'The new partnership: interagency co-operation and urban policy in Leeds', in R. Imrie and H. Thomas (eds), *British Urban Policy and the Urban Development Corporations*. Paul Chapman, London.
- Robson, B. (ed.) (1987) *Managing the City: The Aims and Impacts of Urban Policy*. Croom Helm, Beckenham.
- Robson, B. (1988) *Those Inner Cities: Reconciling the Economic and Social Aims of Urban Policy*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Robson, B., Parkinson, M., Boddy, M. and MacLennan, D. (2000) *The State of English Cities*. TSO, London.
- Robson, W. A. (1939) *The Government and Misgovernment of London*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Rogers, R. (1997), *Cities for a Small Planet* (edited by P. Gumuchdjan). Faber, London.

- Rogers Report (1999) *Towards an Urban Renaissance: Final Report of the Urban Task Force Chaired by Lord Rogers of Riverside*. Spon, London.
- Rothman, B. (1982) *The 1932 Kinder Trespass*. Willow, Altrincham.
- Rowan-Robinson, J. (1997) 'The organization and effectiveness of the Scottish planning system', in R. MacDonald and H. Thomas (eds), *Nationality and Planning in Scotland and Wales*. University of Wales Press, Cardiff.
- Rowtree, B. S. (1901) *Poverty: A Study of Town Life*. Macmillan, London.
- RPG9 (2001) *Regional Planning Guidance for the South East*. DETR/TSO, London.
- RPG9a (1995) *Regional Planning Guidance 9a: The Thames Gateway Planning Framework*. DoE/HMSO, London.
- Russell, B. (1981) *Building Systems, Industrialization and Architecture*. Wiley, London.
- Russell, H., Dawson, J., Garside, P. and Parkinson, M. (1996) *City Challenge: Interim National Evaluation*. HMSO, London.
- Rydin, Y. (1986) *Housing Land Policy*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Saunders, P. (1979) *Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation*. Hutchinson, London.
- Saville, J. (1988) *The Labour Movement in Britain: A Commentary*. Faber, London.
- Scarman Report (1981) *The Brixton Disorders, 10–12 April 1981* (Cmnd 8427). HMSO, London.
- Schaffer, F. (1970) *The New Town Story*. Paladin, London.
- Schaffer, F. (1974) 'The Town and Country Planning Act 1947', *The Planner*, vol. 60, no. 5: 690–5.
- Schuster Committee (1950) *Report of the Committee on the Qualifications of Planners* (Cmd 8059). HMSO, London.
- Scott Committee (1942) *Report of the Committee on Land Utilisation in Rural Areas* (Cmd 6378). HMSO, London.
- Scott, P. (1996) *The Property Masters: A History of the British Commercial Property Sector*. Spon, London.
- SDD (Scottish Development Department) (1963) *Central Scotland: A Programme for Development and Growth* (Cmnd 2288). HMSO, Edinburgh.
- Seeley, I. H. (1974) *Planned Expansion of Country Towns*. Godwin, London.
- SEEP (South East Economic Planning Council) (1967) *A Strategy for the South East*. HMSO, London.
- SEJPT (South East Joint Planning Team) (1970) *Strategic Plan for the South East*, HMSO, London.
- SEJPT (1976) *Strategy for the South East: 1976 Review*. HMSO, London.
- Seldon, A. (ed.) (2001) *The Blair Effect*. Little, Brown, London.
- Sewel, J., Twine, F. and Williams, N. (1984) 'The sale of council houses: some empirical evidence', *Urban Studies*, vol. 21: 439–50.
- Shanks, M. (1977) *Planning and Politics: The British Experience 1960–76*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Sharp, E. (1969) *Ministry of Housing and Local Government*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Sharp, E. G. (1980) 'The London County Council green belt scheme – a note on some primary sources', *Planning History Bulletin*, vol. 2, no. 2: 12–16.
- Sharp, T. (1932) *Town and Countryside: Some Aspects of Urban and Rural Development*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Sharp, T. (1940) *Town Planning*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Sharp, T. (1957) 'Planning now', *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, vol. XLIII, no. 5: 133–41.
- Sharp, T. (1966) 'Planning planning', *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, vol. LII, no. 6: 209–15.
- Sheail, J. (1981) *Rural Conservation in Interwar Britain*. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Short, J. R., Fleming, S. and Witt, S. (1986) *Housebuilding, Planning and Community Action*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Short, J. R., Witt, S. and Fleming, S. (1987) 'Conflict and compromise in the built environment: house building in central Berkshire', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, vol. 12: 29–47.
- Silkin, J. (1987) *Changing Battlefields: The Challenge to the Labour Party*. Hamish Hamilton, London.
- Simpson, M. (1985) *Thomas Adams and the Modern Planning Movement: Britain, Canada and the United States*. Mansell, London.
- Sinclair, G. (1992) *The Lost Land: Land Use Change in England 1945–1990*. Council for the Protection of Rural England, London.
- Sissons, M. and French, P. (eds), (1964) *Age of Austerity 1945–1951*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Sitte, C. (trans. G. R. Collins and C. C. Collins) (1965) *City Planning According to Artistic Principles*. Phaidon, London.
- Skeffington Committee (1969) *People and Planning: Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning*. HMSO, London.
- Skidelsky, R. (1967) *Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929–1931*. Macmillan, London.
- Skidelsky, R. (ed.) (1988) *Thatcherism*. Chatto & Windus, London.
- Skilleter, K. J. (1993) 'The role of public utility societies in early British town planning and housing reform, 1901–36', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 8, no. 2: 125–65.
- Skinner, D. N. (1976) *A Situation Report on Green Belts in Scotland*. Countryside Commission for Scotland, Perth.
- Smales, L. and Whitney, D. (1996) 'Inventing a better place: urban design in Leeds in the post-war era', in G. Haughton and C. G. Williams (eds), *Corporate City? Partnership, Participation and Partition in Urban Development in Leeds*. Avebury, Aldershot.
- Smigielski, K. (1960) 'London: a metropolis in disintegration', *Journal of the Town Planning Institute*, vol. XLVI, no. 8: 208–10.
- Smith, G. C. and Ford, R. G. (1990) 'Social change in outer city British public housing', *Habitat International*, vol. 14, no. 4: 89–96.
- Smith, R. (1979) *East Kilbride: The Biography of a New Town 1947–1973*. HMSO, Edinburgh.

- Smith, R. and Farmer, E. (1985) 'Housing, population and decentralisation', in R. Smith and U. Wannop (eds), *Strategic Planning in Action: The Impact of the Clyde Valley Plan 1946–1982*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Smith, R. and Whysall, P. (1990) 'The Addison Act and the local authority response: housing policy formulation and implementation in Nottingham 1917–1922', *Town Planning Review*, vol. 61, no. 2: 185–208.
- Smith, R., Whysall, P. and Bevrin, C. (1986) 'Local authority inertia in housing improvement 1890–1914', *Town Planning Review*, vol. 57, no. 4: 404–24.
- Smith, T. D. (1970) *An Autobiography*. Oriol, Newcastle.
- SPCL (Stockley Park Consortium Ltd) (c. 1992) *Operating Your Business at Stockley Park, Heathrow*. SPCL, London.
- Stamp, L. D. (1962) *The Land of Britain: Its Use and Misuse*. Longman, London.
- Stansfield, K. (1981) 'Thomas Sharp 1901–1978', in G. E. Cherry (ed.), *Pioneers in British Planning*. Architectural Press, London.
- Starkie, D. A. (1982) *The Motorway Age: Roads and Traffic Policies in Post-war Britain*. Pergamon, Oxford.
- Stein, C. S. (1958) *Toward New Towns for America* (2nd edition). Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.
- Stephenson, G. (ed. C. De Marco) (1992) *On a Human Scale: A Life in City Design*. Fremantle Arts Centre/Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.
- Stilgoe, H. E. (1910) 'Town planning in the light of the Housing, Town Planning Etc Act 1909', *Proceedings of the Institution of Municipal and County Engineers*, vol. XXXVII: 11–45.
- STJTPC (South Tyneside Joint Town Planning Committee) (1928) *The South Tyneside Regional Town Planning Scheme*. STJTPC, Gateshead.
- Sutcliffe, A. (ed.) (1974a) *Multi-storey Living: The British Working-class Experience*. Croom Helm, London.
- Sutcliffe, A. (1974b) 'A century of flats in Birmingham 1873–1973', in A. Sutcliffe (ed.), *Multi-storey Living: The British Working-class Experience*. Croom Helm, London.
- Sutcliffe, A. (1981a) *Towards the Planned City: Germany, Britain, the United States and France 1780–1914*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Sutcliffe, A. (ed.) (1981b) *British Town Planning: The Formative Years*. Leicester University Press, Leicester.
- Sutcliffe, A. (1982) 'The growth of public intervention in the British urban environment during the nineteenth century: a structural approach', in J. H. Johnson and C. G. Pooley (eds), *The Structure of Nineteenth-century Cities*. Croom Helm, London.
- Sutcliffe, A. (1986) 'The "midlands metropolis": Birmingham 1890–1980', in G. Gordon (ed.), *Regional Cities in the UK 1890–1980*. Harper & Row, London.
- Sutcliffe, A. (1988) 'Britain's first town planning act: a review of the 1909 achievement', *Town Planning Review*, vol. 59, no. 3: 289–303.
- Sutcliffe, A. and Smith, R. (1974) *Birmingham 1939–1970*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Swenarton, M. (1981) *Homes Fit for Heroes: The Politics and Architecture of Early State Housing in Britain*. Heinemann, London.
- Tarn, J. N. (1973) *Five Per Cent Philanthropy: An Account of Housing in Urban Areas between 1840 and 1914*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Taylor, N. (1998) *Urban Planning Theory since 1945*. Sage, London.
- TCPSS (Town and Country Planning Summer School) (1949) *Report of the Summer School*. TCPSS, St Andrews.
- Tebbit, N. (1988) *Upwardly Mobile*. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.
- Tewdwr-Jones, M. (1997) 'Land use planning in Wales: the conflict between state centrality and territorial nationalism', in R. MacDonald and H. Thomas (eds), *Nationality and Planning in Scotland and Wales*. University of Wales Press, Cardiff.
- Tewdwr-Jones, M. (2002) *The Planning Polity: Planning, Government and the Policy Process*. Routledge, London.
- Thatcher, M. (1989) *Speeches to the Conservative Party Conference 1975–1988*. Conservative Political Centre, London.
- Thomas, D. (1970) *London's Green Belt*. Faber, London.
- Thomas, H. (2000) *Race and Planning: The UK Experience*. UCL Press, London.
- Thomas, H. and Healey, P. (1991) *Dilemmas of Planning Practice: Ethics, Legitimacy and the Validation of Knowledge*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Thompson, R. (1990) 'An achievable alternative for planning', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Thompson-Fawcett, M. (1998) 'Leon Krier and the organic revival within urban policy and practice', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 13, no 2: 167–94.
- Thornley, A. (1991) *Urban Planning under Thatcherism: The Challenge of the Market*. Routledge, London.
- Townroe, P. and Martin, R. (eds) (1992) *Regional Development in the 1990s: The British Isles in the 1990s*. Jessica Kingsley/Regional Studies Association, London.
- TPI (Town Planning Institute) (1956) *Report on Planning in the London Region*. TPI, London.
- Tripp, H. A. (1942) *Town Planning and Road Traffic*. Arnold, London.
- Tuckett, I. (1990) 'Coin street: there is another way . . .', in J. Montgomery and A. Thornley (eds), *Radical Planning Initiatives: New Directions for Urban Planning in the 1990s*. Gower, Aldershot.
- Tudor Walters Committee (1918) *Report of the Committee to Consider Questions of Building Construction in Connection with the Provision of Dwellings for the Working Classes in England and Wales, and Scotland (Cd 9191)*. HMSO, London.
- Turkington, R. (1999) 'British "Corporation Suburbia": the changing fortunes of Norris Green, Liverpool', in R. Harris and P. Larkham (eds), *Changing Suburbs: Foundation, Form and Function*. Spon, London.

- Tyme, J. (1978) *Motorways versus Democracy: Public Inquiries into Road Proposals and their Political Consequences*. Macmillan, London.
- Underwood, J. (1980) *Planners in Search of a Role: A Participant Observation in a London Borough*. Occasional Paper No. 6, School of Advanced Urban Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol.
- Unwin, R. (1909) *Town Planning in Practice: An Introduction to the Art of Designing Cities and Suburbs*. Fisher Unwin, London.
- Unwin, R. (1912) *Nothing Gained by Overcrowding: How the Garden City Type of Development May Benefit Both Owner and Occupier*. Garden City and Town Planning Association, London.
- Uthwatt Committee (1941) *Interim Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Cmd 6291)*. HMSO, London.
- Uthwatt Committee (1942) *Final Report of the Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment (Cmd 6386)*. HMSO, London.
- Waller, P. (ed.) (2000) *The English Urban Landscape*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Wannop, U. (1984) 'The evolution and roles of the Scottish Development Agency', *Town Planning Review*, vol. 55: 313–21.
- Ward, C. (1973) *Anarchism in Action*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Ward, C. (1976) *Housing: An Anarchist Approach*. Freedom Press, London.
- Ward, S. V. (1974) 'The Town and Country Planning Act 1932', *The Planner*, vol. 60, no. 5: 685–9.
- Ward, S. V. (1975) *Planning, Politics and Social Change 1939–1945*. Department of Town Planning Working Paper No. 1, Polytechnic of the South Bank, London.
- Ward, S. V. (1984) 'List Q: a missing link in interwar public investment', *Public Administration*, vol. 62: 348–58.
- Ward, S. V. (1986) 'Planmaking versus implementation: the example of List Q and the depressed areas 1922–1939', *Planning Perspectives*, vol. 1, no. 1: 3–26.
- Ward, S. V. (1988) *The Geography of Interwar Britain: The State and Uneven Development*. Routledge, London.
- Ward, S. V. (1990) 'Local industrial promotion and development policies 1899–1940', *Local Economy*, vol. 5, no. 2: 100–19.
- Ward, S. V. (1991) 'The fairy ring', *Planning History*, vol. 13, no. 1: 29–31.
- Ward, S. V. (ed.) (1992a) *The Garden City: Past, Present and Future*. Spon, London.
- Ward, S. V. (1992b) 'The garden city introduced', in S. V. Ward (ed.), *The Garden City: Past, Present and Future*, Spon, London.
- Ward, S. V. (1998) *Selling places: The Marketing and Promotion of Towns and Cities 1850–2000*. Spon, London.
- Ward, S. V. (1999) 'Public-private partnerships', in J. B. Cullingworth (ed.), *British Planning: 50 Years of Urban and Regional Policy*. Athlone Press, London.
- Ward, S. V. (2002a) *Planning the Twentieth-century City: The Advanced Capitalist World*. Wiley, Chichester.
- Ward, S. V. (2002b) 'Ebenezer Howard: his life and times', in K. C. Parsons and D. Schuyler (eds), *From Garden City to Green City: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.
- Wates, N. (1976) *The Battle for Tolmers Square*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Wates, N. and Kneivt, C. (1987) *Community Architecture*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Watson, J. P. and Abercrombie, L. P. (1943) *A Plan for Plymouth*. Underhill, Plymouth.
- Weightman, G. and Humphries, S. (1984) *The Making of Modern London 1914–1939*. Sidgwick & Jackson, London.
- Wheatley Commission (Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland) (1969) *Report (Cmnd 4150 I–II)* (2 vols). HMSO, Edinburgh.
- Wheeler, S. (1998) 'Planning sustainable and livable cities', in R. T. LeGates and F. Stout (eds), *The City Reader* (2nd edition). Routledge, London.
- Whitehand, J. W. R. (1992) *The Making of the Urban Landscape*. Institute of British Geographers Special Publication No. 26, Blackwell, Oxford.
- Whitehand, J. W. R. and Carr, C. M. H. (2001) *Twentieth-century Suburbs: A Morphological Approach*. Spon, London.
- Whitehouse, P. (1964) *Partners in Property: A History and Analysis of Institutional Finance for Property Development*. Birn Shaw, London.
- Wilkinson, E. (1939) *The Town that was Murdered*. Gollancz, London.
- Williams, C. M. (2002) 'Regional planning in south east England: a case of "eyes wide shut"', in T. Marshall, J. Glasson and P. Headicar (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Regional Planning*. Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Williams, K., Burton, E. and Jenks, M. (eds), (2000) *Achieving Sustainable Urban Form*. Spon, London.
- Williams, N. (1939) *Population Problems of New Estates with Special Reference to Norris Green*. Liverpool University Press, Liverpool.
- Williams-Ellis, C. (1975, orig. 1928) *England and the Octopus*. Blackie, Glasgow.
- Wilson, H. (1974) *The Labour Government 1964–70: A Personal Record*. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
- Winter, J., Coombes, T. and Farthing, S. (1993) 'Satisfaction with space around the home on large private sector estates: lessons from surveys in southern England and south Wales 1985–89', *Town Planning Review*, vol. 64, no. 1: 65–88.
- Wohl, A. S. (1974) *The Eternal Slum: Housing and Social Policy in Victorian London*. Arnold, London.
- Wohl, A. S. (1983) *Endangered Lives: Public Health in Victorian London*. Dent, London.
- Woolton, Earl of (1959) *Memoirs*. Cassell, London.
- Wright, J. F. (1979) *Britain in the Age of Economic Management: An Economic History since 1939*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

- Wright, M. (1982) *Lord Leverhulme's Unknown Venture*. Hutchinson Benham, London.
- Yelling, J. A. (1986) *Slums and Slum Clearance in Victorian London*. Allen & Unwin, London.
- Yelling, J. A. (1992) *Slums and Redevelopment: Policy and Practice in England, 1918–45*. UCL Press, London.
- Young, H. (1989) *One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher*. Macmillan, London.
- Young, K. and Garside, P. L. (1982) *Metropolitan London: Politics and Urban Change 1837–1981*. Arnold, London.
- Young, M. and Willmott, P. (1957) *Family and Kinship in East London*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Young, T. (1934) *Becontree and Dagenham*. Pilgrim Trust and Becontree Social Survey Committee, London.

Websites

This list comprises only the addresses of all websites directly cited in this book, together with that of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, which contains current government policy documents and many commissioned research reports. Some slightly older government documents may also be found at <www.archive.official-documents.co.uk>. Readers should note that websites can and frequently do change. All those listed here were, however, current in early March 2003.

<www.bluewater.co.uk> Bluewater Shopping Centre, Kent
<www.brindleyplace.com> Brindley Place, Birmingham
<www.cabe.org.uk> Council for Architecture and the Built Environment
<www.cambourne-uk.com> Cambourne, Cambridgeshire
<www.culture.gov.uk> Department for Culture, Media and Sport
<www.defra.gov.uk> Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
<www.dti.gov.uk> Department of Trade and Industry
<www.dtlr.gov.uk> Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions
<www.easternquarry.co.uk> Eastern Quarry – Land Securities
<www.economist.co.uk> *The Economist*
<www.englishpartnerships.co.uk> English Partnerships
<www.gateshead-quays.co.uk> Gateshead Quays
<www.go-se.gov.uk> Government Office for the South East Region
<www.greenwichpeninsula.co.uk> Greenwich Peninsula
<www.greenwich-village.co.uk> Millennium Village, Greenwich
<www.kent-thameside.org.uk> Kent–Thameside Partnership
<www.leeds.gov.uk/millenniumsquare/> Millennium Square, Leeds
<www.liverpoolvision.co.uk> Liverpool Vision Ltd
<www.neighbourhood.gov.uk> Neighbourhood Renewal Unit
<www.newcastle.gov.uk/ccap.nsf/> Newcastle City Centre Action Plan
<www.neweastmanchester.com> New East Manchester Ltd
<www.odpm.gov.uk> Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
<www.princeofwales.gov.uk> Prince of Wales
<www.rtpi.org.uk> Royal Town Planning Institute
<www.scotland.gov.uk> Scottish Executive and Parliament
<www.socialexclusionunit.gov.uk> Social Exclusion Unit
<www.thenewbullring.com> The new Bull Ring Centre, Birmingham
<www.traffordcentre.co.uk> Trafford Shopping Centre, Manchester
<www.urbansplash.co.uk> Urban Splash
<www.urcs-online.co.uk> The Urban Regeneration Companies
<www.wales.gov.uk> National Assembly of Wales
<www.weststevenage.co.uk> West Stevenage proposed expansion

Index

- Abercrombie, Patrick, 64, 66, 72, 80, 88–91, 95, 150, 276
- Adams, Thomas, 32, 50
- Addison, Christopher, 38, 48
- affluent society, 107–114, 139–40, 162–3, 181
- affordable housing, 260, 265–6
- Agenda 21, 235
- Aldridge, Henry R., 19
- Amos, Jim, 185
- architects and planning
- pre-1914, 24, 26, 32–3
 - 1914–1939, 47–9, 58, 62, 72
 - 1939–90, 88, 95, 102, 116, 142–4, 146, 195
 - post-1990, 259, 268
- Arncliffe Centres, 137–9, 254
- Ashford, 166, 267
- Ashworth, William, 1
- asylum seekers, 235, 284
- Attlee, Clement, 92–3, 110
- Aztec West business park, Bristol, 223, 226
- back-to-back housing, 10, 16, 56
- Bankside, London, 258
- Barcelona (as influence), 259, 261
- Barlow Commission/Report (on distribution of industrial population) 1940, 72–4, 79–80, 269
- Barnett, Henrietta, 26
- Basildon New Town, 95, 162, 222
- Basingstoke Expanded Town, 164, 169
- Becontree (Dagenham), London, 45, 49
- Bellamy, Edward, 21–3
- betterment, 3
- pre-1947, 30, 41, 81, 83–4
 - 1947–74, 99–100, 105, 114–5, 119, 127
 - post-1974, 177–8, 190, 224–5, 237
- Beveridge Report (on social insurance) 1942, 84
- birth rate, 109–110
- Blair, Tony, 233–5, 238, 241, 246, 250–1, 260, 266
- Bluewater regional shopping centre, Kent, 253–4, 266
- Board of Trade
- before 1952, 67, 73, 76, 92, 101
 - 1952–74, 119, 155–7, 159, 161, 166
 - see also* Department of Trade and Industry
- bombing, 75–9, 81, –2, 86–7, 254–6
- Bor, Walter, 126, 144
- Bordesley Green Urban Village, Birmingham, 250
- Bournville, Birmingham, 19–20, 23–4, 26
- B. Village Trust, 53
- Bracknell New Town, 95, 98
- Bradley Stoke, Bristol, 226, 261
- Brenthall Park, Harlow, *see* Church Langley
- Brindley Place, Birmingham, 255–6
- Brooke, Henry, 151
- Brown, Frank, 1
- Brown, George, 112, 119, 157, 166
- 'Brown ban', 119, 138, 178
- Brown, Gordon, 241, 260
- brownfield development, 231, 241, 252–3, 258, 262–3, 265–6
- Brundland Report (on environment and development) 1987, 197–8, 235
- Buchanan, Colin/Buchanan Report (*Traffic in Towns*) 1963, 135–7, 167, 260
- building licences, 77, 92, 101, 105, 130
- building societies, 40, 42, 271–2
- Bull Ring shopping centre, Birmingham, 137, 257
- Burnham, Daniel, 34
- Burns, John, 30
- Burns, Wilfred, 126, 140
- business improvement districts (BIDs), 254
- business planning zones, 241
- see also* simplified planning zones
- Byers, Stephen, 238–9, 245
- Byker, Newcastle, 147
- by-law housing, 14–5, 19, 26, 31, 34
- Cadbury, George, 19–21, 23, 26–8, George Jnr, 28
- Callaghan, James, 174–5, 182, 239
- Canary Wharf, London, 215–6, 258, 281
- Cambourne, Cambridgeshire, 264–5
- Cambridge science park, 223
- central areas
- pre-1952, 11–2, 14, 33, 56–8, 88
 - 1952–74, 130–9, 146, 170
 - 1974–90, 201, 210, 213–4, 216–7
 - post-1990, 252–8
 - planning impacts, 269–71, 273, 285
- Central Lancashire New Town, 164, 166–7
- Central Land Board, 99–100, 105, 120
- Centre for Policy Studies, 185, 197
- Chafford Hundred, Grays, 226, 261–2, 266
- Chamberlain, Joseph, 13, 25
- Chamberlain, Neville, 38–9, 48, 60, 67, 70, 72
- Channel Tunnel, 176, 221, 258, 266
- Chelmsford Committee (on regional development) 1931, 65–6
- Chelmsley Wood, Birmingham, 152, 169
- Cherry, Gordon E., 1, 32–3
- Church Langley, Harlow, 226, 261
- Churchill, Winston S., 79, 84–5, 92, 107, 110, 114, 203
- CIAM, *see* Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne
- City Beautiful, 33–4, 57, 215
- City Challenge, 247–50
- City Grant, 207, 209
- civic design, 32–3, 88
- Civic Amenities Act 1967, 123, 125
- Civic Trust, 125
- Clinton, President William J., 234
- Clyde Valley Plan 1946, 94–5, 150, 276
- co-partnership societies, 19, 21, 23, 25–6, 30
- Coin Street, London, 195–6
- Commission for the New Towns (CNT), 161–2, 222, 250, 261, 267
- Commonwealth Games, 251–2, 255
- Community Land Act 1975, 177–8, 188
- Community Development Projects, 179
- compact city, 197, 229
- compensation, 3
- pre-1947, 30, 41, 44, 52, 81, 83
 - post-1947, 99, 101, 105, 114–6, 127–8, 148, 280–1
- comprehensive development areas (CDAs), 87, 100, 102, 123, 131, 133–5, 137, 139
- congestion charging (in London), 260
- Congleton proposed New Town, 161
- Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM), 58, 60, 62
- conservation areas, 41, 123, 125, 191, 199, 275
- Consortium Developments Ltd (CDL), 224–6, 227, 261
- containment, 2–3, 7–8
- pre-1955, 36, 52–5, 89–90
 - 1955–74, 130, 148–54, 170
 - 1974–90, 201, 226–30
 - post-1990, 231, 262–3, 267
 - impacts of, 269–70, 274, 276–8, 282
- Control of Pollution Act 1974, 181
- Control of Land Use* (White Paper) 1944, 87
- Control of Office and Industrial Development Act 1965, 119, 157
- Corby
- New Town, 95
 - Enterprise Zone, 189, 209
 - Urban Regeneration Company, 252, 267
- corporate planning, 184–5
- Council for the Preservation/Protection of Rural England (CPRE), 52, 227, 277
- council housing, *see* municipal housing
- County of London Plan 1943, 88–9, 99
- Countryside Act 1968, 153
- Countryside Alliance, 238
- Cowley, Oxford, 170
- Cramlington, 165, 169
- Crawley New Town, 95, 98, 162
- Cribbs Causeway regional shopping centre, Bristol, 254
- crime, 173, 204, 235, 250
- critical theory, 184
- Crosland, Anthony, 175, 177, 190, 221

- Crossman, Richard, 117, 120, 123, 139, 152–3, 157, 166
 culture of contentment, 173, 187
 Cumbernauld New Town, 161, 163–4, 167–8
 Cwmbran New Town, 95
- Dalton, Hugh, 70, 92
 Daventry Expanded Town, 169
 Dawley New Town (see also Telford), 164, 166
- Debden, Essex, 164
 decentralization and planning, 2, 4, 7
 pre-1939, 21–3, 36, 47–53, 71
 1939–74, 80, 89–91, 93–9, 130, 142, 149, 161–70
 post-1974, 201, 213, 223–6, 230
 impacts, 270, 275–8
- deck-access flats, *see* streets in the sky
 Deeplish, Rochdale, 147
 deindustrialization, 171–2, 232
 Dennison, S. R., 83
 density and planning
 pre-1914, 10–1, 15, 17, 19, 25–6, 31, 34
 1914–90, 38, 40, 45–6, 58, 142, 146, 148–9
 post-1990, 249, 251–4, 259, 262–3, 265
 and planning impacts, 270–1
- Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 239
 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 238
 Department for Trade and Industry, 245
 Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DfLR), 238–40
 Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), 112, 119, 157–8, 170
 Department of National Heritage, 239
 Department of the Environment (DoE), pre-1979 127, 158, 177, 179, 182
 1979–90, 190, 192, 194, 199, 205, 226
 post-1990, 239, 244, 252, 264
- Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), 238, 244–5, 252, 259
- depressed areas, 66–71, 76, 80, 91–2, 104, 154–5, 216
- deregulation, 188, 194, 214, 217, 225, 227, 229, 281
- Derelict Land Grant (DLG), 207, 213
- development charge, 99, 106, 119
 development control, 44, 101, 116–7, 129, 188–90, 194
- development land
 pre-1947, 25, 31, 44, 83–4
 under 1947 Act system, 99–100, 105, 107, 115
 post-1947 Act system, 119, 177–8, 223–6
 and planning impacts, 280–1
- development areas, 92, 154–5, 159–60, 219–20
- development districts, 154–5
- development plans
 1947 Act system, 100, 102, 104, 116, 126, 150, 156
 post-1947 Act system, 118, 120–3, 191, 193–4, 198–9, 237–40
 impacts, 280
- devolution, 218–9, 239–40, 244
- Distribution of Industry Act 1945, 92, 101, 104
- Dobry Report (on development control) 1975, 190
- Docklands, London, 196, 201, 204, 207, 211–3, 215–6, 221
- Dower, John, 86, 103
- Drancy-la Muette, Paris, 58–9, 62, 143
- Drumchapel, Glasgow, 164
- dual market (in land), 114–5
- Dudley Report (on Design of Dwellings) 1944, 88–9
- Earth Summit (Rio di Janeiro) 1992, 235
- East Kilbride New Town, 95
- Eastern Quarry, Kent, 266
- economic planning
 before 1974, 71, 110–1, 116, 122
 after 1974, 174–7, 218–9
- Eden, Anthony, 110, 113
- Edgbaston, Birmingham, 13, 29
- Ellesmere Port Expanded Town, 169
- Elstree, Hertfordshire, 164
- employment policy, 91–2, 172
- engineers and planning, 32, 34, 43, 58–9, 125, 142
- English Heritage, 190–1
- English Land Restoration League, 18
- English Partnerships (EP), 249–50, 252, 259, 261, 267
- Enterprise Zones, 188–9, 207–9, 249
- Environmental Protection Act 1990, 198
- environmentalism, 181–4, 194–5, 197–8, 235
- Estate Action, 207, 249–50
- European Committee of the Regions, 243
- European Commission/(Economic) Community/Union, 176, 187, 220, 233, 245–6, 262
- European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 220
- Euston Centre, London, 132–3, 138
- Eversley, David, 158
- Exchange Square, Manchester, 254–5
- Expanded Towns, 103–4, 156, 166, 169, 221
 impacts, 272, 275–7, 281–2, 284
- Federation of British Industries, 72, 77, 105
- five per cent philanthropy, 15
- Five Year Programmes (of slum clearance), 60
- Forshaw, J. H., 88
- Forster, E. M., 94
- Friends of the Earth, 184, 229
- Galbraith, J. K., 108, 173, 187
- Galley, Ken, 185
- garden cities, 4–5
 pre-1939, 21–6, 38, 47–52, 58, 60, 66
 post-1939, 95, 97, 104, 144, 195–7, 264
- Garden City (and Town Planning Association) 2, 23, 26, 29, 52, 79
see also Town and Country Planning Association
- garden festivals, 206, 211–2, 249
- garden suburbs, 26, 29–30, 32–3, 38–40, 42, 47
- Gateshead Millennium Bridge, 257
- Geddes, Patrick, 27, 33, 100
- General Development Order (GDO), 190, 192, 198
- General Improvement Area, 147
- gentrification, 147, 273
- George, Henry, 18
- Germany (influences)
 pre-1939, 25, 27–8, 33, 48, 57–8, 71–2
 post-1939, 78, 88, 211–2, 220, 259
- Gibson, Donald, 88, 131
- Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR), 201, 221
- Glenrothes New Town, 95
- globalization, 231–3
- Government Offices for the Regions (GOs), 244–5
- Greater London Assembly, 245
- Greater London Authority Act 1999, 240
- Greater London Council, 128, 191, 196, 210, 240
- Greater London Development Plan (GLDP), 127
- Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC), 49, 53–5, 65
- Greater London Plan 1944, 88–91, 94–5, 99, 103, 276
- green belts
 pre-1955, 52–5, 65, 89–90, 99
 post-1955, 142, 148–55, 223, 226–31, 262–3, 267
 impacts, 274, 276–8
- green field development, 231, 261, 263
- green wedges, 55, 263
- Greenwich Millennium Village, 251, 258
- Greenwood, Anthony, 122
- Greenwood, Arthur, 39, 41, 49
- growth points, 165, 167
- growth pole concept, 156, 159
- Gummer, John S., 237, 263
- Hackney, Rod, 195
- Hague, Cliff, 1
- Hailsham, Lord, 156, 165, 204
- Hall, Peter, 1, 125, 188, 279
- Hampstead Garden Suburb, London, 26, 38
- Harborne garden suburb, Birmingham, 26, 29
- Harlow New Town, 95, 98, 226
- Harmsworth, Alfred, 23, 29
- Harold Hill, Essex, 164
- Hatfield New Town, 95
- Haydock Park, Lancashire, 170
- Heath, Edward, 110, 112, 127–8, 139, 155–6, 160, 174–5, 203
- Heathrow Airport, 241
- Hemel Hempstead, 95, 162, 167
- heritage, 190–1, 199, 213, 217
- Heseltine, Michael, 185, 187, 189–90, 224, 226, 236–7
 and inner cities, 204–5, 211–2, 247, 258
- Hichens, Lionel, 70
- high rise housing, 142–7, 186
- Hill, Octavia, 18, 27
- Hillington Trading Estate, Glasgow, 69
- Hinchingbrooke, Viscount, 94
- Hobhouse Report (on National Parks) 1947, 103
- Holford, William (Lord), 86
- homelessness, 173, 283
- Hong Kong, 188
- Hook, Hampshire, 164
- Horsfall, Thomas, C., 25, 28, 33
- Housebuilders Association, 84
- Housing (Chamberlain) Act 1923, 38–9
- Housing (Wheatley) Act 1924, 38–40, 60

- Housing (Greenwood) Act 1930, 39–40, 60
 Housing Act 1935, 40
 Housing Act 1949, 147
 Housing Act 1964, 147
 Housing Act 1969, 147–8
 Housing Act 1974, 148
 Housing Action Area, 148
 Housing Action Trusts, 207, 249
 Housing and Planning Act 1986, 41, 192, 192, 199, 241
 housing reform, 2, 18–21, 23, 38, 48
 Housing, Town Planning Etc Act 1909, 9, 29–32, 36
 Housing, Town Planning Etc (Addison) Act 1919, 38, 41
 Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890, 16
 Howard, Ebenezer, 214, 26, 28, 34, 97, 104, 195–6, 224, 263–4
 Hulme, Manchester, 146, 202, 248–9, 256
 Hyams, Harry, 139
- Idris, Thomas, 23
 immigration, 109, 232, 271, 273, 284
 Imperial War Museum, Trafford, 256
 industrial planning, 67, 69–70, 73, 162–3, 179, 182, 202
 industrial development certificate (IDC), 92, 101, 119, 219
 industrial improvement area, 179, 182, 202, 205
 inner cities, 139–48, 178–82, 201–16, 229, 271–4, 279
 Inner Urban Areas Act 1978, 179–82, 204
 Institute of Economic Affairs, 185
 intermediate areas, 160, 219
 International Convention Centre, Birmingham, 255–6
 Ipswich proposed expansion, 166
 Irvine New Town, 165, 167
 Isle of Grain proposed new town, 169
- Jarrow, 67–8, 71
 Jenkin, Patrick, 187, 227–8
 Joseph, Sir Keith, 120, 142, 151
 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 266 *see also* Rowntree, Joseph
- Keynes, John Maynard, 65, 70
 Keynesianism, 71, 91, 108, 110, 154, 171–2, 175, 199
 Killingworth, 165, 169
 Kirkby, Liverpool, 164
 Kropotkin, Peter, 23
- Laing, 137
 Lakeside regional shopping centre, Thurrock, 214, 276
 Land Commission, 117, 119–20, 127, 178
 Land Compensation Act 1973, 127–8
 Land Nationalisation Society, 18–9, 23
 land nationalization, 18, 84, 177
 Land and Planning, proposed Ministry of, 117–9, 170
see also Ministry of Land and Natural Resources
 land reform, 2, 17–8, 23–5
 'land saving' 148–50
 land taxation, 18, 30, 177–8
 Land Utilisation Survey, 45, 148
 Lawless, Paul, 1
 Le Corbusier, 57–8, 60, 133, 143
 Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993, 249
 Leitch Report (on trunk road assessment) 1977, 182
- Letchworth
 pre-1914, 23–4, 26, 29, 32
 1914–39, 38, 48–9, 52, 69
 Lever, W. H. (Lord Leverhulme), 19–20, 23
 Levy, Joe, 132–3, 138
Lifting the Burden (White Paper) 1985, 191–2, 194, 198, 237
 light rapid transit ('supertrams'), 212, 254, 256
 Lightmoor, Telford, 196
 linear city, 58, 60, 167
 List Q, 66
 Livingston New Town, 164, 167
 Livingstone, Ken, 191, 196
 Llantrisant proposed New Town, 166–7
 Lloyd George, David, 38, 84
 Local Agenda 21, 235
 local development frameworks, 241
 Local Government Act 2003, 254
 Local Government Board, 30, 32
 Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, 188
 local government reform, 125, 128–9, 152–3, 179–80, 185, 237
 local plans
 origins, 120–3, 129, 180
 changes to, 179, 188, 191, 193–4
 Location of Offices Bureau, 119, 218–9
 Lock, Max, 102
 London Passenger Transport Board, 40–1, 45
 London County Council (LCC)
 pre-1914, 12–3, 15–6, 26, 30
 1914–52, 45, 49, 54–5, 60, 62, 88, 93
 1952–65, 116, 125, 132–3, 139, 161, 164, 274
 Lower Earley, Reading, 223–4, 263
 Lowry Centre, Salford, 256
 Lutyens, (Sir) Edwin L., 26, 72, 88
 Lymm, Cheshire, 149, 164
- MacDonald, Ramsay, 39
 Macmillan, Harold, 70, 150, 161, 172, 203
 Major, John, 174, 233–8, 243, 249–50, 254
 Maplin proposed airport and new city, 167, 221
 Marley Report (on Garden Cities and Satellite Towns) 1935, 49
 MARS (Modern Architectural Research) Group, 60, 167
 Marshall, Alfred, 23
 Maudsley, Alan, 147
 Maudling, Reginald, 147, 155
 May, Ernst, 48–9
 Meadowhall regional shopping centre, Sheffield, 214
 Meller, Helen, 1
 Merry Hill regional shopping centre, Dudley, 214
 MetroCentre regional shopping centre, Gateshead, 214
 Micheldever, Hampshire, 261
 Millennium Dome, London, 251, 258–9
 Millennium Villages, 250–1
 Millfield, Sunderland, 147
 Milton Keynes New Town, 165–7, 251, 267
 Ministry of Health, 38–9, 41, 43, 49, 66–7, 81–2
- Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MHLG)
 and planning system, 105, 113–4, 117, 119, 123, 127
 and strategic policies, 133–4, 137, 142, 148, 150–2, 156–7, 166, 169–70
 Ministry of Labour, 67
 Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, 117, 119
 Ministry of Local Government and Planning, 105
 Ministry of Town and Country Planning, 185–8, 93, 96–9, 105
 Ministry of Transport, 72, 127, 133–5, 156
 Ministry of Works and Planning, 82
 Ministry of Works and Buildings, 77, 80
- mixed development, 62, 88–9, 142
 Moberley proposed New Town, 161
 modernism, 57–60, 62, 139–46
 Morris, William, 23–4, 28, 33
 Morrison, Herbert, 54–5, 93
 Morrison, W. S., 85–6, 87
 Mortimer, John, 187
 Mosley, Sir Oswald, 65, 71
 motor cars/vehicles
 1914–39, 36, 52, 56–7, 66
 post-1939, 108, 135–7, 167–8, 173, 182, 187, 233, 251–4, 259–60
 impacts, 270–1, 274–5, 277–8, 284–5, 287
 motorways, 115, 128, 156, 214, 221, 223, 258, 266, 275
 municipal housing
 pre-1914, 15–7, 119, 21, 25–6, 29–30
 1914–39, 37–41, 44–7, 60–3
 post-1939, 89, 139–47, 180–1, 186, 207, 216, 271–2, 274–5, 282–3
 Murrayfield, 139
- National Assembly of Wales, 239
 National Enterprise Board, 174, 218
 National Economic Development Council, 111
 National Housing Reform Council, 19, 21, 25, 32
 National Housing and Town Planning Council, 29
 National Lottery, 259
 National Plan, 112, 157
 nationalization, 18, 84, 99, 111, 174, 234
 Nazis (German National Socialists), 71–2
 Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, 250
 neighbourhood unit, 50–2, 89, 94–6, 163, 168, 274
 Netherlands (as influence), 259–60
 Nettlefold, John S., 25–6, 28–30, 47, 177
 New Ash Green, Kent, 169
 New Deal for Communities, 250
 'New' Labour, 233–5, 238, 244, 249–50
 new regionalism, 242–7
 new settlements, 261, 263–6
 New Towns, 2, 5–6
 pre-1952, 47–8, 91, 93–9, 103–4, 1952–74, 130, 135, 143, 152, 156, 161–70
 post-1974, 189, 196, 201, 221–3, 261, 267
 impacts, 272, 276, 281–5
 New Town development

- corporations, 6, 94–5, 104, 161, 189, 222
- new urbanism, 248
- Newton Aycliffe New Town, 95
- Newtown New Town, 166–7
- Nicolson, Harold, 78
- nimbyism, 187, 194, 229, 276
- north-south divide, 218
- Northampton New Town, 166–7
- Office Development Permit (ODP), 119, 157, 217, 219
- Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), 239, 242
see also Prescott, John
- Orwell, George, 46, 61
- Osborn, Frederic J., 48, 71, 86, 93–4, 144, 148
- Our Common Future* 1987, *see* Brundtland Report
- out-of-town shopping centres, *see* regional shopping centres
- outer cities, 275–9
- owner occupation, 4, 40, 42, 119, 173, 176, 222
 and urban change, 271–2, 282
- Oxford Preservation Trust, 53
- Paris, 47, 58–9
- Parker, Barry, 24, 26, 32, 49, 52–3
- Parker-Morris Report (on housing standards) 1961, 142
- partnership (public-private)
 pre-1990, 117, 131–5, 137–9, 146, 178, 210–1
 post-1990, 234, 248–50, 252, 259, 286
- partnership (under 1978 Act), 179, 201–2
- Patten, Chris, 198, 226
- pedestrianization, 88, 91, 131, 133–7, 162–3, 217, 258
see also precincts
- Perroux, François, 156
- Perry, Clarence, 50–2, 94–5
- Peterborough New Town, 166–7
- Peterlee New Town, 95, 97
- Pick, Frank, 40, 45
- Pilgrim suicide, 114–5
- place marketing, 209–10, 221
- Planning Advisory Group (PAG), 120–2, 126, 128–9, 135, 180
- planning aid, 195
- Planning and Compensation Act 1991, 237–8, 240
- Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, 240–2, 246
- planning gain, 117, 190, 223–5
- Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) notes, 238, 246, 252–4, 265
- Political and Economic Planning (PEP), 71–2, 269
- Pollok, Glasgow, 164
- pollution, 181
- Port Sunlight, Birkenhead, 19, 23–4, 26, 34
- positive planning, 177, 187
- Poulson, John, 147
- Poundbury, Dorchester, 263–4
- poverty, 18, 26, 67, 71, 84, 109, 173–4, 220, 233, 235
 and inner cities, 178, 204, 275
- precincts, 88, 91, 131, 137–9, 163
see also pedestrianization
- Prescott, John, 238–9, 244–5, 249, 259–60, 263, 266–7
- Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs), 234–5
- private tenants, 283
- private housebuilding, 37, 39–45, 94, 114, 216, 223–7, 277
- privatization, 175–6, 222, 233–4
- Property Advisory Group, 190, 192
- property owning democracy, 113–4
- Public Health Act 1875, 14
- public interest, the, 3, 15, 101–2, 186–7, 231, 237
- public involvement, 102–3, 115, 123, 195
- public participation, 122–4, 183
- public-sector tenants, 176, 282–3
- public transport
 pre-1990, 12–5, 25, 40–1, 45, 167, 217
 post-1990, 252, 254, 258–60, 265
- impacts, 270, 274, 284
- Purdom, C. B., 48
- Quarry Hill flats, Leeds, 62
- Quayside, Newcastle, 257
- race and planning, 203–4, 283–4
- racial minorities, 109, 203–4, 271
- racism, 109, 173, 204, 272
- Radburn layout, 51–2, 88, 149, 163
- rationing, 74–5, 97, 131, 161
- Ravenseft, 130–1, 163
- red-lining (of inner cities), 271–2
- Redcliffe-Maud Commission/Report (on English local government reform) 1969, 128, 153
- Redditch New Town, 164
- redevelopment, 2–3, 5–6, 8
 pre-1914, 14–6
 1914–39, 36, 39, 41, 55–63, 70
 1939–52, 76, 80, 84, 86–7, 89, 99–100
 1952–74, 122, 127–8, 130–48, 152, 164, 170
 post-1990, 178, 184, 201, 210, 216
- impacts, 270–3, 283, 285
- regeneration, 201–17, 231, 235, 244, 247–61
- regional chambers/assemblies, 240–1, 246
- Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, 240, 244–5, 259
- regional development agencies (RDAs), 240, 244–7, 250, 252, 259, 267
- regional economic planning councils (REPCs), 157–60, 220
- regional planning
 pre-1952, 49, 53, 55, 64–7
 1952–74, 111, 119, 122, 127, 152, 155–60
 1974–90, 171, 201, 218–221, 223–4, 230
 post-1990, 236, 238, 240–3, 246
- regional policy
 pre-1952, 67–70, 91–101
 1952–74, 116, 138, 154–60, 170
 post-1974, 199, 201, 209, 218–20, 230, 245
 impacts, 278–9
- regional problem, 66–7, 154–5, 159–60, 218, 220, 278–9
- regional shopping centres, 213–4, 253–4, 266
- regional spatial strategies, 241, 246
- Reith, Lord, 80–2, 85–9, 94–5, 106
- Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act 1915, 37
- Restriction of Ribbon Development Act 1935, 44
- ribbon development, 44
- Ridley, Nicholas, 187, 193–4, 198, 209, 226–7
- riots, 109, 173–4, 203–4, 211, 275
- Robertson, John R., 25
- Rogers, Lord (Richard), 251, 260
- Rogers Report (*Towards an Urban Renaissance*) 1999, 251, 259–60, 262
- Roman Point, London, 145–6, 186
- Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 52
- Rowntree, Joseph, 26, *see also* Joseph Rowntree Foundation
- Rowntree, Seebohm, 26–8
- Royal Town Planning Institute, 267, *see also* Town Planning Institute
- Runcorn New Town, 164, 167
- rural buffers, 263
- Salford Quays, 208, 213, 256
- Salt, Sir Titus, 19
- Sandys, Duncan, 123, 125, 150–1
- satellite towns, 5
 pre-1939, 48–50, 52, 55, 58, 64–5
 post-1939, 91, 164, 274
- Schuster Report (on qualifications of planners) 1950, 102
- Scotland and planning, 237–40, 245, 261–3
- Scott Report (*Land Utilisation in Rural Areas*) 1942, 82–5, 103, 148
- Scottish Development Agency (SDA/Scottish Enterprise, 218–9, 244, 250
- Scottish Parliament/Executive, 239–40
- self containment, 49, 95, 97, 274, 276
- SERPLAN, 220
- Sharp, Dame Evelyn, 117, 143
- Sharp, Thomas, 79, 86, 116, 122
- Shaw, George Bernard, 21
- Shore, Peter, 178, 190, 201, 204–5, 209–10, 221–2
- Sieff, Israel, 70
- Silkin, Lewis, 93–4, 97–8, 100, 102–4, 177
- Silkin, John, 177
- simplified planning zones (SPZs), 192, 241
- Single Regeneration Budget (SRB), 250, 252, 259
- Sitte, Camillo, 33
- Skeffington Report (on public participation in planning) 1969, 123–4
- Skelmersdale New Town, 164
- Slough Trading Estate, 49, 69
- slums
 pre-1939, 11, 14, 25, 29, 39, 55–6, 60–3
 post-1939, 109, 139–42, 161, 271
- Smigielski, Konrad, 126, 135
- Smith, T. Dan, 126, 143, 147, 156, 158
- social exclusion, 235, 250
- Soria y Mata, Arturo, 58, 60
- South East Study 1964, 156, 166, 276
- South Woodham Ferrers, Essex, 223
- South Wales Regional Survey 1921, 64
- special areas, 67–70, 72, 92
- special development areas, 160, 219–20
- Speke, Liverpool, 48–9, 69, 164
- Sportcity, Manchester, 251
- Stamp, L. Dudley, 45, 83, 148
- Stein, Clarence, 51–2
- Stephenson, 86
- Stevenage New Town, 94–8, 163, 167
- Stewart, Sir Malcolm, 69–70, 72
- Stilgoe, Henry R., 32
- Stockley Park, London, 222–3

- Stonehouse New Town, 167, 221
strategic gaps, 263
strategic planning, 8, 71–2, 80, 99, 148, 154
retreat from, 182, 188, 191, 201, 221, 229–30
revival post-1990, 240, 243, 246–7, 250, 261, 263
streets in the sky, 143–4, 146, 180
structure plans
origins and preparation, 122–3, 126–7, 179–81, 183
changing role, 188, 190–1, 194, 199, 238, 241, 263
and green belts, 226–7
sub-regional planning studies, 122–3, 126, 152, 158
suburbanization, 36–49, 71, 80, 149, 164, 274–5
surveyors and planning, 30, 32, 34, 105
Sustainable Communities Action Programme 2003, 260
sustainable development, 197, 231, 235–6, 238, 251, 254, 267, 286–7
sustainability, 242, 252, 262, 268
Swindon Expanded Town, 163–4, 166
systems planning, 126, 182, 184
- Tamworth Expanded Town, 169
Taylor, Nigel, 1
Team Valley Trading Estate, Gateshead, 69
Tebbit, Norman, 204
'technological revolution', 11–2, 117, 120, 220
Telford New Town, 166
tenements, 10–1, 14, 16, 18
Thames Gateway, 243, 249, 253–4, 258–60, 266
Thatcher, Margaret/Thatcherism
pre-1990, 171, 173–5, 185–200, 202–11, 219, 221–30
post-1990, 231–8, 242–3, 246–7, 249, 259
'third way', 234, 244, 265
This Common Inheritance (White Paper) 1990, 198–9, 221, 235, 237
Town and Country Planning Act 1932, 43–4, 62, 86, 94, 100
Town and Country Planning ('Blitz and Blight') Act 1944, 86–7, 99, 131
Town and Country Planning Act 1947
as passed, 99–105
changes to, 107, 113–5, 119–26, 129–30, 148
operation, 116–8, 131, 133–5, 148
in retrospect, 240, 242
Town and Country Planning Acts 1953 and 1954, 114–5, 130, 161
Town and Country Planning Act 1959, 115
Town and Country Planning Act 1962, 115
Town and Country Planning Act 1963, 115–6
Town and Country Planning Act 1968, 122–3, 125–6, 128–9
Town and Country Planning Act 1971, 127, 190
Town and Country Planning Act 1972, 127
Town and Country Planning Acts 1990, 199
Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA), 79, 93, 144, 148, 184, 195
see also Garden City (and Town Planning) Association
Town and Country Planning (Interim Development) Act 1943, 86
Town Development Act, 1952, 103–4, 107, 149, 161, 164
Town Planning Institute (TPI), 2, 9, 32, 79, 102, 125, *see also* Royal Town Planning Institute
town planning schemes, 29–33, 38, 41, 43–4, 64–5, 86, 101
Traffic in Towns report, *see* Buchanan Report
Trafford Park industrial estate, 69, 207, 211
Trafford Centre regional shopping centre, 254
tramways, 10, 12, 14–5, 19, 25 *see also* *alsolight* rapid transit
Treforest Trading Estate, Pontypridd, 69
Tripp, H. Alker, 88, 135–6
Tudor-Walters Report (on housing standards) 1918, 38, 40, 47
- unemployment
pre-1952, 28, 65–71, 75, 84, 91
1952–74, 108–9, 154–5, 160
post-1974, 171–3, 175–6, 179, 202–4, 218–20, 232–3, 247
and planning impacts, 275, 278
Unhealthy Areas Committee Reports 1920/1, 48, 53, 60
unitary development plans, 191
United States as influence, pre-1974, 33–4, 50–2, 108, 137
1974–90, 173, 176, 204, 209, 216–7
post-1990, 232, 248, 254, 259
and impacts, 270–1
Unwin, Raymond
pre-1914, 24, 26, 32–4
1914–39, 38, 40, 44, 49–50, 53, 55, 65
- Urban Development/Regeneration Grant (UDG/URG), 209
Urban Development Corporations (UDCs)
1980–90, 188–9, 196, 202, 205–7, 210–1, 214, 222
post-1990, 247, 249, 252, 254, 257, 259, 267
impacts, 273
urban expansions, 231, 265, 267
Urban Programme, 201–2, 205, 213, 250
Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs), 251–2, 267
Urban Splash, 253
Urban Task Force, 259, *see also* Rogers Report
urban villages, 250–1
Urbis, Manchester, 255
Use Classes Order (UCO) 1987, 192, 194
Uthwatt Report (on compensation and betterment) 1942, 81–7, 99–100, 106, 119, 177
- Victoria Park, Manchester, 13
Victoria Square, Birmingham, 256
Vienna, 58, 61–2
Villeurbanne, Lyons, 58
- Waldegrave, William, 227
Wales and planning, 237–40, 245, 262–3
Walker, Peter, 153–4
Wallace, Alfred Russel, 18
Ward, Colin, 264
Warrington New Town, 166–7
Washington New Town, 165, 167–8
Watson, J. Paton, 88
Welsh Development Agency (WDA), 218–9, 244, 250
Welwyn Garden City, 48–9, 52, 69, 95
Wheatley, John, 38–9
Willmott, Peter, 147
Wilson, Harold, 110–2, 117, 120, 127, 160, 172, 174
Winsford Expanded Town, 169
women and planning, 28–9, 37, 108–9, 196, 283–5
Wright, Henry, 51–2
Wythenshawe, Manchester, 48–9, 52–3, 65, 75
- Young, Michael, 147
- zoning, 2–3
pre-1939, 25, 30–1, 33, 44, 58
post-1939, 95, 100, 118, 192, 194
impacts, 272